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Director: Dr. Jesse Richman 
 
Despite the significant contributions from location-based gang studies, the network 
structure of gangs beyond localized settings remains a neglected but important area of research to 
better understand the national security implications of gang interconnectivity. The purpose of 
this dissertation is to examine the network structure of gangs at the macro- and micro-level using 
social network analysis. At the macro-level, some gangs have formed national alliances in 
perpetuity with their goals and objectives. In order to study gangs at the macro-level, this 
research uses open-source data to construct an adjacency matrix of gang alliances and rivalries to 
map the relationships between gangs and analyze their network centrality across multiple 
metrics. The results suggest that native gangs are highly influential when compared to immigrant 
gangs. Some immigrant gangs, however, derive influence by “bridging” the gap between rival 
gangs. Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations (MDTOs) play a similar role and feature 
prominently in the gang network. Moreover, removing MDTOs changes the network structure in 
favor of ideologically-motivated gangs over profit-oriented gangs. Critics deride macro-level 
approaches to studying gangs for their lack of national cohesion. In response, this research 
includes a micro-level analysis of gang member connections by mining Twitter data to analyze 
the geospatial distribution of gang members and, by proxy, gangs, using an exponential random 
graph model (ERGM) to test location homophily and better understand the extent to which gang 
members are localized. The findings show a positive correlation between location and shared 
gang member connections which is conceptually consistent with the proximity principle. 
According to the proximity principle, interpersonal relationships are more likely to occur in 
localized geographic spaces. However, gang member connections appear to be more diffuse than 
is captured in current location-based gang studies. This dissertation demonstrates that macro- and 
micro-level gang networks exist in unbounded geographic spaces where the interconnectivity of 
gangs transpose local issues onto the national security consciousness which challenges law and 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In his book The Transformation of War, Martin van Creveld (1991) predicts the changing 
landscape of military combat. “In the future, war will not be waged by armies but by groups 
whom we call terrorists, guerrillas, bandits, and robbers” (p. 197). His claim preceded the 2001 
attack on the World Trade Center that ignited the ‘global war on terror.’ Unlike previous wars 
where battle lines and enemy combatants were easily identifiable, the distinction between 
soldiers and civilians will be more obscure. The challenge to the state is confronting a more 
diffuse enemy that operates in multiple territories and, in some cases, involves native-born 
citizens carrying out attacks in their country of origin. Colonel Thomas Hammes, USMC (2004) 
agrees that the theater of war is changing. According to him, combatants blend into civilian 
populations and cultivate networked structures to pursue their goals and objectives. As a result, 
conflict zones are no longer confined to remote parts of the world. John Arquilla and David 
Ronfeldt (2001) refer to this phenomenon as netwar. “The term netwar refers to an emerging 
mode of conflict (and crime) at societal levels, short of traditional military warfare, in which the 
protagonists use network forms of organization and related doctrines, strategies, and 
technologies attuned to the information age” (p. 6).  
William Reno (2009) points out that these networks are not isolated to the criminal 
underground. According to him, criminal networks have begun merging with the state apparatus. 
He points to Liberia, where Jewel-Howard Taylor and Adolphus “General Peanut Butter” Dolo 
were elected to the Senate despite serving under former warlord Charles Taylor. “Fusion 
regimes… combine the façade of formal state bureaucratic institutions and the trappings of 
international sovereignty with the control of resources in illicit markets. These regimes use their 
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control over both of these realms of politics to channel resources and distribute access to 
economic opportunities to their supporters” (p. 68). Following the Arab Spring, Michael J. 
Totten, David Schenker, and Hussain Abdul-Hussain (2012) highlight that fifty percent more 
Egyptians voted for the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafists in parliamentary elections bringing 
radical Islamic groups to the forefront of state politics; Bin Ladenists won a third of that vote. 
Other forms of fusion regimes include Iran as a state-sponsor of terrorism. Being militarily weak, 
Tehran uses terrorist groups as proxies to project power and achieve its strategic objectives 
(Byman, 2005). In North Korea, Bureau 39 was established to oversee the sale of military arms 
to terrorist groups to circumvent the global sanctions levied against them. Vice Foreign Minister 
Kim Gye-gwan went as far as issuing an ominous warning to the United States about transferring 
nuclear-capable weapons to terrorist groups if threatened (Chestnut, 2007). The integration of 
state institutions and criminal networks forms the basis of what Moisés Naím (2012) refers to as 
the “mafia state” where mutual exclusivity between the state and criminal organizations is 
indistinct.  
Intrastate conflicts are on the rise, along with the proliferation of non-state violent actors. 
Max Roser (2019) documented that there were 488 intrastate conflicts between 2000 and 2016. 
Compared to the 702 reported cases during the two and a half decades following World War II, 
the rate at which intrastate conflict occurs is becoming more frequent. While supporting the 
assertions made by van Creveld and Hammes, these figures, however, insufficiently represent 
conflicts involving non-state violent actors. As Max Manwaring (2005) points out, the problem 
is that non-state violent actors are primarily defined in military terms instead of their threat to 
national security. This typically limits the analysis of non-state violent actors to terrorists, 
insurgents, or other groups actively seeking to overthrow the state. In the international studies 
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literature specifically, criminal groups such as mafias, cartels, and gangs are either treated as 
peripheral entities operating parallel to states, or their significance is altogether ignored (Friman, 
2009). At the macro-level, the exclusion of criminal organizations underrepresents the 
prevalence and distorts the perception of the severity of non-state violent actors, dilutes 
analytical rigor by keeping the focus on less-developed countries where intrastate conflict and 
state fragility are pervasive, and treats developed countries as having immunity from intrastate 
conflict (domestic terrorism notwithstanding). In other words, it is intellectually misleading. Jake 
Adelstein (2010) demonstrates that criminal organizations can have an impact on political 
outcomes. When faced with the potential of anti-mob legislation, the Japanese Yakuza conspired 
to influence voting behavior in the 2007 and 2009 elections, which led to the removal of the 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). With the exception of 1993 and 1994, the LDP had been the 
primary ruling party in Japan since the end of WW-II. This is more impactful, considering that it 
is uncommon for voters to change their political allegiance in Japan (Ikeda, Liu, Aida, & Wilson, 
2005).  
Government agencies have been proactive in understanding criminal groups. They seek 
to make informed policy decisions through intelligence data and expert analysis to address 
security threats. After reviewing the necessary research conducted on the American Mafia, 
President Richard Nixon signed into law the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 
(RICO) Act of 1970. RICO identified organized crime as a “collective criminal enterprise” 
(Overton, 2008). Rather than charging an individual for committing a crime, leaving the 
leadership of these crime families insulated from prosecution, RICO held the entire network 
accountable. This included mob bosses and their business entities, both illegal and legal. 
Globally, the United Nations established the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 
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(UNTOC) to mitigate the expansion of organized criminal groups by multilaterally attacking 
their profit centers in human smuggling, narcotics, firearm trafficking, and other illicit activities. 
There are currently 147 signatories to the Convention, which assembles states to meet "a global 
challenge with a global response" (United Nations, 2004, p. i). Other disciplines, such as 
criminal justice, provide additional source material with which to analyze organized crime. 
Outside the purview of law enforcement, however, criminology places less emphasis on the role 
of the state.  
In addition to terrorists and organized crime, gangs are a third group within this criminal 
nexus that has failed to receive national or international recognition as a security threat.  Gangs 
are arguably the most ubiquitous category of global criminal group, maintaining a presence in 
virtually every country (Covey, 2010). At the state level, the existence of gangs has either been 
dismissed or relegated to local authorities. In academia, criminologists have been at the forefront 
of gang research. Although they provide valuable insight into gangs, the criminogenic lens limits 
our understanding of a strategic stratum aimed at prevention, intervention, and suppression 
(Bjerregaard, 2015). The centrality of social disorganization theory as a causal factor of gang 
formation, for instance, limits the gang phenomenon to a specific context within a designated 
timeframe (Venkatesh, 2014). This can subsequently lead to anachronistic decision-making, 
limiting the efficacy of gang deterrence. Suffice it to say, the complexity and variability of gangs 
and their transformation requires further investigation. The purpose of this dissertation is to 
assess the network structure of gangs in the United States at the macro- and micro-level. At the 
macro-level, gangs have expanded their criminal enterprise by entering alliances with other 
gangs and criminal groups. Micro-level connections between gang members, on the other hand, 
have facilitated the geographic expansion of gangs.  
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Network structures, highlighted by Hammes, Arquilla and Ronfeldt, and Reno, are a 
prominent feature of the modern gang making this an important yet under-researched area of 
gang studies that can improve our understanding of gangs in the United States (Sierra-Arevalo & 
Papachristos, 2015). Phil Williams (2001) describes several benefits that network structures 
provide for criminal groups. One benefit is the “defensive structure” of the network. Networks 
can be divided into a core and a periphery. This division insulates both core members and flows 
of information. When one peripheral sector is infiltrated or disrupted, it can be discarded without 
adversely impacting the entire network. Williams attests, “Criminal networks compartmentalize 
knowledge and information, making it difficult for law enforcement to have more than localized 
effects on their operations” (p. 75). The internal flexibility of the network structure is another 
benefit that allows criminal groups to form temporary alliances. Limited cooperative agreements 
serve two purposes. First, once a goal or objective has been completed, the ties between groups 
can be severed and relationships dissolved without negatively impacting the core network, 
making criminal investigations more difficult. More importantly, they create synergistic effects 
by allowing different groups access to support structures they otherwise would not have. This 
includes access to information and the ability to exploit communication technologies. Encryption 
techniques, for example, makes detecting criminal activity more challenging for law 
enforcement. Third, criminal networks are not bound by geography. They can remain localized, 
but some expand regionally, nationally, or transnationally. Expansion is often predicated on the 
way the criminal organization defines its goals and objectives (Sullivan, 1997, 2001). This is 
especially applicable for gangs seeking to increase control of the drug market where supply 
chains often originate in foreign countries. A fourth benefit for criminal networks is that they can 
fill the interstitial space between illicit and licit economies. They can exploit the “social capital” 
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of relationships that connect the two to gain a competitive advantage (Burt, 2000). Williams 
concludes, “In sum, criminal networks provide moving and elusive targets that operate across 
enemy lines, infiltrating law enforcement agencies and governments, avoiding confrontation in 
favor of cooption and corruption. They are resilient – although not impervious – to damage and 
have qualities that facilitate recuperation and regeneration” (p. 82).  
Where Arquilla and Ronfeldt refer to the impending conflict as netwar, Hammes, 
speaking in military terms, has called dealing with network structures, the fourth generation of 
warfare (4GW). He argues, "It uses all available networks – political, economic, social, and 
military – to convince the enemy's political decision-makers that their strategic goals are either 
unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit… 4GW makes use of society's networks to 
carry on its fight… via the networks, it directly attacks the minds of enemy decision-makers to 
destroy the enemy's political will" (p. 208). Although Hammes references al-Qaeda and other 
terrorist groups at great length when describing 4GW, the same concept can be applied to gangs. 
Max Manwaring (2005) describes gang members as “social actors.” As a result, their network 
affiliations integrate licit and illicit channels such as the military and law enforcement, with 
which they can benefit the gang.  
According to Jennifer M. Hazen and Dennis Rodgers (2014), there is currently little 
interdisciplinary communication on gang research despite the valuable insights that could be 
gained from the cross-fertilization of ideas. My research considers this point by integrating 
concepts from criminology and international studies. On the one hand, gang studies in 
criminology offer a panoply of factors and conditions related to the formation, behavior, 
continuity, and evolution of gangs. This ontological view is useful in explaining the existence of 
gangs but fails to address their impact on national security. In fact, gangs in the criminal justice 
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literature are often described as small, local groups of friends whose involvement in the gang is 
temporary (Decker & Van Winkle, 1996; Howell, 2012; McGloin, 2005; Peterson, Taylor, & 
Esbensen, 2004; Thrasher, 1927, 2013; Thornberry, Krohn, Lizotte, & Chard-Wierschem, 1993). 
On the other hand, whether it be a direct or indirect level of analysis, central to 
international studies, is the state. The rise of the American Mafia and Islamic-inspired terrorism 
in the United States led to legislation aimed at mitigating the national threat of these two distinct 
criminal groups. Although gang activity continues to adversely impact the state's political, 
economic, and social landscape, gangs have garnered significantly less national attention. A 
2011 National Gang Intelligence Center (NGIC) survey shows that gangs in the United States 
account for 48 - 90% of violent crime in districts across the country. From a more local 
perspective, in 2012, there were approximately 150,000 gang members in the city of Chicago 
(Hubbard, Wyman, & Chicago Crime Commission, 2012). That same year, the homicide rate 
was 18.5 per 100,000 people. Put another way, Chicago's homicide rate was more than double 
that of conflict zones like Afghanistan and Iraq. By comparison, the per capita homicide rate for 
Afghanistan and Iraq was 6.5 and 8.0, respectively (United Nations, 2013). Committing crime, 
however, is not a requirement for gang membership (Decker, Pyrooz, Sweeten, & Moule, Jr., 
2014; Esbensen, Winfree, He, & Taylor, 2001; Thornberry, Krohn, Lizotte, Smith, & Tobin, 
2003). Max Manwaring (2005) describes crime, violence, and instability as symptoms of gang 
activity where the threat of gangs is measured by the extent to which they challenge law and 
order, weaken institutions, and impact the structural integrity of the state. I contend that 
unbounded gang networks provide the foundation of the gang threat defined by Manwaring at the 
national level.  
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There are three reasons I focus my dissertation on gangs in the United States. First, gangs 
have a significantly longer recorded history in the United States than in other parts of the world. 
Although the first major study on gangs did not occur until 1927 with Fredric Thrasher’s The 
Gang: A Study of 1,313 Gangs in Chicago, reported gang activity has been occurring since the 
late 18th century (Cannata, 2009). Over the past couple of decades, there has been a renaissance 
of sorts on gang research as publications have more than doubled (Pyrooz & Mitchell, 2015). 
However, global data on gangs is scarce (Covey, 2010). Second, the history of gangs in the 
United States provides an extensive timeline to comparatively analyze gangs, a segment of gang 
research that Brenda C. Coughlin and Sudhir Alladi Venkatesh (2003) argue needs to be 
developed further. Finally, the United States is considered an exporter of gang culture. It is 
common for gangs in other countries to adopt U.S. gang culture in name, appearance, and 
identity (Valenzuela, 1988; van Gemert, 2005). One of the drivers behind the exportation of gang 
culture is rap music. The rap genre romanticizes the ‘gang,' using lyrics that resonate with groups 
and individuals facing abject conditions (Hagedorn, 2005). In Sierra Leone and Guadalcanal, 
there are militia groups and gangs inspired by deceased American rapper Tupac Shakur (Utas, 
2014). They borrow names from the lyrics of his songs or adopt other monikers like the West 
Side Boys and Tupac Outlaws. For other groups, Tupac t-shirts are worn as uniforms in places 
like the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Ivory Coast. Gangs in Paris, France, are 
beginning to resemble the gangs of Los Angeles, California (Kroeker & Haut, 1995). Moreover, 
the Eurogang Paradox reinforces this association between U.S. gang culture and global gangs. In 
Europe, if gangs do not conform to Hollywood archetypes represented in such films as Boyz N’ 
the Hood or Menace II Society, then authorities deny their existence (Klein, 1996; Klein, Kerner, 
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Waxson, & Wietekamp, 2001). Although my research focuses on gangs in the United States, the 
concepts I use can be applied globally.  
 In the next chapter, I conduct a longitudinal analysis to discuss the history and 
transformation of gangs. This approach, proposed by Coughlin and Venkatesh (2003), seeks to 
improve our understanding of modern gangs by comparing them to past gangs. How have gangs 
changed, and what distinctions can be made between gangs from different time periods? While 
there were similar factors across the United States that contributed to the gang phenomenon, 
there were other, but ultimately inconsequential, regional constraints that mitigated gang 
formation (Howell, 2015). Because documented gang activity occurred disproportionately across 
the United States, I borrow from James Howell (2015) in explaining gang emergence through a 
regional context starting in the Northeast in the 1780s and ending in the South in the 1970s. In 
addition to providing background information on gangs, I make two important observations of 
the modern gang compared to historic gangs. One is the market-orientation of gangs after “hard 
drugs” were introduced in the 1970s and 1980s that made gang participation more economically 
lucrative (Block & Block, 1993; Coughlin & Venkatesh, 2003; Fagan, 1993; Hagedorn, 1994). 
The other is the organization of gangs into network structures to facilitate unmitigated criminal 
activity across geographic spaces.  
Despite the long history of gangs in the United States, there is no universally accepted 
gang definition. In Chapter 3, I provide background on this debate. Some definitions can be too 
broad and include groups not typically associated with gang activity such as fraternities or other 
social organizations. Other definitions can be too narrow and neglect important details of the 
‘gang.’ One such controversy is whether to include input from law enforcement agencies leading 
to what John Hagedorn (1988) refers to as “courthouse criminologists.” Moreover, I differentiate 
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gangs from terrorist and organized crime groups. Generally speaking, terrorists are ideologically 
motivated to invoke political change, organized crime is motivated by profits to acquire power 
and influence, and gangs are territorially motivated to achieve profits. Unlike terrorists who 
target civilian populations as their modus operandi, organized crime and gangs are less likely to 
carry out violence against civilians. This helps them avoid detection from law enforcement and 
maximize profits by selling illicit goods to the community. 
Additionally, terrorists are more likely to directly attack the state while organized crime 
and gangs prefer to avoid confrontation (Malone & Malone-Rowe, 2014). Although there remain 
some distinction between criminal groups, gangs are more nuanced than is covered by current 
definitions. Rather than taking a position on this debate, I argue that considering gang typologies 
can provide additional context towards a more robust gang definition. They can be sub-divided 
by generation and culture. According to John P. Sullivan (1997, 2001, 2006; see also Sullivan & 
Bunker, 2007), there are three generations of gangs. The most basic is first-generation (1-G) 
gangs. “First-generation (turf) gangs are limited in political scope, are localized (often by city 
blocks), and are not highly sophisticated” (Sullivan, 2001, p. 103). Second- (2-G) and third-
generation (3-G) gangs, on the other hand, involve institutionalized gangs that aggressively seek 
to control the drug market and are politically motivated, respectively. According to Julie Ayling 
(2011), “When a gang evolves into a fixture in a community, it can be regarded as 
institutionalized. Participation in the underground economy and gang subculture becomes 
“normal” for its members; the presence of the gang is regarded as part and parcel of community 
life by residents” (p. 7). Whereas 1-G gangs are temporary as members leave to pursue careers 
and raise families, 2-G and 3-G gangs are more permanent. Ayling argues that most gangs 
involve loose connections among friends but acknowledges the national security implications of 
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those gangs that emerge to become a criminal enterprise. These typically include 2-G and 3-G 
gangs. Cultural gangs include street, prison, and Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs (OMGs). Whereas 
street and prison gangs are defined in terms of origin (neighborhood and the prison system, 
respectively), OMGs are considered nomadic gangs where territory is transactional, and 
operating a motorcycle is required for membership. Within generational and cultural typologies, 
I discuss the alliances and rivalries between some of the largest gangs in the United States, 
laying the foundation for Chapter 4. 
 In distinguishing gangs from other criminal organizations, Scott Decker and David 
Pyrooz (2011) suggest organizational structure as a mitigating factor. Membership, consisting 
primarily of a young demographic, reflects a lack of leadership and temporary affiliation 
uncommon in organized crime and terrorist groups. Therefore, the influence of gangs is 
contained within a local radius, a place that has meaning to the gang's identity, and whose goals 
have "symbolic" ends. Since networked structures are prevalent to the modern gang on a larger 
scale compared to the localization of historic gangs, I focus Chapter 4 on the relationships 
between national gangs. I borrow the framework used in the Big Allied and Dangerous (BAAD) 
dataset that uses network analysis to map the largest terrorist organizations in the Middle East. 
Despite the theoretical application of social network analysis to study gangs, current research 
neglects the national interconnectedness of different gang types. Network structures have re-
spatialized the relationships of the modern gang more than any other point in history, allowing 
gangs broader influence over the political, economic, and social landscape of the United States. 
This has led to greater coordination between gangs, increased cohesion within the gang, changed 
the identity of some gangs, and has provided access to previously unavailable resources and 
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know-how. The result of which challenges law and order, weakens institutions, and undermines 
the structural integrity of the state at a national-level.  
In Chapter 4, I examine macro-level gang connections using social network analysis. 
Jennifer Xu and Hsinchun Chen (2005) highlight the importance of using this methodology, 
“Effective use of SNA techniques to mine criminal network data can have important implications 
for crime investigations. The knowledge gained may aid law enforcement agencies fighting 
crime proactively” (p. 106). Michael Sierra-Arevalo and Andrew Papachristos (2015) reinforce 
Xu and Chen by arguing that gang studies can benefit from the application of social network 
analysis, but currently lags behind other disciplines. I use my training as a security threat group 
intelligence officer for the North Carolina prison system and various secondary data sources to 
create an adjacency matrix to show the relationship between gangs in an undirected graph. In 
total, I consider 126 nodes with 638 edges connecting the positive (ally) and negative (rival) ties 
between the different gang types. Additionally, I include Mexican Drug Trafficking 
Organizations (DTOs) in the graph because intelligence data has shown these organizations 
feature prominently in the gang network (NGIC, 2011).  
While some studies have focused on local gangs within a specific city (McGloin, 2005) 
or the relationships within a gang (Fox, 2013), I aim to answer several macro-level questions 
regarding the gang network structure. In general, what does the structure of the gang network 
look like? How are gangs clustered? Which gangs are central, bridges, or isolates? How central 
are Mexican DTOs to the gang network? Mara-Salvatrucha, better known as MS-13, continues to 
be headlined in public discourses regarding immigration. Are gangs formed by immigrants more, 
less, or equally influential to the gang network than gangs formed by native groups? I answer 
these questions by constructing three separate graphs and calculating five common centrality 
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measures to investigate the network influence of gangs. One graph I use is a baseline model that 
includes gangs and Mexican DTOs but does not distinguish the relationship between allies and 
rivals. The other two graphs establish the relationships between gangs by identifying their 
connection as an alliance or rivalry. I label these graphs as gang nexus model 1, which includes 
gangs and Mexican DTOs, and gang nexus model 2, where I remove Mexican DTOs from the 
graph. Out of the three graphs, gang nexus model 1 is the best representation of the world as it 
currently exists. I compare the baseline model to this model to determine how the relationships 
between gangs impact the network structure. Similarly, I compare gang nexus model 2 to gang 
nexus model 1 to determine the extent to which Mexican DTOs influence the network structure 
of gangs. I calculate five common network centrality measures to determine a gang’s network 
influence and compare the results of each model. They include degree, closeness, betweenness, 
and eigenvector centrality, and PageRank, a branch of eigenvector centrality. Because each 
metric provides a different perspective in determining network centrality, and their scores are 
scaled differently, I use the average Z-score as another method to analyze the gang network 
structure. The Z-score generates a standardized metric describing a value’s relationship to the 
mean of a group of values, allowing comparison between different centrality measures.  
 One criticism in using social network analysis to examine gangs at the macro-level is that 
gangs, with their decentralized leadership, lack national cohesion. James Howell (2012) argues 
that the extent to which gangs are connected throughout the country is limited to their namesake. 
Although they share a similar gang identity, Bloods in Los Angeles operate independently from 
Bloods in New York. Therefore, gang objectives, alliances, and rivalries are thought to be a 
manifestation of local conditions. Chapter 5 acts as an extension of Chapter 4 in that I conduct a 
social network analysis of individual gang members at the micro-level. I collect data using a 
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workflow process similar to Swati Agarwal and Ashish Sureka (2016) (See also Agarwal & 
Sureka, 2015), who detect extremist communities on Tumblr. Instead of using Tumblr, the data 
source I use in this chapter comes from Twitter. 
In constructing the micro-level gang network, I use a four-step process. First, I detect 
gang members by capturing Twitter streaming API using a combination of words and phrases 
common to gang culture. Cocaine, for instance, is sometimes referred to as “Aunt Nora” or 
“yayo.” I also consider words and phrases that are gang specific. “Five in the sky, six must die,” 
for example, is a common phrase used by the People Nation to indicate revenge. Two other 
methods I use to detect gang members include using the Twitter search function and following 
Twitter profile recommendations. The second step involves manually validating that the Twitter 
users I detected in the first step are gang members and identifying the gang they belong to. I use 
a set of established criteria such as self-admission, gang colors, gang signs, and other symbols 
affiliated with gang culture to make this determination. After collecting several initial seeds in 
step 2, I use a snowball sampling approach to continue my discovery process by inspecting their 
list of followers.  In the final step, I construct the graph of social connections between gang 
members. Throughout this process, I also document the location of gang members by city, state, 
and country.  
Other relevant research has been conducted by Lakshika Balasuriya et al. (2016) to detect 
and analyze Twitter language and the use of emojis between gang and non-gang members. More 
relevant to this chapter is the work conducted by Sanjaya Wijeratne et al. (2015) that identified 
gang member connections in ten neighborhoods in Chicago. Another important study relevant to 
this chapter involves the use of Twitter to analyze the digital footprint of sex trafficking along 
the U.S.-Mexico border. Julian Way and Robert Muggah (2016) inadvertently discovered the 
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existence of a transnational human smuggling network extending from Central and South 
America to major cities throughout the United States. My research differs in that I attempt to 
study the extent to which gangs are localized. According to the proximity principle, localized 
interaction leads to a greater likelihood of forming interpersonal relationships (Newcomb, 1960). 
I examine the micro-level gang network using an exponential random graph model (ERGM) to 
test the location homophily of gang member connections. If the consensus on gang localization 
holds, then one would expect to see a high correlation between gang member location and their 
connection to other gang members. In other words, the structure of the micro-level gang network 
would cluster around singular locations as opposed to multiple locations. I test four models and 
hypotheses that consider nodal attributes of city, state, and gang affiliation, and an edge attribute 
using the distance (miles) between nodes.  
In the final chapter, I discuss the implications of this dissertation. Gangs do not exist as a 
monolith of the criminal landscape, but differ in their level of complexity and sophistication. 
Although some gangs remain localized, others function in unbounded geographic spaces. At the 
macro- and micro-levels, gang networks transpose local gang security threats onto the national 
consciousness. Studying the network structure of gangs provides an empirical-analytic tool to 
examine the extent to which gangs challenge law and order, weaken institutions, and impact the 










HISTORY, TRANSFORMATION, AND THE THREAT OF GANGS 
 
Some of the earliest recorded gang activity in U.S. history can be traced to the 19th 
century. The Five Points, for instance, produced some of the bloodiest conflicts among rival 
gangs in New York City. One of the more infamous gangs to have emerged in this area, The Five 
Points Gang, was composed of Italian immigrants and launched the careers of Charles “Lucky” 
Luciano, patriarch to the Genovese crime family, and Al Capone, who later established the 
Chicago Outfit. Both men played an important role in establishing the American Mafia. In the 
Southwestern region of the United States, William H. Bonney, better known as Billy the Kid and 
leader of The Rustlers, followed a markedly different path than The Five Points Gang. Rather 
than forming along ethnic lines, The Rustlers were a gang of cattle rustlers and thieves that took 
part in the Lincoln County War. Following the deaths of their core members, The Rustlers 
disbanded in 1880.  
At first glance, it seems apparent that manifestations of ‘the gang’ are rooted in local 
conditions. Negative environmental stimuli push individuals and groups onto trajectories that 
allow them to best satisfy their wants and needs. While most people remain law-abiding citizens, 
others resort to crime or choose to join gangs. Once formed, however, the gang becomes a 
stressor within the community, which changes the dynamic of the local landscape. Although 
there is evidence to demonstrate that gangs vary across space and time, gangs have gone through 
a series of transformative phases, contributing to a functional equivalence of behavior that has 
culminated in the modern gang. For example, violence remains the gang modus operandi, but 
stealing cattle has become a nonextant criminal activity among gangs. This chapter involves a 
longitudinal comparison of historic and modern gangs in the United States by analyzing the 
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history and transformation of gangs. According to Brenda C. Coughlin and Sudhir Alladi 
Venkatesh (2003), the longitudinal comparison of gangs is an under-researched topic that can 
improve our understanding of the gang phenomenon. Specifically, how have gangs changed over 
time, and what sets modern gangs apart from other historical variations? One misconception in 
gang studies is the perception that gangs are limited in both scale and scope, which supports a 
consensus that they are localized actors motivated by territory (Venkatesh, 2000). Upon further 
review, however, there are two main distinctions of the modern gang. Coughlin and Venkatesh 
explain, after 1970, the commercialization of narcotics such as cocaine and heroin changed the 
motivation of gangs from territory to a market-orientation, which inadvertently led to changes in 
the structural organization of some gangs. Additionally, the network structure of gangs has 
become more sophisticated. The connectivity of gangs has re-spatialized their relationships with 
other gangs and criminal organizations, has contributed to the hybridization of some gangs 
through the integration of extremist ideologies (Anti-Defamation League, 2016), and has allowed 
gang members to infiltrate state institutions (Eyler, 2009). I contend that both attributes of the 
modern gang challenge the location-based gang perspective and situate them onto the national 
security consciousness.  
Despite the existence of gangs early in American history, the first gang study was not 
conducted until 1927. Frederic M. Thrasher’s The Gang: A Study of 1,313 Gangs in Chicago 
focused on immigrant groups. He explains, “The Gang… is one manifestation of the 
disorganization incident to the cultural conflict among diverse nations and races gathered in one 
place and themselves in contact with a civilization foreign and largely inimical to them” (p. 220). 
Since his important contribution to the field, the gang phenomenon has become more complex. 
While racial and ethnic divisions continue to play a major role in the formation and cohesion of 
18 
 
gangs, other environmental factors have emerged that influence an individual’s preference to join 
or remain in a gang. The method of conceptualizing gangs, however, has remained stagnant. For 
instance, the term ‘gang’ is often used synonymously with ‘youth’ or ‘juvenile’ group. Gang 
members are considered young, their time in the gang short, and their influence localized, 
typically not extending beyond a street corner or neighborhood (Decker & Van Winkle, 1996; 
Howell, 2012; McGloin, 2005; Peterson, Taylor, & Esbensen, 2004; Thrasher, 1927, 2013; 
Thornberry, Krohn, Lizotte, & Chard-Wierschem, 1993). A longitudinal comparison provides a 
means to critically analyze the origins and transformation of gangs. The average age of gang 
members, for example, has increased over time, making the current demographic description 
anachronistic.  
This chapter argues that two developments separate historical gangs from the modern 
gang. One is the economic orientation of gangs, and the other involves network structures. When 
cocaine and heroin became popularized in the 1970s and 1980s, for example, this created more 
lucrative market opportunities for gangs and their members (Coughlin & Venkatesh, 2003). 
Since then, other “hard drugs” such as crystal meth, ecstasy, and fentanyl have flooded the 
market. Additionally, innovations in narcotics have made detection more difficult, which has 
increased the accessibility of illicit drugs. K2 spice, or synthetic marijuana, marijuana wax, and 
suboxone, for instance, are increasingly being smuggled into prisons across the country due to 
their inconspicuous appearance. The diversification of narcotics and ease at which they can be 
obtained has changed the cost-calculus of gang participation by incentivizing the longevity of an 
individual’s membership (Drug Enforcement Agency, 2018; National Gang Intelligence Center 
(NGIC), 2011, 2013, 2015). As I will demonstrate using intelligence data released by the Federal 
Bureau of Investigations, there is a positive correlation between the economic benefits of 
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narcotics and gang activity. Chiefly, the proliferation of gangs and the number of active gang 
members after the introduction of cocaine. Individuals are maintaining their gang affiliation for 
extended periods of time, as evidenced by an increase in the number of adult gang members 
(Curry & Pyrooz, 2014).  
The other difference between historical gangs and the modern gang is the network 
structures that connect gangs to other gangs, gangs to criminal organizations, has led to the 
integration of extremist ideologies and the hybridization of gangs, and has allowed gangs to 
benefit from participating in state institutions while, at the same time, contributing to the de-
legitimization of these institutions. Especially those that are responsible for security and public 
safety. It is crucial to understand the extent to which network structures make gangs more 
sophisticated and dangerous today than they have been in the past. Advances in communication 
technologies have enabled the rapid exchange of information across long distances allowing 
coordination at the local, state, national, and international levels.  Not only can gangs and their 
members coordinate long distances, but modern technology facilitates the exchange of ideas that 
can be used to influence others. This strategy is commonly used by terrorist organizations such 
as ISIS and al-Qaeda to recruit new members and disseminate their ideology (Silber & Bhatt, 
2007).  
The purpose of this chapter not only illustrates how gangs have changed over time, but it 
is meant to provide the reader background on the institutionalization of gangs in the United 
States. The first section, explains gang formation from the perspective of environmental 
conditions and the subsequent preferences and choices that contribute to an individual’s decision 
to join a gang. Being subjected to similar conditions can generate different outcomes. Although 
certain conditions can increase the likelihood of gang participation, the decision to join a gang or 
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not ultimately lies in the agency of the individual. Agency is a concept often neglected when 
discussing why people join gangs. Urban areas across the country have become synonymous 
with gang activity. Los Angeles, for example, is considered the gang capital of the United States 
(Los Angeles Police Department, 2019). However, it would be impractical to assume that all 
Angelenos belong to a gang.  
In the second section of this paper, I borrow from James C. Howell (2015) to discuss the 
history and transformation of gangs. He describes gang formation as proliferating 
disproportionately across the Eastern, Western, Midwestern, and Southern regions of the United 
States in a non-linear pattern. Although he falls short of a direct comparison between gangs, I 
expand on Howell’s work by highlighting the similarities and differences between historical 
manifestations of the gang and the modern gang. Most notably, the economic incentives of gang 
participation and their increased connectivity. The final section outlines the contemporary gang 
landscape. In this section, I show how the modern gang is more dangerous than historic gangs by 
challenging the location-based approach to address gangs. I include additional information from 
the NGIC and FBI that highlights the economic, political, and social impact of gangs.  
2.1 Theories on Gang Participation 
 Despite their propensity for violence and crime, gangs continue to recruit new members 
successfully. It can be inferred by the geospatial distribution of gang activity, that the number of 
gangs and gang members is higher today than they were in the 18th and 19th centuries.  Once 
considered an urban phenomenon, this delineation has become obscure as gangs continue to 
expand into suburban and rural communities (Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 
Prevention, 1997). In areas where gangs are new, small-scale operations can have a significant 
impact (Weisheit & Wells, 2001). More broadly, gangs did not begin to appear in the Southern 
region of the United States until the 1970s (Howell, 2015). 
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Environmental conditions and individual preferences can explain theories on gang 
participation. Although one can reinforce the other, it is helpful to analyze each category in 
isolation to better understand the extent to which categorical factors impact an individual’s 
decision to join a gang, given the range of other available alternatives. If someone joins a gang 
for economic reasons, why not get a job instead? If someone joins a gang for protection, why not 
take legal action to remove the threat? One field of study that has extensively searched for 
answers to these questions and others is criminology. Being a criminal is not a requirement for 
joining a gang, however, being a gang member exposes people to a criminal culture that can 
influence their behavior (Bernburg, Krohn, & Rivera, 2006). In fact, gang members commit 
crimes, especially violent crimes, at a disproportionately higher rate than non-gang members 
(U.S. Department of Justice, 2018). Within the criminology literature, there are significant 
parallels between the study of crime and gang participation. For this reason, I turn to 
criminogenic theories to explain how environmental factors condition individual preferences for 
gang participation. These include theories on social disorganization, differential 
association/social learning, general strain theory, environmental/routine activity, and race-
relations in criminology.  
Social disorganization theory is one of the most fundamental concepts regarding the 
impact of the environment on criminal behavior. The basis for this theory falls under the 
umbrella of “’neighborhood-effects’ research, where a neighborhood effect is defined as an 
emergent property of neighborhoods, net of neighborhood differences in population composition 
(that) has its roots in early Chicago school theorizing on the influence of urban environments, but 
it stresses the social processes or mechanisms that act as engines for how neighborhoods 
influence a given phenomenon or behavior” (Papachristos & Kirk, 2006, p. 67). According to 
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social disorganization theory, “Disorganized communities cause crime because informal social 
controls break down and criminal cultures emerge. They lack the “collective efficacy” to fight 
crime and disorder” (Cullen, Agnew, & Wilcox, 2014, p. 6). When applied to gang membership, 
Sudhir Alladi Venkatesh (1997) expands on social disorganization theory using the cluster 
concept posited by Giovanni Sartori (1969). “Specifically, the gang partially fills the void left by 
other community-based institutions. Adaptation is the central trope… for underclass researchers 
to explain a range of phenomena: for example, the gang can be a substitute for poorly 
functioning familial structures; its value orientation offers a moral chart for those youths 
excluded from mainstream cultural systems” (p. 89). In other words, a weakening of the 
institutions responsible for mitigating deviant behavior within the community increases the 
likelihood of gang participation. Geoffrey Hodgson (2006) defines institutions as "durable 
systems of established and embedded social rules that structure social interactions… In short, 
institutions are social-rule systems” (p. 13). Gangs can exploit dysfunction within this system of 
social controls (e.g., family, education, and legal), typically found in poor neighborhoods. Once 
established, the gang provides an outlet for the disenfranchised and exacerbates the 
establishment of control structures for future generations. Whether out of fear, or some other 
negative stimuli, informal control mechanisms devolve under the presence of gangs (Anderson, 
1999; Lane & Meeker 2003; Skogan 1990). Further, formal controls suffer as policing these 
areas becomes increasingly difficult. "Spotters” alert gang members to the presence of police 
units and witnesses to gang activity are often reluctant to assist with criminal investigations 
(Miethe & McCorkle, 1997).  
Another theoretical framework to consider when explaining gang participation is 
environmental/routine activity. The theory on routine activity incorporates probability theory and 
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possesses three fundamental characteristics that Lawrence Cohen and Marcus Felson (2014) 
refer to as ‘direct-contact predatory violations’; an offender, a target, and the absence of 
protection. Accordingly, the higher the frequency of exposure to criminal elements in the 
neighborhood, the more likely is victimization. Considering the predatory nature of gangs, and 
their predisposition towards criminal activity, the applicability of this criminogenic theory makes 
sense when explaining gang participation. You can either remain a victim, alter your behavior 
(e.g., stay indoors more often), join a gang, or form your own gang. Whereas social 
disorganization theory treats the environment as capable of mitigating deviant behavior under 
normal conditions, routine activity identifies criteria for victimization.  
One group that immediately comes to mind when thinking about direct-contact predatory 
violations are migrants. Migration occurs both within and between state borders. An important 
factor that has been identified in the cost-calculus of migrating involves economic circumstance. 
When the cost of remaining in place exceeds the benefit of seeking economic opportunity 
elsewhere, people migrate (Martin, 2015). Migration leads to another urban-centric explanation 
of gang participation, like social disorganization theory. If, for instance, the motivation to 
migrate is job availability, then migrants are likely to settle in areas recognized for a high 
capacity of industry and commerce. These tend to be larger cities such as Los Angeles, New 
York, and Chicago, to name a few. The movement of people becomes increasingly problematic 
when mass migration creates a labor surplus leaving a significant percentage of the population in 
a concentrated area unemployed, making direct-contact predatory violations more acute. Under 
these conditions outlined by Cohen and Felson, migrants represent a vulnerable group of people. 
They provide gangs an ample supply of victims, recruits, and, in some cases, challengers.  
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Sonja Wolf (2012) provides insight into how environmental/routine activity led to the 
formation of Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) in the 1980s. Salvadoran migrants, escaping the civil 
war in their home country, fled to the United States for asylum (some legally, others illegally). 
Arriving with limited means, they settled in the Los Angeles area but were soon victimized by 
some of the established gangs. Chiefly, the Bloods and the Crips. MS-13 formed in response to 
this threat and increased its membership as more Salvadorans migrated to the area. Similarly, in 
the 1970s, the Cambodian genocide carried out by Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge, caused a mass 
exodus from the country. As Cambodian immigrants arrived in the United States, they 
experienced similar outgroup pressures from U.S. gangs as Salvadoran immigrants. In response 
to the threat, Cambodian refugees formed the Tiny Rascal Gang (TRG), currently the largest 
Asian gang in America. I elaborate on MS-13 and the TRG in Chapter 3 when I provide a more 
in-depth discussion on gang-specific origins. 
While the absence of social controls can contribute to gang participation, social 
disorganization theory is predicated on the ethnography of single urban neighborhoods in 
Chicago (Papachristos & Kirk, 2006). Similarly, one of the assumptions of 
environmental/routine activity is that the living conditions within a neighborhood facilitate 
crime, another indication of an urban-centric bias when explaining why people join gangs. As a 
result, the core propositions of these theories fail to explain gangs in rural and suburban settings. 
Two theories that better account for cultural gaps between geographic areas include differential 
association/social learning and anomie/general strain theory. Both theories emphasize decision-
making as a reflection of socially constructed preferences. The former theory posits that criminal 
behavior, or gang participation, is learned through social interaction (Sutherland & Cressey, 
2014). As the adage goes, “birds of a feather flock together.” People tend to seek out and 
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associate with others that share their values and interests (Tajfel & Turner, 2004). Additionally, 
the higher the social interactions with an individual or group, the more convergent interests 
become (Vigil, 2004). Most gangs, at least during their inception, begin as a group of closely-
knit friends whose interests align (Ayling, 2011). General strain theory, on the other hand, 
describes gang participation as consequential to the barriers of achieving socially constructed 
goals. Speaking in criminogenic terms, Francis Cullen, Robert Agnew, and Pamela Wilcox 
(2014) summarize the central thesis of this theory, “When individuals cannot obtain success 
goals, (e.g., money or social status), they experience strain or pressure… The strains… may be 
linked to goal blockage (or deprivation of valued stimuli) but also to the presentation of noxious 
stimuli and the taking away of valued stimuli” (p. 7). Income, protection, social status, and group 
acceptance are some commonly identified reasons for joining a gang. “Goal blockage” or 
“noxious stimuli” impede an individual’s ability to achieve one or more of these goals 
satisfactorily. The magnitude of stressors from the perspective of an individual contributes to 
their decision to join a gang rather than achieving goals through other available means. While the 
environment, as described by social disorganization theory, can exacerbate these stressors, 
general strain theory focuses on an individual’s interpretation given the context of their 
circumstances and how they set and prioritize their goals. Thus, what they cannot achieve on 
their own, they can do so by proxy of the gang. 
Finally, along the spectrum of individual preference are criminogenic theories on race 
relations. Crime is “due to unique structural conditions (e.g., concentrated disadvantage, living in 
isolated and segregated neighborhoods) and to cultural beliefs rooted in those conditions… 
Among some… racial discrimination might also be an added criminogenic risk factor” (Cullen, 
Agnew, & Wilcox, 2014, p. 9). Whether clustering is the result of easily identifiable physical 
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traits, cognitive similarities, shared experiences, and worldview, or the historical context of a 
specific time period, race and ethnicity can be tied to the origin of most gangs. White 
supremacist gangs, for instance, are typically rooted in Nazism. By borrowing the symbols, 
values, and ideals espoused by Adolf Hitler, racially motivated attacks manifest in ‘othering.' 
Specifically, that non-whites are inferior and disposable. In gangs where racial division remains 
part and parcel to the group's modus operandi, racial/ethnic divisions continue to factor 
prominently in gang membership. 
On the whole, the transformation of gangs has made them more inclusive. Ethnicity is not 
as useful in understanding American gangs as it once was (Johnson, Webster, & Conners, 1995). 
One of the criteria for joining MS-13 used to require members be from El Salvador. Now they 
accept members of various Hispanic origins such as Honduras, Guatemala, and Mexico. Scott 
Decker and David Pyrooz (2011) add, “Theories explaining gang emergence do not translate 
fluidly to explaining gang membership” (p. 153). The Folk Nation, one of the largest gangs in 
the United States, began as an African American gang. Their alliance now includes gangs whose 
members are White and Hispanic. Similarly, the Crips, a splinter group of the Black Panther 
Party, originated as an African American gang, but currently allow membership from Pacific 
Islanders such as the Sons of Samoa and the Tonga Crips. 
Although there is merit to the impact of environmental conditions and the social 
construction of individual preferences on gang participation, there is a significant weakness to 
both approaches. Chiefly, the role of agency in the decision-making process. Richard Maclure 
and Melvin Sotelo (2004) summarize the concept of ‘structured individualization’ introduced by 
Peter Rudd and Karen Evans (1998):  
Accordingly, while the life chances of young people are strongly affected by factors of 
the local environment and by dominant ideological, political, and socio-economic forces, 
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it is nonetheless important not to forget the individualized aspects of youth development 
and decision-making. Whatever their circumstances, young people interpret their 
experiences and strive to make sense of the influences that affect them in unique ways. 
Where opportunities are limited or non-existent, they will often endeavor to establish 
social groupings and undertake collective actions that compensate for lack of resources 
and environmental support. (p. 420) 
 
Determining how an individual interprets their experiences, and mobilizes is difficult for 
researchers to test. In that regard, theories on environmental conditions and socially constructed 
preferences facilitate a more straightforward method of analysis. Another approach, however, is 
to analyze the interaction of different theories. James Diego Vigil (1999, 2002, 2003) uses a 
dynamic approach to explain gang participation with his multiple marginality theory. Rather than 
a single factor, Vigil posits that there is a connection between the explanatory risk factors that 
contribute to the marginalization of individuals, making them susceptible to join a gang. These 
factors are often indistinguishable. In low-income neighborhoods, for instance, conditions of 
poverty, unemployment, and single-family households are all present. As individuals seek out 
alternatives to improve their circumstances, the viability of gang participation satisfies the 
multiplicity of adverse conditions facing the individual. Like social disorganization theory, gang 
norms replace weakened social controls aimed at mitigating deviant behavior. 
James C. Howell (2015) uses a more process-oriented approach to explain gang 
formation and the subsequent participation of its members. He clusters different factors into five 
phases. In the first phase, there is social disorganization due to a combination of migrant 
concentration, residential instability, and concentrated disadvantage. Phase two involves a 
weakening of the neighborhood, family, and subsequent social controls. Similar to Vigil’s 
multiple marginality theory, the characteristics of the second phase include low neighborhood 
control, family disorganization, youth alienation, and racial-ethnic conflicts. Under the 
conditions of the first two phases, youth subculture and gangs begin to emerge. This third phase, 
28 
 
influenced by gangsta rap, includes the formation of conflict groups and youth gangs. Phase four 
involves various facilitators that strengthen the gang as a unit. These include large-scale public 
housing, prison population growth, economic restructuring, and guns and drug trafficking. The 
fifth and final phase sees the transformation of gangs and the embeddedness of the individual's 
role in the gang. Street gangs and prison gangs emerge after achieving phase five. Moreover, this 
involves the institutionalization of gangs and their permanence in the community. The gang 
offers an alternative for those who are displaced, an observation that supports similar conclusions 
made by Thrasher (1927). Once established, gangs not only compete for control with other 
gangs, but they contend with the state for the right to continue establishing and enforcing the 
rules. This conflict leads to a further deterioration of local conditions as gangs solidify their 
position. 
2.2 History and Transformation of Gangs  
 A longitudinal analysis can improve our understanding of gangs by observing how gangs 
have changed over time. These changes can be descriptive (the characteristics of the gang and its 
members), functional (how gangs organize and operate), or transactional (how gangs interact in 
society to achieve their goals and objectives). This separation helps to conceptualize gangs 
within a contemporary context rather than relying on outdated constructs of the gang 
phenomenon. Brenda Coughlin and Sudhir Alladi Venkatesh (2003) explains, “Since its 
inception, street-gang research has been wed to the notion that gangs are highly local actors 
motivated by the need to protect territory and claim turf. This location-based perspective remains 
at the core of much research, despite evidence that local gangs have nonlocal members and that 
gangs migrate and/or expand into new territories” (p. 56).1 The characteristics with which gangs 
 




are described is one way researchers localize gangs. For example, ‘youth' is a common 
demographic descriptor used in gang definitions (I provide a thorough discussion on defining 
gangs in the next chapter). Therefore, it can be inferred that the age of a gang member 
determines the extent of their mobility where younger individuals are more restricted to local 
geographic spaces. The use of ‘youth gang,’ however, is misleading as data from the National 
Gang Intelligence Center (2012) shows 65% of gang members in 2011 were 18 years of age or 
older. According to this survey, the percentage of adults to youths is steadily increasing. 
Approximately three out of every five gang members is an adult, an increase of 15% from 1996 
when the ratio of adult to youth gang members was 1:1.  
 Gangs have emerged disproportionately across space and time. Most scholars attribute 
economic conditions to the growth of gangs (Decker, van Gemert, & Pyrooz, 2009). Other 
scholars point to abrupt social change. G. David Curry and Scott Decker (2002) identify the 
1890s, 1920s, 1960s and 1990s as four significant periods of gang growth. Although stopping 
short of comparing gangs throughout U.S. history, James Howell (2015) presents a detailed 
description of their history and transformation. Like Curry and Decker, Howell ascribes gang 
growth to social and economic transition in the country at various points in time. His approach 
differs in that he recognizes the culmination of factors that led to the non-linear regional 
emergence of the modern gang.  
 Howell begins in the Northeastern region with an emphasis on New York City. For 
Howell, unlike Curry and Decker, the first period of gang activity occurred between 1783 and 
the1860s. Mass migration from Europe exceeded the city’s ability to accommodate the 
substantial increase in population (Anbinder, 2001). The influx of people, which incapacitated 
the city, led to a concentrated disadvantage. "The isolation and marginalization of very poor 
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immigrants in the rapidly growing New York City prompted them to establish a small secure 
area where group control of resources and spaces could provide a buffer against the uncertainty, 
chaos, and dangerousness of many city streets” (Howell, 2015, p. 2). During this time, two of the 
earliest gangs in the United States appeared, the Forty Thieves and Kerryonians. Both gangs 
were formed by Irish immigrants. Gang formation in Boston and Philadelphia followed a similar 
path as New York.  
The second phase of gang growth occurred between the 1860s and 1930s. Two events 
during this period inadvertently resulted in gang consolidation. The first was the Civil War draft 
riots that began in New York and spread to Cleveland, Pittsburgh, and Baltimore. The violence 
of these riots targeted both the city and the Black population living within the city. The aftermath 
of the draft riots resulted in the absorption of smaller gangs. Additionally, there was a shift in the 
ethnicity of gangs. The decrease in European immigrants and the successful assimilation of the 
previous generations reduced the number of ethnically white recruits. As a result, the ‘gang’ 
began to disintegrate and was replaced by violent youth groups (Sante, 1991).  
 The third and final period of gang growth in the Northeastern region of the United States, 
described by Howell, took place between the 1930s and 1980s. The "great migration" between 
World War II and the 1970s was primarily economic-driven. Blacks and Hispanics from the 
South migrated north for better employment opportunities. The availability of jobs, however, 
were insufficient to meet demand, and, like the first phase of gang formation, cities were unable 
to accommodate population growth. One attempt to “fix” the problem in New York led to 
segregated housing and concentrated disadvantage. More importantly, this strategy brought 
together gangs previously dissociated from one another. In addition to the concentration of 
residents by race and ethnicity, there was an ethnic shift in the composition of immigrants, which 
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further exacerbated racial tensions by creating a culture clash. Unlike the initial waves of 
immigrants that originated from Europe, more citizens from Latin America and the Caribbean 
began entering the region. These domestic and international migratory patterns fueled conflicts 
from Boston to Philadelphia and throughout the rest of the Northeast region. 
City officials recognized the impending threat of gangs to local communities and the city 
at-large. Two programs implemented in the 1960s aimed to disrupt the cycle of gang violence 
and retaliation in New York (Schneider, 1999). The Mobilization for Youth (MFY), which 
addressed the issue of social disorganization (Greene & Pranis, 2007), and the Lower Eastside 
Neighborhood Association (LENA) that contributed to a brief truce, reduction in gang activity, 
and the de-securitization of gangs in New York. The progress made to reduce gang activity 
lasted until cocaine and heroin became popularized. Which, ironically, gangs mobilized to push 
these drugs out of their community (Greene & Pranis, 2007). Since the proliferation of drugs in 
poor urban neighborhoods, gangs have assumed control over much of the drug trade in the 
United States. Nearly sixty percent of law enforcement agencies indicate that street-level drug 
sales represent a high-level threat in their jurisdiction, with another twenty percent that consider 
the threat moderate (National Gang Intelligence Center, 2015). 
 Insofar as gang growth occurred during different periods, two of the other regions 
discussed by Howell, the Midwest, and the West, experienced similar patterns of mass migration, 
concentrated disadvantage, marginalization, and racial tension. In the Midwestern region, Howell 
focuses his analysis on Chicago. The first phase of gangs emerged between the 1860s and 1920s. 
Like New York, Irish gangs were the first to emerge in this region and contributed to racial 
tensions. In response to hostilities from Irish gangs and whites in general, Black gangs began to 
form in the early 1900s (Adamson, 1998). Riots from racial conflicts persisted between 1900 to 
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1949, with 38 occurring in 1919 during the “Red Summer.” Three factors within this timeframe 
contributed to the animus between white and Black communities. After World War I, veterans 
returning home from the war discovered their employers had replaced them with Black men who 
emigrated from the South. Social Athletic Clubs (SACs), the first record of institutionalized 
gangs, continuously firebombed Black neighborhoods. Finally, the lynching of a Black teen 
caught swimming in the “white’s only” section of Lake Michigan set off a series of riots 
throughout the region.  
The second period of gang growth in the Midwest occurred from the 1920s-1940s when 
gangs occupied the spaces between residential and commercial areas. Even as white gangs began 
decreasing, politicians played a role in the institutionalization of SACs. Despite white gangs 
being “a one-generation immigrant ghetto phenomenon” (Moore, 1998, p. 68), SACs perpetuated 
racial hostilities. Additionally, there was significant population growth in minority communities. 
The availability of jobs in the Midwest attracted an influx of Mexican migrants displaced by the 
revolution in their country of origin. Following the second period of gang growth, the Black 
population doubled from 278,000 to 500,000, and the migration of Hispanics after WW II 
continued unabated. The ethnic transition contributed to what Christopher Adamson (2000) 
refers to as ‘defensive localism.’ In this context, people were responding to changes in local 
identity with violence. Throughout metropolitan areas, gangs were mobilized to target Blacks 
and Hispanics. This outgroup aggression provided cohesion for Black and Hispanic gangs, in 
addition to the establishment of low-income housing by the Chicago Housing Authority that 
supplied a location for gang operations (Venkatesh, 2000). “In short order, the public housing 
high-rises became gang incubators and drug turf battle-grounds” (Howell, 2015, p. 22). After 
1960, wars over territory, reputation, recruitment, and identity led to gang expansion (Block and 
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Block, 1993). With the presence of white gangs shrinking, Howell provides further insight into 
how minority gangs coalesced and maintained unification. “Gang lore in Black and Mexican-
American gangs never let members forget the failure of law enforcement and the criminal justice 
system to protect them from the early Irish gangs” (p. 23). 
 In the West, gang formation originated from the self-segregation of Hispanic populations 
between the 1890s to 1930s. The close bonds between juveniles raised in Hispanic enclaves, 
referred to as palomilla, replaced the social controls of family, school, and church. Similar to the 
Midwest, and due to the region’s proximity to the southern border, Hispanic immigration 
continued unabated. Two events, the Sleepy Lagoon Murder, and Zoot Suit Riots served to unite 
Hispanic gangs and, at the same time, built narratives surrounding the conflict culture of 
Mexican youths. Unlike the emergence of Hispanic gangs, Black gangs emerged as juvenile 
groups in the 1920s and 1930s to protect against violence from whites. By the 1940s they had 
transitioned into conflict groups, and by the 1960s they consolidated in segregated housing units.  
Black migration westward and the civil rights movement highlight the third phase of 
gang growth in the West. Two of the most notorious gangs in the United States to have emerged 
during this period are the Bloods and Crips. Following the Watts riots of 1965, members of the 
Black Panther Party splintered. According to Howell, there was frustration over the lack of 
progress in ensuring rights for African Americans, and disagreement over the most effective path 
moving forward. The Bloods and Crips began as social activists but quickly transformed into 
criminal street gangs. It has been suggested that Blood stands for "Brotherly Love Overrides 
Oppression and Destruction" while Crip means “Community Revolution In Progress” (Marie’, 
2015).  It was within the space between social activism and deviant behavior that the Bloods and 
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Crips flourished, and have expanded across the country. Their rivalry is one of the longest in 
American history, spanning nearly fifty years.  
  Unlike the other three regions of the United States, gang growth in the Southern region 
did not occur until the 1970s. Howell presents four explanations that set the South apart from the 
other three regions; there was no white ethnic immigration, the South was an agrarian society 
until after WW II, the “Great Migration” pushed population growth into the other three regions, 
and Southern culture emphasized non-secular views and the family unit. Howell explains, 
"Racial/ethnic tensions were minimal as the Blacks had migrated northwards, and the Mexicans 
assimilated easily into the Southern culture" (p. 42). The closest group to resemble a gang during 
this time was the Ku Klux Klan (KKK). According to Howell, the KKK formed in response to 
federal soldiers deployed to the South to enforce the Emancipation Proclamation. After 1877, 
however, membership dropped significantly when the Reconstruction Acts were repealed.  
During the 1970s, the South began experiencing similar conditions that led to gang 
formation in the East, West, and Midwest, but in a much shorter period. The Immigration and 
Nationality Act of 1965 ended immigration quotas, which fueled defensive localism in the South. 
Immigrants from Latin America, the Caribbean, and Asia began settling in the region and 
changing the ethnic composition. Additionally, low-income high-rise apartments were 
constructed that consolidated gangs and led to concentrated disadvantage. In Howell's words, 
"The South region became a wellspring of gang growth from the 1970s through 1995 as this 
region led the nation in the number of new gang cities" (p. 42). Walter B. Miller (2001) supports 
Howell's observation. There were new gang cities in 32% of the cities across the South compared 
to 26% in the Midwest, 6% in the Northeast, and 3% in the West. Moreover, between 1970-
1995, South Atlantic cities reported a 44% increase in gang activity. 
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 Howell does not include a discussion on global gangs, but the same conditions he 
describes as contributing to the formation of gangs in the United States occurred in countries 
around the world. Insofar as the U.S. is considered ‘ground zero’ for the gang phenomenon, the 
analysis of global gangs can inform our observations and conclusions (Campbell & Muncer, 
1989; Covey, 2010; DeFleur, 1967). In Russia, Perestroika changed the social, political, cultural, 
and economic landscape. As part of Mikhail Gorbachev’s glasnost policy, economic reform 
included transitioning from a command- to a market-economy. One of the unintended 
consequences of his policy led to the collapse of institutions, creating a void that was filled by 
gangs (Gilinsky, 2006; Stephenson, 2008). Don Pinnock and Dudu Douglas-Hamilton (1997) 
detail the rise of gangs in post-apartheid South Africa. According to them, gangs formed in 
response to forced migrations and peer pressure. South African gang members became role 
models, providing leadership, organization, and protection in a hostile environment. Their role as 
community leaders legitimized gangs as institutions. Gang formation, in other, more developed 
countries, has also been observed. Fourteenth and fifteenth-century England experienced gangs 
as society transitioned from agrarian to industrial (Sheldon, Tracy, & Brown, 2001). Further, the 
vulnerability of children has become commonplace in almost all areas of the world that 
experience gang activity. In Brazil, young kids are targeted for recruitment because the law 
prohibits the prosecution of minors (Dimenstein, 1991). In Finca Santa Tomás, Guatemala, 
parents, unable to provide for their children, abandon them on the streets, providing an ample 
supply of gang recruits (Moorehead, 1990). Sarah Thomas de Benitez (2007) summarizes the 
cycle of gang participation among global youths, “Street gang hierarchies both protect and inflict 
violence. Intimidation is the order of the day. Younger children are at the mercy of violent 
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behavior, risking losing earnings and possessions to older, bigger boys. As they grow, they, in 
turn, socialize new children into street-based hierarchies and rules enforced by violence” (p. 38). 
2.3 Modern Gangs and the Contemporary Landscape  
 Two distinctions between the modern gang when compared to historical gangs make 
them more dangerous today than at any other point in history. Before the 1970s, gang 
involvement in the illicit economy was considered anecdotal (Chein et al., 1964; Moore, 1991; 
Keiser, 1969; Spergel, 1964). Instead, gangs concentrated on defending their territory from 
rivals. Security was prioritized as the delineation of territory along city blocks established a 
gang’s domain. Protecting territory prohibited rival gangs from exercising control over 
neighborhoods, often at the expense of local residents. Although territory continues to be 
important, the commercialization of cocaine and heroin after 1970 pushed gangs into a more 
market-oriented direction (Coughlin & Venkatesh, 2003; Jankowski, 1991; Spergel, 1995; 
Venkatesh, 2000). Selling drugs provided a sustainable income, especially for the 
disenfranchised living in poor neighborhoods. This contributed to structural changes manifested 
in the modern gang (Coughlin & Venkatesh, 2003).  
Foremost is the idea that gangs are bounded to a specific location and organize to protect 
territory. In a survey conducted by Jerome Skolnick (1990), a Blood respondent from Los 
Angeles explains, “They got homeboys… you know, Crips?.. It’s got to the point where they’re 
in every state now. Nine times out of ten, when I get out of town, I know somebody that’s out 
there” (p. 8). In a separate interview, a member of the Crips corroborated that location is not a 
factor for gang operations. “Everywhere you go, you know what I’m saying, anywhere you go, 
you’re gonna see some people from L.A. If they got, you know, a dope house out there, or a dope 
street out there, you gonna see somebody… you’ll run into somebody on that street from L.A.” 
(p. 8). These admissions challenge two other conceptions regarding the gang composite. One is 
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that gangs involve a group of tight-knit friends, and the other is that gang membership is short 
(Ayling, 2011). The genesis of gang formation may involve close acquaintances, but as gangs 
grow, these characteristics begin to fade. Due to their market-orientation, gang expansion is 
analogous to a growing business. It may begin as owned and operated by family and friends, but 
as the business expands, these close bonds are insufficient to sustain the growth. As a result, 
people from outside the "inner circle" integrate into the business. Moreover, establishing dope 
houses, and the subsequent oversight required indicates a sense of permanence in gang 
membership. 
Adjectives such as ‘youth’ or ‘juvenile’ are often used interchangeably with the term 
‘gang’ where youth is considered a “salient feature” of gang participation (Covey, Menard, & 
Franzese, 1992; Huff, 1989; Lasley, 1992). Little has changed since the early work of Frederic 
Thrasher where ‘youth gang’ is the focal point of gang research. The lexical emphasis on 
‘juvenile delinquents’ is the bedrock of the Eurogang definition, which has garnered a growing 
consensus among researchers (Curry, 2015). According to the Eurogang definition, “a street 
gang is any durable, street-oriented youth group whose involvement in illegal activity is part of 
its group identity” (Klein & Maxson, 2006, p. 4). Even with as detailed as Howell is in his 
explanation on the transformation of gangs, he qualifies gangs as ‘youth groups.’ The modern 
gang, however, is concentrated around adult members (Curry, 2000), an omission that has led to 
false conclusions about gang behavior. The National Gang Intelligence Center (NGIC) (2012) 
released a report showing the distinction between juvenile (under the age of 18) and adult (age 
18 and older) gang members. In 1996, the age of gang members was split evenly, with 50 percent 
being juveniles and 50 percent being adults. However, the age composition of gangs has 
increasingly included members over the age of 18. By 2011 adults represented 65 percent of 
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gang membership while juveniles accounted for 35 percent. In 2014, gang members between the 
ages of 18 to 25 accounted for 66 percent of all validated gang members in the state of North 
Carolina. Another 28 percent were between the ages of 26 to 35, an increase of 8 percent from 
2011 (North Carolina State Highway Patrol, 2014). David Pyrooz (2014) conducted a 
longitudinal analysis of gangs and discovered that 40% of individuals with a gang history 
occurred during adulthood. “Research that focuses only on juveniles misses out on a very large 
portion of the population of gang members” (Curry, 2015, p. 13). In short, the emphasis on gangs 
as juvenile groups undermines several critical observations regarding the modern gang. 
An important question that this data raises is, what has caused a shift in the age 
composition of gang members? Although it is beyond the scope of this chapter, one explanation 
is the market-oriented gang that emerged after 1970 (Coughlin & Venkatesh, 2003). According 
to the NGIC (2015), nearly 60 percent of law enforcement agencies reported street-level drug 
distribution as the highest degree of criminal gang activity in their jurisdiction. Large-scale drug 
distribution was nearly 30 percent, with another 25 percent considering this criminal activity to 
be moderate. Skolnick explains that gangs shifted from a “cultural gang” where individuals 
coalesced around social status and protection, to an “entrepreneurial gang” focused on economic 
opportunity. Once gangs made this transition, migration became incentivized. Increased 
competition and market saturation in local areas suppressed drug prices, which led gangs to seek 
alternative sources of revenue outside their neighborhoods and cities. An important implication 
revealed by Skolnick is that the street corner gang and the extraterritorial gang exist in the same 
space.  
The other distinction of the modern gang is their network orientation, making them more 
connected than historic gangs. It is within this framework that we can examine the extent to 
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which gangs influence the political, economic, and social landscape. George Tita and Steven 
Radil (2011) spatialize the social network of gangs using bivariate and multivariate analyses to 
reach several important conclusions about the gang phenomenon that coincide with observations 
made by Howell and Skolnick. First, they conclude that urbanization is the most significant 
predictor of gang activity. This finding quantitatively supports the genesis of gangs forming in 
urban areas. Similarly, Tita and Radil conclude that urban residents in rural areas are a 
significant predictor of gang activity outside large cities. Economic conditions, according to 
them, are responsible for gang diffusion between metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas. They 
explain that gangs form in poor urban neighborhoods and expand into rural areas experiencing 
economic growth.  
Conceptually, the network structure of gangs raises two critical issues. Chiefly, localizing 
the gang neglects the ability of gang members to operate outside their immediate proximity, and 
ignores the public perception and capabilities of local authorities in these areas. Interviews 
conducted by Ralph Weisheit and L. Edward Wells (2001) supports the latter sentiment. One law 
enforcement agent identified as ID#179 explains, “In a small town like this, our little gangs, to 
the people, are serious. But, to the big city, this would be minor” (p. 7). Another, identified as 
ID#151, adds, “Well, again, the problem is significant for us, but I suppose if you were 
comparing it to an urban environment, it would be minimal” (p. 7). Coming from law 
enforcement officials in smaller American towns suggests that the impact of gangs is distributed 
disproportionately across the country. Urban centers, where gangs originated and have a long 
history, are better equipped to respond to gang activity than rural areas where gangs are a new 
phenomenon. They often lack the resources, capabilities, and specialized gang units of larger 
cities, a fact that gangs continue to exploit (Weisheit & Wells, 2001).  
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In addition to the economic explanation provided by Tita and Radil, Weisheit and Wells 
offer two other factors that have contributed to gang diffusion and the establishment of gang 
networks. One factor is displacement by criminal offenders who exploit the jurisdictional 
limitations of law enforcement agencies. As one observer explains, "We have a lot of drug 
activity, and I think a lot of the problem is that the gangers from Washington and Oregon, you 
know, head over this way to evade the law over there" (part 2, p. 17). The other factor is urban 
flight. Urban flight involves leaving the conditions of the urban environment to remove oneself 
from a territory controlled by gangs. Interviews conducted by Weisheit and Wells, however, 
reveal that an unintended consequence of gang members moving to escape gang life has led to 
rural communities importing gang culture.  
 The United States is considered the progenitor of the gang phenomenon (Covey, 2010). 
With their extensive history and continued expansion, gangs have established themselves as an 
American institution. As Howell, Skolnick, and Tita and Radil have demonstrated, what 
originated as an urban phenomenon has cascaded across the country. Gangs now maintain a 
presence in all fifty U.S. states. Their transformation, however, has entered a new stage through 
the application of network structures. The connection between gangs at the macro-level have 
become stronger and, in some cases, have abated the racial tensions prevalent in historic gangs 
(Chapter 3 provides a description of gang alliances and I conduct a macro-level analysis of gangs 
in Chapter 4). More importantly, a ‘network of ideas’ has integrated extremist ideologies into the 
identity of some gangs and has influenced the process through which decisions are made by re-
shaping their worldview. When the United Blood Nation (UBN) formed in 1993, Omar Portee 
and Leonard McKenzie integrated gang culture with the anti-oppression ideology espoused by 
the Black Panther Party (BPP) (NDIC, 2003). The incorporation of the BPP into the identity of 
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African American gangs, however, is nothing new. Although they are considered a gang in their 
own right (NGIC, 2011), in the 1960s, when members of the BPP splintered to form the Bloods 
and the Crips, they inherently transferred their ideology to them. More concerning is the 
potential connection between gangs and terrorist organizations. Joseph Rogers (2007) argues that 
a gang-terrorist nexus is unlikely, a common consensus in gang research. His assertion is 
predicated on the divergent interests between gangs and terrorists. Rogers defends his position in 
economic terms, "If the gang-terror link proved true, and another attack on the US was 
successful, the gangs would, in essence, destroy some of the customers (drugs) and victims 
(robbery, auto theft) on which they depend to make money." He continues by pointing out their 
ideological differences, “gang members in the US are Roman Catholic, not members of the 
Islamic Radical Groups who engage in terrorist activities. At this level of analysis, the gang 
members are as much an enemy of the jihad as the rest of US society” (p. 24). The lack of 
empirical evidence supports Rogers' argument. However, the foundation from which this 
argument relies on has several weaknesses. First, the interpretation of terrorism as Islamic-
inspired attacks takes too narrow a view. Any viewpoint that perpetuates violent action can be 
considered radical. In addition to religious zealotry, acts of terrorism have been committed by 
environmentalists, animal rights groups, and various other left-wing and right-wing groups. Put 
another way, it is not uncommon for white supremacists to also belong to a white gang. Neither 
group is considered an incubator for radical Islam. Second, Rogers ignores the fact that 
organized criminal groups are becoming functionally similar. To finance their operations, 
terrorist groups have begun manufacturing counterfeit goods, fake credit cards, and narcotics 
(Flanigan, 2012). Gangs are being used as distribution channels to sell these illicit products; a 
similar strategy used by cartels to sell narcotics.  
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Although U.S. intelligence data indirectly confirms the argument made by Rogers, 
pointing out the conjecture surrounding a gang-terrorist nexus, there have been a few well-
documented cases that raise the possibility of this connection. In 2002 Jose Padilla, a member of 
the Latin Kings, was convicted under the Patriot Act for conspiring with al-Qaeda to detonate a 
dirty bomb on U.S. soil. Rogers attempts to invalidate Padilla’s gang ties and dismisses this as 
the actions of an individual rather than a concerted effort of the Latin Kings. Over a decade 
earlier, however, Jeff Fort, leader of the gang El Rukn, was propositioned for $2.5 million by a 
Libyan terrorist group to carry out a terrorist attack in the United States. A similar plot unfolded 
in California in 2005. The main difference between Padilla, Fort, and the incident in California is 
that the latter attempt was a result of homegrown terrorism, the third point that Rogers misses. 
Mark Hamm (2007) describes how the 2005 Los Angeles Bomb Plot unfolded. Despite not 
having a connection to any terrorist group, and while serving prison sentences, Kevin Lamar 
James, a 76th Street Crip, and Levar Washington, a Rollin’ Sixties Crip, planned a coordinated 
set of terrorist attacks that targeted military and religious sites across Los Angeles. James, a 
practicing Sunni Muslim, started Jamiyyat Ul-Islam Is-Saheeh (JIS). Through his gang, he began 
disseminating the JIS Protocol throughout the California penal system. A second doctrine 
entitled “Blueprint 2005” was a call to arms against the state. “The Blueprint was modeled after 
the Qaeda training manual which instructs al-Qaeda operatives to set up “Islamic programs” if 
they are incarcerated and try to recruit “candidates” who are “disenchanted with their country’s 
policies” (p. 43). The implications of the bomb plot highlighted the vulnerability of U.S. 
correctional institutions in mitigating the exchange and crystallization of extremist norms 
(Roberts & Collins, 2020). Moreover, it revealed that communique between gangs and terrorists 
is not a sufficient condition for the radicalization of gang members. Rather, it is the message 
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espoused by radical groups that matter. Both James and Washington belonged to rival gangs, yet 
they were able to set aside their differences for a common goal. It is within this network of ideas 
between gangs and terrorists that get neglected when trying to determine the likelihood of a 
gang-terrorist nexus.  
The integration of extremist ideologies into the gang ethos has become normalized as part 
and parcel to their transformation. Motivated by territory and profits, gang culture has evolved to 
incorporate extremist worldviews contributing to the hybridization of gangs, or metagang. That 
is to say; the terrorist message is resonating with gangs even though terrorists are not training, 
funding, or coordinating with them. The Five Percenters and Gangster Disciples, for example, 
have incorporated teachings from the Nation of Islam into their identity. “Since its founding in 
1930, the Nation of Islam (NOI) has grown into one of the wealthiest and best-known 
organizations in black America. Its theology of innate black superiority over whites and the 
deeply racist, antisemitic and anti-LGBT rhetoric of its leaders have earned the NOI a prominent 
position in the ranks of organized hate” (The Southern Poverty Law Center, 2016). Founded in 
1964, the Five-Percent Nation of Gods and Earths (Five Percenters), an offshoot of the Nation of 
Islam, believe in the “innate divinity of the black man… and the idea that the white man is a 
devil who was created through a process of genetic grafting by a mad scientist named Yakub 
6000 years ago” (Andrews, 2013, p. 12). The cornerstone of their teaching rests on the idea of 
Supreme Mathematics and the Supreme Alphabet, which are ways for followers to interpret 
numbers and symbols in shaping their worldview. One lesson, borrowed from the NOI, claims 
that 85 percent of the population lives in ignorance imposed by 10 percent of the population who 
seek to keep the world subservient and under their control. The name Five Percenters comes 
from the idea that they are the enlightened few (5 percent of the population) who are determined 
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to teach the rest of the world the truth. This transcendence, however, is reserved for Black men 
whom the founder of the Five Percenters, Clarence Edward Smith (aka Clarence 13 X, aka Allah 
the Father) claimed was “God personified, and that each black man could cultivate and 
eventually realize his godliness through meditation, study, and spiritual and physical fitness” 
(Johnson, 2006). Smith established the Five Percenters after leaving the Nation of Islam. His 
teachings emphasize that Black people were the original inhabitants of Earth, also referred to as 
the fathers and mothers of civilization. The Gangster Disciples and Almighty P. Stones, among 
others, practice a similar ideology emphasizing Black nationalism. In short, “Black street and 
prison gangs borrowed principles emphasizing Black nationalism and Black consciousness from 
the Nation of Islam, Black Power, and Black Panthers” (Cureton, 2009, p. 359). Some White 
street and prison gangs have followed a similar path through a revivalist movement of Odinism 
and the integration of white supremacist ideology.2 “Odinism is a religion of race and of blood. 
The return of the gods is posited as the culmination of an apocalyptic End Time drama that 
liberally blends elements of Christian eschatology with the Norse Ragnarök tradition. The return 
of the Golden Age pantheon is a much-longed-for event in these dark days, for the return of the 
gods will mean a return to the days of racial purity. Of harmony, and of universal happiness” 
(Kaplan, 1997, p. 85). The return to Odinism promotes a sense of familial bond in the imaginary 
of its members, a means of unification in blood and combat (Center on Extremism, 2016). It is 
the network of ideas that connects radical extremism with gang culture, creating metagangs. The 
threat that emerges combines the criminal motives of territory and profit from gangs with an 
 
2 The main distinction between white gangs and white supremacists is that the operations of the former group 
functions regardless of race. For example, they are willing to cooperate with Black, Hispanic, and Asian gangs. 
Additionally, they distribute narcotics to anyone willing to buy from them, including whites. Selling drugs to white 
communities is considered an affront to the vision of white supremacists, whose primary goal is to preserve and 
expand the white race.  
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attempt to evoke political change through terrorism. Additionally, the language, symbols, and 
customs used by extremist groups aim to unify gang members as a cohesive unit. The animus 
directed toward the white race taught by the Nation of Islam and integrated into the Five 
Percenters and white gangs that adhere to a Norse mythos that directs followers to take up arms 
for the sake of racial purification are two examples.  
 A final connection of significance is the established networks between gangs and the 
state. The transformation of gangs has inherently evolved in parallel with the state, and, as 
‘social actors,’ gang members occupy legitimate spaces of public service. Of particular concern, 
is the integration of gang networks with security institutions. That is to say, institutions whose 
primary objective is to enforce the law and mitigate public safety threats, both domestic and 
foreign, are being subverted to advantage gangs. According to an NGIC (2013) survey, 43% of 
law enforcement respondents reported gang member involvement in the military, 35% in 
corrections, 15% in law enforcement, and 7% in the judiciary and courts. A separate NGIC 
(2011) report shows that 1-2% of total military personnel are gang-affiliated. Their authority 
ranges from low-level soldiers to ranking officers (NGIC, 2007).  
There is, however, some disagreement on the magnitude of gangs in the military. At least 
one branch of the military challenges the findings by the NGIC. The Criminal Investigation 
Command (CID) (2007), the division responsible for investigating felonious crimes within the 
Army, states, “Overall, the assessment of the threat of gang activity in the Army is low” (p. 9). 
To support their claim, the CID regularly lists the number of gang-related infractions in the 
Army. These crimes have included murders at separate military bases in Fort Hood, TX, 
Schofield Barracks, HI, and Fort Wainwright, AK carried out by Gangster Disciples, La Familia, 
and Bloods, respectively. The murder at Fort Wainwright targeted members of the Crips, the 
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largest rival to the Bloods. Other crimes reported by the CID involving gangs included assault, 
narcotics, and destruction of property. On the whole, the CID concludes that non-gang member 
military personnel commit crimes at a higher rate than military-connected gang members. 
Despite attempts by the CID to assuage concerns over gangs in the military, “Law 
enforcement officials are concerned about gang-affiliated soldiers transferring their acquired 
training and weapons back to communities to facilitate the commission of crimes. When such 
transfers of knowledge and supplies have occurred, communities have suffered, and law 
enforcement officials have fared poorly” (Eyler, 2009, p. 705). In addition to the tactical training 
and know-how that military-connected gang members provide to gangs, there have been several 
cases of military-grade equipment smuggled onto the streets (NGIC, 2007). This theft has 
included night vision gear, body armor, and assault weapons (Smith, 2011). Findings by Carter 
Smith (2015) support the claims made by the NGIC and Gustav Eyler. Smith conducts surveys 
between law enforcement officials in Texas and Tennessee regarding military-trained gang 
members (MTGMs). Gang investigators from both states were asked a series of questions related 
to gang activity in their jurisdiction. Respondents included gang specialists from military and law 
enforcement officials. In Texas, they reported an 85% increase in gang activity, 89% of gang 
members in their jurisdiction were active-duty military, and 100% of MTGMs were gang-
affiliated before entering the military. Gang investigators in Tennessee also reported a significant 
increase in gang activity (77%), but active-duty gang members (25%) and gang affiliation before 
joining the military (31%) were lower than in Texas. A member of the Tennessee Gang 
Investigators’ Association provides context for the increasing pattern of gang participation in the 
military: 
The current generation of gang members are the first in a very long time to grow up 
during a time of high military activity. As a result, more gang members are now joining 
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military service for a wide variety of reasons and are returning to the (civilian 
community) jurisdiction with basic military training at the very least. I have seen gang 
members in the military encourage others in their gang to enlist as well. The percentage 
of military-trained gang members will continue to rise for the foreseeable future. (Smith, 
2015, p. 23) 
 
Table 2.1 shows felonious and non-felonious crimes committed by gang members in the military 
as the CID and NCIS have investigated them. The results of which contradict earlier reports by 
the CID that the threat of MTGMs is low. 
 
Table 2.1 Gang-Involved Criminal Investigations for the Army (CID) and Navy (NCIS) 
Agency Year 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
CID Felony 7 5 5 10 16 17 27 34 11 NA 
CID Non-Felony 22 8 4 13 44 62 92 109 102 NA 
NCIS Felony NA NA NA NA NA NA 12 64 78 79 
NCIS Non-Felony NA NA NA NA NA NA 67 130 120 115 
       (Source: Carter Smith, 2015) 
 
One area that the NGIC and CID agree on is the vulnerability of military personnel and 
their families to gang recruitment. It is not uncommon for service members to relocate multiple 
times throughout their careers. Frequently relocating or having one (or both) parent(s) on 
deployment for extended periods creates a sense of isolation and instability with their children 
(Eyler, 2009). For family members, each transfer involves assimilating into their new 
surroundings. This period of adjustment provides recruitment opportunities for gangs similar to 
the social disorganization present in poor communities. Some military personnel are targeted 
because they share an affinity for motorcycles similar to Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs (OMGs). A 
2016 CID flier issued to military personnel warns service members to exercise caution when 
attending motorcycle events because OMGs frequently attend. They socialize, target, and 
befriend members of the military.  
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On the threat of gangs in the military, Eyler concludes that a gang presence in the 
military undermines the efficacy of achieving military objectives by jeopardizing unit order and 
security, diminishing professionalism, and increasing the threat to local communities. He also 
draws parallels between the military and school. Both institutions provide gangs fertile grounds 
for recruitment. “Approximately 80 percent of survey respondents indicate gangs are present in 
the public-school systems within their jurisdiction, with 54 percent reporting that gangs in their 
school system pose a moderate or serious threat” (p. 38). From this information, the inference 
here is that the less selective the institution, the easier it is for gangs to infiltrate. The process for 
entering the military, for instance, is more restrictive than the criteria required for entering the 
public school system. 
  Gangs have also infiltrated law enforcement institutions. Chiefly, correctional institutions 
designated for the punishment and rehabilitation of criminal offenders, and institutions 
responsible for policing its citizens and apprehending those that violate the established laws of 
society. When analyzing gangs in correctional institutions, I speak from a position of authority in 
having worked as a correctional officer in security threat group intelligence responsible for 
mitigating gang activity. Given the mass shortages of correctional officers across the country, it 
is common for gang members with no criminal history to gain employment. Once inside, they 
begin supplying their gang with information about the facility, staff, and standard operating 
procedures. The information they obtain is then used to smuggle in contraband, corrupt or coerce 
employees, and transfer information in and out of prison. One of the more infamous cases 
involved the abduction of North Carolina’s Assistant District Attorney (ADA), Colleen Janssen’s 
father, Frank Arthur Janssen (details of this case can be found in The United States of America v. 
Kelvin Melton (2014)). Janssen prosecuted Kelvin Melton, a 1-8-Trey gang leader of the United 
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Blood Nation, in 2012 for murdering his ex-girlfriend’s boyfriend (a case description can be read 
in State of North Carolina v. Melton (2014)).  In 2014, while serving his sentence in the high-
security maximum control unit (HCON)3 at Polk Correctional Institution, Melton ordered the 
abduction of ADA Janssen for his incarceration. The assailants had the wrong address, and 
Janssen's father was taken by mistake. After five days of captivity, federal authorities rescued 
him in Atlanta, GA. After a Department of Justice investigation, it was discovered that 
correctional officers Gregory Dustin Gouldman and Jason Dean were responsible for providing 
Melton with a cellular phone, a felony crime in the state of North Carolina (North Carolina 
Department of Justice, 2017). In addition to attempted murder, Melton made over 100 phone 
calls from his cell in the HCON unit. When gang members gain unrestricted access to their 
associates on the street, this jeopardizes the integrity of correctional institutions and challenges 
its legitimacy in the eyes of the public. The implications from such events heighten the security 
risk to communities by allowing gangs and their leadership to control operations regardless of 
the strict regulations and observation of the state. 
 Gangs are not always as deliberate as the case involving Kelvin Melton when attempting 
to corrupt law enforcement institutions. Sometimes designees of the state, responsible for 
apprehending criminals, succumb to the gangster lifestyle. In most large cities, for instance, 
specialized gang divisions are used as tactical units to suppress gang activity. The unintended 
consequence of these units leads to "decoupling," which generates a sense of isolation from 
officers, reduced oversight and accountability, and creates a counterculture at odds with the 
overall police organization (Katz & Webb, 2006). Renford Reese (2003) provides two other 
 
3 HCON is reserved for high-profile inmates and those who pose a security threat to the institution. Standard 
operating procedures require that these inmates be separated from the regular population, prohibited from having 
visitors such as family and friends, and limited in their number of personal belongings. Their only contact comes 
from correctional staff who carefully monitor the inmates for sanitation, recreation, and feeding. 
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theories to explain why police officers join gangs. One is the ‘rotten apple theory’ that claims 
corruption is a result of a few bad actors in the department. The other theory focuses on the 
environment cultivated by city leaders. From this perspective, there is a trickle-down effect. The 
criminal behavior exhibited by officers is a consequence of the culture created by corrupt 
politicians and high-ranking officers in the police department. 
 Charles M. Katz and Vincent J. Webb (2006) summarize one of the most notorious cases 
involving officer corruption in the Rampart District of Los Angeles, where officers began 
behaving like a gang in their own right. In addition to corruption, allegations of civil rights 
abuses led to what has become known as the Rampart Scandal. An investigation into the district 
primarily revealed malfeasance in the anti-gang unit CRASH (Community Resources Against 
Street Hoodlums). CRASH was established in the 1980s to combat the rise of gang violence in 
the city. Although CRASH was lauded for a decrease in gang-related crimes, an internal affairs 
investigation later determined that their methods were unlawful and, in several cases, involved 
civil rights abuses. Randall Sullivan (2002) documents the impetus for the Rampart Scandal. One 
LAPD Rampart officer, Raphael Perez, testified that the officers in CRASH behaved like the 
gangs that they were targeting. In addition to engaging in criminal conduct, their mannerisms, 
use of symbols, and established norms resembled that of a gang. Another notable CRASH officer 
engaged in criminal conduct, David Mack, was convicted of robbing a Bank of America. Some 
of the money from the robbery was allegedly meant as a payoff to Harry Billups (aka Amir 
Muhammed) for the murder of American rapper Christopher Wallace (aka The Notorious B.I.G., 
aka Biggie Smalls). The feud between the Notorious B.I.G. of Bad Boy Records, and Tupac 
Shakur, another American rap artist, of Death Row Records, is well-documented, and their 
murders remain unsolved (Sullivan, 2002). However, it was the shooting death of Kevin Gaines 
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by Detective Frank Lyga of the Hollywood Division that led to the investigation into the 
Rampart District. Gaines, a CRASH officer close to Perez and Mack, had ties to the Bloods and 
worked off-duty at Death Row Records for the owner and CEO Marion “Suge” Knight (a 
member of the MOB Pirus, aligned with the Bloods) until being shot and killed by Lyga who 
was assigned to investigate and solve the murders of Shakur and Wallace. Before the shootout 
with Lyga, Gaines was allegedly flashing gang signs. Through his investigation into the murders 
of Tupac and Biggie, Lyga inadvertently discovered the abuses and gang connections of Perez, 
Mack, and Gaines. The subsequent Rampart Scandal unveiled these abuses throughout the 
division.  
The fallout from the Rampart scandal supports the theory by Katz and Webb. 
“Decoupling” led to officers exhibiting gang-like behavior and, in some cases, joining gangs like 
the Bloods. Although there are “rotten apples,” or bad actors as Reese suggests, the corruption in 
the Rampart District was widespread. The investigation into the scandal identified roughly 70 
officers, most of whom were members of the anti-gang unit CRASH. Further, the role of the 
political environment in cultivating a culture that condones corruption is unsubstantiated in this 
case. One can argue that elections are won when politicians are responsive to their constituents. 
A strategy to win political favor is to identify corrupt police officers publicly. Especially when 
those officers are abusing the residents within their district. It seems more plausible that a lack of 
oversight, accountability, and transparency in addition to the continued interaction between 
officers and gang members contributes to the establishment of norms that reflect a conflict 
culture, similar to the process of gang formation described by Howell.  
2.4 Conclusion  
Early in U.S. history, domestic conditions fueled the rise and institutionalization of gangs 
in America. Although gangs emerged disproportionately across different regions of the country, 
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similar patterns of weak social controls, concentrated disadvantage, goal blockage, and mass 
migration have created an environment conducive to the formation of gangs. In turn, the 
environment helps shape individual preferences, making the benefits of joining a gang more 
attractive than other available alternatives; economic reasons, to improve social status, 
protection, or to satisfy thrill-seeking behavior, to name a few. As Howell (2015) demonstrates, 
what begins as collective action against adverse conditions, develops into a subculture of conflict 
groups. The final stage of this transformation culminates with the formation of gangs, whereby 
gangs replace the social controls typically taught by family and school, resulting in the 
normalization of deviance and criminality within communities. 
Although gangs began as an urban phenomenon, they have permeated throughout the 
country. Historically, gangs have been characterized as groups of loosely affiliated youths whose 
time in the gang is short, and influence confined to a city block or small neighborhood. As a 
result, the primary motivation of gangs is to protect their territory. The inference from this 
description is that they lack the necessary organization and sophistication to be a national threat. 
The modern gang, however, operates in urban, suburban, and rural communities, and, in some 
cases, has transnational ties. This expansion can be explained through a longitudinal analysis 
comparing historic gangs to the modern gang. Although some of their characteristics are similar, 
the modern gang differs from historic gangs in two significant ways. First, the modern gang is 
more market-oriented than historic gangs. The commercialization of cocaine and heroin after 
1970 has made gang participation a more lucrative enterprise. The ability to control market share 
in the illicit economy has altered the gang composite by attracting adult members, incentivizing 
gang participation for longer durations of time, and increasing the longevity of gangs. One of the 
earliest gangs in the United States, for example, The Five Points Gang, lasted roughly 30 years 
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compared to modern gangs such as the Bloods and the Crips that have been around since the 
1960s and show no signs of disappearing. The other distinction between the modern gang and 
historic gangs involves the creation of sophisticated network structures. The market orientation 
of the modern gang is partially responsible for gang expansion. In order to improve their market 
position, gangs seek partnerships and distribution channels outside of their home territory; a 
point made by Tita and Radil (2011) when comparing the economic conditions that contribute to 
gang activity in urban and rural communities. Gangs occupy both spaces, but for different 
reasons. They form in urban centers but gravitate towards areas in rural America where 
economic opportunities are greater. To facilitate this growth, they manage their supply chain by 
cultivating connections to other locations. Moreover, they have the advantage of functioning 
unbounded, whereas bureaucratic processes and jurisdictional barriers act as operational 
constraints for local law enforcement.  
In addition to greater gang-to-gang cooperation at the national level, gangs have begun 
adopting terrorist ideologies. This ‘network of ideas’ has contributed to the hybridization of 
some gangs as they integrate extremist beliefs into the gang culture. Combining these two 
systems of beliefs aims to unite gang members and elevate their focus onto a larger scale. For the 
Five Percenters, this means fighting a historical injustice perpetrated by white people that have 
subjugated Black communities and deprived them of their rightful place atop the social 
hierarchy. For some white gangs, this means resurrecting a Norse consciousness that aims to 
purify the races — an inevitable conflict with apocalyptic undertones.   
A final connection that separates the modern gang from historic gangs involves state 
institutions. Specifically, gang members that occupy the spaces responsible for security from 
both domestic and foreign threats. These include connections to the military and law 
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enforcement agencies. Gangs corrupt and undermine their operational efficacy, deteriorate public 
trust, and provide cover for illicit gang activity. Moreover, the specialized training gang 
members receive has been used to commit crimes in U.S. communities throughout the country. 
Unlike historic gangs that were primarily local, the network orientation of modern gangs present 
significant challenges to law and order, weakens institutions, and negatively impacts the 
structural integrity of the state by transposing local gang activity onto the national security 





















WHAT IS A GANG? THE ROLE OF GANG TYPOLOGIES IN DEFINING GANGS 
 
 There is no universally accepted definition of ‘gang’ (Huff & Barrows, 2015). A point of 
contention within this debate is disagreement on the scope of what constitutes a gang. Too broad, 
and non-gang affiliated groups like fraternities can be categorized as gangs. Too narrow, and 
definitions miss categorically important features of gangs. Another argument points to the 
tautology of including crime in gang definitions, electing instead to conceptualize gangs as 
performative manifestations. From this perspective, gangs are defined in terms of their 
environment and the social context with which they form. Similarly, input from law enforcement 
agencies has been rejected as being influenced by politically motivated agendas, an 
“unscientific” approach where gangs are defined by disparate criteria across the country. Some 
states have adopted the federal definition of gangs, and others have written their own. States such 
as Hawaii, Maine, New Mexico, Rhode Island, Vermont, and West Virginia have no official 
gang definition (Huff & Barrows, 2015). It can be inferred that differences between jurisdictional 
authorities responsible for providing meaning to the term ‘gang’ reflect a localized interpretation, 
undermining a universal gang definition from emerging. In the first part of this chapter, I 
highlight the debate on defining gangs.  
G. David Curry (2015) effectively reconciles the differences between broad and narrow 
gang definitions, arguing that law enforcement sources compliment sociological perspectives by 
integrating environmental group factors with current gang data. However, the debate on defining 
‘gang’ neglects gang typologies, which leads to an amorphous definition of the term. This is 
important because some gangs, although forming under similar conditions, follow different 
trajectories which complicate our conclusions on the criteria that distinguish gangs from other 
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criminal groups. John Sullivan (1997), for example, describes gang transformation occurring 
along an evolutionary scale that involves three generations of gangs. First-generation gangs are 
the most ubiquitous, primarily focused on protecting territory while second-generation gangs are 
market-oriented and demonstrate greater cohesion towards advancing group objectives. Second-
generation gangs began emerging after the introduction of narcotics in the 1970s by providing 
lucrative economic opportunities and stability (Coughlin & Venkatesh, 2003). Finally, third-
generation gangs aim to influence political outcomes and often use terrorism or quasi-terrorism 
to achieve their goal. Including evolutionary gang typologies in gang definitions help to collate 
them with organized crime and terrorist organizations. The former is comparable to the profit-
motivations of second-generation gangs, while the latter shares the ideologically-driven 
attributes of third-generation gangs. Thinking about gang evolution helps address similar 
questions asked by Scott Decker, Tim Bynum, and Deborah Weisel (1998).  What qualifies as a 
gang, and when does a gang transition to an organized crime syndicate or terrorist organization? 
In addition to generational gang types, there are cultural gang types divided into street, prison, 
and outlaw motorcycle gangs. While street gangs originate in neighborhoods, prison gangs 
originate in the prison system. Outlaw motorcycle gangs (OMGs), on the other hand, are more 
nomadic than street or prison gangs, and share an affinity for motorcycle subculture. It is not my 
intention to argue a position on defining gangs but to provide additional consideration for a more 
eloquent gang definition. In the second part of this chapter, I emphasize the origins and history of 
some of the more prominent gangs in the United States. Not all gangs are similar, making the 
examination of gang typologies an important contribution to developing a gang definition that 




3.1 Defining Gangs 
 It is best to start with Frederic Thrasher (1927) when attempting to understand the debate 
on defining gangs (Curry, 2015). In his seminal study of Chicago gangs, Thrasher defines the 
gang as “an interstitial group formed spontaneously and then integrated through conflict” (p. 57). 
Although the absence of social controls plays a role in gang formation and conflict contributes to 
gang cohesion, defining gangs by early twentieth century standards over-simplifies the modern 
complexity of gangs. Because gangs are fluid, any robust definition of gangs should address 
temporality (Curry, 2015). As an alternative to Thrasher, Malcolm Klein (1971) defines gangs 
as, “Any denotable group of youngsters who (a) are generally perceived as a distinct aggregation 
by others in their neighborhood, (b) recognize themselves as a denotable group (almost 
invariably with a group name), and (c) have been involved in a sufficient number of delinquent 
incidents to call forth a consistent negative response from neighborhood residents and/or 
enforcement agencies” (p. 13). However, Walter Miller (1975) is quick to highlight ambiguity in 
the term ‘youth,' and provides his definition of (youth) gangs as “a self-formed association of 
peers, bound together by mutual interests, with identifiable leadership, well-developed lines of 
authority, and other organizational features, who act in concert to achieve a specific purpose or 
purposes which generally include the conduct of illegal activity and control over a particular 
territory, facility, or type of enterprise” (p. 121). Robert Bursik and Harold Grasmik (1993) point 
out that fraternities and other non-gang affiliated groups fit the gang definition proposed by 
Klein, a similar weakness found in Miller’s definition.  
G. David Curry (2015) builds on Richard Ball and Curry (1995) in re-visiting the logic of 
defining gangs. He delineates the contrasting viewpoints among scholars that have prohibited a 
universally accepted definition of ‘gang’ from materializing. One part of the debate involves the 
use of crime in official gang definitions as a redundant, if not unnecessary, descriptor that 
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propagates a moral panic (Shute & Medina, 2014). Although Klein and Miller explicitly 
integrate criminal behavior in their definitions, Scott Decker et al. (2014), Finn-Aage Esbensen 
et al. (2001), and Terrence Thornberry et al. (2003) remind us that criminal activity is not 
required to join a gang. James F. Short, Jr. (1996) avoids using a criminogenic lens when he 
posits, “Gangs are groups whose members meet together with some regularity, over time, on the 
basis of group-defined criteria of membership and group-defined organizational characteristics; 
that is, gangs are non-adult sponsored, self-determining groups that demonstrate continuity over 
time” (p. 5). Other scholars avoid using ‘crime’ by defining gangs as social constructs 
(Brotherton, 1997), symbolic of “street life” (Conquergood, 1997), resistant to their social status 
and reject established centers of authority (Garot, 2010), and best understood in the same context 
as social movements (Katz & Jackson-Jacobs, 2004).  
 Although committing crimes is not a prerequisite for joining a gang, gang culture 
encourages, if not incentivizes, criminal behavior (Bernburg, Krohn, & Rivera, 2006). This can 
be in the form of peer pressure, inherited traits through socialization, or for promotional 
opportunities. One of the most effective ways to gain the trust of other gang members, and 
demonstrate one's loyalty, is by carrying out a criminal act, especially through violence (Federal 
Bureau of Investigations, 1982). A 2011 National Gang Intelligence Center survey indicates that 
48 – 90% of violent crime in districts across the country were committed by gang members. 
Because violent crime is a salient feature of gang behavior, some scholars such as Judith 
Aldridge, Juanjo Medina, and Robert Ralphs (2012) question why this is not more prominently 
featured in gang definitions. Some prison gangs, for example, require their members to assault 
correctional officers as part of their recruitment process, or to advance in rank. Not all crimes, 
however, require an assault or homicide. Less malicious criminal activity involves “spotting” to 
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alert other gang members of a police presence, or “tagging” that mark gang-controlled territory. 
In most cases, the more serious the crime, the greater the opportunity for advancement. I provide 
gang-specific examples when discussing the typology of gangs later in this chapter.  
Another debate in defining gangs, according to Curry, is whether or not to include the 
lexical terms used by law enforcement. John Hagedorn (1988) refers to scholars that borrow 
definitions from law enforcement as “courthouse criminologists.” Jack Katz and Curtis Jackson-
Jacobs (2004) argue that law enforcement definitions are, by design, manifested in a policy 
agenda with ready-made solutions that target inimical groups. Differences in gang reporting 
across space and time lead to different interpretations of gangs, “more often reflecting the 
organization of social control agencies than empirical realities about gang memberships or 
gangs” (Fagan, 1990, p. 190). One definition that has gained some momentum is the Eurogang 
definition. First proposed in Malcolm Klein (2001) and adopted by Klein and Cheryl Maxson 
(2006), “A street gang is any durable, street-oriented youth group whose involvement in illegal 
activity is part of its group identity” (p. 4). The full extent of the Eurogang definition identifies 
durability (differentiating between short- and long-term groups), defines youth (between ages of 
12 – 25), and incorporates illicit group behavior (Hiestand, 2018). Although Curry disagrees, the 
authors claim that the Eurogang definition has drawn a consensus among gang scholars. 
Aldridge, Medina-Ariz, & Ralphs (2012), however, point out that the Eurogang definition 
includes groups that convene to use illegal drugs, the same generalization that weakens Klein’s 
1971 definition. Despite this criticism, Todd Hiestand (2018) indicates that California Assembly 
Bill (AB) 90 borrows from the Eurogang definition: 
’Criminal street gang’ means an ongoing organization, association, or group of three or 
more persons, whether formal or informal, having as one of its primary activities the 
commission of crimes enumerated in paragraphs (1) to (25), inclusive, and paragraphs 
(31) to (33), inclusive, of subdivision e of Section 186.22 who have a common 
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identifying sign, symbol, or name, and whose members individually or collectively 
engage in or have engaged in a pattern of definable criminal activity (p. 5). 
 
The primary differences between the Eurogang definition and AB 90, according to Hiestand, is 
that the latter operationalizes 'group,' disregards age, acknowledges a common identifier among 
members, and includes crime as an individual or group act. However, the adjustments made to 
AB 90 in contrast to the Eurogang definition appear to be an abridged version of gangs defined 
by federal agencies. The National Gang Intelligence Center (2015), a division of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigations defines gangs as:  
(1) an association of three or more individuals; (2) whose members collectively identify 
themselves by adopting a group identity, which they use to create an atmosphere of fear 
or intimidation frequently by employing one or more of the following: a common name, 
slogan, identifying sign, symbol, tattoo or other physical marking, style or color of 
clothing, hairstyle, hand sign or graffiti; (3) the association’s purpose, in part, is to 
engage in criminal activity and the association uses violence or intimidation to further its 
criminal objectives; (4) its members engage in criminal activity, or acts of juvenile 
delinquency that if committed by an adult would be crimes; (5) with the intent to enhance 
or preserve the association’s power, reputation, or economic resources; (6) the 
association may also possess some of the following characteristics: (a) the members 
employ rules for joining and operating within the association; (b) the members meet on a 
recurring basis; (c) the association provides physical protection of its members from other 
criminals and gangs; (d) the association seeks to exercise control over a particular 
location or region, or it may simply defend its perceived interests against rivals; or (e) the 
association has an identifiable structure; (7) this definition is not intended to include 
traditional organized crime groups, such as La Cosa Nostra, groups that fall within the 
Department’s definition of “international organized crime,” drug trafficking 
organizations or terrorist organizations (p. 4). 
 
Curry finds that using law enforcement methods to define gangs provides valuable insight into 
developing an operational gang definition. “Even when older definitions have proved acceptable, 
new definitions often become necessary, either because of changes in the phenomenon itself or 
changes in the purposes for which the definition is required. As the relative visibility of various 
phenomenal features changes with research progress, redefinition often becomes necessary” (p. 
23). Curry concludes that the methodology used by law enforcement operatives is more precise 
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than the broad gang definitions developed by Klein, Miller, and Klein and Maxson. Law 
enforcement agencies use a self-reporting mechanism that is absent in the scholarly research 
design of survey data. Additionally, law enforcement narrowly target groups of individuals that 
represent a significant threat to the community. This approach excludes peripheral gang 
affiliations (e.g., individuals that participate in gang crimes but are not gang members) and 
superfluous gang descriptors, while including the most recent gang characteristics. For example, 
G. David Curry (2000) and David Pyrooz (2014) deride “youth gang” as anachronistic. Although 
juvenile membership may have been more prevalent in the past, both studies agree that the gang 
problem is centered on adults. As I point out in the previous chapter, using ‘youth’ or ‘juvenile’ 
to describe gang members ignores the realities of the demographic composition of gangs where 
adult members play a prominent role. The use of law enforcement sources to define gangs 
provides observational data on gangs as they evolve (Curry, 2015). Moreover, the attributes used 
by law enforcement agencies to define criminal groups provide the context necessary to 
differentiate between them (Abadinsky, 2010). The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, for 
example, establishes that organized crime: 
1. Engages in the illegal use of force, fraud, and corruption. 
 
2. Derives power through money from illicit activity. This includes gambling, loan 
sharking, theft and fencing of property, importation and distribution of narcotics, and 
other forms of social exploitation. 
 
3. Infiltrates and corrupts legitimate businesses and labor unions to subvert the 
democratic process. 
 
4. Weakens the U.S. economic system by harming investors, interfering with “free” 
competition, and disrupting global commerce. 
 
 Whereas gangs are conceptualized as being territorial, organized crime groups like the 
mafia and cartels are characterized as being profit-driven. Terrorist organizations, a third 
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criminal group, on the other hand, are considered ideologically motivated to invoke political 
change. The U.S. Department of Justice (2009) codifies a terrorist with behavior consistent with 
committing acts of terrorism in the following definition: 
(1) the term “international terrorism” means activities that— 
(A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the 
criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation if 
committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any State; 
(B) appear to be intended— 
(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; 
(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or 
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or 
kidnapping; and 
 
(C) occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or transcend 
national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they 
appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or 
seek asylum; 
 
(2) the term “national of the United States” has the meaning given such term in section 
101(a)(22) of the Immigration and Nationality Act; 
(3) the term “person” means any individual or entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial 
interest in property; 
(4) the term “act of war” means any act occurring in the course of— 
(A) declared war; 
(B) armed conflict, whether or not war has been declared, between two or more nations; 
or 
(C) armed conflict between military forces of any origin; and 
 
(5) the term “domestic terrorism” means activities that— 
(A) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the 
United States or of any State; 
(B) appear to be intended— 
(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; 
(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or 
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or 
kidnapping; and 
           (C) occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. 
 
That is not to say that gangs, organized crime, and terrorist groups do not share similar 
characteristics. All three use violence as a means to achieve their ends. The fundamental 
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difference here is their motivations. Generally speaking, gangs are territorial, organized crime 
groups are profit-driven, and terrorist organizations focus on influencing political outcomes.  
3.2 Gang Typologies 
 There are two important gang types that deserve attention. One is generational and 
classifies gangs by their primary motivation of territory, profits, or ideology through evolution. 
The other is cultural and includes street, prison, and outlaw motorcycle gangs (OMGs). Although 
cultural gangs exist at various stages of evolution, gang generations and culture are mutually 
exclusive. John Sullivan (2001, 2006) points out that most street gangs can be categorized as 
first- or second-generation gangs, but some, such as MS-13, the Gangster Disciples, and Black P. 
Stone Nation, have transformed into third-generation gangs. Examining gang typologies gives 
nuance to an otherwise complex debate on defining the gang archetype. Gang generations 
provide insight into the evolutionary spectrum of gangs where their motivation not only 
separates gangs from other gangs but distinguishes gangs from organized crime and terrorist 
groups. Understanding cultural gangs, on the other hand, is important because it highlights the 
norms, values, and characteristics of different gangs.  
Considering gang typologies helps conceptualize gangs in terms of their shared 
similarities and differences that can move us towards a more unified gang definition. Jack Katz 
and Curtis Jackson-Jacobs (2004) explain gangs in the context of social activism, but their 
hypothesis does not account for the profit-orientation of some street gangs. The Crips and Latin 
Kings, for example, originated as community advocacy groups to protect the rights of African 
American and Hispanic communities, respectively. However, ‘gangs as social activists’ neither 
explains their transition into criminal street gangs when more economically lucrative 
opportunities emerged, nor does it address the subsequent impact this had on the formation of 
rival gangs. Gang definitions that use ‘youth’ or ‘juvenile’ to describe gangs does not apply to 
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outlaw motorcycle gangs whose members are typically older. OMGs undermine the gang 
definition proposed by James F. Short (1996) who considers gangs bereft of adult-sponsorship. 
Similarly, Dwight Conquergood (1997) conceptualizes gangs as “symbolic of street life,” a 
colloquialism used to describe urban areas where residents are struggling to survive. This 
neglects the confinement of prison gangs to correctional facilities and the proliferation of other 
gang types into rural settings. Several of the largest OMGs in the United States, for example, 
formed in rural areas that do not fit the “street life” description. The Hells Angels formed in 
Fontana, California while the Outlaws MC and Sons of Silence formed in McCook, Illinois and 
Niwot, Colorado, respectively. A common behavior of gangs that Judith Aldridge, Juanjo 
Medina, and Robert Ralphs (2012) consider important to defining gangs is their propensity to 
commit crime, particularly through acts of violence. Earning rank in a prison gang requires 
assaulting other inmates (usually rival gang members) or prison staff. In the Aryan Brotherhood, 
higher ranks are reserved for those that have committed more serious crimes, up to and including 
homicide (FBI, 1982). In the following section I provide an overview of gang typologies with an 
emphasis on the origin and history of some of the largest national gangs in the United States.  
3.2.1 Gang Generations 
John Sullivan (1997) postulates that the trajectory of gangs can be determined by three 
dimensions. One is politicization, or the political motivations of a gang, ranging from limited to 
evolved. The other is internationalization, or the geographic reach of a gang ranging from local 
to transnational. Third is the level of sophistication a gang demonstrates. Together, these three 
factors help explain the evolution of gangs and the extent to which they have transformed into 
net warriors. According to Sullivan, there are three generations. The most basic and ubiquitous 
of the three are first-generation (1-G) gangs or proto-net warriors. Sullivan provides the 
following definition for 1-G gangs: 
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Traditional street gangs have focused on a narrow slice of violence. Primarily turf-
oriented, they operate under loose leadership, with ill-defined roles and a focus on loyalty 
and turf protection. These gangs engage in a broad range of opportunistic criminal 
activity and inter-gang rivalry. Individual members may sell drugs. They are localized 
and not highly sophisticated (p. 95). 
 
Second-generation (2-G) gangs are consistent with the description of gangs identified by Brenda 
Coughlin and Sudhir Venkatesh (2003) after the introduction of narcotics in the 1970s. They 
demonstrate greater organization and group dedication to capitalize on market opportunities. 
Sullivan refers to 2-G gangs as emerging net warriors. He provides the following definition for 
2-G gangs: 
The more entrepreneurial, drug-centered, gang emerges as a second generation type. This 
gang is interested in market protection, and focuses its criminal endeavors on drugs as a 
business. Second generation gangs are more cohesive, with greater centralization of 
leadership. Drug-selling becomes a group rather than individual activity. Drug gangs use 
violence to control their competition and assume a market rather than a turf orientation. 
They may embrace a broader political agenda (albeit market-focused), operate in a 
broader (sometimes multi-state) context, and conduct more sophisticated operations (pp. 
95-96). 
 
Once gangs evolve, they begin to share characteristics with other criminal groups. 2-G gangs 
resemble organized crime where criminal activity functions as a business, and security is gained 
through market control. Insofar as they use violence similar to 1-G gangs, they aim to protect 
market share rather than territory. Third-generation (3-G) gangs, on the other hand, are more 
closely related to terrorist organizations by using violence to influence political change. The 3-G 
gang emerges in what Sullivan refers to as a net warrior. He provides the following definition of 
3-G gangs:  
The third generation street gang is a mercenary-type group with goals of power or 
financial acquisition and a set of fully evolved political aims. Third generation gangs 
operate at the global end of the spectrum and are more sophisticated in nature. This type 
of gang may embrace either quasi-terrorism or true terrorism to advance its influence and, 
as such, are net warriors who truly challenge the nation-state (p. 96). 
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Intuitively, the continuity of gangs and the circumstances with which they form places them on 
different trajectories. Some remain localized occupying smaller spaces while others expand as 
their interests, and means to satisfy those interests, change. In most cases, this involves 
occupying more territory where network channels help control the flow of information and 
resources. Although he makes a valid point that different variations of gangs exist 
simultaneously along an evolutionary spectrum, Sullivan fails to address how gangs fit into these 
categories. In his subsequent work (See Sullivan 2001 and 2006), he explicitly identifies which 
gangs fit the 2-G and 3-G descriptions, but without a formal methodology describing his 
selection process. In other words, how political, transnational, and sophisticated, does a gang 
have to be in order to be considered a 1-G, 2-G, or 3-G gang? Moreover, he limits his analysis of 
gang generations to street gangs. This ignores two other important gang types, prison and 
motorcycle clubs, that I cover in the next section. 
3.2.2 Cultural Gangs 
There are three gang types, each with their own distinct culture. The largest group are 
street gangs. Street gangs form on the street and can be subdivided into neighborhood (local) and 
national gangs. Although they operate in the prison system, prison gangs are a separate gang 
type, and are sometimes referred to as “supergangs.” Whereas street gangs originate in 
neighborhoods and are imported into the prison system, prison gangs form in prison and, in some 
cases, are exported into neighborhoods. Where prison gangs do not have representation outside 
of the prison, they control street-level operations through proxy gangs. A third cultural gang is 
outlaw motorcycle gangs (OMGs). Unlike street and prison gangs, OMGs are nomadic and show 
an affinity for motorcycle sub-culture. In fact, knowing how to operate a motorcycle is required 
for membership.  
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3.2.2.1 Street Gangs 
According to the NGIC (2015), “Street gangs are criminal organizations that formed on 
the street and operate in neighborhoods throughout the United States. Neighborhood-based gangs 
are confined to specific neighborhoods and jurisdictions, with no known leadership beyond their 
communities. National-level gangs have a presence in multiple jurisdictions” (p. 11). The 
distinction of neighborhood and national gangs fit nicely with Sullivan's evolutionary theory. 
Neighborhood-based gangs undoubtedly cover 1-G while national-level gangs more closely 
resemble 2- and 3-G gangs. Globally, “Street gangs have been more common in the United 
States than any country in the world. It is also true that American street gangs… have had a 
profound role in shaping street gangs throughout the world” (Covey, 2010, p.38). The discussion 
that follows identifies several of the largest street gangs in the United States, along with some of 
their primary allies and rivals. 
3.2.2.1.1 Bloods & Crips 
Two of the largest African American street gangs in the United States are the Bloods and 
Crips. With a rivalry spanning half a century, the first of these two gangs to form was the Crips 
in the latter half of the 1960s. According to Juan Francisco Esteva Martinez and Marcos Antonio 
Ramos (2008), there are three competing theories to explain their genesis. One explains their 
formation as a product of institutional racism and violence directed at southern blacks migrating 
to Los Angeles. In response to these hostile conditions, the Crips emerged to protect Black 
communities. Similarly, towards the end of the civil rights movement, another theory suggests 
the Crips aimed to replicate the Black Panther Party (BPP) as a community organization. Their 
objective was to provide justice and equality for African Americans. The third theory on the 
origin of the Crips contradicts the other two, positing that neighborhood criminals began working 
together to victimize Black communities.  
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Rather than separate theories, all three describe the origin of the Crips at different stages 
of their development. The Watts riots of 1965 provide the best starting point. On August 11, 
1965, Marquette Frye, a twenty-one-year-old African American, and his brother were pulled 
over near their home by the California Highway Patrol for driving while intoxicated. According 
to eyewitnesses, one of the officers assaulted his mother, Rena Price, when she attempted to 
intervene in the arrest of her son (Horne, 1995). The situation escalated into a melee involving 
her, her sons, and the officers on the scene sparking outrage from the crowd that had gathered. 
Rena Price and her two sons were arrested. Backlash from the community resulted in what has 
become known as the Watts riots, or Watts Rebellion, resulting in 1,000 injuries, 4,000 arrests, 
and $200 million in damage (Horne, 1995). Following the riots, the BPP formed to advocate for 
African Americans and protect Black communities. Their community involvement had a 
profound impact on Black youths in Los Angeles (Stack, 2003), and, at a time of racially charged 
conflicts across the country, the Crips formed as an offshoot of the BPP (Howell, 2015). One of 
the founders of the Crips, Raymond Washington, wanted to emulate the BPP (Alonso, 2010). In 
fact, he grew up on the same street as Bunchy Carter, one of the leaders of the BPP, and someone 
he knew personally. This association was a source of pride for Washington (Alonso, 2010). 
Moreover, some of the original Crip members were involved with the BPP. Dissatisfied with the 
pace at which the BPP was getting results, they splintered from the group (Howell, 2015). In 
1971 when Washington met Stanley "Tookie" Williams at Washington Preparatory High School, 
the Crips officially formed. Under this alliance, they began consolidating gangs in South Central 
Los Angeles and emerged as the largest gang in the area. Although the Crips began as a 
community-oriented group, they quickly pivoted into a criminal organization when gang leaders 
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realized the lucrative economic opportunities of distributing narcotics and illegal firearms 
(Howell, 2015).  
Gangs not absorbed by the Crips were left alienated and vulnerable. In response to the 
Crips, the Blood alliance was formed. One of the first gangs to resist the Crips were the Pirus. 
They declared war against the West Side Crips in 1971, and, within a few years, other gangs 
such as the Slausons, Brims, Bishops, and Pueblos joined the Bloods (Martínez, 2008). Some of 
these gangs currently exist as Blood sets, but at the time, they coalesced under a single banner. 
The presence of the Crips and Bloods have been reported in all fifty U.S. states with others 
emerging overseas. The extent to which they are connected remains unclear. In addition to the 
primary gang, several sets and allies exist on both sides. The rivalry among the Crips and Bloods 
continues today and includes several sets and allies across the country. 
Since their formation, several gang sets and subsets have claimed Crip and Blood 
affiliation. Although most major gang sets preserve their alliances, the splintering of these gangs 
has also led to internal conflict. One of the main Crip-on-Crip rivalries involves the 
Neighborhood Crips (aka Rollin Os, aka Deuces) and the Gangster Crips (aka Trays). They were 
allies until 1979 when a recruit of the Eight Tray Gangsters shot and killed a member of the 
Rollin' 60s Neighborhood Crips. The Eight Tray Gangsters were unwilling to cooperate and turn 
over the recruit who had surrendered himself to police custody. In retaliation, the Rollin' 60s 
killed a member of the Eight Tray Gangsters. A gang war erupted with other area Crip sets being 
forced to take sides. Their rivalry continues today and has spilled over into other communities. 
The Rollin' 60s Neighborhood Crips is one of the fastest-growing gangs in the country and has 
expanded overseas (Rap Dictionary, 2015). One Crip set that attacks other Crip sets is the Grape 
Street Crips. Located in the Jordan Downs Housing Projects in Watts, they have a long-standing 
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feud with the PJ Watts Crips located in the Imperial Courts Housing Projects. Both gangs 
originated in the Watts district of Los Angeles.   
 Some Blood sets face similar circumstances as the Crips. The Tree Top Pirus (TTP), for 
example, frequently attack other Piru and Blood sets. Having originated in Compton, the Tree 
Top Pirus primarily feud with local gangs. They have since expanded throughout the United 
States with a strong presence in Maryland. Despite their continued hostilities towards the Crips 
and Blood sets, their main rival is the Compton Varrio Tortilla Flats, one of several Hispanic 
gangs at odds with the TTP (Rap Dictionary, 2015b). Another Blood set known to attack other 
Bloods is the Bounty Hunter Bloods. Although their primary rival is the Grape Street Crips, the 
Bounty Hunter Bloods maintain rivalries with the TTP, Athens Park Bloods, and several other 
Blood sets. The rivalry with the Grape Street Crips has led to intermittent alliances between the 
Bounty Hunter Bloods and the PJ Watts Crips. Bounty Hunter Bloods originated in the 
Nickerson Garden Housing Projects in the late 1960s as the Green Jackets and has since been 
reported in several cities throughout the country, including Norfolk, Virginia, and Trenton, New 
Jersey (United Gangs, 2020). 
3.2.2.1.2 Folk Nation & People Nation 
The rivalry between the Folk and People Nations originated in Chicago and has since 
spread throughout the United States. Larry Hoover, leader of the Supreme Gangsters, established 
the Folk Nation alliance in 1978. Rod Emory (1996) explains that continued bloodshed in the 
streets of Chicago, and the size and strength of the Supreme Gangsters led two of Hoover's 
rivals, the Black P. Stones and Black Disciples, seeking to align with them. Hoover first 
approached Jeff Fort, leader of the Black P. Stones, but negotiations broke down. The leader of 
the Black Disciples, David Barksdale, on the other hand, agreed to merge with Hoover's 
Gangsters, and the Black Gangster Disciple Nation (BGDN) was formed in 1969. Following 
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Barksdale's death in 1974, the BGDN eventually split into the Black Disciples, and Gangster 
Disciples as growing opposition among some Black Disciple members grew over Hoover’s push 
for greater unity between Disciples and Gangsters (Omori & Thompkins, 2008). In 1978, while 
Hoover was serving a 150-200 year prison sentence in Stateville Correctional Center in Crest 
Hill, Illinois, for the murder of William Young, he orchestrated a work stoppage among inmates 
over allegations of abusive conditions at the prison facility. The aftermath of this insurrection 
inspired unity among various gangs that decided to join the Folk Nation alliance (Chicago Gang 
History, 2017a). One of the original Folk members was the BGDN. They eventually dropped 
‘Black’ from their name and became the Gangster Disciples (GD) as their rivalry with the Black 
Disciples (BD) intensified. Despite belonging to the Folk Nation, the BD and GD remain 
enemies. Some of the main gangs, or sets, that pledge allegiance to the Folk Nation include the 
Imperial Gangsters, La Raza, Maniac Latin Disciples, and seven others.  
In response to the creation of the Folk Nation and his failed attempt at merging with 
Hoover's Supreme Gangsters, Jeff Fort used his influence as the leader of the Black P. Stones to 
form his own gang alliance in Chicago, the People Nation. One of the most important members 
in this alliance is the Latin Kings. Established in the early 1960s by Ramon Santos (aka King 
Papo) and "White Sal," the Latin Kings have maintained cohesion between members by creating 
a sense of brotherhood that extends throughout the United States and across the globe (Chicago 
Gang History, 2017b). As one of the largest gangs in the alliance, the influence of the Latin 
Kings exceeds the People Nation. This has contributed to internal conflicts with other members 
of the alliance. In the early 1990s, for example, the Latin Kings went to war with the Latin 
Counts, Bishops, and Insane Deuces (Chicago Gang History, 2017b). Other notable gangs that 
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have joined the People Nation include the Vice Lords, Four-Corner Hustlers, the Bishops, and 
the Gaylords.  
 One distinction that sets the Folk and People Nations apart from other gangs is their 
political motivation. Ideologically, they resemble Black nationalist gangs like the Five 
Percenters. John Sullivan (2001) identifies several gangs in both alliances that have transformed 
into third-generation gangs. Jeff Fort integrated an Islamic belief system into the Black P. 
Stones. It was through religion that Fort sought to maintain cohesion among gang members. 
After being rejected by the Black Muslims and Moorish Science Temple of America, he 
attempted to align the Black P Stones as a terrorist branch of the Libyan government in 1986 and 
traveled to Libya during a travel ban to negotiate terms with President Muammar Ghaddafi 
(Knox, 2008a). A similar situation unfolded in 2002 when José Padilla, a member of the Latin 
Kings, was arrested under the Patriot Act. He was subsequently convicted for conspiring to 
commit murder and acts of terrorism by detonating a “dirty bomb” on U.S. soil (Padilla v Bush, 
2002). Some argue the Padilla case provides anecdotal evidence of a terrorist connection that 
represents the action of an individual and is not indicative of the gang as a whole. However, 
George Knox (2010) provides the following threat analysis on the Latin Kings:  
The Latin Kings are a Level Three gang organization: they exist as a centralized, 
authoritarian, violent formal organization complete with a written constitution and by-
laws. As a gang, they have often taken advantage of any political corruption they could, 
but do so on a "case by case" basis: where it helps, they do it for business, and in this 
sense fit the more classic pattern of organized crime. From a perspective of size of the 
gang, its penetration of communities outside its epicenter (i.e., Chicago), and its 
propensity for violence, we would give this gang an 8 on a zero to ten point scale (the 
higher the number the higher the threat). Making it one of the most threatening gangs in 
the United States today. 
 
Although Knox's assessment does not include terrorism, he describes the Latin Kings as being a 
cohesive gang with centralized leadership that has expanded beyond the city borders of Chicago, 
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where members are bound together by a formal set of rules and resemble the structure of 
organized crime groups. In fact, the Latin Kings originated as a community advocacy group for 
Hispanic Americans, and maintain branches throughout the world. 
The Gangster Disciples are another politically motivated gang. Behind the scenes, they 
have built a criminal drug trafficking enterprise while attempting to control their public image 
through media manipulation (Knox, 2008b). The latter involved a re-branding campaign to 
change the meaning of GD from Gangster Disciples to “Growth and Development” predicated 
on six principles: love, life, loyalty, knowledge, wisdom, and understanding (Emory, 1996). 
Additionally, they launched their own political action group, 21st Century VOTE (Voices of 
Total Empowerment), to provide funding and campaign support for candidates seeking political 
office (Omori & Thompkins, 2008). 
3.2.2.1.3 Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) & 18th Street (Barrio 18) 
In 1979, a military coup in El Salvador led to the deposition of President Carlos 
Humberto Romero, setting the stage for a civil war that lasted until 1992. During this time, an 
estimated 1 million refugees fled the country with a majority resettling in the United States 
(Valdez, 2000). Among the displaced population of Salvadoran migrants were street gang 
members and former members of the paramilitary rebel organization Farabundo Martí National 
Liberation Front (FMLN). Many of them settled in the Rampart District of Los Angeles, 
California (Adams & Pizarro, 2009). More specifically, Pico-Union, an area characterized by 
poor living conditions and high crime rates where residents were victimized by white, Black, and 
Hispanic gangs (Wolf, 2012). To protect themselves, Salvadoran youth either joined the 
Dieciocho (also known as the 18th Street Gang or Barrio 18), a Hispanic gang established in 
1960, or formed their own gang, Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13), (Wolf, 2012). In 1996, the U.S. 
Government passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act to 
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remove non-citizens convicted of crimes. A move that effectively exported American gang 
culture to other parts of the world (Covey, 2010). Since a majority of Salvadoran refugees had 
entered the country illegally, and members of MS-13 frequently broke the law, policing 
strategies targeted the gang for deportation.  
Once MS-13 members were returned to their home country, they began recruiting within 
communities and among neighboring countries, which fueled their expansion into Central and 
South America. Their primary rival, the 18th Street Gang, or Barrio 18, followed a similar path. 
Deportees began recruitment campaigns to maintain their competitiveness with MS-13. Barrio 18 
received the nickname “The Children’s Army” for recruiting gang members out of elementary 
schools (Virginia State Police, 2011). The continued growth of these two gangs and the level of 
violence created in the wake of this rivalry prompted the Salvadoran government to intervene in 
2009. Under the leadership of President Mauricio Funes, a ceasefire was brokered between MS-
13 and Barrio 18. In exchange for reducing gang violence and prohibiting recruitment in schools, 
the government paid MS-13 leaders $25 million and, in some districts, placed them on the 
government payroll (Farah & Babineau, 2017). With the ceasefire in place, MS-13 focused on 
gaining community support, established military training camps, and began integrating into state 
law enforcement agencies. Additionally, MS-13 began to strengthen its relationship with the 
Sinaloa Cartel and Los Zetas to train, work, and expand (Cawley, 2013). In the United States, 
Luis Gerardo Vega was invited into the inner circle of the Mexican Mafia in 2011, which 
facilitated their foray into distributing methamphetamines (Garcia, 2016). The Mexican Mafia 
operates exclusively as a prison gang in the United States but is responsible for coordinating 




Although the truce between MS-13 and Barrio 18 significantly reduced gang homicides, 
it also had the unintended consequence of transforming MS-13 to a third-generation gang. By 
2014, the negotiated ceasefire deteriorated, and MS-13 leadership began exercising their political 
clout. The truce showed them that they could get concessions from the government. To that end, 
MS-13 began leveraging its ties to the community to influence political outcomes. In some cases, 
political parties were charged a fee to campaign in certain neighborhoods, and in others, they 
directly financed political candidates. They also intervened in the politics of neighboring 
countries. In 2017, for example, MS-13 prohibited Honduran President Juan Orlando Hernández 
from campaigning in San Pedro (Farah & Babineau, 2017). Members of MS-13 threatened to kill 
anyone that chose to vote for him, forced campaign workers to quit, and prevented the 
circulation of campaign literature promoting Hernández’s candidacy (Farah & Babineau, 2017). 
They made similar threats in El Salvador against members of FMLN running for public office.  
 Currently, MS-13 is one of the largest gangs in the United States and has been acknowledged 
and targeted by the U.S. Justice Department. They have been reported in all 50 states, but their 
strongest presence is in Washington DC, New York, and California (Adams & Pizarro, 2009). 
The criminal activities of MS-13 and Barrio 18, and their cooperation with Mexican cartels have 
become tantamount to the debate on immigration reform. In response to the emerging 
transnational threat, the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) established the Transnational 
Anti-Gang (TAG) Task Force in El Salvador (2007), Guatemala (2009), and Honduras (2011). 
The purpose of TAG is to collaborate with host country intelligence agencies in collecting and 
disseminating information on MS-13 to mitigate the adverse impact their criminal activities have 
on public safety in the United States (Federal Bureau of Investigations, n.d.). According to a 
2018 joint investigation conducted by Insight Crime and the Center for Latin American and 
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Latino Studies, MS-13 has a clearly defined constitution with rules outlining what is considered 
appropriate conduct for their members. They are organized as a hierarchical networked hybrid 
structure. They maintain a hierarchical structure in El Salvador with several clicas throughout the 
United States and Central and South America. These groups range in sophistication and purpose. 
Some clicas engage in petty crimes and involve as little as ten members, while others exceed 100 
members and involve more complex criminal activities. MS-13 leaders also attend mandatory 
meetings to coordinate strategies and discuss disciplinary action against members that violate the 
rules. The organization of MS-13 demonstrates a national and transnational interconnectedness 
not captured by the location-based approach to studying gangs. 
3.2.2.1.4 Tiny Rascals Gang (TRG) 
The same conditions that gave rise to MS-13 led to the formation of the Tiny Rascal 
Gang (TRG). In 1975, Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge rose to power in Cambodia, concluding 
nearly a decade of civil war. His regime was responsible for the Cambodian genocide that left an 
estimated 1.5 – 2 million people dead between the years 1975 to 1979, and displaced countless 
others (Valdez, 2000). A significant number of Cambodian refugees sought asylum in the United 
States. From this immigrant group, the Tiny Rascals Gang formed in California in the mid-
1980s. Similar to Salvadoran refugees around the same timeframe, the re-settlement process 
placed Cambodian families in poor neighborhoods with limited access to resources, leaving them 
vulnerable. They were frequently victimized by Black, Hispanic, and white gangs. Additionally, 
Al Valdez (2000) points out that the assimilation process for Cambodian youths led to a conflict 
between the traditional values espoused by their parents and Western norms. This led to the 
disintegration of the family unit as many chose to leave home and seek independence on the 
streets. At first, they formed decentralized youth conflict groups defending small swaths of 
territory, but over time they coalesced to form the TRG.   
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One behavioral characteristic that distinguishes this gang from other gangs is that they 
are nomadic. Members of the TRG remain mobile, viewing territory as transactional rather than 
permanent (Valdez, 2000). The 2010 California report on organized crime describes the process 
of joining TRG as "walking in" and then "jumping in." The former refers to committing a crime. 
This can range from non-violent crimes such as breaking and entering or theft to more serious 
offenses such as murdering a rival gang member. The latter step requires willingly being 
assaulted by members of the TRG. Originally, membership was strictly reserved for 
Cambodians. This requirement has been relaxed over time and membership from other Asian 
ethnicities is allowed. The TRG is considered the largest Asian gang in the United States (North 
Carolina Correctional Officer Training, 2016).  
3.2.2.2 Prison Gangs 
With a tendency to be nationally organized and maintain influence over street gangs, 
prison gangs are frequently described as outposts of "supergangs" (Knox, 1994; Sanchez 
Jankowski, 1991; Venkatesh & Levitt, 2000). Studies conducted of Chicago gangs have shown 
that “gang lords” have maintained, or even increased, their power while incarcerated 
(Papachristos, 2001; Venkatesh, 2000). Defining a prison gang, however, remains challenging 
because street gangs operate in the prison system, and prison gangs have increasingly become 
involved in street-level activity. Unless renounced or through the completion of a Security Threat 
Group (STG) step down program, street gang members often maintain their gang affiliation 
when incarcerated. The term STG is ascribed to all inmates considered high-risk for disruptive 
behavior (Knox, 2012). This designation refers to street gangs, prison gangs, and other inmates 
that harbor extremist political ideologies such as members of the Sovereign Citizens Movement. 
Despite the presence of street gangs in prison and prison gangs on the street, however, the main 
distinction separating these types of gangs is their origin (Knox, Etter, & Smith, 2019). Contrary 
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to street gangs that “form on the street and operate in neighborhoods,” the NGIC (2015) defines 
a prison gang as, “A criminal organization that originates in the penal system and continues to 
operate within correctional facilities throughout the United States. Prison gangs are self-
perpetuating criminal entities that also continue their operations outside of prison” (p. 15). 
Unlike the incarceration of Bloods and Crips that import their gang affiliations into the prison 
system, the Mexican Mafia, Nuestra Familia, Aryan Brotherhood, and Black Guerilla Family are 
considered “pure” prison gangs (Knox, 2012).  
Further, prison gangs have a higher level of organization, discipline, and observance of 
formal gang structures than street gangs (Pyrooz & Decker, 2019). Within the confines of prison, 
clearly defined power roles emerge, and gang members can either abide by the rules or face the 
consequences, up to and including death. In some prison gangs, membership is a lifelong 
commitment. The Aryan Brotherhood (AB), for example, maintains a "blood in, blood out" 
policy (Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC), 2005). Joining the gang requires recruits to 
murder an enemy of the AB (blood in). After becoming a member, the only way to leave the 
gang is through death (blood out). This sentiment is reflected in the blood oath taken by each 
member of the AB: "An Aryan brother is without a care/He walks where the weak and heartless 
won't dare/For an Aryan brother, death holds no fear/Vengeance will be his, through his brothers 
still here" (SPLC, p. 4).  
William Hankins (2014), a prison gang investigator at San Quentin Correctional Institute 
chronicles the rise and spread of four prominent U.S. prison gangs, or what he refers to as the 
"axis of evil." One of the earliest of these prison gangs to form was the Mexican Mafia (also 
referred to as La Eme or the Black Hand) in the late1950s by Luis "Huero Buff" Flores, Richard 
Ruiz, and several other Hispanic Americans. The founding members understood that their 
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criminal lifestyle would keep them in prison for most of their lives. In order to navigate the 
dangers of prison life, their interests were better served together rather than as individuals (Knox, 
Etter, & Smith, 2019). Not only could they better guarantee their safety, but they could profit 
while carrying out their prison sentence. Instead of a distinct leader or “shot caller,” members of 
the Mexican Mafia have a flat egalitarian structure (Hankin, 2014). Similar to other prison gangs, 
however, they adhere to a strict code of conduct to maintain order. In State of California v Luis 
Maciel (2007), Special Investigator Sergeant Richard Valdemar of the Los Angeles Sheriff’s 
Department Prison Gang Section provides testimony on the rules of the Mexican Mafia:  
1) "Carnal," is applied to one with membership in the Mexican Mafia. All others who are 
merely associated with the gang are referred to as "Camarada" or "Camrade." 
2) Loyalty to the gang is valued above all else, including the member's family, their local 
street gang, and God. 
 
3) Dropping out of Erne is against the gang's rules. If a person disassociates from Eme, 
he will be placed on a "hit list" or "green light list," which means that the "dropout" must 
be killed by any Erne member who is in proximity, and has the ability to kill. 
 
4) A Mexican Mafia gang member may only be killed by another member. A member of 
Erne who has an opportunity to kill someone on the hit list, but does not take action, risks 
being placed on a hit list and killed.  
 
5) Members of the Mexican Mafia are expected to make a living through criminal 
enterprises such as drug dealing. Part of the funds a member raises from drug activities 
goes to support gang members who cannot support themselves. 
 
6) The sanction of death will be imposed on any person who robs a dealer who pays taxes 
to the Mafia. 
 
7) Mexican Mafia has a rule which prohibits members from hurting innocent children. A 
street gang member who participates in an act which results in accidental death of a 
child will be placed on a "hit list." 
 
8) The Mexican Mafia sometimes uses a person who is being considered for membership, 
or new members, to commit murder, as a test of the person's fortitude, courage and 
fighting ability.  
 
9) There is a special mentorship relationship between a Mexican Mafia member and 
someone he has recruited and successfully sponsored for membership. The mentor 
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"raises his hand" for the new member, meaning he teaches the recruit how to conduct 
himself as a member of the gang (pp. 11-14).4 
 
The set of clearly defined rules and enforcement of those rules provides the Mexican Mafia, and 
other prison gangs like them, the organizational structure necessary to maintain control inside the 
prison. Moreover, the cohesion of the Mexican Mafia allows them to influence criminal activity 
outside the prison. According to the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) (1974a), “The 
(Mexican) Mafia had come to the realization that if the fear of the prison inmate is controlled, it 
must be necessarily so, that the criminal operating in free society, must be aware of this power” 
(p. 45). Based on this premise, the Mexican Mafia used fear and intimidation to build their 
criminal enterprise in 1971. Members of street gangs are particularly vulnerable, given their 
tendency to be repeat criminal offenders. David Skarbek (2011) (as cited in United States v 
Aguirre et al., 1994, pp. 4-5) points out, “The Mexican Mafia is able to assert control and 
influence over gang members outside the penal system because the gang members do not want 
their members to be assaulted, and because the gang members know that, if they are incarcerated, 
they will need the protection of the Mexican Mafia while they serve their sentences” (p. 706). 
The designation “supergang” comes from the ability of prison gang leaders to maintain control of 
criminal activity inside and outside the prison setting. 
One street gang in particular that falls under the Eme banner are the Sureños, a group of 
loosely affiliated Hispanic gangs originating in southern California. The Mexican Mafia rules by 
proxy using members of the Sureños alliance to carry out their orders on the street. These gang 
members have been described as “foot soldiers” whose performance and dedication are 
monitored by the Mexican Mafia the same as a professional sports team scouts college recruits 
 
4 Ramon “Mundo” Mendoza (2012), a former member of the Mexican Mafia from 1970-1977, provides a firsthand 
account of the rules.    
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(Rocky Mountain Information Network, 2008). Individuals that meet the high standard of the 
Mexican Mafia are invited to join. Some of the notable street gangs that belong to the Sureños 
include Florencia 13, MS-13, and 18th Street. While the latter two gangs are mortal enemies, it is 
not uncommon for Sureño sets to fight. When members of these gangs go to prison, however, 
they set aside their differences as representatives of the Mexican Mafia. 
 The North-South division of Hispanic gangs in California led to the creation of Nuestra 
Familia (Spanish for Our Family) in 1968. While the Mexican Mafia provided protection for 
Mexican American inmates, they treated northern Californians with contempt (FBI, 1977). 
Therefore, Nuestra Familia formed among northern Californian inmates to protect against the 
violence directed towards them from the Mexican Mafia and other gangs. In 1971, they 
established a constitution outlining a paramilitary organizational structure (FBI, 1977). Contrary 
to the flat leadership style used by the Mexican Mafia, Nuestra Familia is hierarchical led by a 
General and Strategic Advisor on top, and followed by several Captains whose authority is 
ranked 1-10. At the bottom of the power structure are Lieutenants, Regimental Commanders, 
Squad Leaders, and Soldiers. Similar to the relationship between the Mexican Mafia and 
Sureños, however, Nuestra Familia rules by proxy using the Norteños alliance to carry out street-
level criminal activity. Although not as closely tied to their surrogate gangs like the Mexican 
Mafia and Sureños outside of prison, members of the Norteños are still required to pay tribute to 
Nuestra Familia while incarcerated (FBI, 1977).  
 To assist in their rivalry against the Mexican Mafia, Nuestra Familia has formed alliances 
with other prison gangs (Knox, Etter, & Smith, 2019). One of their notable allies is the Black 
Guerilla Family (BGF), an African American prison gang founded in 1966 by George “The 
Dragon” Jackson, George “Big Jake” Lewis, and W. L. Nolen in San Quentin. According to the 
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FBI (1974b), "The BGF is formed from members of the Black Panther Party, Black Muslims and 
the Republic of New Africa within the California Department of Corrections who thought that 
their groups were moving too slow. They formed the BGF to identify with" (p. 12). The BGF has 
since expanded throughout the rest of the California prison system and has been identified in 
several other states, including Maryland, West Virginia, Washington, Pennsylvania, North 
Carolina, and Missouri (NGIC, 2011). Similar to other prison gangs, the BGF has established 
criminal activity on the street. However, it is their extremist ideology and connection to terrorist 
organizations that make the BGF a high-level security risk. Jackson reified the BGF under 
Maoist principles where class struggles are defined along racial lines, and state representatives, 
including law enforcement, are viewed as inimical manifestations of African American 
oppressors (Knox, Etter, & Smith, 2019). To this end, the BGF has a history of coordinating with 
several validated terrorist organizations. Under the Black August Organizing Committee 
(BAOC), they maintain ties to Weather Underground, the Black Liberation Army, the Prairie 
Fire Organizing Committee, and has supported revolutionary movements in El Salvador, Iran, 
and other developing countries (FBI, 1981).  
 Another important ally of Nuestra Familia and the BGF is Dead Man Incorporated 
(DMI). According to the Gang Identification Task Force on white prison gangs (n.d.), DMI was 
created as an offshoot of the BGF with a similar modus operandi. Despite being close with the 
BGF leadership and respected among inmates in the Maryland Department of Corrections, one of 
the founders of DMI. Perry Roark, was prohibited from joining the BGF because membership 
was reserved for Black inmates. Established in the late 1990s, the BGF leadership sanctioned the 
creation of DMI in their image, but for white members. They harbor a similar antipathy towards 
the state and promote acts of sedition to undermine government authority. In addition to the 
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Maryland prison system, DMI has been identified in correctional institutes across North Carolina 
(NGIC, 2011).  
The Mexican Mafia has also formed alliances with other prison gangs. One of their most 
powerful allies is the Aryan Brotherhood (AB), also referred to as “The Brand.” An FBI 
Freedom of Information Act Report (1982) on the Aryan Brotherhood details the origin of this 
relationship. Members of the Blue Bird Gang and other white inmates in San Quentin State 
Prison formed the AB in 1967 to protect themselves against Black and Hispanic gangs. Shortly 
after their formation, they adopted white nationalist symbols such as the swastika, dual lightning 
bolts (the SS lightning bolt is a symbol of Nazi Germany), and HH (Heil Hitler), and quickly 
spread throughout the California prison system. On July 3, 1972, Jessie Renteria Castro, a 
ranking member of Nuestra Familia, was stabbed to death by a member of the AB at Deuel 
Vocational Institution in Tracy, California. Because the Mexican Mafia had been at war with 
Nuestra Familia and members of EME were friends with members of the AB, the two gangs 
found it mutually beneficial to form an alliance after the assassination of Castro. Despite 
identifying as a white nationalist prison gang, the AB has habitually aligned with other minority 
gangs like Mexicanemi, a Hispanic prison gang that originated in Texas in 1984, and several 
Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs). In 1996, the AB was hired by the American 
Mafia. John Gotti, head of the Gambino Crime Family in New York City, was assaulted by 
Walter Johnson while serving a life sentence at the U.S. Federal Penitentiary in Marion, Illinois. 
After being attacked, Gotti hired the AB for protection. This alliance raised the profile of the AB 
and provided them access to channels outside the prison to manufacture and distribute narcotics 
(SPLC, 2005). As a result, the AB has gradually become more focused on profiteering than 
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enforcing a white nationalist agenda (SPLC, n.d.). This move has caused several white power 
groups to disavow the AB and label them “race traitors” (Montaldo, 2019; Reeve, 2013).  
Tracking the AB is difficult as “copycat gangs” have emerged with the expansion of the 
AB throughout the state and federal prison system (Anti-Defamation League (ADL), 2016). To 
preserve their image, however, AB members have been known to react violently when 
encountering “posers,” often making them burn or cut off any tattoos that would tie them to the 
gang (ADL, 2016; Montaldo, 2019). In addition to the appropriation of the Aryan Brotherhood 
namesake by unaffiliated white inmates, the term “Aryan” is commonly used by other white 
supremacist gangs creating confusion on how these gangs are affiliated. For example, the Aryan 
Circle, established in 1985 in the Texas prison system, has been identified in Montana, 
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, North Carolina, and Oklahoma (NGIC, 2011). They use similar 
identifiers to the AB, such as the dual lightning bolts and swastikas, but often rival the Aryan 
Brotherhood for control over the drug trade (ADL, 2009). Despite their differences, however, 
white nationalist and Aryan gangs identify to some degree as Peckerwoods. The term 
"Peckerwood" is a racial epithet meaning "white trash" that has been internalized by gangs where 
the majority of members are white (ADL, 2020). In the tiered system of the AB, Peckerwood is 
the name assigned to new recruits (ADL, 2016). When new members commit more serious 
crimes, they can advance in rank and authority within the brotherhood. The term Peckerwood has 
also been adopted by several Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs (OMGs), the subject of the next section. 
3.2.2.3 Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs (OMGs) 
The final major cultural gang type involves outlaw motorcycle gangs (OMGs), also 
referred to as One Percenters. After the Hollister Riot in 1947, a representative for the American 
Motorcycle Association stated, “99% of the motorcycling public are law-abiding; there are 1% 
who are not” (Bosmia et al., 2014, p. 523). The 1% moniker was thus adopted by biker gangs 
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and is displayed in patches as a source of pride to differentiate criminal from non-criminal 
motorcycle clubs (Quinn, 1987; Quinn & Forsyth, 2009). According to the National Gang 
Intelligence Center (2015), “OMGs are ongoing organizations, associations or groups of three or 
more persons with a common interest or activity characterized by the commission of, or 
involvement in, a pattern of criminal conduct. Members must possess and be able to operate a 
motorcycle to achieve and maintain membership within the group” (p. 22). As of 2011, there 
were approximately 44,000 OMG members in the United States (NGIC, 2011). The largest of 
these motorcycle clubs have been called the “Big Five.” They include the Hells Angels, Pagans, 
Outlaws, Bandidos, and Sons of Silence (Hayes, 2018; Richardson, 1991). As the largest 
motorcycle clubs, several support clubs of smaller biker gangs maintain alliances with them.  
One main difference between OMGs and the other two gang types is their organizational 
structure. OMGs have established a presence throughout the United States and internationally. 
They are organized into chapters that meet frequently and stay connected through a formal 
hierarchy where leadership roles are clearly defined in accordance with club bylaws. Similar to 
the constitution established by the Mexican Mafia, the level of organization demonstrated by 
OMGs undermines the lack of national cohesion espoused by location-based approaches to 
describe gang behavior. According to California Department of Justice Intelligence Specialist 
Anna Richardson (1991), prior to a 1983 RICO investigation into the Pagans MC, leaders of the 
organization went as far as to vote on which chapters would distribute narcotics. She provides 
the following description on the organizational structure of the Hells Angels: 
 Unlike most other outlaw motorcycle gangs, the Hells Angels do not have a national or 
international president but instead have regional officers who are chosen to represent 
various chapters (a region) at regional meetings. There are two slates of officers; one to 
represent the East Coast and a second, the West Coast. Monthly meetings are held by 
these officers. These meetings also include one or two representatives from the opposing 
coast; not to vote but to report back to their region any new business. All major decisions 
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are voted on worldwide. In states with multiple chapters, a state meeting is also held in 
addition to the chapter’s weekly meetings (p. 3). 
 
The spread of OMGs can be attributed to their nomadic culture of traveling across the American 
landscape. Richardson provides a succinct description of the evolution of motorcycle gangs. She 
points out that traveling is one of the characteristics of the motorcycle lifestyle, which is 
encouraged through annual “bike runs” and rallies that occur at various locations. One of the 
largest is the Sturgis Motorcycle Rally in South Dakota. Other locations include Daytona Beach, 
FL, Myrtle Beach, SC, Laconia, NH, Austin, TX, and Durango, CO for the Four Corners 
Motorcycle Rally. In the late 1960s, as larger motorcycle clubs canvassed the country, they 
began absorbing smaller clubs and establishing different chapters to act as hubs when they were 
on the road. At the time, they showed irreverence toward law enforcement, but their criminal 
activity “lacked a certain focus.” However, Richardson makes the following observation of 
OMGs after 1970 that supports the assertions made by Brenda Coughlin and Sudhir Alladi 
Venkatesh (2003):  
In the 1970s, a drug culture evolved in this country. First as participants and slowly as 
suppliers, outlaw motorcycle gangs were drawn into this drug culture. Soon, gangs 
learned there was money to be made by organized criminal activities. In the 1970s, they 
became profit oriented. 
 
Today, outlaw motorcycle gangs are sophisticated organizations that utilize their 
affiliation with a motorcycle club as a conduit for criminal activity. The nature of their 
activity is generally conspiratorial, and their goals are attained through the use of 
violence and intimidation. Because of their expertise in sophisticated weaponry and their 
international intelligence networks, outlaw motorcycle gangs pose a formidable threat to 
society in general and specifically to law enforcement (pp. 5-6). 
 
Although not exclusive to OMGs, another indicator of their influence is the ability to attract 
military-connected recruits. A 2016 flier distributed by the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation 
Command indicates that servicemembers often prefer motorcycles as a low-cost transportation 
alternative to owning an automobile and often participate in a subculture that brings motorcycle 
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enthusiasts together. Joe Ethridge, chief of CID’s Criminal Intelligence Division, warns, “Many 
service members, civilian employees, and family members attend functions that are designed for 
motorcycle riders and the brotherhood of the biker subculture… Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs will 
attend these functions as well. It is well documented that OMGs and support clubs recruit 
military members into their ranks” (U.S. Army, 2016, pp 1-2). Street gangs have also been 
known to actively recruit military personnel (Eyler, 2009). In other cases, they encourage their 
members to join the armed forces for access to military training and resources that benefit the 
gang on the streets (Eyler, 2009; U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command, 2007). In addition 
to their affinity for motorcycles, however, several OMG members are military veterans, placing 
them in a unique position to leverage their shared experiences to target military recruits.  
Arguably, the largest and most publicly recognized of the Big Five motorcycle clubs is 
the Hells Angels. Shortly after the Hollister Riot, in 1948, Otto Friedl, Arvid Olsen, and other 
members of the Pissed Off Bastards motorcycle club splintered off to form the Hells Angels (a 
name taken from the WWII bomber), in Fontana/San Bernardino, California (Hayes, 2018). 
According to George Knox, Gregg Etter, and Carter Smith (2019), the Hells Angels currently 
have 238 chapters spread across the United States, Canada, Europe, Africa, Australia, and South 
America. Their expansion has led to the formation of alliances with street gangs, prison gangs, 
and organized crime groups. In Arizona and Idaho, chapters of the Hells Angels have been 
linked to the Sinaloa Cartel, one of the most powerful drug trafficking organizations in Mexico 
(DEA, 2018). Other chapters have been tied to the Gambino and Buffalino crime families in 
New York and the Licavoli family in Cleveland (Richardson, 1991). An association between the 
Hells Angels and the Genovese crime family founded by Charles “Lucky” Luciano has also been 
reported (Richardson, 1991).  
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The other four motorcycle gangs that make up the “Big Five” have followed a similar 
pattern of formation, expansion, and connection. Founded by Lou Dobkins, the Pagans formed in 
1959 in Prince George’s County, Maryland (Hayes, 2018). Primarily concentrated in the eastern 
United States, and without an international presence, they have been one of the least expansive 
OMGs of the Big Five (Hayes, 2018). A 1983 RICO case against the Pagans nearly dismantled 
them completely, but they have since rebounded and begun to grow in strength (Richardson, 
1991). Their continued growth has been facilitated by the connections with other criminal groups 
like the Aryan Brotherhood (SPLC, 2005), Mexican DTOs in Wyoming (DEA, 2018), and their 
involvement with the Bruno crime family, an Italian-American Mafia group from South 
Philadelphia (Richardson, 1991).  
The oldest of the Big Five is the Outlaws MC. Although the founding members of the 
club are unknown, they formed in McCook, Illinois, in 1935 (Hayes, 2018). Similar to the 
Pagans, the Outlaws MC maintain a lower profile than some of the other One Percenters. They 
have, however, expanded throughout the United States and established several international 
charters. Moreover, unlike most other OMGs, they allow members to seamlessly transfer their 
membership from one chapter to another (Richardson, 1991). That is to say, their members are 
not beholden to a single chapter or geographic locale.  
One of the Big Five OMGs similar to the Hells Angels in terms of reputation and 
exposure are the Bandidos. The Bandidos were formed in Texas by former Marine and Vietnam 
veteran Don Chambers in 1966 (Hayes, 2018). Richardson highlights that recruits, also referred 
to as prospects, are required to visit all of the Bandido chapters within their first year. This 
allows them to become familiar with each chapter when it comes time to vote on their 
membership and makes it difficult for undercover officers to infiltrate the gang. Similar to other 
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Big Five members, the Bandidos have expanded throughout the United States and currently have 
chapters in thirty-one other countries (onepercenterbikers.com, 2020). The Bandidos maintain 
connections to the Gulf Cartel and Los Zetas in Texas, and other Mexican DTOs in New York 
(DEA, 2018).  
Finally, the latest addition to the big motorcycle clubs is Sons of Silence. They were 
founded in 1966 by Bruce “Dude” Richardson in Niwot, Colorado (Hayes, 2018). An alliance 
with the Hells Angels accelerated their expansion into the Midwest and triggered a rivalry with 
the Outlaws (Richardson, 1991). In 1998, the Sons of Silence opened their first international 
chapter in Munich, Germany, where they currently have six chapters (Hayes, 2018). They also 
maintain connections to various Mexican DTOs in Florida and Wyoming (DEA, 2018). 
3.3 Conclusion 
Gangs follow a pattern of formation, expansion, and connection. In the formation stage, 
external stimuli lead individuals to coalesce into a group. The different settings in which this 
takes place contribute to cultural gang types categorized as street, prison, or outlaw motorcycle 
gangs (OMGs). For example, prison survival led to the formation of the Mexican Mafia, social 
inequality led to the formation of the Crips, and the Folk Nation formed to project strength and 
unity akin to Hoover’s work stoppage in Stateville Correctional Center. Individuals sidelined and 
adversely impacted by these gangs formed their own gang in opposition to the status quo. 
Nuestra Familia, the Bloods, and the People Nation emerged in defiance of the Mexican Mafia, 
Crips, and Folk Nation, respectively. As rivalries take shape, tensions over security and resource 
competition fuel gang proliferation in which they respond by seeking out alliances through 
(trans)national networks. The decisions that gangs make inherently place them on different 
trajectories where transformation occurs across three dimensions that motivate behavior. This 
includes territory, profit, and ideology at various points in time. 
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It is not the intention of this chapter to define gangs, but rather to examine gang 
typologies as part of the ongoing debate. Gang typologies are useful in developing a definitional 
framework separate from the sociological perspective that emphasizes environmental factors and 
a law enforcement lexicon contingent on geographic specificity. Territorial considerations, for 
example, are influenced by gang culture and evolution. The mobility of prison gangs is restricted 
to correctional institutions, while OMGs are nomadic. Neither gang type is particularly interested 
in territory. Street gangs, on the other hand, are more territorial, but their position on the 
evolutionary spectrum determines how territory is prioritized. According to John Sullivan, first-
generation gangs are primarily motivated by territory, while second-generation gangs focus on 
territory insofar as it allows them to protect market share. More importantly, gang typologies 
help collate gangs with other criminal groups. Some federal definitions of ‘gang’ qualifies them 
as distinct from other criminal groups. A definition written by the National Gang Center (1999) 
reads, “A gang is a group of youths or young adults in your jurisdiction whose involvement in 
illegal activities over months or years marks them in their own view and in the view of the 
community and police as different from most other youthful groups. Do not include motorcycle 
gangs, hate or ideology groups, prison gangs, or other exclusively adult gangs.” However, across 
Sullivan’s evolutionary scale, some gangs have more in common with organized crime and 
terrorist groups. Using gang typologies to develop gang definitions provides the nuance 
necessary to differentiate gangs from other criminal groups. When do gangs make the transition 
to mafia, cartel, or terrorist organization? At a minimum, second-generation gangs that emerged 
after 1970 resemble organized crime groups with ties to transnational drug trafficking 
organizations. Similarities can be inferred between 2-G gangs and how the FBI defines 
transnational organized crime as:  
91 
 
Those self-perpetuating associations of individuals who operate transnationally for the 
purpose of obtaining power, influence, monetary and/or commercial gains, wholly or in 
part by illegal means, while protecting their activities through a pattern of corruption and/ 
or violence, or while protecting their illegal activities through a transnational 
organizational structure and the exploitation of transnational commerce or 
communication mechanisms.  
 
Moreover, third-generation gangs resemble terrorist organizations. As I conclude this chapter, 
the U.S. Department of Justice has designated MS-13 as a terrorist organization in the United 
States. Other gangs demonstrate a similar propensity for terrorism. The Black Guerilla Family 
has ties to terrorist groups and engages in seditious activity around the world while the Black P. 
Stones offered to work as a terrorist branch of the Libyan government. In short, understanding 


















CENTRALITY AND COMMUNITY DETECTION: A MACRO-LEVEL  
 
APPROACH TO UNDERSTANDING THE NETWORK STRUCTURE OF 
 
GANGS IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
 A critical step toward understanding the national structure of gangs is to analyze their 
connections with other gang types. For this chapter, I examine the relationships between gangs at 
the macro-level using social network analysis (SNA). Although the application of SNA in 
criminology is limited, the theoretical foundation for analyzing gangs is well-documented. The 
basic principle behind SNA is studying the "interconnected system of things" to expose patterns 
of relationships. Gangs are social entities that cultivate relationships at the macro- (between 
gangs) and micro- (between gang members) levels. A similar macro-level approach is used in the 
Big Allied and Dangerous (BAAD) model that uses SNA to study terrorist organizations. I 
incorporate the BAAD framework in this study by building an adjacency matrix of gang 
connections to calculate centrality measures in three separate models. The first is a baseline 
model that does not differentiate between allies and rivals (referred to as unweighted ties) and 
includes gangs and Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs), or cartels. Since the 
context of these relationships matter, the second model, gang nexus model 1, includes gangs and 
cartels and distinguishes between positive (allies) and negative (rivals) ties (referred to as 
weighted ties). The final model, gang nexus model 2, is similar to gang nexus model 1 but with 
the cartels removed from the network. The results are intended to map the interconnectedness of 
gangs, determine the relative importance of gangs in the network, comparatively analyze gangs 
formed by native groups to gangs formed by immigrant groups, and assess the extent to which 
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rivalries and cartels impact the gang network structure. All of which are important to understand 
the macro-level gang structure from a network perspective. 
As a strand of "big gang theory," the macro-level approach to gang studies is sometimes 
criticized as misconceiving the organization, cohesion, and size of gangs (Howell, 2012). This 
argument characterizes gangs as decentralized groups lacking cohesion, with no definitive 
affiliation where members adopt gang names popularized by public discourse like Bloods or 
Crips. Despite this criticism, the evolutionary gang types proposed by John Sullivan discussed in 
the previous chapter, posits that there are three generations of gangs where second- and third-
generations evolve into "net warriors" and are characterized as cohesive groups with centralized 
leadership. Whereas second-generation gangs are market-oriented and motivated by profits, 
third-generation gangs are ideologically-driven to invoke political change. Both rely on 
cultivating networks of relationships. The Drug Enforcement Agency also differentiates between 
‘neighborhood’ and ‘national’ gangs. Similar to the location-based perspective on gangs, they 
describe neighborhood gangs as disorganized loosely affiliated groups. On the other hand, 
national gangs demonstrate a high degree of organization with a clear hierarchy and set of rules. 
In addition to addressing the criticism of macro-level gang analysis in this chapter, I support the 
findings of this study in Chapter 5 by analyzing the geospatial distribution of gang members at 
the micro-level to show the relationship between gangs and gang members across the country. 
4.1 Social Network Analysis and Gang Studies 
Over the years, social network analysis (SNA), or more generally, network analysis, has 
been formalized into an empirical-analytic research method adopted by a wide range of 
disciplines (Freeman, 2004). Mark Newman (2015) explains the purpose of studying networks. 
According to him, “A network is a simplified representation that reduces a system to an abstract 
structure capturing only the basics of connection patterns… Networks are thus a general yet 
94 
 
powerful means of representing patterns of connections or interactions between parts of the 
system” (p. 2-3). These relationships, or the "interconnected system of things," make SNA 
appealing to study gangs. Especially when variable independence, a common assumption in 
statistical modeling, is insufficient to make inferences on system behavior. Steven Radil, Colin 
Flint, and George Tita (2010) add, “For social network analysis, similarly patterned actors are 
seen as occupying distinct ‘social positions’ in network structures, which is to say that they are 
similarly embedded in the webs of relationships that constitute the social network in terms of 
links to other actors… As one of the primary goals of social network analysis is to formalize the 
theoretical concepts of social position, social network analysis is a useful way to explore the 
concepts of embeddedness in a quantitative fashion through highlighting different social 
positions as realized in networked data” (p. 314). Because systems, or groups of interconnected 
objects, are present in both the physical and behavioral sciences, understanding relationships 
between these objects can provide valuable insight on social phenomena.  
SNA uses graph theory to illustrate pairwise connections, or edges (ties), between sets of 
vertices (nodes) that are either directed (asymmetric ties) or undirected (symmetric ties). The 
most rudimentary interpretation of graph theory provides a visualization of network components 
and their relationship to one another. More advanced SNA, however, provides a way to quantify 
these relationships. For this study, I conduct a network analysis of gangs using centrality 
measures to make inferences on gang structures at the macro-level. In graph theory, centrality 
refers to the importance of nodes by their position in the network relative to other nodes across a 
varied set of dimensions (Luke, 2015). I use these results to compare the network influence of 
gangs formed by groups native to the United States to gangs formed by immigrant groups, the 
extent to which rivalries impact gang centrality, and the role of Mexican Drug Trafficking 
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Organizations (DTOs) on gang influence in the network. The implications of this research 
contribute to our understanding of gangs in the United States from a network perspective. 
The benefits of SNA techniques on the study of gangs has been highlighted by several 
scholars in the field of criminology using theoretical paradigms. Jenny Piquette, Chris Smith, and 
Andrew Papachristos (2014) describe the intrinsic value of using SNA to further our 
understanding of the gang phenomenon. “At their core, street gangs are social networks created 
by the coming together, socializing, and interacting of individuals in particular times and in 
particular places. The employment of social network analysis has the potential to examine 
patterns of interaction among gang members and gangs, illuminate structural variation across 
gangs, and measure the influence of gang networks on individual action.” Whereas criminal 
behavior is often explained as a function of attributional data such as socioeconomic conditions, 
SNA emphasizes relational data to explore structural patterns embedded in the connections 
between individuals and groups (McGloin & Kirk, 2010). According to Michael Sierra-Arevalo 
and Andrew Papachristos (2015), "It is exactly the enhanced "groupness" of gangs that 
differentiates them from common, passing delinquent groups, and which makes gangs 
analytically interesting. While gangs are made up of individuals, the gang's life and culture are 
largely defined by group processes and resulting structures. Importantly, not only do 
relationships exist within gangs, but the relationships between gangs can also shape the structural 
reality of gang life” (p. 157). Despite the benefits of studying gangs through the lens of SNA, 
this remains an under-researched area in criminology (Sierra-Arevalo & Papachristos, 2015). 
Andrew Abbott (1999) attributes this gap in the literature to the “variables paradigm” supported 
by regression techniques that privilege abstract conditions such as poverty or education. He 
claims, “Within variable-based thinking, one allows for a few “interactions” to modify this single 
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causal meaning contextually, but the fundamental image of variables’ independence is enshrined 
in the phrase “net of other variables” and in the aim to discover this net effect, whether through 
experimental or statistical manipulation” (p. 197). To his point, paradigmatic shifts within 
scientific communities often take time to demonstrate the explanatory value of new techniques 
and require a body of researchers willing to accept that change (Kuhn, 1962). 
However, SNA, as an analytic tool, was introduced in 1934 with Jacob Moreno’s seminal 
work in developing the first sociogram. Before Moreno, Emile Durkheim and Ferdinand Tönnies 
had begun developing a concept of SNA in the late 1890s. Although earlier conceptions of SNA 
were available, it was not until the 1950s that modern SNA became a formal research method. 
Later in the 1980s, its usage became popular among social and behavioral scientists (Freeman, 
2004). Sierra-Arevalo and Papachristos point out that criminologists often lag behind other 
disciplines in their application of novel research methods. This lag can be explained on the 
merits argued by Abbot. Unwillingness to change or resistance to novel methodological 
approaches impacts research design for a particular field of study. However, this is a significant 
gap for a research method that seems well-suited to improve our understanding of gangs. As 
SNA has transformed from an amorphous concept to a formal method of research, it can be 
argued that the SNA tools to study gangs have existed for over a century.   
Another possible explanation for the delay in using SNA concepts is the lack of publicly 
available data on gangs to generate meaningful results. In order to gain access to gang data, 
special considerations are required and finding a law enforcement agency willing and able to 
supply reliable data is challenging (Gunnell, Hillier, & Blakeborough, 2016). Despite these 
impediments, some attempts have been made to move beyond the theoretical application of SNA 
in studying gangs to a more empirical approach. In completion of his dissertation at the 
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University of Arizona, Andrew Fox (2013) uses social network analysis to study the internal 
social structure of gangs in Glendale, Arizona, from 2006 - 2010. With data provided by the 
Glendale Police Department, his findings indicate that local gang members maintain loose 
affiliations with the gang at large while forming smaller, cohesive, subgroups, and common 
associations of friendships between gang members and different cliques. Further, approximately 
80% of gang members remained in the network for a single year, indicating the salience of gang 
participation and short duration of gang activity. Although the results of his study reinforce the 
conclusions proposed by other qualitative studies, Fox works with a small sample size averaging 
74 gang members for each year. Moreover, his research is localized and does not identify the 
gang attributes such as affiliation, generation, or type. For example, his results appear consistent 
with first-generation gangs in terms of politicization, localization, and sophistication. "First 
generation or “turf” gangs are limited in political scope. They are localized and not highly 
sophisticated” (Sullivan, 1997, p. 97).  
Similar to the study conducted by Fox, Jean McGloin (2006) takes a localized approach 
to study individual gang members in Newark, New Jersey. Using funding from the U.S. 
Department of Justice, McGloin applies SNA to the “problem analysis” of gangs. Her research is 
motivated by assisting law enforcement in improving the strategic efficacy of gang mitigation 
programs. One example she provides is, “Continuing to analyze the network of relationships will 
provide insight on whether an intervention strategy is further disorganizing the gang(s), or 
having the unintended consequence of increasing cohesion, and thereby raising the risk of more 
crime. At the same time, should positions in the gang shift, or new people move into structurally 
important positions within the gang, interventions may have to address new individuals or alter 
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current strategies” (p. 24). McGloin’s contribution both demonstrates the efficacy of SNA on the 
study of gangs and illustrates the policy implications.  
Although taking a similar localized approach as Fox and McGloin, Amy Carpenter and 
Stacey Cooper (2015) conduct a macro-level network analysis of gangs and cartels in the Sand 
Diego-Tijuana region to improve community resilience. Unlike Fox, Carpenter and Cooper 
explicitly target second-generation gangs for their research. According to Sullivan, "This gang is 
interested in market protection, and focuses its criminal endeavors on drugs as a business. 
Second generation gangs are more cohesive, with greater centralization of leadership. Drug-
selling becomes a group rather than individual activity. Drug gangs use violence to control 
competition and assume a market rather than a turf orientation" (p. 95). The authors also 
differentiate between street, prison, and outlaw motorcycle gangs (OMGs), whereby each plays a 
different role in the network. In the context of structural relationships between gangs, they 
conclude that Hispanic gangs maintain familial ties in Mexico, bringing them closer to DTOs, 
prison gangs often arrange agreements between cartels and street gangs, and OMGs are 
tangential to the overall network structure. Although Carpenter and Cooper identify factors 
relevant to community resilience in the San Diego-Tijuana region, the overall gang structure 
presented is a small piece of a much larger puzzle that could potentially impact their conclusions 
on the structure of gangs in the region. For example, they conclude that the Hells Angels exist as 
a peripheral gang whose sole connection in the network is with the Mongols, a rival OMG. 
While this might be true for the San Diego-Tijuana border, other Hells Angels charters in 
Arizona, Idaho, and New Jersey have ties to Mexican DTOs (DEA, 2018; NGIC, 2011). 
Expanding the macro-level analysis would benefit this study since the Hells Angels are a 
national gang with the potential to access narcotic supply chains outside the San Diego-Tijuana 
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area. Having ties to Hells Angels charters with connections to Mexican DTOs, for instance, 
would reduce the necessity for local gang partnerships without diminishing their role in drug 
trafficking as suggested by Carpenter and Cooper. By accounting for the relationships outside the 
San Diego-Tijuana area, the authors can make more robust conclusions of their findings in terms 
of community resilience.  
Gangs, particularly OMGs or second-generation gangs, are more complex than what can 
be learned from strictly localized approaches. The Hells Angels, in particular, have charters 
throughout the world that facilitate criminal activity. In total, they have ninety-eight charters 
spread across twenty-seven states, with twenty-four in California alone, and several charters in 
sixty other countries, including six in Mexico (Hells Angels MC, n.d.). These numbers do not 
take into account the fifteen support clubs of the Hells Angels that independently establish their 
charters. Neglecting these connections ignores the possibility of distribution outside the narrow 
purview of local analyses, an important distinction that has wide-ranging implications for 
understanding the network structure of gangs. 
Using SNA to study gangs at the local level provides a valuable, yet limited, perspective 
on gang structures, but does not go far enough in understanding the national network of gangs. A 
macro-level national assessment of gang structure is necessary to make definitive conclusions 
about local gang relationships. David Pyrooz, Andrew Fox, and Scott Decker (2010) take a 
similar approach to understanding race, ethnicity, and economic disadvantage as causal factors of 
gang participation in urban centers. In defending the relevance of their research, they explicitly 
state, "At this point in time, given the scarcity of macro-level gang research, it is necessary to 
take a step toward identifying relevant predictors that apply to cities, not just a city” (p. 7). The 
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same logic can be applied to the study of national gang structures using SNA, an area of gang 
studies that has not been explored.  
James Howell (2012), however, trivializes macro-level network analyses, a strand of “big 
gang theory,” by addressing several “myths” on how gangs are conceptualized. The first myth 
acknowledges the organization of gangs. He argues that rather than highly structured 
organizations like Mexican DTOs, “Street gangs are generally loosely organized groups that are 
constantly changing – consolidating, reorganizing, and splintering” (p. 31). His second myth 
addresses the size of gangs. He claims the methodology of reporting gang affiliations has inflated 
gang membership. While there may be a significant number of Crips, for example, local gangs 
often adopt the names of nationally recognized gangs without any affiliation to them or their sets. 
Wesley McBride, President of the California Gang Investigator’s Association, summarizes the 
lack of cohesion between gangs. “In Los Angeles there are over 200 Crips sets and maybe 100 
Bloods sets, there is no common leader among any and they war on one another. [Most gang 
violence involves] Crips on Crips, Bloods on Bloods. There is no evidence of a Crips or Bloods 
nation in California. They do not understand that concept of gang nations. Each gang is totally 
independent of other gangs” (cited in Howell, 2012, p. 33 and Howell, 2015, p. 36). Marcus 
Felson (2006) contends that “the colossal gang is largely an illusion – many independent gangs 
just using the same name over a wider space for a longer time” (p. 308). In rationalizing the 
second myth, the third and final myth explains why "gangs of the same name are connected." 
Felson points out that this is a defense mechanism to project a reputation for being dangerous 
and well-connected. The arguments presented by Howell potentially undermine big gang theory 
and the study of gangs at the macro-level.  
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It would be imprudent to dismiss Howell’s criticisms out of hand. First, it is not 
uncommon for local conditions to spawn rivalries among gang sets where distinct patterns of 
conflict and cooperation emerge. For example, the Tree Top Pirus are known to feud with other 
Piru and Blood sets, and the Neighborhood Crips remain at odds with the Gangster Crips (United 
Gangs, n.d.). At the same time, the rivalry between the Crips and Bloods is well-documented and 
nationally recognized. The evolution of gangs posited by Sullivan attenuates the confusion 
between allies and rivals, where second and third-generation gangs demonstrate a higher degree 
of cohesion. Second-generation, market-oriented gangs, resemble entrepreneurial organizations 
where supply chain management becomes paramount to their operations. The establishment of 
networks allows the distribution of contraband from coastal areas to the interior of the country. If 
these networks did not exist, illicit goods such as narcotics would be limited to border towns. 
Through partnerships, gangs coordinate to control these supply routes (Drug Enforcement 
Administration, 2018). As a result, second-generation gangs take on the appearance of Mexican 
DTOs in terms of organization (Sullivan, 1997). Further, third-generation gangs maintain the 
same cohesion as second-generation gangs but are brought together through similar ideology and 
political-motivation. “The third generation street gang is a mercenary-type group with goals of 
power or financial acquisition and a set of fully evolved political aims…This type of gang may 
embrace either quasi-terrorism or true terrorism to advance its influence” (Sullivan, 1997, p. 96). 
One politically motivated gang, the Five Percenters, founded as an offshoot of the Nation of 
Islam, is a Black nationalist organization that uses incendiary language in their teachings to 
characterize white people as devils and advocate violence against them (Coward v Robinson, 
2017; Hardaway v Haggerty et al., 2009). Their teachings allow them to maintain unity among 
members regardless of geography. Other gangs such as Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and Barrio 18 
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have transformed into third-generation gangs by exploiting social, political, and economic 
disparity (Sullivan, 2006). The 2009 National Gang Intelligence Center (NGIC) gang report 
highlights MS-13’s national cohesion, “Traditionally, the gang consisted of loosely affiliated 
groups known as cliques; however, law enforcement officials have reported increased 
coordination of criminal activity among Mara Salvatrucha cliques in the Atlanta, Dallas, Los 
Angeles, Washington, D.C., and New York metropolitan areas” (p. 26).  
 In cities outside of Los Angeles, gangs have formed nations. As I discussed in the 
previous chapter, Chicago-area gangs such as the People and Folk, for instance, have cultivated 
alliances of loosely affiliated gangs that have since permeated throughout the United States. 
Their rivalry is equivalent to the Bloods and Crips, and members of the People and Folk Nations 
range from first to third-generation gangs. They experience similar internal conflicts as the 
Bloods and Crips described by McBride. As members of the Folk Nation, the Black Disciples, 
and Gangster Disciples, once a single gang known as the Black Gangster Disciples, remain 
mortal enemies. The Spanish Cobras have historically engaged in hostilities with most other 
People Nation members in the People Nation. The infighting is part and parcel to an aggregate 
pattern of gang relationships that is worth exploring. My training as a security threat group 
intelligence officer was conducted using this macro-level understanding of gang relationships 
(North Carolina Correctional Officer Training, 2016).  
Outside of Sullivan’s evolutionary perspective, the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) 
(2018) makes this important distinction between neighborhood and national gangs: 
NBGs (Neighborhood Gangs) operate mainly in the specific jurisdictions where they live. 
Many take on the names of national-level gangs and attempt to emulate them, but they 
rarely display the same level of sophistication or structure as national-level gangs (p. 107) 
 
National-level gangs are often highly structured; maintain a strict hierarchy, a 
constitution, and definitive set of rules; and share common tattoos and symbols. They 
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have a presence in many jurisdictions around the country. Many of these national level 
gangs work in conjunction with their counterparts in other locations around the country to 
benefit the whole gang, (p. 108) 
 
According to the DEA, the local gang described by Howell and Felson and the national gang that 
falls on Sullivan’s evolutionary spectrum exist simultaneously. While studying neighborhood 
gangs is beneficial, however, this limits our understanding to a specific locale. It is through the 
national gang structure that gang culture is being reproduced at the local level. This is a fact that 
warrants further investigation on the interconnectedness of national gangs. More importantly, 
there is empirical evidence to suggest national gangs are cultivating networks of criminal ties, or, 
to use Sullivan's phrase, becoming "net warriors." Sullivan, the DEA, and NGIC suggest that 
national gangs have become more cohesive, organized, and sophisticated. Despite these reports, 
the macro-level analysis of network gang structures remains an undeveloped area of gang 
research. 
4.2 A Macro-Level Network Approach to Analyze Gang Structure 
The distribution of narcotics as a lucrative business contributed to changes in the 
organizational gang structure (Coughlin & Venkatesh, 2003). Since the 1970s, one of the 
defining features of the modern gang has been its network orientation. This is a trait Sullivan 
attributes to the second-generation gang archetype in which they use group-control mechanisms 
to exert influence over market outcomes, transforming gangs from territorially-bounded, 
localized groups, to "net warriors" expanding into peripheral spaces and beyond. It is this 
transformation that necessitates a better understanding of the relationships between gangs at the 
national macro-level. As a consequence of their expansion, gangs invariably seek allies and 
create enemies as they compete for the same scarce resources and market opportunities 
(Coughlin & Venkatesh, 2003; Densley, 2014). The network structure this has created provides 
advantages to entrepreneurial and ideologically motivated gang types by diversifying 
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information and resource suppliers. Where direct ties are missing, structural holes can be filled 
by third parties to facilitate competitive advantage (Burt, 1995). Insofar as gangs have a 
proclivity for criminal behavior and their influence continues to spread, so does the threat to 
public safety. SNA, as an empirical-analytic tool, although under-utilized in gang studies, is an 
effective method to examine the interconnectedness of gangs and analyze their centrality, or 
influence in the network.  
Network analysis can improve our understanding of gang structures at the macro-level by 
revealing patterns of relationships. One of the most fundamental applications of SNA involves 
mapping gang connections. What gangs are allies and rivals, and how does this shape the 
national gang structure? The Aryan Brotherhood, for example, is often affiliated with white 
nationalism. However, their alliances with the Mexican Mafia and other ethnic gangs have been 
disavowed by other white nationalist gangs (Reeve, 2013). How do ethnically heterogeneous and 
homogenous connections compare in terms of cohesion and gang centrality? Has the diverse set 
of alliances impacted the Aryan Brotherhood's influence when compared to the homogenous 
alliances of white nationalist gangs? Further, distinctions of gangs have been made across 
different generations with different degrees of complexity, as Sullivan proposes. Within the 
generational framework exist different types of gangs (i.e., street, prison, and motorcycle gangs), 
each with distinct characteristics that I highlight in the previous chapter. Prison gangs like the 
Mexican Mafia, for instance, do not directly engage in street-level activity but exert control 
outside the prison setting through proxy gangs. These are street gangs that carry out orders on 
behalf of prison gangs. SNA can provide insight into the interconnectedness of different gang 
types and identify which gangs from these categories are the most influential. Mapping the 
relationships between gangs also provides an overview of the structural weaknesses in the gang 
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network. Which gangs or connections, if removed, would disconnect the graph? This type of 
inquiry is important to disrupt criminal gang activity by targeting and isolating the flow of 
information and resources. 
In recent years, MS-13, a gang formed by Salvadoran migrants in the United States, has 
been central to the public discourse on gangs. President Donald Trump (2017, 2018, 2019) has 
repeatedly addressed the threat of MS-13 to American communities (See also comments made 
by Attorney General Jeff Sessions (2018) in creating the Transnational Organized Crime Task 
Force). However, the narrative has been framed as part of a larger debate on U.S. immigration 
policy and border security. Centrality measures provide a method to formalize the extent to 
which discursive practices are politicizing or securitizing immigrant gangs by quantifying and 
comparing their network influence to native gangs. Some immigrant gangs have formed as a 
result of frequent victimization. Outgroup pressure from the Bloods and Crips in Los Angeles, 
for example, is often attributed to the formation of MS-13 (Wolf, 2012). These same conditions 
led to the formation of the Tiny Rascal Gang (TRG). Cambodian refugees facing genocide under 
Pol Pot fled to the United States, where the predation of native gangs caused them to band 
together for protection (Valdez, 2000). Whether formed by native or immigrant groups, 
identifying and targeting the most influential gangs could potentially deter the next MS-13 or 
TRG from emerging.  
Another group that is frequently mentioned in the immigration debate is transnational 
organized crime groups such as cartels and mafias. In particular, Mexican DTOs have 
strengthened their relationships with street, prison, and motorcycle gangs in the United States 
(NGIC, 2011, 2013, 2015). How influential are cartels, and what, if any, impact do they have on 
the network structure of gangs? Assessing gang alliances, especially to transnational organized 
106 
 
crime groups, helps contextualize their threat to public safety on a broader scale. In short, the 
more we understand macro-level gang structures, the more robust our inferences on their national 
security implications. Given the network orientation of gangs since the 1970s, SNA, as an 
empirical-analytic tool, is well-suited to examine these structures. 
4.3 Methodology 
This research is the first attempt at a macro-level network approach to analyze national 
gang structures in the United States. I borrow an approach similar to the Big Allied and 
Dangerous (BAAD) database developed by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism 
and Responses to Terrorism (START). According to the lead investigators for this project, Victor 
Asal, R. Karl Rethemeyer, and Ian Anderson (2011), "BAAD seeks to create a comprehensive 
database of terrorist organizations. The database contains information on organizational level 
variables such as ideology, location, size, structure, and funding as well as network data on 
variables such as allies, rivals, targets, and state sponsors." My research focuses on gang clusters 
and centrality measures. In SNA, clustering is useful to determine the cohesion of a graph and 
detect communities, or subgraphs, embedded in the network (Newman, 2015). Centrality 
measures, on the other hand, are used to quantify influential nodes based on their network 
position (Newman, 2015). Gangs with high network centrality control the flow of information 
and resources compared to gangs with low centrality. For this reason, gangs with higher 
centrality represent the greatest potential threat to national security. Unfortunately, a formal 
system for data collection on gangs similar to BAAD has not been established. This should, 
however, be integrated into future macro-level gang research. A comprehensive database on 
national gangs would make possible a longitudinal analysis of gang structure, another under-
researched area of gang studies (Coughlin & Venkatesh, 2003).  
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There are three problems Jennifer Xu and Hsinchun Chen (2005) identify when 
constructing criminal networks from unstructured data. One is the application of fuzzy 
boundaries or the ambiguity involved with determining which nodes to include in the network 
and how those nodes are connected. Whereas the sources used to construct the BAAD database 
were retrieved from the Terrorism Knowledge Base (TKB) created by the National Memorial 
Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, the Correlates of War (COW) Project, and the Polity 
and Polity 2 Projects, at the time of writing this chapter, no similar, publicly available, resources 
exist for gang research in the United States. Instead, I use the information presented in the 2011 
National Gang Threat Assessment released by the National Gang Intelligence Center (NGIC) to 
select the gangs used in this study. The 2011 NGIC gang assessment is the most recent and 
comprehensive report showing the state location of gangs at the time of this writing. I include 
gangs identified in two or more states. The BAAD dataset follows a similar approach of focusing 
on the world's largest terrorist groups. However, a problem with the selection process for gangs 
is that several gangs in the NGIC report are named after streets common in states across the 
country. The 121st Street Gang, for example, is "generic." Unlike gangs with nationally 
recognizable relationships such as the rivalry between the Crips and Bloods, and in the absence 
of a national gang database, it is difficult to identify any discernable connection between them, 
their allies, and their rivals. Therefore, I exclude "generic" gangs from the dataset. In addition to 
gangs, I include Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs), or cartels, in the dataset 
because they factor prominently in the gang network. They form alliances with gangs in the 
United States to act as distribution networks for illicit goods. Roughly 69% of the agencies 
reporting in the 2011 NGIC report indicate that gangs in their jurisdiction are involved in drug 
distribution. Seeking economic opportunity through the distribution of narcotics has led to 
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increases in violent crime and the migration of gangs into new communities (Tita & Radil, 
2011).  
Although the gangs used in this study were taken from the 2011 NGIC, establishing 
connections between them is a separate, more complex process. I cross-reference several sources 
to verify the existence of a connection between gangs. This is an attempt to minimize any 
assumptions or arbitrary associations that might undermine the results of this study. I take four 
steps in validating the connections between gangs. First, I consult several reputable sources that 
document alliances and rivalries between gangs. One set of sources include government gang 
intelligence publications. In addition to the 2011 NGIC gang report, I review the 2013 and 2015 
gang reports, the 2018 National Drug Threat Assessment released by the U.S. Department of 
Justice Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and The Gang Book published by the Chicago 
Crime Commission. Each report contains information on gang trends for prison, street, and 
motorcycle gangs and discusses their connections, including partnerships with Mexican DTOs. 
Additionally, I consult the North Carolina Correctional Officer Training Manual on prison 
security threat groups. This section of the manual is used to facilitate the identification of gang 
members by prison staff and make officers aware of the alliances and rivalries between gangs 
from a macro perspective.  
In addition to government sources, I use two publications in the field of gang studies that 
identify connections between gangs. The Encyclopedia of Gangs, a compilation of essays that 
address current events for specific gangs, and The One Percenter Encyclopedia, a compilation of 
essays that focus on OMGs, provide information on gang connections. Lastly, I use open-source 
websites that contextualize these connections by describing the history and transformation of 
gang alliances and rivalries. The various resources I use include United Gangs, One Percenter 
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Bikers, Chicago Gang History, Gang Identification Task Force (blog), Police Law Enforcement 
Solutions, InSight Crime, Southern Poverty Law Center, the Rap Dictionary, and the Hip Hop 
Database.  
The context of gang relationships helps address data reliability issues endemic to national 
gang reports. Federal publications rely on a decentralized data collection process from local 
sources that can lead to inconsistencies between law enforcement agencies. Some districts are 
equipped with specialized gang units and subject matter experts. In contrast, others either lack 
sufficient resources to track gangs or do not differentiate between gang and non-gang activity as 
a matter of standard operating procedure. Twenty-two percent of the law enforcement agencies 
responding to the 2011 Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquent Protection (OJJDP) survey 
(2013) indicated that they do not collect or maintain information on gangs (Cited in Huff & 
Barrows, 2015). In the 2011 NGIC report, the Lewiston Police Department was the only agency 
in Maine to contribute. Similarly, the West Valley City Police Department, a suburb of Salt Lake 
City, was the sole contributing agency from Utah, and there were no contributions from the state 
of Vermont. 
Disparate processes have led to inaccuracies in the publication of gang data. Some 
jurisdictions report gangs as an aggregate group while others use a different vernacular. White 
supremacists and white nationalists are two names of the same group aggregated from 
Peckerwood gangs. Other examples in the NGIC report include Russian and Somali gangs 
documented as non-descript groups. Further, the decentralized data collection process suffers 
from omissions in gang reporting.  The Iron Order Motorcycle Club, established in 
Jeffersonville, Indiana in 2004, is an OMG that has a presence in forty-seven states plus the 
District of Columbia, and chapters in eleven countries outside of the United States (One 
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Percenter Bikers, 2020b), but is not represented in the 2011 NGIC gang report. Also problematic 
is the misrepresentation of gangs, which could be a consequence of inadequate police training or 
a general unfamiliarity of previously unidentified “new” gangs to an area. The Black Gangster 
Disciples are reported in several states, but this gang separated in the 1970s, forming two distinct 
gangs, the Black Disciples and Gangster Disciples, whose rivalry continues today (Chicago Gang 
History, 2017b). The issue of data reliability in government publications and gang studies, in 
general, provides a separate, but important argument in favor of a macro-level gang database 
similar to that used to inform the BAAD model. Although inter-agency cooperation occurs, there 
is an information gap at the state, regional, and national level (Huff & Barrows, 2015). I address 
the limitations of the NGIC gang report in the next chapter by collecting Twitter data on gangs to 
examine the geospatial distribution of gangs at the micro-level. 
The third factor I consider in modeling the network includes using connections that are 
explicitly verified in the sources I use. For example, the 2018 DEA reports that the Latin Kings 
in Kansas have connections to "Mexican Cartels." Connections with unspecified cartels or other 
groups are not included in the model. Further, in the rare case that a data source contradicts 
another, I consider the date and consensus of the references to determine the existence of a 
connection, and whether that connection represents an alliance or rivalry. On the one hand, gang 
relationships are fluid and change over time (Xu & Chen, 2005). Once an ally of white 
nationalist gangs, recent data suggests that the Aryan Brotherhood is at odds with these groups 
because of their ties to ethnic gangs. Therefore, the connection between these two gangs is coded 
as a rivalry. On the other hand, gangs with the same affiliation are not exempt from infighting. 
Although a member of the Folk Nation, the Spanish Cobras frequently engage other members of 
the alliance in violent confrontation (Chicago Gang History, 2017c). In the dataset, this gang is 
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coded as an ally to the Folk Nation, but a rival to other gangs in the Folk Nation. These 
connections are concluded by a general agreement between multiple sources in this study. 
Another problem identified by Xu and Chen is data transformation. Constructing network 
models from unstructured data is time-consuming and labor-intensive. Mainly when modeling 
criminal networks where associations are not always transparent. In part, I address this issue 
through the sources I have selected and the rigorous verification process I use to validate the 
relationships between gangs. The size of the network is relatively small, reducing the time it 
takes to build the gang network. I use an adjacency matrix to show the connections between 
gangs. In total, the dataset for this study includes 121 vertices (nodes) represented by 69 street 
gangs, 19 prison gangs, 25 outlaw motorcycle gangs (OMGs), and 8 cartels. Moreover, each 
gang can be categorized into 12 primary gang affiliations that include different sets and sub-sets. 
The Tree Top Pirus, for example, is a Piru set affiliated with the Bloods, making them a Blood 
sub-set. The highest number of gang affiliations belong to OMGs with 26 nodes. Gangs 
unaffiliated with any primary gang represents 24 nodes. Together, OMGs and unaffiliated gangs 
represent approximately 40% of the nodes in the network. Half of the affiliated gangs in the 
dataset are evenly represented, ranging from 9 to 13 nodes. The least represented gang 
affiliations include the Norteños, Insectos, black nationalist gangs, and the Sureños ranging from 
2 to 6 nodes. Finally, 77 gangs, or 63.64% of the dataset, were started by native groups. Another 
34 gangs, or 28.10% of the dataset, originated with immigrant groups in the United States. In 10 
gangs or 8.26% of the dataset, I could not identify the origins of the gang. Table 4.1 lists the 





Table 4.1 Gang Representation by Type, Affiliation, and Country of Origin 
Gang Type Total % of Total 
Street Gangs 69 57.02% 
Prison Gangs 19 15.70% 
OMGs 25 20.66% 
Cartels 8 6.61% 
Total 121 100% 
 
Gang Affiliation Total % of Total 
Crips 10 8.26% 
Bloods 9 7.44% 
Folk Nation 9 7.44% 
People Nation 9 7.44% 
Norteños 2 1.65% 
Sureños 6 4.96% 
Black Nationalists 3 2.48% 
Peckerwood (White Nationalists) 13 10.74% 
Motorcycle Clubs 26 21.49% 
Insectos 2 1.65% 
Unaffiliated 24 19.83% 
Mexican Cartels 8 6.61% 
Total 121 100% 
 
Country Origins Total % of Total 
Native Groups 77 63.64% 
Immigrant Groups 34 28.10% 
Unconfirmed 10 8.26% 
Total 121 100% 
 
 
Finally, Xu and Chen point out that network dynamics are problematic. “Criminal networks are 
not static, but are subject to change over time. New data and even new methods of data 
collection may be required to capture the dynamics of criminal networks” (p. 102). The issue of 
network dynamics is less a concern addressed in this study, and more a reflection on the 
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importance of this research. Future iterations on the macro-level analysis of gang associations are 
necessary to deal with network dynamics. Some variation of the BAAD database, a useful tool 
for conducting longitudinal analyses on the relationships between terrorist groups, would be an 
effective model to study gangs.   
In order to analyze the network structure of gangs at the macro-level, I construct three 
different graphs to test network centrality. Measures of centrality quantify the importance of a 
node in the network (Newman, 2015). The first graph I use is a baseline model that shows the 
connections between gangs, regardless of their relationship. Whether an ally or a rival, these 
connections inextricably link gangs. The Crips, for example, are rarely discussed without 
mentioning the Bloods. That goes the same for other gangs that have longstanding rivalries such 
as the People and Folk Nations and the Norteños and Sureños. As I discuss in Chapter 3, some 
gangs form in response to outgroup pressures from established gangs. The baseline model uses 
an unweighted adjacency matrix where each edge is coded as 1 (ally or rival) if a connection 
exists, and 0 if no connection exists. I use the baseline model to analyze the impact of rivalries 
on network influence by comparing the results to the other two models. 
Although alliances and rivalries constitute a connection between gangs, the context of 
that relationship matters (Tita et al., 2003). The second graph, gang nexus model 1, considers the 
positive (ally) and negative (rival) ties on gang influence in the network. As early as 1946, 
negative ties in network analysis have been used to study avoidance or sentiment relations 
between nodes (Harrigan and Yap, 2017). Whereas alliances can improve the network centrality 
of a gang, rivalries can have an adverse impact. In the third and final graph, gang nexus model 2, 
I consider the positive and negative ties between gangs but remove cartels from the gang 
network to analyze their impact on gang influence. For all three models, gangs represent a vertex 
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(node) on the graph, edges (tie) indicate a connection between gangs, and the graphs are 
undirected. That is to say, if an alliance or rivalry exists, each gang is aware of this relationship. 
Crips know they are rivals with Bloods and vice versa. Both gang nexus models use a weighted 
graph where an edge is coded as 1 (ally), -1 (rival), or 0 (no connection).  
I use two methods to analyze macro-level gang structures. First, I identify the cutpoints, 
bridges, and community detection in gang nexus model 1. This model incorporates the weighted 
ties between gangs as an ally or rival and includes cartels. Gang nexus model 1 most closely 
resembles the real-world gang structure. Cutpoints and bridges, two important locational 
properties of a graph, indicate structural weaknesses in a network (Luke, 2015). Whereas 
cutpoints represent a node that, if removed, disconnects parts of the graph, bridges represent their 
edge equivalency. If a cutpoint or bridge is removed, then two subsets of nodes would be unable 
to communicate. Another method of identifying relationships in a network is through community 
detection. Usha Nandini Raghavan, Réka Albert, and Soundar Kumara (2007) explain, “A 
community in a network is a group of nodes that are similar to each other and dissimilar from the 
rest of the network. It is usually thought of as a group where nodes are densely inter-connected 
and sparsely connected to other parts of the network" (p. 1). Cliques are a basic representation of 
network communities that indicate density by the number of node closures, or shared friends. 
The second method I use to analyze the macro-level gang structure is through centrality 
measures. Network centrality quantifies a gang's network influence, or importance, over other 
nodes. The higher the centrality, the greater the likelihood that a gang controls the flow of 
information and resources throughout the network (Fox, 2013). I use five common centrality 
measures for each of the three models. One of the most fundamental metrics of network 
influence is degree centrality. Influence is measured by taking the sum of connections to a node 
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(Luke, 2015).  The more direct ties a node has the higher its importance in the network. Gangs 
with a higher number of connections have access to more information and resources, providing 
them an advantage over gangs with a low number of connections. Another centrality measure I 
include is closeness centrality, where influence is determined by the average number of shortest 
paths from one node to all other nodes in the network (Luke, 2015). This is calculated by 
inverting the mean distance between nodes. Gangs with the highest closeness centrality score can 
send and access information and resources quicker than gangs with a low closeness centrality 
score. A third centrality measure I use to evaluate gang influence is betweenness centrality. 
Betweenness centrality considers the extent to which a node lies on paths that connect other 
nodes (Luke, 2015). These types of nodes are referred to as “bridges” or “brokers.” Gangs exert 
influence in the network by controlling the flow of information and resources. In some cases, the 
removal of these gangs results in the graph becoming disconnected; useful when trying to isolate, 
target, and disrupt criminal networks. Closeness and betweenness centrality scores are best used 
for analyzing connected graphs. 
The last two measures I use in this study are PageRank and eigenvector centrality. 
PageRank is a Google algorithm designed to measure web pages centrality based on the 
importance of other web pages with which they are connected. Whereas degree centrality 
assumes network influence from the total number of connections to a node, PageRank assigns a 
weight to those nodes based on their relative importance in the network. Sergey Brin and Larry 
Page (1998) explain that importance is not only based on the number of links but also depends 
on the position on the graph relative to other influential nodes. According to their assessment, “A 
page has high rank if the sum of the ranks of its backlinks is high. This covers both the case 
when a page has many backlinks and when a page has a few highly ranked backlinks” (p. 3). In 
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principle, a node can have importance if the node is connected to several other nodes throughout 
the network, if they have low connections to other nodes but are connected to other highly 
connected nodes, or both (Newman, 2015). The assumption here is that the importance of a 
highly centralized gang will increase other gangs' status in their orbit. Although PageRank 
improves upon degree centrality, this metric is best applied to directed graphs. For example, the 
higher the number of out-degree connections from a centralized node, the less the influence 
being passed to other nodes. Another centrality measure that works similar to PageRank is 
eigenvector centrality. While PageRank falls within the eigenvector family, Eigen centrality is 
useful for measuring undirected weighted graphs that are connected or disconnected. Table 4.2 
summarizes the network centrality measures I use in this study (for a more formal definition of 
degree, closeness, betweenness, and eigenvector centrality measures see Borgatti (2005), and for 
a more formal definition of PageRank centrality see Brin and Page (1998)). Table 4.3 provides 
an overview of the descriptive statistics for each model by centrality measure which I discuss 
further in the results section. 
 
Table 4.2 Brief Summary of Each Centrality Measure 
Centrality Measure Description Advantage 
Degree Centrality 
Measures influence from direct connections to 
node. 
Most basic centrality 
measure. 
Closeness Centrality 
Measures influence from the inverse average 
of shortest paths that a node is connected. 
Effective in measuring 
centrality for connected 
graphs. 
Betweenness Centrality 
Measures influence from the sum total of 
shortest paths passing through a node. 
Effective in measuring 
centrality for connected 
graphs. 
PageRank 
Measures direct connections to a node AND 
the connectedness of other nodes. 
Effective in measuring 
centrality for directed 
graphs. 
Eigenvector Centrality 
Measures direct connections to a node AND 
the connectedness of other nodes. 
Effective in measuring 
centrality for directed 




Table 4.3 Descriptive Statistics and Centralization Scores by Centrality Measure for Each Model 
Centrality Measure Centralization Index Mean Median Std Dev Range 
Baseline Model (Unweighted - No Allies & Rivals) 
Degree 0.4913 14.05 11 12.86 0 - 73 
Closeness 0.0222 0.000577 0.000631 0.000162 0.000069 - 0.000668 
Betweenness 0.1465 70.26 4.9478 170.22 0 - 1107.86 
PageRank NA 0.0083 0.0076 0.0059 0.0013 - 0.0365 
Eigenvector 0.7764 0.2364 0.1587 0.2216 0 - 1 
Gang Nexus Model 1 (Weighted - Allis & Rivals) 
Degree 0.1979 6.25 5 6.34 0-30 
Closeness 0.0139 0.000256 0.000303 0.000095 0.000069 - 0.000313 
Betweenness 0.1429 65.26 1.12 158.60 0 - 1077.05 
PageRank NA 0.0083 0.0071 0.0067 0.0015 - 0.0374 
Eigenvector 0.7813 0.2316 0.1497 0.2415 0 - 1 
Gang Nexus Model 2 (Weighted - Allies & Rivals, No Cartels) 
Degree 0.1691 5.06 3 5.19 0 - 24 
Closeness 0.0137 0.000240 0.000291 0.000092 0.000079 - 0.003 
Betweenness 0.1597 64.91 0.6667 168.04 0 - 1049.08 
PageRank NA 0.0089 0.007 0.0071 0.0017 - 0.0392 
Eigenvector 0.8294 0.1853 0.0814 0.2285 0 - 1 
 
 
There is no consensus on which centrality measure is best suited for determining network 
influence (Luke, 2015). As I point out, each centrality measure uses a different standard to justify 
a node's importance. Therefore, the final metric I use in this study ranks gangs based on their 
aggregate network centrality score. I achieve this by converting the centrality score for each gang 
into a Z-score and taking the average Z-score for all three models. Rather than basing centrality 
on a single measure, aggregating the results show a pattern of gang centrality across all five 
metrics used in this study. The results of this study are calculated using R-Studio. R-Studio is an 
open-source integrated programming environment for R used to conduct quantitative computing 




I begin this section discussing some of the network descriptions for gang nexus model 1. 
This includes cutpoints, bridges, and community detection. Gang nexus model 1 represents the 
focus of this study while the other two models are used to comparatively analyze changes in the 
gang structure. I finish this section showing the centrality measures and aggregate centrality 
scores for all three models. Centrality shows a gang’s position in the network and arguably 
indicates their influence, or control, over the flow of information and resources. 
4.4.1 Cutpoints, Bridges, and Community Detection 
The diameter of gang nexus model 1 is 6. A graph's diameter measures the efficiency of 
information and resources moving through the network (Luke, 2015). This means that the 
longest shortest path between all pairs of vertices in this network is a distance of six. Often 
referred to as six degrees of separation, this metric is common when discussing the small-world 
phenomenon (See de Sola Pool & Kochen, 1979; Milgrim, 1967; Travers & Milgrim, 1969). 
Figure 4.1 provides a basic visual of gang connections and their network centrality. Node 
size indicates the relative influence of a gang to the network where larger nodes are more 
important than smaller nodes. The Crips and Bloods appear to be highly influential. Red edges 
indicate a rivalry between two nodes, and blue edges indicate an alliance. Gang clusters can be 
observed based on these connections. For example, Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs (OMGs) appear 
on the right side of the graph, while the People and Folk Nations are shown on the left. Isolates 
(gangs with no connections to any other node in the network) are removed to improve the 


































There are seven cutpoints in gang nexus model 1, whereby four of them are of interest. 
They include four of the "Big 5" Motorcycle Gangs in the United States, as recognized by the 
U.S. Department of Justice (1991). In addition to their ties to the OMG community, the Bandidos 
and Hells Angels, two rival motorcycle clubs, have alliances with Los Zetas, the Gulf Cartel, and 
the Juarez Cartel, and the Sinaloa and Tijuana Cartels, respectively.  Moreover, the Hells Angels 
have ties to two white prison gangs, the Aryan Brotherhood and Nazi Lowriders, and a white 
street gang, the Aryan Nation. Despite being rivals with the Hells Angels, the Pagans have ties to 
the Aryan Brotherhood and Aryan Nation. Similarly, the Outlaws have connections to the Aryan 
Brotherhood and one of their strongest allies, the Mexican Mafia. Although the cutpoints provide 
interesting results in disconnecting OMGs from the rest of the gang nexus, the bridges detected 
in the graph are less revealing. The bridges involve mostly the Big 5 OMGs, but rather than 
disconnecting subsets of motorcycle clubs, the removal of these edges results in the isolation of a 
single gang. For example, the Rough Riders MC has one connection in the network to the 
Pagans. Removing the edge between the Rough Riders and Pagans results in the Rough Riders 
becoming isolated in the graph. 
 Two of the largest cliques in gang nexus model 1 (allies and rivals) with nine members 
are white nationalist groups and the People Nation with the Bloods, who share an alliance with 
most members of the People Nation. The next highest clique outside of these two groups is the 
Folk Nation with six. Although the Folk Nation is an alliance of several other gangs, there are 
significant rivalries between member gangs. One of the notable rivalries is between the Gangster 
Disciples and Black Disciples that originated in the 1970s. Another one involves the "Insane" 
and "Maniac" sets. There is a similar issue with other gangs like the Crips. Grape Street Crips 
and Hoover Gangster Crips, for instance, continuously feud with other Crip sets, especially at the 
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local level in the Watts district of Los Angeles. One of the main rivals to the Hoover Gangster 
Crips is the Neighborhood Rollin’ Crips.  
A more formal representation of network community measures gang clusters through a 
detection algorithm. For this study, I use the Label Propagation and Louvain community 
detection algorithms. Both have higher modularity scores.5 Compared to other community 
detection algorithms, the modularity score for the Label Propagation algorithm is 0.50, and it is 
0.5101 for Louvain. In the Label propagation algorithm, each node is identified by the label of 
the community to which they belong, and nodes choose the community to which the maximum 
number of its neighbors belong (Raghavan, Albert, & Kumara, 2007). The formation of 
communities propagates throughout the network until all nodes are placed into a community. On 
the other hand, the Louvain algorithm, first introduced by Vincent Blondel, Jean-Loupe 
Guillaume, Renaud Lambiotte, and Etienne Lefebvre (2008), “is a hierarchical clustering 
algorithm, that recursively merges communities into a single node and executes the modularity 
clustering on the condensed graphs” (Needham & Hodler, 2019). Both community detection 
methods consider the positive ties between gangs when dividing them into clusters. For a more 
formal explanation of the Louvain algorithm, see Hao Lu, Mahantesh Halappanavar, and Anath 
Kalyanaraman (2014), and for an application of the Louvain algorithm on social networks see 
Josep M. Pujol, Vijay Erramilli, and Pablo Rodriguez (2009). 
In total, there are five communities detected using the Label Propagation algorithm. The 
smallest community includes the Insectos where Grupo 25 is aligned with Grupo 27. Another 
community includes white Nationalist gangs that overlap with a third community, including 
 
5 M. E. J. Newman (2006) explains, "that true community structure in a network corresponds to a 
statistically surprising arrangement of edges, can be quantified using the measure known as modularity. 
The modularity is, up to a multiplicative constant, the number of edges falling within groups minus the 
expected number in an equivalent network with edges placed at random” (p. 2). 
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OMGs, the Sureños, several established prison gangs such as the Aryan Brotherhood and Texas 
Syndicate, and cartels. Some cartels, like the Sinaloa and Juarez Cartels, overlap with 
communities that include Bloods, People Nation, and Norteños. The final community detected 
with the Label Propagation algorithm includes the Crips and Folk Nation. Figure 4.2 shows the 
Label Propagation community detection algorithm results, where communities are color-coded, 



























The Louvain community algorithm detects six communities where several clusters 
resemble the Label Propagation algorithm. For example, the Insectos remain a community along 
with the Bloods, People Nation, and Norteños, Crips and Folk Nation, and the cartels, Sureños, 
and some prison gangs. The main difference between the two algorithms is how they cluster the 
OMGs and white nationalist groups. Unlike the Label Propagation method, Louvain separates 
the Hells Angels and their allies into a separate community while other OMGs remain in a 
community with cartels, Sureños, and prison gangs. Similarly, white nationalist gangs, while still 
a community, are not as embedded in this community either. Figure 4.3 shows the results from 
the Louvain community detection algorithm where communities are color-coded, and edges 






















4.4.2 Degree Centrality 
Degree centrality measures network influence by the number of edges connected to a 
node (Luke, 2015). The greater the number of connections to a gang, the stronger their influence 
in the network. The results of the baseline model show that the Crips and Bloods rank first and 
second as the most influential gangs in the network with 73 and 71 connections, respectively. 
Compared to the centrality of other gangs in the network, the Crips and Bloods have significantly 
higher connections. The next three gangs with high centrality are the Sureños (45 ties), Aryan 
Brotherhood (37 ties), and Latin Kings (36 ties). All five of the most central gangs in the 
baseline model originated from native groups. Gangs formed by immigrant groups with the 
highest degree centrality include MS-13 (El Salvador) ranked ninth with 31 ties, Zoe Pound 
(Haiti) ranked eleventh with 28 ties, and La Raza (Mexico) ranked fourteenth with 24 ties. 
Cartels in the baseline model also account for significantly less influence than the Crips and 
Bloods. The highest-ranked cartel is the Sinaloa Cartel ranked tenth with 29 ties. The average 
degree centrality measure for the baseline model is 14.05 with a median score of 11, a degree 
centrality range from 0 – 73, and a centralization index of 0.4913. Centralization indices measure 
the extent to which the most central node compares to the centrality of the other nodes in the 
network (Freeman, 1979). A higher centrality index means greater variation in the distribution of 
influence across the network. Conversely, a low centralization index suggests centrality is more 
evenly distributed across all nodes in the network. For the baseline model, influence based on 
degree centrality is moderately distributed across the network.   
 The gang nexus model 1 provides context on gang relationships by distinguishing 
between positive ties (allies) and negative ties (rivals). In this model, the Crips and Bloods 
remain the two most central gangs in the network, but by a more modest number of connections 
than in the baseline model. Degree centrality for the Crips and Bloods is 30 and 28, respectively, 
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followed by the Sinaloa Cartel and Sureños tied for third with 24 ties each. Ranked fourth is the 
Latin Kings with 20 ties, and tied for fifth are the Aryan Brotherhood, Aryan Nation, and 
Mexican Mafia with 17 ties. It is worth mentioning that both the Aryan Brotherhood and 
Mexican Mafia are prison gangs that formed the Aryan Nation and Sureños, respectively, as 
proxies to conduct street-level gang activity. Centrality among immigrant gangs remained 
consistent, but the network ranks are inverted. Zoe Pound ranks eighth with a degree centrality 
score of 14, La Raza ranks tenth with a degree centrality score of 12, and MS-13 ranks 
fourteenth with a degree centrality score of 8. Overall, the degree centralization index for the 
gang nexus model 1 is 0.1979, meaning that centrality is more evenly distributed across the 
network than in the baseline model. The average degree centrality score is 6.25, with a median of 
5 and range from 0 to 30. 
The gang nexus model 2 uses the same positive and negative ties to show the relationship 
between gangs when cartels are removed from the network. In this model, the Crips and Bloods 
tie for first as the most influential gangs with a degree centrality score of 24. Compared to the 
gang nexus model 1, the Sureños improve their network rank to second, the Aryan Nation and 
Latin Kings rank third, and the Mexican Mafia ranks fourth. Additionally, Zoe Pound and La 
Raza improve to fifth and sixth in their network rank with degree centrality scores of 12 and 11, 
respectively. MS-13, on the other hand, drops to thirteenth with a degree centrality score of 4. 
This suggests that the degree centrality of MS-13 in the network is dependent on cartels. In the 
absence of cartels, other gangs improve their degree centrality. These include gangs and their 
allies that are highly cohesive, as indicated by the cliques discussed at the beginning of this 
section. The Black P. Stones, for example, rank third with a degree centrality score of 14, and the 
Vice Lords and People Nation rank fourth with degree centrality scores of 13. In addition to the 
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Latin Kings, the Black P. Stones and Vice Lords are members of the People Nation, and one of 
their most important allies are the Bloods. This means that the People Nation and Bloods 
community has several of the network's most central gangs. Another cohesive community 
somewhat represented in the top five most central gangs is the white nationalists. Peckerwood 
ranks fourth with a degree centrality score of 13 followed closely by the Nazi Lowriders with a 
degree centrality score of 12. The degree centralization index for gang nexus model 2 is 0.1691. 
The mean centrality score is 5.06, with a median score of 3 and a range of 0 to 24. Table 4.4 
shows the degree centrality scores for select gangs in all three models. A complete list of degree 

















Table 4.4 Degree Centrality Scores and Network Rank by Country and Gang Type 
Gang Centrality Score Centrality Rank Country Gang Type 
Baseline Model (Unweighted - No Allies & Rivals) 
Crips 73 1 US Street 
Bloods 71 2 US Street 
Sureños 45 3 US Street 
Aryan Brotherhood 37 4 US Prison 
Latin Kings 36 5 US Street 
MS-13 31 9 El Salvador Street 
Sinaloa Cartel 29 10 Mexico Cartel 
Zoe Pound 28 11 Haiti Street 
La Raza 24 14 Mexico Street 
Gang Nexus Model 1 (Weighted - Allies & Rivals) 
Crips 30 1 US Street 
Bloods 28 2 US Street 
Sinaloa Cartel 24 3 Mexico Cartel 
Sureños 24 3 US Street 
Latin Kings 20 4 US Street 
Aryan Brotherhood 17 5 US Prison 
Aryan Nation 17 5 US Street 
Mexican Mafia 17 5 US Prison 
Zoe Pound 14 8 Haiti Street 
La Raza 12 10 Mexico Street 
MS-13 8 14 El Salvador Street 
Gang Nexus Model 2 (Weighted - Allies & Rivals, No Cartels) 
Bloods 24 1 US Street 
Crips 24 1 US Street 
Sureños 17 2 US Street 
Aryan Nation 14 3 US Street 
Black P Stones 14 3 US Street 
Latin Kings 14 3 US Street 
Aryan Brotherhood 13 4 US Prison 
Mexican Mafia 13 4 US Prison 
Peckerwood 13 4 US Street 
People Nation 13 4 US Street 
Vice Lords 13 4 US Street 
Black Guerrilla Family 12 5 US Prison 
Nazi Low Riders 12 5 US Prison 
Zoe Pound 12 5 Haiti Street 
La Raza 11 6 Mexico Street 




4.4.3 Closeness Centrality 
Closeness centrality measures network influence by inverting the average distance 
between a node and all other nodes (Newman, 2015). The less distance a node travels to reach all 
other nodes, the greater their centrality in the network. Despite being a common centrality 
measure in network analysis, however, closeness best measures influence in connected graphs. 
This is reflected in the low closeness centralization index for all three models. Centralization for 
the baseline model is 2.22%, 1.39% for gang nexus model 1, and 1.37% for gang nexus model 2. 
By itself, closeness centrality is a poor indicator of gang prominence for this study, but patterns 
of gang centrality emerge when compared to the other measures. Similar to the degree centrality 
results, the two most prominent gangs in the baseline model are the Crips and Bloods. Both 
gangs rank first with the same closeness centrality score of 0.000668. Unlike degree centrality, 
however, the gap between centrality scores is less significant, suggesting gangs in the network 
are equally distant from one another. For example, the closeness centrality score for the second 
and third most central gangs in the network, the Aryan Brotherhood and Aryan Nation is 
0.000010 and 0.000011 less than the Crips and Bloods, respectively. The same results apply to 
immigrant gangs and cartels. MS-13 and the Sinaloa Cartel rank fifth with a closeness centrality 
score of 0.000651. The tenth-ranked gangs, Zoe Pound and Neo-Nazis, a white supremacist gang 
that originated in the United Kingdom, are not far behind with a closeness centrality score of 
0.000643. The average centrality score for the baseline model is 0.0000577, and the median 
score is 0.000631, with a range from 0.000069 to 0.000668. 
In gang nexus model 1, cartels are more prominent, but the separation between closeness 
centrality scores are less than in the baseline model. Whereas the Sinaloa Cartel ranks first with a 
closeness centrality score of 0.000313, the Crips, Gulf Cartel, La Familia Michoacana Cartel, 
Mexican Mafia, and Los Zetas rank second with a closeness centrality score of 0.000311. 
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Moreover, the difference between closeness centrality scores of the first-ranked Sinaloa Cartel 
and the sixth-ranked MS-13 is 0.000006. The average closeness centrality score for gang nexus 
model 1 is 0.000256, and the median score is 0.000303, with a range from 0.000069 to 0.000313. 
When cartels are removed from the network, the Juggalos and Mexican Mafia rank first in gang 
nexus model 2 with a closeness centrality score of 0.0003. However, the difference in closeness 
centrality scores between gangs remains marginal. The Crips and Bloods rank second and third 
with closeness centrality scores of 0.000299 and 0.000298, respectively. Moreover, as one of 
several gangs ranked seventh, the closeness centrality score for MS-13 is 0.000294. The average 
closeness centrality score for gang nexus model 2 is 0.000240, the median score is 0.000291, and 
the range of scores is 0.000079 to 0.003. Table 4.5 shows the results of the closeness centrality 
scores for select gangs in all three models. A complete list of closeness centrality scores for each 














Table 4.5 Closeness Centrality Scores and Network Rank by Country and Gang Type 
Gang Centrality Score Centrality Rank Country Gang Type 
Baseline Model (Unweighted - No Allies & Rivals) 
Bloods 0.000668 1 US Street 
Crips 0.000668 1 US Street 
Aryan Brotherhood 0.000658 2 US Prison 
Aryan Nation 0.000657 3 US Street 
MS-13 0.000651 5 El Salvador Street 
Sinaloa Cartel 0.000651 5 Mexico Cartel 
Neo-Nazi 0.000643 10 UK Street 
Zoe Pound 0.000643 10 Haiti Street 
La Raza 0.000642 11 Mexico Street 
Skinheads 0.000642 11 UK Street 
Gang Nexus Model 1 (Weighted - Allies & Rivals) 
Sinaloa Cartel 0.000313 1 Mexico Cartel 
Crips 0.000311 2 US Street 
Gulf Cartel 0.000311 2 Mexico Cartel 
La Familia Michoacana Cartel 0.000311 2 Mexico Cartel 
Mexican Mafia 0.000311 2 US Prison 
Zetas Cartel 0.000311 2 Mexico Cartel 
Aryan Brotherhood 0.000310 3 US Prison 
Bloods 0.000310 3 US Street 
Juggalos 0.000310 3 US Street 
Sureños 0.000310 3 US Street 
Zoe Pound 0.000310 3 Haiti Street 
La Raza 0.000308 5 Mexico Street 
18th St  0.000307 6 El Salvador Street 
MS-13 0.000307 6 El Salvador Street 
Gang Nexus Model 2 (Weighted - Allies & Rivals, No Cartels) 
Juggalos 0.000300 1 US Street 
Mexican Mafia 0.000300 1 US Prison 
Crips 0.000299 2 US Street 
Bloods 0.000298 3 US Street 
Sureños 0.000298 3 US Street 
La Raza 0.000297 4 Mexico Street 
Vatos Locos 0.000296 5 Mexico Street 
Zoe Pound 0.000296 5 Haiti Street 
18th St  0.000295 6 El Salvador Street 




4.4.4 Betweenness Centrality 
Betweenness centrality measures network influence as the extent to which edges pass 
through a node (Luke, 2015). Nodes act as "bridges" or "brokers," whereby their centrality is 
determined by the highest number of shortest paths. It is assumed that network influence comes 
from having direct access to different sections of the network that would otherwise involve a 
greater number of intermediaries or become altogether disconnected. For the models in this 
study, betweenness centrality suffers from the same weakness as closeness centrality and is best 
suited for connected graphs, albeit with a higher centralization index. The betweenness 
centralization indices for the baseline model, gang nexus model 1, and gang nexus model 2 is 
14.65%, 14.29%, and 15.97%, respectively. Similar to the degree and closeness centrality 
measures, the two central nodes in the baseline model are the Crips and Bloods with betweenness 
centrality scores of 1107.86 and 984.21, respectively. The Aryan Brotherhood ranks third in 
network centrality with a betweenness score of approximately 500 points less than the Crips. 
Their betweenness centrality score of 628.69, however, is closer to the fourth and fifth-ranked 
gangs. The Aryan Nation has a betweenness centrality score of 572.02, and the Outlaws MC, one 
of the "Big 5" Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs, has a betweenness centrality score of 503.26. 
Immigrant gangs have varying degrees of betweenness centrality. The immigrant gang with the 
highest centrality is the Ñetas, a Puerto Rican prison gang that connects their rivals, Grupo 25 
and Grupo 27, to the network. They rank thirteenth with a betweenness centrality score of 
214.79, which is slightly less than the Sinaloa and Gulf Cartels that rank tenth and eleventh with 
betweenness centrality scores of 243.29 and 237.80, respectively. Other immigrant gangs with 
the highest centrality include MS-13 ranking sixteenth with a betweenness centrality score of 
188.37, and Zoe Pound and La Raza ranking twenty-second and thirty-third with betweenness 
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centrality scores of 91.22 and 32.48, respectively. The average betweenness centrality score for 
the baseline model is 70.26, with a median score of 4.95 and range from 0 to 1107.86. 
 In gang nexus model 1, both the Crips and Bloods remain central to the network, ranking 
first and third with betweenness centrality scores of 1,077.05 and 707.55, respectively. The 
Sinaloa Cartel, however, ranks second with a betweenness centrality score of 838.78.  While 
their rivalries are primarily limited to other cartels, their alliances are more diverse and include 
other cartels, street, prison, and outlaw motorcycle gangs. Moreover, they bridge the gap 
between rival gangs such as the People and Folk Nation, the Sureños and Norteños, and MS-13 
and 18th Street. The Gulf Cartel performs modestly higher than in the baseline model, ranking 
eighth with a betweenness centrality score of 311.45. Similarly, Los Zetas ranks eleventh with a 
betweenness centrality score of 226.78. In the top five rankings, the Outlaws MC performs lower 
while the Hells Angels improve to fourth with a betweenness centrality score of 460.53. The 
Hells Angels are another one of the "Big 5" motorcycle clubs. While the betweenness centrality 
of immigrant gangs such as the Ñetas and MS-13 are significantly less, Zoe Pound improves 
their rank to twelfth with a betweenness centrality score of 209.04. The Rollin' 30s Crips, a set of 
Crips formed by immigrants from Belize, ranks twenty-third with a betweenness centrality score 
of 93.50. In this model, the average betweenness centrality score is 65.26, and the median score 
is 1.12, with a range from 0 to 1077.05.  
In gang nexus model 2, the Crips are the most central gang in the network with a 
relatively similar betweenness centrality score of 1049.08 compared to the other two models. 
The Bloods rank third and have a relatively similar betweenness centrality score of 716.03 
compared to gang nexus model 1. Two gangs that improve their network influence when cartels 
are removed include the Mexican Mafia, ranked second with a betweenness centrality score of 
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781.29, and the Juggalos, ranked fourth with a betweenness centrality score of 689.87. Ranking 
tenth, the centrality of Zoe Pound improves slightly with a betweenness centrality score of 
211.86. In contrast, the betweenness centrality score of the Rollin' 30s Crips drops slightly to 
82.50 with an improved rank of nineteen. The betweenness centrality score of MS-13 also 
declines, which implies their influence in the gang network, measured by the paths that pass 
through them, relies on cartels. In this model, the average betweenness centrality score is 64.91, 
and the median score is 0.6667, with a range of scores from 0 to 1049.08. Table 4.6 shows the 
results of the betweenness centrality scores for select gangs in all three models. A complete list 

















Table 4.6 Betweenness Centrality Scores and Network Rank by Country and Gang Type 
Gang Centrality Score Centrality Rank Country Gang Type 
Baseline Model (Unweighted - No Allies & Rivals) 
Crips 1107.86 1 US Street 
Bloods 984.21 2 US Street 
Aryan Brotherhood 628.69 3 US Prison 
Aryan Nation 572.02 4 US Street 
Outlaws MC 503.26 5 US OMG 
Sinaloa Cartel 243.29 10 Mexico Cartel 
Gulf Cartel 237.80 11 Mexico Cartel 
Ñetas 214.79 13 Puerto Rico Prison 
MS-13 188.37 16 El Salvador Street 
Zoe Pound 91.22 22 Haiti Street 
La Raza 32.48 33 Mexico Street 
Gang Nexus Model 1 (Weighted - Allies & Rivals) 
Crips 1077.05 1 US Street 
Sinaloa Cartel 838.78 2 Mexico Cartel 
Bloods 707.55 3 US Street 
Hells Angels 460.53 4 US OMG 
Sureños 375.68 5 US Street 
Gulf Cartel 311.45 8 Mexico Cartel 
Zetas Cartel 226.78 11 Mexico Cartel 
Zoe Pound 209.04 12 Haiti Street 
Rollin 30s Crips 93.50 23 Belize Street 
La Raza 87.93 26 Mexico Street 
MS-13 11.46 47 El Salvador Street 
Gang Nexus Model 2 (Weighted - Allies & Rivals, No Cartels) 
Crips 1049.08 1 US Street 
Mexican Mafia 781.29 2 US Prison 
Bloods 716.03 3 US Street 
Juggalos 689.87 4 US Street 
Aryan Nation 419.54 5 US Street 
Zoe Pound 211.86 10 Haiti Street 
La Raza 157.12 12 Mexico Street 
Rollin 30s Crips 82.50 19 Belize Street 






Developed as an algorithm by Google to detect the importance of webpages, PageRank is 
a type of eigenvector centrality that best measures node influence in directed graphs. Whereas 
degree centrality determines network influence strictly based on the number of edges connected 
to a node, PageRank relaxes the assumption that the connections to those nodes are equal. 
Instead, PageRank centrality measures network influence by the number of connections a node 
has in addition to the quality of those connections (Brin & Page, 1998). Under these conditions, a 
node with few connections can have influence if connected to highly influential nodes. Unlike 
the other four centrality measures, PageRank does not generate a centralization score. The top 
four gangs of the PageRank baseline model are similar to the degree centrality baseline model. 
The Crips and Bloods are the two most central gangs with PageRank centrality scores of 0.0365 
and 0.0353, followed by the Sureños and Aryan Brotherhood with PageRank scores of 0.0220 
and 0.0198, respectively. MS-13 is the highest-ranked immigrant gang in eighth with a 
PageRank centrality score of 0.0164. Other highly central immigrant gangs include Zoe Pound, 
ranked fifteenth, and La Raza, ranked twenty-third with PageRank centrality scores of 0.0134 
and 0.0113, respectively. The Sinaloa Cartel ranks twelfth with a PageRank centrality score of 
0.0155 followed by the Gulf Cartel and Los Zetas that both rank nineteenth with a PageRank 
centrality score of 0.0120. Overall, the average PageRank score for the baseline model is 0.0089, 
the median score is 0.007, and the range is from 0.0017 to 0.0392.  
In the gang nexus model 1, Crips and Bloods have the highest PageRank centrality scores 
of 0.0374 and 0.0335, respectively. The PageRank centrality scores for Zoe Pound and La Raza 
slightly improve to 0.0163 and 0.0134, along with their ranks of thirteen and twenty, 
respectively. Additionally, cartels increase their network rank and PageRank centrality scores. 
The Sinaloa Cartel improves to third with a PageRank centrality score of 0.0272. Other cartels 
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that improve network centrality include the Gulf Cartel, ranked eighth with a PageRank 
centrality score of 0.0195, Los Zetas, ranked eleventh with a PageRank centrality score of 
0.0183, and the Tijuana Cartel, ranked twelfth with a PageRank centrality score of 0.0168. 
Despite receiving a PageRank centrality score above the average of 0.0083, the score for MS-13 
decreases significantly from the baseline model to 0.0095, earning them a rank of thirty-third. 
The median PageRank score for gang nexus model 1 is 0.0071, with a range from 0.0015 to 
0.0374. 
Removing cartels from the network generates the same five most central gangs as the 
baseline model starting with the Crips, Bloods, and Sureños, with the Aryan Nation, and Aryan 
Brotherhood switching positions at fourth and fifth rank. Zoe Pound and La Raza remain the 
most central immigrant gangs ranked ninth and fourteenth with the addition of the Neo-Nazis 
ranking nineteenth with a PageRank centrality score of 0.0134. MS-13 drops to thirty-ninth with 
a PageRank centrality score of 0.0072. This is below the average PageRank centrality score of 
0.0089. The median PageRank centrality score for gang nexus model 2 is 0.007, with a range of 
scores from 0.0017 to 0.0392. Table 4.7 shows the results of the PageRank centrality scores for 
select gangs in all three models. A complete list of PageRank centrality scores for each gang can 









Table 4.7 PageRank Centrality Scores and Network Rank by Country and Gang Type 
Gang Centrality Score Centrality Rank Country Gang Type 
Baseline Model (Unweighted - No Allies & Rivals) 
Crips 0.0365 1 US Street 
Bloods 0.0353 2 US Street 
Sureños 0.0220 3 US Street 
Aryan Brotherhood 0.0198 4 US Prison 
Aryan Nation 0.0184 5 US Street 
MS-13 0.0164 8 El Salvador Street 
Sinaloa Cartel 0.0155 12 Mexico Cartel 
Zoe Pound 0.0134 15 Haiti Street 
Gulf Cartel 0.0120 19 Mexico Cartel 
Zetas Cartel 0.0120 19 Mexico Cartel 
La Raza 0.0113 23 Mexico Street 
Gang Nexus Model 1 (Weighted - Allies & Rivals) 
Crips 0.0374 1 US Street 
Bloods 0.0335 2 US Street 
Sinaloa Cartel 0.0272 3 Mexico Cartel 
Sureños 0.0259 4 US Street 
Latin Kings 0.0209 5 US Street 
Gulf Cartel 0.0195 8 Mexico Cartel 
Zetas Cartel 0.0183 11 Mexico Cartel 
Tijuana Cartel 0.0168 12 Mexico Cartel 
Zoe Pound 0.0163 13 Haiti Street 
La Raza 0.0134 20 Mexico Street 
MS-13 0.0095 33 El Salvador Street 
Gang Nexus Model 2 (Weighted - Allies & Rivals, No Cartels) 
Crips 0.0392 1 US Street 
Bloods 0.0361 2 US Street 
Sureños 0.0262 3 US Street 
Aryan Nation 0.0229 4 US Street 
Aryan Brotherhood 0.0226 5 US Prison 
Zoe Pound 0.0179 9 Haiti Street 
La Raza 0.0161 14 Mexico Street 
Neo-Nazi 0.0134 19 UK Street 






4.4.6 Eigenvector Centrality 
Similar to PageRank centrality, eigenvector centrality considers network influence by the 
quality of connections to a node. Unlike the PageRank centrality measure, however, eigenvector 
centrality is useful in determining node influence for undirected graphs. This is reflected in the 
high eigenvector centralization indices for all three models. The centralization index for the 
baseline model, gang nexus model 1, and gang nexus model 2 is 77.64%, 78.13%, and 82.94%, 
respectively. Measured on a scale from 0 to 1, the Crips and Bloods are the two most central 
gangs in the baseline model with eigenvector centrality scores of 1.0 and 0.9931, respectively. 
The Sureños rank third with an eigenvector centrality score of 0.6894 followed by the Gangster 
Disciples with an eigenvector centrality score of 0.6355, and the Black P Stones with an 
eigenvector centrality score of 0.6254. The immigrant gang with the most substantial influence is 
Zoe Pound, ranking twelfth with an eigenvector centrality score of 0.5404, followed by Neo-
Nazis, ranked fourteenth with an eigenvector centrality score of 0.4831, and Skinheads, ranked 
seventeenth with an eigenvector centrality score of 0.4660. La Raza and MS-13 rank eighteenth 
and twenty-first with eigenvector centrality scores of 0.4627 and 0.4551, respectively. Similar to 
the other models and centrality scores, the Sinaloa Cartel is the highest-ranked cartel at sixteen 
with an eigenvector centrality score of 0.4694. The second most influential cartel is Los Zetas, 
ranked thirty-second with an eigenvector centrality score of 0.3723. For the baseline model, the 
average eigenvector centrality score is 0.2364, with a median score of 0.1587, ranging from 0 to 
1. 
 When accounting for rivalries, gang nexus model 1shows that the most central group in 
the network is the Sinaloa Cartel with an eigenvector centrality score of 1.0. They are followed 
by the second most central gang in the network, the Bloods with an eigenvector centrality score 
of 0.9263. Ranked in order from seventh to ninth, the cartels central to the network include the 
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Gulf Cartel, Los Zetas, and La Familia Michoacana Cartel with eigenvector centrality scores of 
0.6932, 0.6498, and 0.6467, respectively. The Crips, with an eigenvector centrality score of 
0.8462, drops to fourth behind the Sureños, with an eigenvector centrality score of 0.8530. In this 
model, the separation between the Crips and Bloods is a reflection of ingroup hostilities. The 
Bloods maintain greater cohesion between their sets than the Crips. Compared to the baseline 
model, Zoe Pound maintains its ranking with a higher eigenvector centrality score of 0.6079 
while other immigrant gangs drop slightly. La Raza ranks twenty-sixth with an eigenvector 
centrality score of 0.4588, and MS-13 ranks twenty-eighth with an eigenvector centrality score 
of 0.4115. For gang nexus model 1, the average eigenvector centrality score is 0.2316, the 
median score is 0.007, and the range of scores is from 0 to 1. 
The Bloods remain highly central in gang nexus model 2 with an eigenvector centrality 
score of 1.0 while the Crips drop to eleventh with an eigenvector centrality score of 0.5844. This 
is an indicator that the influence of the Crips is more dependent on cartels than the Bloods. 
Gangs that become more central to the network when cartels are removed include members of 
the People Nation. Gangs included in the People Nation alliance rank second to fifth with 
eigenvector centrality scores that range from 0.7485 – 0.8126. When combined with the Bloods, 
the five most influential gangs in the network belong to one of the largest cliques identified 
earlier in this section. Moreover, the Insane Unknowns, a gang started by Puerto Rican 
immigrants and members of the People Nation, represents the most influential immigrant gang in 
the network with a rank of eight and an eigenvector centrality score of 0.6444. Other immigrant 
gangs such as Zoe Pound and La Raza remain relatively unchanged from gang nexus model 1. 
Zoe Pound ranks tenth with an eigenvector score of 0.5866, and La Raza ranks twenty-fourth 
with an eigenvector centrality score of 0.3399. MS-13, on the other hand, drops significantly in 
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both rank, forty-sixth, and eigenvector centrality score, 0.1105, suggesting their network 
influence is contingent upon relationships with cartels. The average eigenvector centrality score 
is 0.1853, the median score is 0.0814, and the range of scores is from 0 to 1. Table 4.8 shows the 
results of the eigenvector centrality scores for select gangs in all three models. A complete list of 






















Table 4.8 Eigenvector Centrality Scores and Network Rank by Country and Gang Type 
Gang Centrality Score Centrality Rank Country Gang Type 
Baseline Model (Unweighted - No Allies & Rivals) 
Crips 1.0000 1 US Street 
Bloods 0.9931 2 US Street 
Sureños 0.6894 3 US Street 
Gangster Disciples 0.6355 4 US Street 
Black P Stones 0.6254 5 US Street 
Zoe Pound 0.5404 12 Haiti Street 
Neo-Nazi 0.4831 14 UK Street 
Sinaloa Cartel 0.4694 16 Mexico Cartel 
Skinheads 0.4660 17 UK Street 
La Raza 0.4627 18 Mexico Street 
MS-13 0.4551 21 El Salvador Street 
Zetas Cartel 0.3723 32 Mexico Cartel 
Gang Nexus Model 1 (Weighted - Allies & Rivals) 
Sinaloa Cartel 1.0000 1 Mexico Cartel 
Bloods 0.9263 2 US Street 
Sureños 0.8530 3 US Street 
Crips 0.8462 4 US Street 
Latin Kings 0.8179 5 US Street 
Gulf Cartel 0.6932 7 Mexico Cartel 
Zetas Cartel 0.6498 8 Mexico Cartel 
La Familia Michoacana Cartel 0.6467 9 Mexico Cartel 
Zoe Pound 0.6079 12 Haiti Street 
La Raza 0.4588 26 Mexico Street 
MS-13 0.4115 28 El Salvador Street 
Gang Nexus Model 2 (Weighted - Allies & Rivals, No Cartels) 
Bloods 1.0000 1 US Street 
Vice Lords 0.8126 2 US Street 
Black P Stones 0.8033 3 US Street 
People Nation 0.7691 4 US Street 
Latin Kings 0.7485 5 US Street 
Insane Unknowns 0.6444 8 Puerto Rico Street 
Zoe Pound 0.5866 9 Haiti Street 
Crips 0.5844 10 US Street 
Latin Counts 0.5793 11 Mexico Street 
Vatos Locos 0.4086 16 Mexico Street 
La Raza 0.3399 23 Mexico Street 




4.4.7 Network Centrality Aggregation 
 Among the five centrality measures used for this study, there is no consensus in the 
scholarly literature on which one best explains network influence (Luke, 2015; Newman, 2015). 
Each metric provides its perspective on what constitutes centrality. One can argue that having 
many connections would increase your relative importance in a network because you have access 
to information and resources from several sources. Another argument can be made that the 
shorter the distance between nodes facilitates a quicker speed at which information and resources 
can travel. However, aggregating the centrality scores across all five measures provides another 
dimension of analysis in determining gang centrality patterns. Because the centrality scores use 
different indices, I calculate the aggregate score for each gang by taking the average Z-score. 
The Z-score provides a standardized metric by converting a value’s relationship to the mean of a 
group of values. When compared to the values of different groups, this places them on the same 
normal distribution. 
When Z-scores are aggregated the Crips and Bloods rank first and second in all three 
models. As two of the most significant gangs in the United States, this result is not surprising. 
While the Crips have eight different sets in two or more states in the United States, the Bloods 
have seven. This is different from other gangs such as the Folk Nation and People Nation, where 
the alliance is built on a collaboration between several independent gangs. The Latin Kings, for 
instance, has an aggregate centrality rank of five in gang nexus model 1, placing them 
significantly higher than the People Nation, ranked twenty-second, with which they are a 
member. The Aryan Brotherhood ranks third with an aggregate centrality Z-score of 1.82 but 
drops out of the top five most important gangs when considering negative ties. Accounting for 
adversarial relationships reduces their rank to eighth with an aggregate centrality Z-score of 1.43. 
This rank is unchanged in gang nexus model 2, suggesting that the centrality of the Aryan 
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Brotherhood is based more on their relationships to other gangs in the network, and is less 
dependent on cartels. In contrast, MS-13 ranks twelfth in the baseline model with an aggregate 
centrality Z-score of 0.97, drops to thirty-first with an aggregate centrality Z-score of 0.28 in 
gang nexus model 1 and falls even further in gang nexus model 2 to forty-fourth with an 
aggregate centrality score of -0.11. It can be inferred from these results that MS-13's influence is 
adversely impacted by their rivals (compared to their allies), and their dependence on cartels. 
The network centrality of Zoe Pound, on the other hand, another immigrant gang, is relatively 
stable across all three models with an aggregate centrality Z-score that improves from model to 
model. For the baseline model, gang nexus model 1, and gang nexus model 2, their aggregate 
centrality Z-scores are 0.77, 1.09, and 1.17, respectively. This suggests that their alliances are 
more impactful than rivalries in determining their network importance, and they are not 
dependent on cartels. Finally, gang nexus model 2 illustrates the relative importance of cartels in 
the gang network. For example, the highest-ranked cartel in both models, the Sinaloa Cartel, 
does not have the highest number of connections as indicated by their rank of eleven in the 
baseline model. However, they do not have a significant number of rivals, either. This is 
demonstrated with an improved aggregate centrality rank from eleventh in the baseline to third in 
gang nexus model 1 with an aggregate centrality Z-score that improves from 0.98 to 2.86, 
respectively. The aggregate centrality rank of other cartels also improves. The Gulf Cartel, 
aligned with the Sinaloa Cartel, ranks seventh in gang nexus model 1 with an aggregate 
centrality Z-score of 1.45. Los Zetas, one of the largest rivals to the Sinaloa Cartel, ranks ninth 
with an aggregate centrality Z-score of 1.27.  As a rival to both the Sinaloa Cartel and Los Zetas, 
the Tijuana Cartel, ranks thirteenth with an aggregate centrality score of 0.98. One explanation of 
the influence of cartels in the gang network is their lack of rivalries. Except for MS-13, gangs 
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rarely challenge cartels. Their rivalries are typically limited to other cartels and global crime 
syndicates. The data source used for this study, however, does not indicate the role of other 
criminal organizations other than Mexican DTOs. The Yakuza, Triads, and Italian Mafia, among 
others, have been reported to operate in the United States, but the extent to which they cooperate 
with gangs is not well-known. These are relationships that should be explored in future research. 
Table 4.9 lists the aggregate centrality Z-scores for select gangs. A complete list of the aggregate 



















Table 4.9 Aggregate Centrality Z-Scores and Network Rank by Country and Gang Type 
Baseline Model (Unweighted - No Allies & Rivals) 
Gang Aggregate Z-score Centrality Rank Gang Type Country 
Crips 3.90 1 Street US 
Bloods 3.67 2 Street US 
Aryan Brotherhood 1.82 3 Prison US 
Sureños 1.67 4 Street US 
Aryan Nation 1.63 5 Street US 
Sinaloa Cartel 0.98 11 Cartel Mexico 
MS-13 0.97 12 Street El Salvador 
Zoe Pound 0.77 14 Street Haiti 
Gulf Cartel 0.63 17 Cartel Mexico 
Zetas Cartel 0.60 19 Cartel Mexico 
La Raza 0.50 23 Street Mexico 
Gang Nexus Model 1 (Weighted - Allies & Rivals) 
Crips 3.52 1 Street US 
Bloods6 2.94 2 Street US 
Sinaloa Cartel 2.86 3 Cartel Mexico 
Sureños 2.10 4 Street US 
Latin Kings 1.56 5 Street US 
Gulf Cartel 1.45 7 Cartel Mexico 
Zetas Cartel 1.27 9 Cartel Mexico 
Zoe Pound 1.09 10 Street Haiti 
Tijuana Cartel 0.98 13 Cartel Mexico 
La Raza 0.66 23 Street Mexico 
MS-13 0.28 31 Street El Salvador 
Gang Nexus Model 2 (Weighted - Allies & Rivals, No Cartels) 
Crips 3.24 1 Street US 
Bloods 3.11 2 Street US 
Mexican Mafia 1.79 3 Prison US 
Sureños 1.66 4 Street US 
Juggalos 1.57 5 Street US 
Zoe Pound 1.17 11 Street Haiti 
La Raza 0.80 17 Street Mexico 
MS-13 -0.11 44 Street El Salvador 
 
 
6 When degree centrality is removed, the Z-score for the Sinaloa Cartel is 2.87 and the Z-score for the Bloods is 




This study has several important implications. Foremost, it highlights the necessity for a 
more standardized approach to collecting gang data in the United States. Whereas the BAAD 
model provides a useful framework to study terrorist organizations from a network perspective, 
the data available to gang researchers fall significantly short of this benchmark. The 2011 NGIC 
gang report is the most recent source of information on gang location at the national level. At 
almost ten years since being published, an update on gang location has not been released. In 
contrast, the BAAD model provides annual updates on the status of terrorist groups to include 
their location, the (dis)integration of alliances and rivalries, and their network influence, among 
other details. A similar model for gang studies can be potentially useful to conduct spatial and 
longitudinal analyses for researchers and policymakers. Moreover, the data collection process for 
national gang intelligence uses local contributions from law enforcement, leading to concerns 
over data reliability. The NGIC gang report relies on the participation of local districts that 
provide information through decentralized channels. C. Ronald Huff and Julie Barrows (2015) 
point out that law enforcement agencies rarely contribute to regional (20%) and national (15%) 
gang databases, and less than half contribute information to state (41%) databases (OJJDP, 
2013).  
Despite the data limitations, the findings in this study demonstrate the value of a macro-
level analysis to better understand the structural network of gangs in the United States. Two 
influential gangs, the Bloods and Crips, score consistently high across the five centrality 
measures used in all three models as well as the aggregate centrality Z-score. Both gangs 
demonstrate that they have numerous connections in the network, maintain connections to 
influential members, remain close to network members, and act as "bridges" to connect various 
segments of the network. On a broader scale, they highlight the importance of native gangs to the 
149 
 
network structure. Originating in the same area of Los Angeles, the Bloods and Crips were 
formed by citizens of the United States during a time of social transition towards the end of the 
civil rights movement. The predation of these gangs has been linked to the formation of 
immigrant gangs like MS-13 (Wolf, 2012). 
Not accounting for cartels, gangs formed by native groups ranked as the top five most 
central in the network across all metrics used in this study compared to gangs formed by 
immigrant groups. Immigrant gangs with the highest network centrality include the Haitian gang 
Zoe Pound, and La Raza, formed by Mexican immigrants. The reason for their network 
centrality derives from two different sets of factors. Zoe Pound lacks a definitive archrival 
similar to the Bloods and Crips and Folk and People Nations, respectively. Instead, they are 
allies with several nationally recognized gangs and bridge the gap between rival gangs. They are 
aligned with the Bloods and Crips, Gangster Disciples and Black Disciples, and Los Zetas and 
the Sinaloa Cartel. The rivals to Zoe Pound, on the other hand, are primarily affiliated with white 
nationalist ideology. These include Skinheads, Neo-Nazis, Nazi Lowriders, and other 
Peckerwood gangs. In contrast, La Raza has connections to the Crips and high-profile Hispanic 
gangs such as the Mexican Mafia and Sureños in addition to Los Zetas. As a member of the Folk 
Nation, however, their rivals include gangs affiliated with the People Nation as well as the 
Bloods, one of the People Nation's most influential allies. One immigrant gang that has 
influenced public policy is MS-13 (See Dudley et al. (2018) and U.S. Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (2020)). Despite the attention they have garnered, their network influence remains 
relatively low, a consequence of having a significant number of network rivalries and their 
dependency on Mexican DTOs. As a Sureño set, their allies are homogenous, including other 
Hispanic gangs such as the Mexican Mafia and cartels, while their rivals are diverse. They 
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include influential gangs such as the Bloods and Crips, other Hispanic gangs such as Barrio 18, 
another Sureño set, and the Aryan Brotherhood, an ally of the Mexican Mafia. MS-13 also 
openly feuds with the Juarez and Beltrán-Levey (Sierra) Cartels, which is rare for gangs given 
that DTOs have significantly more resources and behave like para-military organizations. 
Additionally, MS-13 relies on its connections to Los Zetas and the Sinaloa and Gulf Cartels for 
influence in the network. Removing DTOs, the network centrality of MS-13 drops significantly. 
Since native gangs appear to exert more influence over the network, these results suggest that 
MS-13 is being politicized. That is to say, the discursive context of MS-13 as a national security 
threat is aimed at achieving some other political objective such as enhancing border security. 
In addition to MS-13, Mexican DTOs play a role in shaping the network structure of 
gangs. When included in the network, several cartels are highly influential. This can be observed 
in both individual centrality measures and the aggregate scores. More importantly, the removal 
of cartels reshapes the overall structure of the network. Especially when considering the 
eigenvector centrality measure, the best predictor of centrality according to the centralization 
index score for this study. Using this metric, the removal of cartels results in a structural shift to 
gangs motivated by ideology in what Sullivan describes as third-generation gangs. Aside from 
the Bloods that remain the most central gang in the network, other gangs include the People 
Nation and members of their alliance. Two of these gangs, the Vice Lords and Almighty P. 
Stones, have adopted an Islamic religious identity. In the case of the Almighty P. Stones, founder 
Jeff Fort pledged his support to former President Muammar Gaddafi by offering his gang’s 
services as a terrorist branch of the Libyan government (Knox, 2008). A third influential gang 
that is part of the People Nation is the Latin Kings. Jose Padilla, a Muslim convert and member 
of the Latin Kings, was sentenced under the Patriot Act for conspiring to detonate a dirty bomb 
151 
 
on U.S. soil (Padilla v Bush et al., 2002). Although the affiliation with Islamic extremism has 
been isolated to individual gang members, the Latin Kings function as a type of religious 
organization to unite members to protect Hispanic communities (Brotherton & Barrios, 2004). 
They maintain several branches throughout the world. 
Overall, the macro-level network analysis of gangs allows researchers and policymakers 
to map out gang connections and relationships at a point in time. It can be applied longitudinally 
to monitor changes in these relationships and observe the structural impact on the gang network. 
The Aryan Brotherhood, for example, is often associated with white nationalism. However, their 
alliance with the Mexican Mafia and other ethnic minority gangs has brought condemnation 
from white supremacists that view these alliances with contempt. The ability to conduct a 
longitudinal analysis would provide insight on the extent to which the apostasy of white 
nationalist ideology contributed to their network centrality. The Aryan Brotherhood ranks higher 
across all five centrality measures than their former white supremacist allies. Further, future 
research studying the macro-level network structure of gangs should include more organized 
crime groups. Although this study considers Mexican DTOs, which have a significant structural 
impact on the gang network, there are other transnational criminal organizations not included in 
the dataset. To name a few, the Japanese Yakuza, Chinese Triads, and Italian Mafia operate in 
the United States. After the failed assassination attempt of John Gotti, head of the Gambino 
crime family, while serving his prison sentence, the Aryan Brotherhood was hired to protect him. 
A move that has been attributed to raising their profile (Southern Poverty Law Center b, n.d.). 
However, the extent to which other criminal groups form alliances with gangs is not well 
understood. Referred to as "Hanging the Blue Lantern," Triads in China use gangs as a 
probationary mechanism to promote new members (Matheron, 1988). Is the same tradition 
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practiced in the United States? The inclusion of other criminal groups could provide a more 


























RE-SPATIALIZING GANG MEMBER CONNECTIONS: AN 
 
EXPONENTIAL RANDOM GRAPH MODEL OF TWITTER DATA TO 
 
 ANALYZE THE GEOSPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF GANG NETWORKS 
 
Gang research commonly focuses on localized geographic spaces (Coughlin & 
Venkatesh, 2003; Venkatesh, 2000), where descriptors related to demography, organization, and 
longevity form the cornerstone of the gang construct. This is partially due to data limitations and 
research agendas that privilege social problems (Pyrooz & Mitchell, 2015). The gang archetype 
has been described as a loosely connected disorganized group of juveniles whose time in the 
gang is short, contributing to a consensus that treats gangs as local actors (Venkatesh, 2000). 
‘Youth’ or ‘juvenile,’ for example, is often used as a defining gang characteristic (Cohen, 1955; 
Howell, 2012; Howell, 2015; Klein, 1971; Klein, 2001, Klein & Maxson, 2006; Miller, 1975; 
Short, Jr. 1996) despite evidence to the contrary (Venkatesh, 2000). The implication of 
categorizing ‘gangs as youth groups’ suggests gang members lack mobility, and their 
connections to other gang members are limited to narrowly defined geographic spaces. From a 
location-based perspective, the interconnectedness of gangs can be explained by the proximity 
principle. According to the proximity principle, location determines the formation, existence, and 
maintenance of interpersonal relationships where connections are more likely to form in 
environments that foster repetitive socialization (Newcomb, 1960). This often occurs in local 
communities where individuals live, work, worship, or attend school. In short, the proximity 
principle supports a localized view of gang member interconnectedness. The smaller the 




It would be imprudent to dismiss the valuable contributions localized gang studies have 
made to the criminal justice field (Hagedorn, 1988; Klein, 1971; Miller, 1958; Sánchez 
Jankowski, 1991; Short, Jr. & Strodtbeck, 1965; Spergel, 1995; Thrasher, 1927, Vigil, 1988). 
Localized studies allow us to draw inferences about gangs by comparing factors that are 
conditioned by geography. However, studies that aggrandize local conditions limit our 
understanding of gangs to a specific time and place (Venkatesh, 2014). Advances in 
communication technology have re-spatialized how gang members share information, form 
connections, and maintain relationships (Pyrooz & Moule, Jr, 2019). For example, Facebook, 
YouTube, Instagram, and Twitter are digital mediums frequently used to connect gang members 
(National Gang Intelligence Center, 2015). Yet, in the age of social media, our understanding of 
gang interconnectivity is not well understood beyond local settings.  
Outside of localized gang studies, conclusions on the distribution of gangs are typically 
determined by qualitative methods (Radil, Flint, & Tita, 2010). The purpose of this study is to 
quantitatively analyze the geospatial distribution of gang members in the United States using an 
exponential random graph model (ERGM) of Twitter data. ERG models analyze the sub-
structures of social networks to determine the patterns of relationships between vertices (in this 
case, the influence of location on shared gang member connections). The contribution of this 
study is threefold. First, I aim to examine location homophily and heterophily by city and state to 
examine the extent to which location influences gang member connections. If the consensus of 
gang localization holds, the smaller the geographic space, the more likely we are to observe 
connectivity between gang members. This would also be an outcome consistent with the 
proximity principle. This study's second contribution aims to discover the macro-level 
implications (gang interconnectedness) by examining micro-level processes (gang member 
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interconnectedness). If gang membership is largely homogenous (gang members belonging to the 
same gang), then, by proxy, we can make inferences about the national connectivity of gangs. 
This supports some of the arguments I make in the previous chapter. Finally, I aim to analyze the 
geographic clustering of the population sample and the distribution of gang members across 
different cities. Most gangs formed in urban areas and spread to other parts of the country 
(Howell, 2015). If gangs are strictly localized, then it would be reasonable to expect the 
frequency distribution of gang members from the population sample to be concentrated in high-
density cities. While this objective is less related to the ERG model, it is still an important 
contribution to understanding the geospatial distribution of gangs.  
I divide this paper into three sections. In the first section, I explain gang localization 
using extant literature to demonstrate the conceptual and behavioral factors as well as law 
enforcement responses that have contributed to the location-based consensus of gangs. I then 
provide a counterargument to gang localization by discussing the digital footprint of gangs. In 
many cases, digital communication technologies have been subverted to assist in gang activity. 
This includes promoting gang culture, facilitating gang member coordination, recruiting new 
members, and "cyber banging" with rival gangs (National Alliance of Gang Investigators, 2015). 
I also discuss studies closely related to my research in terms of their methodological similarities, 
which ties into the second section of this paper, where I discuss the methodology used to collect 
and analyze my data. My methodology, or workflow process, involves four stages. In the first 
stage, the initial seed discovery, I identify gang member profiles on Twitter by capturing 
streaming API that matches common gang words and phrases, using the Twitter search function, 
and following Twitter recommendations. In stage two, I conduct a relevance computation by 
manually inspecting each profile to validate gang members using multiple criteria (e.g., self-
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identification, language, hand signs, colors, etc.) and avoid including false-positive Twitter 
profiles in the sample population. As a former correctional security threat group intelligence 
officer, I was responsible for validating gang members at intake. I apply a similar methodology 
for this study to validate gang members on Twitter. The third stage involves searching the REST 
API to determine the location of validated gang member profiles. I use an exponential non-
discriminative snowball sampling process by randomly drawing followers from the initial seeds. 
Out of the randomly selected group, I apply the techniques from stage two to manually validate 
gang member profiles. I continue stages two and three as an iterative process to build a network 
edgelist in the fourth stage of my workflow process.  
The third and final section of this paper provides two separate sets of results. In the first 
part, I discuss the data collection results. These include the descriptive statistics on gang member 
Twitter profiles as well as the gangs and locations I discover from my workflow process. The 
other set of results include calculations from the ERG model that aims to test four hypotheses. 
Three hypotheses use nodal attributes of city, state, and gang affiliation to analyze the impact of 
homophily on gang member connections. The fourth hypothesis involves an edge attribute to 
determine the influence of distance (miles). Although the data collected for this study does not 
support a joint effects model that combines nodal attributes, I include these results because 
interesting inferences can be made in terms of the impact location and gang affiliation have on 
gang member connections.  
Insofar as the results of this study support the proximity principle, it challenges the 
location-based perspective of gangs. Whereas location homophily plays a role in observing 
shared connections between gang members to an extent, the statistical significance at the city-
level is not as high as one would expect to observe given the localized consensus on gangs. In 
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fact, gang affiliation appears to better explain gang member connections, and, by proxy, 
demonstrates national gang interconnectedness. Moreover, the results from the data collection 
process suggest gang member location is diffuse. They seem to have migrated from high-
population density cities to small- and mid-sized cities, a conclusion implicit in James Howell’s 
research (2015). After interpreting the results of the individual and joint effects attribute models, 
I discuss the implications of this study and provide suggestions for future research. 
5.1 The Location-Based Perspective on Gangs 
 Localization affixed to a particular place implies that subjective factors contribute to 
localizing an object. What does it mean to claim residence of the United States, California, Los 
Angeles, Watts, or Jordan Downs? Each geographic space can be considered localized, the scale 
of which one is appropriate depends on the context or audience. When applied to gangs, there is 
a consensus among scholars that gangs are territorially bounded to a single street or 
neighborhood (Venkatesh, 2000). Connections between gang members subsequently form within 
these geographic spaces. Social psychologists refer to this phenomenon as the proximity 
principle (Newcomb, 1960), or the network of attraction (Festinger, Schachter, S. & Back, K. 
1950), where greater interaction at the local level leads to a higher likelihood that interpersonal 
relationships will form. Paulina Preciado, Tom Snijders, William Burk, Hakan Stattin, and 
Margaret Kerr (2012) formally test this theory and conclude that proximity matters in the 
formation, existence, and maintenance of friendships. Thus, it stands to reason that threats of 
such a limited scale remain under the purview of local authorities.  
The localization of gangs is predicated on a collection of ideas, absent a unified 
theoretical framework. One of these categories includes the demographic features used to 
describe gangs and their members. The phrase youth or juvenile gang, for instance, has become 
synonymous with gangs in general. James Howell (2015) explains gangs as originating from 
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juvenile conflict groups. Ascribing youth or juvenile to ‘the gang’ has become reflexive in other 
disciplines as well. According to the definition of gangs provided by the American Academy of 
Child and Adolescent Psychiatry (2016), “Gangs are groups of children, adolescents and young 
adults who share a common identity and are involved in wrongful or delinquent activities.” 
Categorizing gangs as youth groups suggests they have limited mobility or geographic 
restrictions. Albert J. Reiss, Jr. (1988) describes gangs as a temporary manifestation that 
invariably dissolves because membership in the long-term is unsustainable. He argues that their 
impermanence is a result of transience, the incarceration of criminal offenders, and the 
maturation of other members into adulthood. His last point conceptualizes the gang as a youth 
group by implying that members transitioning into adulthood abandon the gang lifestyle. On the 
whole, Reiss’s research supports gangs as local actors by highlighting the internal 
inconsistencies of the gang and their struggles to maintain cohesion.  The constant turnover of 
membership disrupts the overall organization of the gang, leaving them incapable or unwilling to 
expand.  
 Behavior is another area of gang studies contributing to the localization consensus. This 
strand of research is featured prominently in the neighborhood-effects and collective efficacy 
literature (Papachristos & Kirk, 2006). Theories such as social disorganization, concentrated 
disadvantage, and social inequality use neighborhood-effects to explain how the failure of social 
institutions at the local level leads to deviance and other high-risk activities (Sampson, Morenoff, 
& Gannon-Rowley, 2002). On the other hand, “collective efficacy refers to the process of 
activating or converting social ties to achieve any number of collective goals, such as public 
order or the control of crime” (Papachristos & Kirk, 2006, p. 67). Collective efficacy explains 
behavioral outcomes as an adaptive response to deficiencies in local conditions (Sampson, 
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Raudenbush, & Earls, 1997). Where the state has failed to provide public goods such as security 
or economic opportunity, individuals with a shared experience at the local level take collective 
action. In short, behavior and environment are mutually constitutive. Where neighborhood-
effects account for the deterioration of local conditions, collective efficacy explains how gangs 
respond to negative stimuli.   
The localization of gangs, as a behavioral response to environmental conditions, is 
perpetuated by several other factors. Gangs claim territory, for instance, to provide members a 
safe area to congregate and carry out illicit business activities. The geographic concentration of 
gangs results in turf wars (Campbell, 1984; Vargas, 2016), where competition over local 
resources drive rivalries (Brantingham, Tita, Short, & Reid, 2012). Within these gang-controlled 
territories, George Tita, Jacqueline Cohen, and John Engberg (2005) localize gangs further into 
what they refer to as “gang set spaces.”  Rather than the total area claimed by a gang, they argue 
that gang set spaces are smaller subsections within a territory reserved for gang activity, 
localizing gangs even further. In addition to territorial motivation and material benefits, there are 
psychological factors for gang participation that emerge within the local context. For example, 
gangs satisfy status-seeking behavior and help people meet peer-group needs (Cohen, 1955; 
Shaw & McKay, 1942; Thrasher, 1927). In some cases, gangs provide a source of friendship, 
mutual trust, and identity (Klein, 1995), and in other cases, they provide a path for individuals to 
gain power (Knox, 1994) or respect (Anderson, 1999). All of which have a higher local intrinsic 
value. 
 Finally, approaches to combat gangs are formulated at the local level, reinforcing the 
consensus that gangs are localized. Anti-gang tactics aim to attack an individual’s involvement at 
different stages of participation.  According to Beth Bjerregard (2015), these strategies include 
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prevention, intervention, and suppression. Prevention strategies establish programs to deter 
individuals from joining a gang and generate public awareness of the dangers of gang-life. In 
cases where someone joins a gang, however, intervention strategies provide a means of escape. 
Suppression strategies, the bedrock of the criminal justice system, involves intelligence 
gathering, policing, and legislation to punish gang members for criminal activity. Taken together, 
prevention, intervention, and suppression represent a comprehensive strategy to mitigate gang 
activity at the local level by focusing on deterrence, structural change, and community 
mobilization to discourage the material and psychological incentives of gang participation 
(Spergel & Curry, 1993). For example, the suppression tactics in Project Bull’s Eye, an anti-gang 
initiative in Durham, North Carolina, aims to reduce gang-related violence in the city through 
specialized training for law enforcement, intelligence sharing, and cooperation among local and 
state agencies. The prevention and intervention strategies outlined in this initiative identify at-
risk juveniles, collaborate with faith-based organizations, and address quality of life issues. 
Insofar as Project Bull's Eye modeled parts of the U.S. Department of Justice crime reduction 
strategy, the overall focus is strictly localized. Missing from Project Bull’s Eye, however, is a 
collaborative effort involving other state or federal law enforcement agencies despite the national 
and transnational connections between gangs.  
Strategies designed to mitigate gang activity focus on local conditions (Decker, 
McGarrell, Perez, & Hipple, 2007). There are, however, some federal resources available to state 
and local districts. The federal legal system factors prominently in the state’s arsenal to combat 
gang criminality. Thirty-six out of the fifty states plus the District of Columbia have adopted 
RICO statutes, and 27 states have amended these statutes to include gang participation 
(Bjerregaard, 2015). RICO, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970, 
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was instrumental in dismantling the American Mafia. Rather than charging criminal offenders 
individually, RICO gave prosecutors the authority to charge a group of offenders with the same 
crime. Other federal laws target illicit acts commonly associated with gang activity. The Violent 
Crime and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, signed by President Bill Clinton, extended the 
maximum sentence for drug-related crimes when the offender is gang-affiliated. Chapter 26, 
section 150001 entitled Street Gangs, subsections b, c, and d allow additional penalties to prison 
sentencing not to exceed ten years (103rd Congress, 1994). Another initiative that takes a similar 
approach, Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN), includes additional sentencing for gun-related 
crimes involving gang members (Decker, McGarrell, Perez, & Hipple, 2007). The problem is the 
inconsistency in the application of the law as state, local, and judicial authorities pursue criminal 
charges and sentencing at their discretion. In states that have gang participation statutes, it is not 
mandatory to prosecute criminal gang members under the more stringent penalties. 
Further, while a little more than half of the states have enacted gang participation statutes, 
twenty-four states have not (Bjerregaard, 2015). Disparate responses to gangs at the state and 
local levels incentivize gangs to establish network connections in areas where the laws are more 
lenient. Additionally, policymakers use the same nomenclature as the consensus among scholars 
and researchers of gang studies. PSN, for instance, describes gang members using terms such as 
'youth' and 'juvenile.' As I have argued, the focus on juvenile gang members misrepresents the 
gang phenomenon by contributing to the perceived localization of gangs.  
Despite gangs being mutually constitutive with local conditions, there is evidence to 
support that these same conditions exist across space and time, challenging the uniqueness of this 
relationship (Howell, 2015). If the conditions that led to gang formation is consistent across the 
country, then why is there so much emphasis on localizing gangs? Gangs are more complex than 
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can be explained by local dynamics, and while their ties to the community make sense, some 
scholars have debated the location-based consensus. Julie Ayling (2011) adopts an evolutionary 
approach to better understand the gang phenomenon. "An evolutionary framework of variation, 
selection, and replication can assist in unpacking the forces at work in determining differential 
patterns of evolution" (p. 13). Despite having similar origins, gangs transform along different 
trajectories (Howell, 2015). Some examples of gang variation that Ayling identifies include 
demographics, organizational structure, and purpose. 
Further, theories that are strictly localized ignore the proliferation of gangs. Gang 
proliferation is part and parcel of changes in the landscape that elicit an adaptive response 
(Ayling, 2011). The commercialization of cocaine and other narcotics, discussed in Chapter 2, 
created a market-oriented gang motivated more by profits than territory (Coughlin & Venkatesh, 
2003). Explaining the gang phenomenon through a local lens also limits our understanding of 
gangs by focusing on the proximity of gang members in the same geographic space. Modern 
technology, however, has condensed time and space, making communication possible regardless 
of location. The introduction of social media sites like Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram has 
created a more interconnected world for socialization and the exchange of ideas. Cyberspace has 
transformed the “local gang,” once isolated by geography, into netwarriors where connections 
are local, national, and transnational (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2001). Instrumental in the 
transformation process are social media platforms.  
5.2 Gangs, the Internet, and Social Media 
Introduced to the public in 1991, the World Wide Web laid the groundwork for the 
modern social media era. Andreas Kaplan and Michael Haenlein (2010) define social media as 
“a group of internet-based applications that build on the ideological and technological 
foundations of Web 2.0, and that allow the creation and exchange of user-generated content” (p. 
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60). José Van Dijck (2013) points out that the original vision behind this digital revolution 
"make culture ‘participatory,’ ‘user-centered,’ and ‘collaborative’” (p. 10). The rise of social 
media sites such as Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram provides users the ability to search, create, 
select, share, and store information. Speaking in more general terms, Lisa Gitelman (2006) 
explains ‘media’ as a “socially realized structure of communication, where structures include 
both technological forms and their associated protocols, and where communication is a cultural 
practice, a ritualized collocation of different people on the same mental map, sharing or engaged 
with popular ontologies of representation” (p. 7). Whereas Kaplan and Haenlein provide a basic 
understanding of how social media is used, Gitelman explains why social media is used.  
Creating user content through social media platforms is a form of expression and identity, 
the result of which generates like-minded communities. Janet Abbate (1994), while not directly 
referencing social media, correctly points out that having an online presence dually constitutes 
users as both “consumers” and “framers” of technology. Gitelman expands on Abbate’s 
sentiment by discussing the ontological reality of social media users. She states, “Users in this 
sense do not necessarily stand in any self-conscious relationship to publics. They are neither 
exactly “counterpublics” nor exclusively sub-cultures; they are diverse, dynamic, and 
disaggregate. They stand both as mirrors and receptors for the ideological: individuals do not 
“belong” as users, but their activities as users can have profound consequences… in belonging” 
(Gitelman, 2006, p. 60). Thus, social media users and the networks they create influence and 
attract similar others. They are both creators and consumers of information whose opinions and 
digital footprint shape public discourses.  
Beyond the ontological expression of social media are the speed at which information is 
generated and the magnitude at which it is simultaneously consumed. In an annual study released 
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by Cumulus Media, an internet minute in 2018 generated 3.7 million Google searches, 4.3 
million YouTube videos watched, 973,000 Facebook logins, and 481,000 Tweets (Desjardins, 
2018). This is impressive when compared to other, more traditional media formats. Daily 
televised news broadcasts, for example, attract an average of 4 million daily viewers (Pew 
Research, 2019a) while print newspapers at their peak had 63 million daily subscribers (Pew 
Research, 2019b).  Moreover, the number of social media users overshadows other media 
platforms. The number of active monthly Twitter users, for instance, in the last quarter of 2017 
was 330 million (Statista, 2018a).  
Given the potential for user-generated content and the interconnectedness made available 
by social media platforms, it is not surprising that gangs have subverted these digital applications 
for their advantage. Maintaining a social media presence allows gangs to recruit new members, 
promote their ideology, threaten rivals, and coordinate activities. A 2015 survey on gang member 
social media participation conducted by the National Gang Intelligence Center (NGIC) shows 
that nearly 100% of agencies report street gang members having a Facebook account, and a little 
over 60% have an Instagram and Twitter account. Another survey conducted by the NGIC 
reveals that gang member social media usage continues during incarceration. Similar to street 
gang members, the most preferred social media platform for prison gang members is Facebook. 
Nearly 100% of agencies reported inmates to have an active Facebook account. Additionally, 
50% of prison gang members use Twitter, while another 45% use Instagram. Gangs control the 
flow of contraband into prisons through bribery and coercion in order to maintain unsupervised 
connections to their associates outside the prison. 
There are several reasons that gang members use social media. The NGIC report 
identifies “recruitment, communication, targeting rivals, advancing criminal activities, and 
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thwarting law enforcement” as some of the more frequent usages of social media by gang 
members. This includes luring girls into sex trafficking, cyber banging, and witness tampering. 
More importantly, gangs establish online networked communities through social media in what 
Mizuko Ito and Daisuke Okabe (2005) refer to as “ambient co-presence.”  Philippa Collin, Kitty 
Rahilly, Ingrid Richardson, and Amanda Third (2011) succinctly summarize this concept as, 
"Ongoing visual access to a small-scale communication cluster (or community) via spontaneous 
and everyday images uploaded to a collaborative media space" (p. 18). These images make 
permissible the glorification and dissemination of gang culture. Images and videos depicting 
camaraderie, cash, drugs, women, and urban masculinity are common in promoting the gangster 
lifestyle (Patton, Eschmann, & Butler, 2013). "Content sharing plays a major role in cultivating 
belonging and a sense of collective identity. Sharing written, visual, or audio content on SNS 
(Social Networking Sites) that represents or portrays an individual or community experience 
invites others to engage and relate" (Collin, Rahilly, Richardson, & Third, 2011, p. 18). Social 
media provides a portal for gangs to proselytize individuals receptive to their message. The same 
strategies are used by terrorist groups to facilitate norm crystallization in the radicalization 
process (US Senate Committee, 2008).  
In addition to the functional benefits of participating in social media platforms, gang 
members enjoy certain protections for being members of the social media community. Provided 
users do not violate established community standards, there is no prohibition on content 
promoting gang culture. Instead, their social media posts are considered a form of expression and 
granted protection under the first amendment. Not only are these posts an acceptable form of free 
speech, but social media search functions can be used to find gang member profiles. Moreover, 
the algorithm used by social media sites recommends gang member profiles when viewing other 
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similar accounts. I use this feature, among others, during the discovery phase of my workflow 
process. 
Another way social media companies facilitate an online gang presence is through legal 
protections. Although law enforcement agencies are capable of monitoring social media activity, 
they are prohibited from acquiring developer credentials. This condition is explicitly stated in the 
application and agreement statement. In 2016, social media platforms such as Facebook, 
Instagram, and Twitter restricted developer credentials to prohibit law enforcement agencies 
from collecting data on their users (Brennan Center for Justice, 2019). Additionally, depending 
on the location of their servers, social media companies are not legally obligated to assist with 
criminal investigations. In the ruling of Microsoft v United States (2016), it was decided that the 
Stored Communications Act (SCA) did not extend extraterritorially outside of the United States. 
Judge José A. Cabranas in his dissenting opinion stated that the majority’s decision “has 
substantially burdened the government’s legitimate law enforcement efforts, created a roadmap 
for the facilitation of criminal activity and impeded programs to protect the national security of 
the United States and its allies" (p. 2). This sentiment was affirmed by Deputy Assistant Attorney 
General Brad Wiegmann (2017) in testimony given to the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Crime 
and Terrorism (2017). He provides the following examples:  
     of dozens of investigations, across the country, in every judicial circuit, in which the impact  
     of the Microsoft decision has frustrated those investigations and risked thwarting the pursuit  
     of justice… The impacted investigations run the gamut – from child exploitation and human  
     trafficking, to firearms and drug smuggling, to tax fraud, computer fraud, and identity theft.  
     These cases directly affect public safety and may even affect national security. While the  
     most obvious impact of the Microsoft decision may be to frustrate investigations of foreign  
     nationals targeting U.S. victims, these examples make clear that the Microsoft decision also  
     thwarts or delays investigations even where the victim, the offender, and the account holder  




Finally, social media, in addition to other new technology, has been used to conceal the identity 
of criminal offenders through coded transmissions. Downloadable apps available in the Apple 
Store and Google Play enable senders to deliver messages without leaving trace evidence on 
their electronic device (NGIC, 2015). Receivers, on the other hand, can access messages using 
cloud data storage, making it difficult to implicate them in illicit activities. Overall, social media 
provides an advantage to gang members in both functionality and protection.  
5.3 Similar Studies to Detect Criminal Groups Using Social Media Analytics 
The late 1980s ushered in the “empirical era” of criminology (Pyrooz & Mitchell, 2015). 
However, the introduction of research methods and their applications in this field of research has 
lagged behind other disciplines (Sierra-Arevalo & Papachristos, 2015). Social network analysis 
and social media analytics, two well-established methods of quantitative research, have only 
recently been applied to the study of gangs. Social media analytics, in particular, provides 
researchers an alternative to mine data on gang members in the absence of publicly available 
statistics. When addressing the sprawl of criminal gang behavior, open-source data and text 
analytics are useful in analyzing the threat (Brewster, Polovina, Rankin, & Andrews, 2014). 
Whether for personal use or to facilitate the needs of the gang, gang members are raising their 
digital profile by maintaining an online presence.   
The difficulties in analyzing the gang phenomenon in the United States stems from data 
availability, data reliability, and the covert nature of gang activity. Although there are 
inconsistencies across the country on how government entities collect and use gang data, there is 
one commonality; gang data on individuals is on a “right-to-know, need-to-know” basis. In other 
words, intelligence data on gang members are reserved for law enforcement authorities working 
in the official capacity of tracking criminal gang activity.  
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Social media analytics helps circumvent the limitations facing researchers. Although not 
targeting gangs specifically, Swati Agarwal and Ashish Sureka (2015, 2016) highlight the 
efficacy of using social media to detect covert networks. They use text-data sentiment analysis 
on Tumblr, a microblogging and social networking website, to detect networks of jihadi 
extremists. In 2018, Tumblr ranked the 7th most popular social networking site (Statista, 2018b). 
Agarwal and Sureka use a multi-step iterative detection process that begins by identifying users, 
or "seeds," that meet their criteria of "hate promoting" bloggers. They identify initial seeds by 
retrieving textual posts in the Tumblr application programming interface (API) using the search 
function. This discovery phase involves searching text-data in relevant tags, posts, and 
usernames. Some of the language they target includes 'jihad,' 'ISIS,' 'holy war,' and other words, 
phrases, and topics commonly associated with Islamic extremism. They use posts originating 
from a blogger’s account, or re-blogged content from other bloggers’ accounts. In the next phase, 
Agarwal and Sureka conduct a manual inspection of blogs to remove the false positives in their 
search query. The context of blogs that discuss Islam and ISIS, for instance, are not necessarily 
promoting hate but could be some other type of reference point or discussion. Additionally, 
Agarwal and Sureka clean their data in this second phase by removing non-English words along 
with English stopwords. The third phase involves a relevance computation by comparing 
exemplary documents (conducted as a separate phase and then attached to the workflow process) 
to a character level n-gram language modeling approach. In stage four, they consider the 
connection of users to the initial discovery phase by comparing notes on relevant users (re-
blogged and liked posts). The number of notes represents the popularity and similar interests 
between users to establish the community of extremist bloggers.7 Finally, the authors conduct a 
 
7 There are two reasons for this approach. First, the privacy policies of Tumblr prohibit the extraction of followers 
from other bloggers. The other reason is that tracked tags create a virtual community. Regardless if bloggers follow 
169 
 
social network analysis of relevant bloggers using a directed graph traversal random walk 
algorithm where nodes represent bloggers, and edges indicate the ties (re-blog and like) between 
bloggers. 
The use of network analysis in Agarwal and Sureka is especially critical when attempting 
to observe patterns that are not easily identifiable from raw data. Jacob Moreno (1934) was one 
of the earliest authors to develop the application of sociometric methods, which aim to analyze 
the interpersonal relationships between individuals. Since his seminal work in sociology, 
Moreno's sociometric model has become a useful analytic tool permeating to other research 
disciplines. Stuart Koschade (2006) uses SNA to analyze Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), the terrorist 
group responsible for the 2002 bombing in Bali. Within the JI terrorist cell operating in Bali, his 
results show the activity of members, the access each member has to other members, and the 
flow of information. He suggests applying his research to other terrorist cells responsible for 
bombings in Jakarta in 2003, an Australian embassy in 2004, and the second bombing in Bali in 
2005. Koschade concludes that SNA, as a counter-terrorism tool, can better inform policymakers 
on the formation of terrorist cells and their clandestine operations.  
The same methods developed by Moreno can be useful in criminology. “Effective use of 
SNA techniques to mine criminal network data can have important implications for crime 
investigations. The knowledge gained may aid law enforcement agencies fighting crime 
proactively” (Xu & Chen, 2005, p. 106). This is especially more acute in a globalized world 
where criminal connections have become transnational (Brewster, Polovina, Rankin, & Andrews, 
2015). In addition to SNA as a resource to learn about the interpersonal relationships of criminal 
connections, open-source data, and text analytics facilitate the analysis of sociometrics to 
 
each other, they are linked by their shared interests. A new post, with a specific tag, automatically appears on a 
user's dashboard based on their interests as opposed to direct contact with other users.  
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mitigate criminal threats. Research conducted by Lakshika Balasuriya, Sanjaya Wijeratne, Derek 
Doran, and Amit Sheth (2016), while not concerned with SNA, serves to provide an outline for 
detecting gang members on Twitter. Their workflow process resembles Agarwal and Sureka, 
with the exception of using language as an identifiable criterion. Language, according to them, 
differs across space and time, making gang member detection ineffective (For more on this point, 
see also Desmond Patton, 2015). Rather, they identify commonly used hashtags such as #BGD 
(Black Gangster Disciples) to detect gang member profiles in addition to shared musical interests 
of gangsta rap, a sub-genre of hip-hop, to validate those profiles. More specifically, they focus 
on the cross-section of rap artists that are gang-affiliated. The authors discovered 400 gang 
member profiles using this method. Although their contribution to the larger body of knowledge 
compares Tweet texts, Twitter profile descriptions, musical interests, emojis, and profile images 
between gang and non-gang members, using rap music to identify gang members limits the 
results to minorities. White gangs, for instance, typically listen to a different music genre such as 
punk rock. Moreover, the hashtags they use in their detection process focus on a specific gang, 
the Black Gangster Disciples. Despite these limitations, their research provides reference points 
for other researchers to follow. They conclude that discovering gang members on Twitter 
requires a comprehensive process targeting their use of digital media such as images, videos, and 
emojis. I use this approach to validate gang member profiles and identify their gang affiliations. 
Refer to the methodology section in this paper for further details on my gang validation process.  
 Similar to Balasuriya, Wijerante, Doran, and Sheth, Sanjaya Wijerante, Derek Doran, 
Amit Sheth, and Jack Dustin (2015) establish a process to analyze the digital footprint of gangs 
by collecting open-source API data on Twitter. The authors automate a spatiotemporal-thematic 
analysis to discover the relationship between gang member location and their correspondence. 
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Specifically, they found a significant level of cyber banging between two rival gangs. The 
automation of this discovery method, however, only generated a location in 3.62% of the Tweets 
they extracted. Further, the authors conduct a social network analysis on a directed graph using 
friend and follower connections. They discover that the average degree in their network is 
fifteen, meaning that each Twitter user in their dataset is connected to fifteen other users, on 
average. Additional findings reveal 72 interconnected communities with an average of 19 users 
per community with significant offline interaction between gang members. The sentiment-
emotion analysis along seven emotional categories (joy, sadness, anger, love, fear, thankful, and 
surprise) conducted by the authors show that gang interaction is mostly negative. The authors 
attribute this to the excessive use of curse words. Wijerante, Doran, Sheth, and Dustin run into 
the same problem as Balasuriya, Wijerante, Doran, and Sheth. The scope of their study, while 
demonstrating the potential for social media analytics, is limited to two rival gangs, the Gangster 
Disciples and Black Disciples, within ten neighborhoods on the South Side of Chicago. Their 
discovery process only generated 91 gang members. Limitations in the geographic range, the 
small size of the dataset, and the lack of diversity among gangs could bias the results of this 
study. For example, one would expect to observe a negative sentiment when studying the 
relationship between two rival gangs. 
One study that maps out gang connections in a larger geographic space is conducted by 
Julian Way and Robert Muggah (2016), who use Twitter analytics and SNA to analyze human 
smuggling at the U.S.-Mexico border. The research of Way and Muggah demonstrates the utility 
of social media analytics for gathering intelligence data on criminal organizations. Although 
their intended purpose was to examine the digital footprint of cartels and gangs in sex trafficking 
between Tijuana, Mexico, and San Diego County, the results revealed the pervasiveness of illicit 
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criminal networks. They inadvertently discovered covert networks extending from the southern 
border of the United States to cities like Chicago, New York, Miami, and Baltimore. 
Additionally, they found transnational connections involved in the sex trafficking trade in other 
Latin American countries such as Colombia, Argentina, Uruguay, and Nicaragua. The discovery 
process of Way and Muggah resembles Balasuriya, Wijerante, Doran, and Sheth in that they 
conduct a digital forensic analysis of users by manually inspecting Twitter profiles. Their 
research differs, however, in that they use existing public profiles of cartel and gang members 
and rely more heavily on text-data. They create a lexicon of “gang slang” terms to assist in 
identifying cartel and gang member profiles. One of the interesting results in their study is the 
discovery of other gangs. Way and Muggah avoid the selection bias of Wijerante, Doran, Sheth, 
and Dustin and Balasuriya, Wijerante, Doran, and Sheth by discovering a more varied selection 
of gang profiles that include Hispanic and non-Hispanic gangs outside the initial geographic 
point of inquiry. In their analysis, Way and Muggah offer an important methodological 
suggestion.  
     Social media analytics methods are capable of effectively detecting, identifying, tracking, and  
     monitoring the ongoing communications, interactions, activities and operations of criminal  
     gangs in the U.S. and Mexico. The approach to research requires a clear recognition of the  
     opportunities and constraints of monitoring social media. It is not merely a matter of  
     hoovering-up masses of social media profiles and generating "hits," though this is part of the 
     process. What is often required is very detailed assessments of “suspected” profiles, assessing  
     content and associated networks, and then repeating the process with positive returns. The  
     approach is less Big Data crunching and more mixed-method and qualitative (p. 14).  
 
I consider the point made by Way and Muggah an essential part of the methodology for this 
research. However, while Way and Muggah privilege the study of gangs and crime (See also 
Pyrooz & Moule, Jr. (2019) for a comparative analysis of criminal behavior between gang and 
non-gang members online, and Sela-Shayovitz (2012) for a discussion on gangs and cyber-
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crime), I seek to answer a more fundamental question about gangs. Chiefly, how significant is 
geographic location to gang member connections in the era of social media?   
5.4 Methodology 
There is little argument that monitoring the digital footprint of gang members provides a 
valuable resource to gather intelligence data. While conducting this study, I encountered several 
profiles where Tweets originated from inmates inside a prison. The timestamp on one photo was 
sent five minutes prior to me accessing their Twitter account. Other profiles revealed military-
connected gang members, ties to high-profile celebrities and politicians, and references to 
criminal activity. Despite the benefit of observing criminal gang activity, social media analytics 
can also improve our understanding of the gang phenomenon outside of the criminogenic 
perspective. My research differs from other publications in that I seek to address the impact of 
location on gang member connections using Twitter data. For this study, I examine gangs using 
an exponential random graph model (ERGM) to test the location homophily of gang member 
connections. I test the following four models and hypotheses that consider three nodal attributes, 
city, state, and gang affiliation, and an edge attribute, the distance (miles) between nodes:  
 
Node Attribute Models 
Model 1: Location by City 
H0 – City attributes have no impact on gang member connections. 
H1 – Gang members in the same city are more likely to form a connection. 
Model 2: Location by State 
H0 – State attributes have no impact on gang member connections. 
H1 – Gang members in the same state are more likely to form a connection. 
Model 3: Gang Affiliation 
H0 – Gang affiliation has no impact on gang member connections. 
H1 – Gang members with the same gang affiliation are more likely to form a connection. 
 
Edge Attribute Model 
Model 4: Location by Distance (Miles)  
H0 – Distance between gang members has no impact on their connection.  




I collected the data for this study using Twitter. “Twitter is a real-time global information 
network that lets users create and share ideas and information instantly. People and organizations 
send messages through our website and mobile site, client applications (e.g., Twitter for 
Android; Twitter for iOS), SMS, or any variety of third-party applications” (Twitter Help Center, 
n.d.). I use R-Studio, an integrated programming environment for R, to capture Twitter streaming 
API and generate the results of this study. “R is a language and environment for statistical 
computing and graphics” (The R Foundation, n.d.).  
5.4.1 Twitter 
 My research uses Twitter data to analyze the geographic distribution of gang members. 
Other social media platforms are available, and some, like Facebook, have a higher usage rate 
among gang members. However, Twitter API is robust and more accessible for data retrieval. 
Whereas Twitter’s default account setting is public, Facebook provides several different filters 
for users to restrict access to their content (Lomborg & Bechmann, 2014). The research I 
highlighted in the previous section illustrates the efficacy of collecting Twitter data to identify 
gang members. Further, the extracted data can be used to conduct sentiment and emotion 
analysis or analyze the community structure of social networks.  
 Sanjaya Wijerante et al. (2018) provides a detailed description of the data that can be 
extracted from a tweet, the metadata-related features, and data conversion using Twitter analytics 
to ascertain meaningful inferences. I am concerned with the application of Twitter-related 
features to identify gang members. Moreover, the sentiment of a tweet is necessary to determine 
if a connection between Twitter users is positive or negative. The text data in a tweet contains 
positive, negative, or neutral connotations to determine the sentiment of the sender. For example, 
gang members frequently engage in “cyber banging.” Desmond Patton, Robert Eschmann, and 
Dirk Butler (2013) refer to this as, “The phenomenon of gang affiliates using social media sites 
175 
 
to trade insults or make violent threats that lead to homicide or victimization.” According to 
them the three features of “cyber banging” include the following: “(1) promote gang affiliation 
and/or communicate interest in gang activity; (2) gain notoriety by reporting participation in a 
violent act or communicating an impending threat; (3) share information about rival gangs or 
network with gang members across the country” (p. A55). Users can also attach hashtags or 
URLs that identify a topic of discussion. Additionally, user mentions and retweets illustrate a 
connection between two or more Twitter profiles. Tweet indicators reveal the number of times a 
retweet is sent, the original author, and the number of "likes" a tweet receives. A Twitter account 
displays the user’s name, screen name, and sometimes a location. There is also the opportunity 
for users to provide a brief biography or description of themselves that is publicly available for 
others to view (provided a profile is not private). One of the profile features relevant for 
extrapolating social network data is the friends and followers of a user. These indicate if a 
connection between users exists.  
In addition to text and user data, each tweet has metadata that is not readily available 
through the standard interface on Twitter. Metadata includes a unique identifier for each tweet, 
coordinates (longitude and latitude) of a tweet's origin location, the machine-detected language 
of a tweet, a record of the Coordinated Universal Time (UTC), and the time zone where the 
tweet was sent. Taken together, the text data, user data, and metadata can be applied to word n-
grams (unigram or bigram), part of speech (PoS) tags, entities that are either explicitly or 
implicitly named, user mentions, hashtags to identify discussion topics, or URLs relevant to the 
exchange of information between users. Finally, retweets, replies, and friends/followers are all 
useful in conducting social network analysis.  
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5.4.2 Workflow Process  
The methods to conduct a social media analysis are well-established, as I demonstrated in 
the previous section. They typically involve stages of discovery, relevance computation, manual 
inspection, and, if applicable, building a social network dataset. My workflow includes the 
following four-step process: 
1. Seed Discovery – In the initial seed discovery stage, I identified gang member profiles 
using three strategies. One strategy involved capturing Twitter streaming API coded in R-Studio 
from a bounding box that targeted the continental United States. When attempting to analyze 
human trafficking on the southern border, the use of language was effective for Way and 
Muggah in the seed discovery process. Gangs use language as one method to establish and 
reinforce a distinct identity. The words and phrases gang members use can be as simple as a 
standard greeting, a way to denigrate rivals, or to reference people, places, or events. Balasuriya, 
Wijerante, Doran, and Sheth and Wijerante, Doran, Sheth, and Dustin used hashtags such as 
#BDK (Black Disciple Killer) and #GDK (Gangster Disciple Killer) in the discovery stage of 
their workflow process. Unlike these other studies, however, I use language configurations that 
target a broader spectrum of gangs. The list of words and phrases I use to capture tweets are both 
general and specific to the Bloods, Crips, People Nation, Folk Nation, Five Percenters, Black 
Guerilla Family, Hispanic gangs, White gangs, Jamaican gangs, Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs, and 
Asian gangs. Table 5.1 provides a sample of the words and phrases that I use to capture the 
Twitter streaming API of gang members. A complete list of the words and phrases I used to 






Table 5.1 Language Sample for Four of the Largest Gangs in the United States 
Gang Language Meaning 
Folk Nation All is one We're all together and OK 
 GD Gangster Disciples 
 74 Gangster Disciples 
 Vicky Lous Insult to Vice Lords/People Nation 
People 
Nation (G)DK (Gangster) Disciple Killer 
 
5 in the sky, 6 must 
die Revenge against Folk 
 ALKN 
Almighty Latin King's Nation (a member of the People 
Nation) 
Crips Slob, Sloob Disrespect to Bloods 
 Adidas All Day I Destroy a Slob (Blood) 
 B/K Blood killer 
 What it C Like Crip greeting 
Bloods Crab Disrespectful name for Crip 
 Damu Swahili for Blood 
 Snoovers Insult to Hoover Street Crips 
 Krab Insult to Crips 
 
 
The Twitter search function was another strategy I used in the discovery stage. A similar 
method is used in Sureka and Argarwal to discover extremist groups on Tumblr. I typed gang 
names into the search bar on Twitter and inspected profiles that matched the results. Further, 
Twitter uses an algorithm to recommend user-profiles based on your Twitter activity. The final 
strategy I used in the discovery process involved following Twitter recommendations.   
2. Relevance Computation – The second stage involved relevance computation based on 
the initial seed discovery from the first stage, referenced against exemplary documents. I 
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conducted this stage manually to validate gang member Twitter accounts and avoid including 
false-positive profiles into the dataset. G. David Curry (2015) emphasizes self-identification as 
important to the validation process, but I include gang member profiles with two or more of the 
following criteria: self-identification, language, hand signs, tattoos, media illustrating gang 
culture/symbols, gang colors, associates, hashtags, emojis, or external news sources (primarily 
used for gang-affiliated celebrities). Table 5.2 shows the breakdown of the gang member 
validation criteria. Since this study is predicated on the use of language to detect gang members, 
it is not surprising that the largest factor across all validated gang member profiles is language. 
As a percentage of total gang members, 80.30% of gang member profiles included language as 
one of the validation criteria. Among all validated gang members, 32.37% met at least two 







































Identification 293 40.36% Two 235 32.37% 
Language 583 80.30% Three 246 33.88% 
Hand Signs 237 32.64% Four 125 17.22% 
Tattoo 14 1.93% Five 84 11.57% 
Media 375 51.65% Six 30 4.13% 
Colors 186 25.62% Seven 6 0.83% 
Associates 301 41.46%    
Hashtag 158 21.76%    
Emoji 176 24.24%    
News 25 3.44%    
 
 
A further breakdown of those gang members that only met the two criteria threshold 
shows that 10.64% were validated because they self-identified and used gang language. Another 
78.3% of gang members that met at least two validation criteria included either self-identification 
or language. Those that self-identify and include some other criteria represent 18.72% of the 
sample population, and 59.57% include language and some other criteria. In all pairs of criteria, 
substantive evidence was used to validate a gang member. For example, no gang members were 
validated using only a hashtag and emoji. If the supporting evidence to validate a gang member 
could not be found, then the profiles were discarded. Table 5.3 provides a breakdown of the 
validation criteria for gang members meeting two criteria as a subset of the total sample 
population. As a correctional officer, I used similar methods to validate gang members during the 
intake process and when dispatched as a member of the Prison Emergency Response Team 
(PERT).   
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Table 5.3 Validation Criteria for Gang Members Meeting Two Criteria as a Subset 
of the Total Sample Population 
Validation Criteria 
Combinations 
Total Validation Criteria 
Combinations 
Combination of Validation 
Criteria as % of Total Gang 
Members Meeting Two Criteria 
Self + Language 25 10.64% 
Self + Other Criteria  44 18.72% 
Language + Other 
Criteria 140 59.57% 
Hand Sign + Media 2 0.85% 
Hand Sign + Colors 1 0.43% 
Hand Sign + Associates 2 0.85% 
Hand Sign + Hashtag 2 0.85% 
Hand Sign + Emoji 1 0.43% 
Tattoo + Emoji 1 0.43% 
Media + Colors 3 1.28% 
Media + Associates 5 2.13% 
Media + Hashtag 2 0.85% 
Media + Emoji 2 0.85% 
Media + News 1 0.43% 
Colors + Emoji 1 0.43% 
Associates + Hashtag 1 0.43% 
Associates + Emoji 1 0.43% 
Associates + News 1 0.43% 
 
 
Gang members can be identified as one of three levels, according to the Santa Cruz 
County Gang Task Force (2018). At the lowest level are Wannabes. A Wannabe has no formal 
ties to a gang but expresses an interest in gang culture and often fits the profile of gang members, 
such as living in a poor neighborhood, high truancy, and poor performance in school. The second 
level of gang involvement is an Associate characterized by having a personal relationship with a 
gang member, adopting gang colors and symbols, and considerations for joining a gang. Gang 
Members are the highest level of gang involvement. These are individuals who have gone 
through the initiation of becoming a gang member, pledge their commitment to the gang, 
frequently engage in illicit activities, and fully adopt the gang's language, symbols, and rituals. I 
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include all three gang member types in the sample population for this study. At the most basic 
level, "Youth who dress like, imitate, and hang out with gang members may be putting 
themselves in just as much risk as jumped-in gang members. Simply put, a rival gang member is 
not going to stop and ask if their perceived rival is a wannabe or if he is the real deal. He will 
simply act or react, and the end result could be injury or death” (Santa Cruz County BASTA 
flier, 2018). One of the limitations of collecting Twitter data is distinguishing between the three 
levels of gang members. However, this study does not measure the magnitude of gang 
involvement but seeks to detect those who identify as a gang member. All three levels give the 
appearance of gang membership by explicitly promoting, disseminating, and supporting gang 
culture, a behavior consistent with other criminal groups (Crone & Harrow, 2011; Moghaddam, 
2005; Silber & Bhatt, 2007).  
Part of the identification process also involved determining the gang in which a Twitter 
user belongs. The six-pointed star, for instance, is both a religious symbol used by the Jewish 
faith and a universal identifier of the Folk Nation, necessitating a manual inspection of profiles to 
ascertain the context of these symbols. Emojis are another symbol that can have multiple 
applications. The handicap or grape emojis can have one meaning for non-gang members but are 
also used by the Crips and Grape Street Crips, respectively. For this reason, I avoid the inclusion 
of false-positive profiles by focusing on at least two validation criteria.  
3. Search REST API – After validating profiles in the second stage, I searched the 
Twitter REST API to determine the location of gang members and to discover other gang 
member accounts. For all Twitter accounts inspected, I manually identified their location. In 
cases where multiple locations were discovered, I coded them as primary and secondary. 
Additionally, I extracted other gang member accounts through retweets, user mentions, and the 
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list of followers. My data selection process uses an exponential non-discriminative snowball 
sample where referrals are randomly drawn from initial seeds and their followers. I considered 
the list of followers as opposed to the list a user is following because this signals an intent to 
subscribe or receive notifications from a specific Twitter user. Since the followed can choose to 
block a follower, allowing an account to follow you is an implicit acceptance of that connection. 
Finally, after discovering additional profiles from the Twitter REST API, I validated these 
accounts using the same criteria in stage two of this workflow process. I continued this as an 
iterative process up to 200 followers or until the discovery of follower profiles were exhausted. 
Additionally, I discarded all non-relevant profiles and added relevant profiles to the dataset.  
4. Build Network – I used the relevant profiles discovered from the workflow process to 
construct an edgelist where the vertices, or nodes, represent Twitter users and an edge indicates a 
tie between vertices (See Piquette, Smith & Papachristos (2014) for a discussion on the benefits 
of SNA to gang studies). The network I use is an undirected graph that assumes reciprocity 
between gang members. In order to conceal the identity of Twitter users, I designated each node 
with a numerical value. I collected the data for this study between June 1 to June 30, 2019. I 
analyzed the network data using an exponential random graph model (ERGM). Similar to 
regression analysis, ERGMs examine the influence of an independent variable on a dependent 
variable. However, whereas statistical regression assumes independence between nodes, ERGMs 
account for their interrelatedness. It is the dependence between nodes that forms the structural 
foundation of a network and the point of interest for an ERG model. The ERGM used in this 
study tests the location homophily of gang member connections or the extent to which gang 
member connections are localized. Figure 5.1 illustrates my workflow process. The same process 




Figure 5.1 Workflow Process to Collect Twitter Data 
  
5.5 Data Collection Results 
The workflow process I use resulted in the discovery of 1,636 connections between 726 
gang and cartel members in 135 cities (18 international), 35 U.S. states, and 13 countries 
(including the United States). I include cartels in the sample population for two reasons. First, 
cartels feature prominently in the structure of the gang network (DEA, 2018; NGIC, 2011, 2013, 
2015). Second, these connections were made as part of the discovery process. Connections 
between gang members and cartels further challenge the location-based gang consensus by 
highlighting geospatially diverse connections. The average activity for Twitter users in this 
dataset includes 4.22 years and 12,220 tweets, with an average of 38,492 followers. Compared to 
the median, the years of activity is close to the mean at 4 years, but the number of Tweets and 
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the dataset that have a significantly higher number of tweets and followers. For example, the 
discovery process revealed a few celebrities and high-profile individuals with gang ties. Whereas 
the median provides a better descriptive indicator to this study, the mean provides a snapshot of 
gang content exposure to Twitter followers. Table 5.4 provides information on Twitter profile 






















Table 5.4 Twitter Profile Descriptions 
Average Twitter Profiles Following 901 
Median Twitter Profiles Following 453.5 
Average Twitter Followers 38,492 
Median Twitter Followers 355 
Average Year Joined 2013 
Median Year Joined 2013 
Average Years of Activity 4.22 
Median Years of Activity 4 
Average Tweets 12,220 
Median Tweets 2,250 
Average Likes 2,221 
Median Likes 267 
Gang Members 726 
Connections 1636 
Gang Total 42 
Established Gangs 38 





Average Population 329,969 
Median Population 111,398 
International 18 
Average Population 1,904,832 







In the sample population, 27.76% homophily ties (gang members in the same city shared a 
connection) were detected compared to 72.24% heterophily ties (gang members in different 
cities shared a connection). The edgelist to calculate the distribution frequency of city ties is used 
in model 1 to determine the significance of location by city on gang member connections. 
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Homophily ties detected for gang members in the same state was 35.58% compared to 64.42% 
heterophily ties. The edgelist to calculate the distribution frequency of state ties is used in model 
2 to determine the significance of location by state on gang member connections.  
Finally, the frequency distribution of gang member connections of the same set was 
64.3% compared to 35.7% heterophily ties to different sets. When considering the frequency 
distribution of gangs from the same primary gang, however, the homophily and heterophily ties 
change significantly to 82.04% and 17.96%, respectively. Although some gangs claim the same 
primary gang affiliation, there is a higher degree of rivalry when compared to the gang set. The 
Rollin’ 60s Neighborhood Crips and Eight Tray Gangster Crips, for example, both claim Crip 
affiliation. However, a dispute in 1979 turned each set into rivals. As the division widened, other 
Crip sets either joined the Neighborhood Crips (Rollin’ Os) or Gangster Crips ("Deuces and 
Trays," n.d.). The two sets are also referred to as the Deuces (2x) and Trays (3x), respectively. 
Therefore, I use gang sets as nodal attributes rather than primary gangs in this study. The high 
percentage of gang members connecting to other members of the same gang indicates that gang 
homophily is a strong predictor for observing shared connections between gang members. 
Moreover, increasing connections between members of the same set to members of the 
same primary gang reinforces the importance of understanding gang relationships at the macro-
level, an under-researched area of gang studies and the premise of Chapter 4. Gang sets appear 
fragmented in the overall network structure but appear to share more connections when gangs are 
connecting with members of the same alliance. For example, when looking at the city-level 
connections of the Gangster Disciples, they have 86 heterogeneous ties. As a member of the Folk 
Nation, several of these ties include members within their gang alliance. When consolidating the 
Gangster Disciples and other sets into their primary gang, the Folk Nation, these ties represent 
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221 homogenous connections in the sample population. Table 5.5 shows the frequency 
distribution of homophily and heterophily ties between gang members by city, state, and gang 
affiliation. 
 
Table 5.5 Frequency Distribution of Gang Member Connections 








City 27.76%  72.24%  
State 35.58%  64.42%  
Gang Set 64.30%  35.70%  
Gang Primary 82.04%  17.96%  
 
 
The distribution of gangs is not isolated to highly populated urban areas. There is an even split of 
mid-density (population of 100,000-999,999) and small-density (population 1,000-99,000) cities 
of 44.44% with a few gang members discovered in high-density (population of 1-3 million) and 
minuscule-density (population < 1,000) cities. Table 5.6 shows the frequency distribution of 
gang members by city size measured in population density. 
 
Table 5.6 Frequency Distribution of Gang Members Across City Size 
(Measured by Population Density) 
  
City 
Population   
High-Density (1-3 million)  5.98%   
Mid-Density (100,000 - 999,999)  44.44%   
Small-Density (1,000-99,999)  44.44%   




There are forty-two gangs and six cartels represented in the dataset. Five of the forty-two 
gangs discovered are considered "new" gangs. The Gotti Gang, for example, was recognized by 
the Norfolk Police Department in May 2017 (Edwards, 2017). Other “new” gangs include 
B.W.A. (Bread Winners Association) Gang, Cutthroat Gang (CTG), Global Avenue Boys, and 
Only My Brothers (OMB). The largest gang included in the dataset are the Crips with 175 
members. When the different Crip sets are included, the Crips represent approximately a fourth 
of the total gang members in the dataset. The Crips are one of the largest domestic gangs in the 
United States whose rivalry with the Bloods began in the 1960s (Howell, 2015). Another gang in 
the dataset with high representation is the Gangster Disciples. I identified 119 Gangster 
Disciples, along with 64 members of the Folk Nation. Larry Hoover, a founder of the Gangster 
Disciples, played a role in establishing the Folk Nation, whose alliance includes several gangs. 
With the exception of the Latin Kings, their rival, the People Nation, is not well represented in 
the dataset. Other gangs noticeably missing from the dataset are Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and 
White gangs such as the Aryan Brotherhood. Neither the streaming nor the rest API generated 
any results for these gangs. In the case of MS-13, this could be due to language barriers. 
Although the Sinaloa Cartel and Red Command are included in the dataset, two groups with 
similar language constraints (their primary language is Spanish and Portuguese, respectively), 
they were discovered by their connections with gang members using the workflow process. 
Moreover, the Twitter search function did not generate results for MS-13 or White gangs, 
making detection difficult. Unlike the Bloods and Crips that have several hashtags and profiles 
created in their name, text searches for MS-13 and White gangs produced news headlines or 
discussions between users condemning these groups. Especially on the topics of "white power" 
and "white nationalism." It is worth mentioning that prominent figures espousing white 
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nationalism, such as David Duke, have significantly less followers than notable figureheads in 
other gangs. Calvan Broadus, Jr. (aka Snoop Dogg), an American rapper and former Rollin’ 20s 
Crip, and Louis Farrakhan, leader of the Nation of Islam (NOI), have 17.8 million and 340,000 
followers, respectively. With similar messages promoting Black nationalism, Farrakhan modeled 
his teachings after the Five Percenters when he re-structured NOI in 1981 and continues to have 
members from this gang serving in leadership positions (Allah, 2014).  
With the exception of the Red Command, the discovery of cartels in this dataset are 
consistent with the findings in Way and Muggah (2016). They identified the leadership of the 
Sinaloa Cartel, who have reciprocal ties to one another, but not their followers. For example, 
Ovidio Guzmán López, son of Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzmán, follows nine Twitter accounts but 
has 89,000 followers. The accounts he follows consist of other leaders and family members in 















Figure 5.2 Gang Members by Gang 
 
 
The geographic representation in the dataset reflects what we would expect to observe. 
Across the United States, gangs are concentrated in densely populated urban areas. In this 
dataset, there were seventy-four gang members discovered in Los Angeles, twenty-nine in 
Atlanta, twenty-eight in Chicago, and fifteen in Memphis. Twenty-eight gang members were 
discovered in Compton, a comparatively smaller city, but this is due to its proximity to Los 
Angeles. The city and county of Los Angeles are considered the "gang capital" of the United 
States (Los Angeles Police Department, 2020). In total, the highest number of gang members in 
this dataset, one hundred thirty-four, was discovered in the state of California. Of the gang 



















































members in California, sixty-three are Crips, and another twenty-two belong to Crip sets. The 
geographic distribution of Crips in California includes twenty-four located in Compton, eighteen 
in Los Angeles, eight in Long Beach, and thirteen in other cities. Considering the Crips 
originated in the Los Angeles area, it makes sense to observe a high degree of clustering in this 
region. Additionally, as one of the largest gangs in America, it is not surprising to observe a high 
degree of distribution across the country and internationally. In total, Crip members were 
discovered in thirty-five U.S. and international cities.  
Another gang more heavily concentrated in Los Angeles is the Grape Street Crips. The 
Grape Street Crips originated in the Jordan Down Housing Projects in Watts. Thirty-two out of 
the thirty-seven Grape Street Crip members identified were from Los Angeles. It is not 
uncommon for people to migrate, and another three were discovered in Memphis and two in 
Atlanta. Similarly, the Gotti Gang and Five Percenters originated from New Jersey and New 
York, respectively. This is reflected in the dataset with seven of the eight Gotti Gang members 
located in New Jersey, and fourteen Five Percenters detected in New York.  
 One gang that does not resemble the same pattern of having one geographic area that is 
highly clustered, especially where they originated, is the Gangster Disciples. As one of the 
original members of the Folk Nation, the Gangster Disciples originated in Chicago. This area 
was the focus of Balasuriya, Wijerante, Doran, and Sheth (2016) and Wijerante, Doran, Sheth, 
and Dustin (2015). However, the results of this study revealed that Gangster Disciples are 
clustered, but across a greater distribution than a single metropole. Where seven were discovered 
in Illinois (six of those located in Chicago), there were sixteen discovered in Georgia, sixteen in 
South Carolina, eight in Tennessee, and eight in Alabama. Overall, Gangster Disciples were 
discovered in forty-two cities across twenty-three states, and while the distribution of Gangster 
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Disciples is as expansive as the Crips, they have fewer international ties. The results of the 
workflow process revealed that the Gangster Disciples have a tie to Haiti, and the Crips have ties 
to South Africa, Peru, Indonesia, and the Cayman Islands. Figures 5.3 and 5.4 show the 
geographic concentration and distribution of select gangs by city and state, respectively. See also 
the Appendix for a visual map on the geographic concentration and distribution of select gangs. 
Figures 5.5, 5.6, and 5.7 show the total geographic concentration and distribution of gangs by 























Figure 5.3 Location of Select Gangs by City 
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Figure 5.4 Location of Select Gangs by State 
 







































Bloods Crips Five Percenters
Folk Nation Gangster Disciple Grape St Crips
195 
 
Figure 5.5 Distribution of Gang Members by City 
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Figure 5.7 Distribution of Gang Members by Country (Excluding the U.S.) 
 
 
5.6 Exponential Random Graph Model (ERGM) 
Exponential Random Graph Models analyze the sub-structures of social networks to 
determine the patterns of relationships between vertices. Garry Robins and Dean Lusher (2012) 
provide the following definition of ERGMs:  
     Exponential random graph models (ERGMs) are statistical models for network structure,  
     permitting inferences about how network ties are patterned. Put another way, ERGMs are tie- 
     based models for understanding how and why social network ties arise. This focus aligns  
     ERGMs with a principal goal of much empirical social network research, which is to  
     understand a given “observed” network structure (i.e., a network on which a researcher has  
     collected data), and so to obtain insight into the underlying processes that create and sustain  
     the network-based social system (p. 9).  
 
A more formal explanation of ERGMs can be found in David Hunter, Mark Handcock, Carter 
Butts, Steven Goodreau, and Martina Morris (2009). ERGMs function much the same way as 
linear regression models with one distinct feature. They account for path dependencies in 
network structures. This can be accomplished by measuring the impact of nodal attributes. For 
further explanation and a comparison between nodal attribute models and evolutionary models, 
see Riitta Toiven et al. (2009). In addition to node attributes, edge attributes (also referred to as 















relational attribute effects) can be used to determine the probability distribution of a graph (See 
Martina Morris, Mark Handcock, and David Hunter (2008) for a more detailed explanation). M. 
E. J. Newman (2015) provides an example of the underlying ERGM application. 
     Many of the networks we observe in the real world exist in only one instantiation, one  
     example that we can study. There’s only one Internet, for instance, and only one World Wide  
     Web. But is the precise structure of such a network – the precise pattern of connections in the  
     Internet, say – the only possible structure the network could have? Common sense suggests  
     that it is not. For a start, the Internet evolves in time, so we see different structures if we look  
     at different times and all of them are by definition plausible structures for the network. More  
     importantly, it’s clear that, had circumstances been slightly different, the Internet could easily  
     have evolved to have a different topology, but one that in practical terms would probably  
     have worked about as well as the present one… That is, all reasonable choices for the  
     structure of the Internet have some basic features in common, even if they differ in similar  
     details. Similar considerations also apply to other types of networks, including social    
     networks, biological networks, and information networks (p. 565). 
 
For this study, I use an ERGM with an undirected network graph to test the location homophily, 
or heterophily, of shared gang member connections. By using the ERG model, my research aims 
to understand the extent to which location impacts gang member connections. Although there is 
a degeneracy problem in ERGMs, this relates to issues of transitivity in social networks. 
Transitivity analyzes the likelihood that a friend of a friend is your friend. For this reason, triadic 
closures, or network clustering, is not relevant to this study, but should be considered in future 
research. ERGs that model homophily, on the other hand, do not suffer from the same limitation. 
See Alessandro Rinaldo, Stephen Feinberg, and Yi Zhou (2009) for a detailed explanation of 
ERGM degeneracy. 
5.6.1 ERGM Results 
For each calculation, there is a null model showing the probability of a connection 
forming between gang members without considering attributes. The edgelist used in the city 
attribute model, for example, shows a 1.12% probability of a connection forming between two 
nodes. This means that, in the absence of any identifiable criteria, there is a low probability of 
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observing a connection between two individuals in the network. The edgelists used in the state 
and gang affiliation nodal attribute models and the edge attribute model also show a low 
probability of observing connections between nodes when only edges are considered.  
We can observe the relevance of the attributes by comparing them to the null models. The 
results of this study support the proximity principle to some degree. That is to say, individuals 
concentrated in a geographic space are more likely to develop interpersonal relationships. When 
considering nodal attributes, location has an impact on the formation of gang connections. In the 
first model, city attributes are statistically significant at the 95% confidence interval (p < 
0.0139). We can reject the null hypothesis and state that gang members from the same city are 
more likely to form a connection. Model 1 includes 634 edges between 335 vertices. By taking 
the log-odds of the coefficient, we can predict that the probability of a connection forming 
between gang members from the same city in this model is 59.12%.8   
When considering state location, the statistical significance of connections forming 
between gang members is higher. Model 2, which includes 771 edges connecting 385 vertices, 
measures state attributes and is statistically significant at the 99% confidence interval (p < 
0.0045) with a probability of 57.25% that a connection between gang members will form. 
Although I do not include a national model in this study, it can be inferred that connections based 
on country would be highly statistically significant at the 99.99% confidence interval (p < 
0.001). Especially considering that out of the 726 vertices, 672 are from the United States. 
Moreover, the results suggest that a more diffuse population across a broader geographic space 
reduces the likelihood of interaction. Defining location on a larger scale contributes to a lower 
probability of connections forming between gang members when comparing city (59.12%) and 
 
8 The plogis function in R-Studio generates a log-odds likelihood ranging from 0-1. 
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state attributes (57.25%). The third model testing individual effects is gang affiliation homophily 
with 1,538 edges connecting 717 vertices. Gang affiliation is highly statistically significant at the 
99.99% confidence interval (p < 0.0002), and accounts for a 56.78% probability that connections 
between gang members form based on similarities in gang affiliation. For Model 3, it is 
important to mention that the results are based on gang sets rather than their primary affiliation. 
The Rollin’ 60s Neighborhood Crips, for example, are treated as separate entities from the Crips. 
This is an important distinction to make when considering the probability of a connection 
forming. If gangs were consolidated into their primary gang affiliation, then it is likely that the 
probability of a connection forming would be greater than 56.78%. 
Unlike the three nodal attribute models, Model 4 uses an edge attribute to test the 
distance between vertices (measured in miles). The miles between gang members tested in 
Model 4 has no significant impact on the formation of a connection. Although the distance in 
miles is not a good predictor of observing gang member connections, we can still make 
inferences about the location-based perspective. If gangs are localized, we would expect to see 
higher clustering in terms of distance. The miles between nodes might be too scattered to make a 
statistical determination on the impact of distance and the formation of gang member 
connections, but this is not necessarily a reflection of proximity. Gang members that are 2, 3, 5, 
or 10 miles apart are still geographically close. However, the dataset for Model 4 (the same 
dataset used in Model 1) shows that the distance between nodes is decentralized rather than 
clustered. The average distance between vertices is 963.24 miles, with a range of 0-12,863 miles. 
We might not be able to reject the null hypothesis for Model 4, but the distance between nodes 
challenges the idea that gangs are localized. Rather than clustering, the mileage between gang 
members suggests they occupy a more diffuse geographic space. Table 5.7 provides the ERGM 
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results for the individual effects of attribute homophily (city, state, gang affiliation, and distance 
(miles)) on gang member connections (See the Appendix for figures illustrating the data used in 
the city and state attribute models). 
 
Table 5.7 ERGM Results: Individual Effects Model of Attribute Homophily 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 




















Vertices 335 335 385 385 717 717 335 335 
Edges 634 634 771 771 1538 1538 634 634 
Estimate 
Std. 
-4.4848 0.3691 -4.574 0.2921 -5.13 0.4978 -4.4848 22.5093 
Error 0.0403 0.15 0.0366 0.1027 0.0259 0.0672 0.0403 210.3468 
p-Value <1e- 04*** 0.0139* <1e-04*** 0.0044** <1e-04*** 0.0002*** <1e-04*** 0.915 
Probability 0.0112 0.5912 0.0102 0.5725 0.0058 0.5678 0.0112 1 
Signif. codes: 0 '***'  0.001 '**'  0.01 '*'  0.05 '+'  0.1 ' '  1 
 
 
The Twitter data collected for this research is best designed for testing the individual effects of 
attributes (e.g., location homophily) on gang member connections.9 As described in the 
methodology section, the sample population is composed of Twitter users that I validated as a 
gang member and the gang with which they belong. In some cases, the primary gang was 
identified, and in others, the gang set was identified. It is possible that members identified in a 
primary gang could belong to a set of that gang that was not made explicit during the discovery 
process. Considering the joint effects between location and gang membership changes the model 
 
9 This study's data limitations are why I do not consider other network conditions (e.g., transitivity or connections 
with other gang members that are friends with my friend) or attributes in explaining gang member connections. 
Further analysis of gang member connections is possible if the data collection process supports the initial research 
inquiry and should be explored in subsequent studies. 
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by capturing the conditional effect of independent variables and their impact on the dependent 
variable. Nonetheless, it is worth examining since both attributes are indicative of real-world 
characteristics associated with gang members. That is to say, gang members in the sample 
population both live in a location (e.g., city, state, etc.) and belong to a gang. Table 5.8 shows the 
ERGM results for joint effects of nodal attribute homophily (e.g., city and primary gang, city and 
gang set, state and primary gang, state and gang set) on gang member connections.  
The joint effects of nodal attributes indicate that the resolution used to study gang 
member connections matter. When observing gang member connections by city location and 
gang set, cities are approaching statistical significance at the 90% confidence interval (p < 
0.0753), and gang affiliation is highly statistically significant at the 99.99% confidence interval 
(p < 0.0001). City and primary gang affiliation, on the other hand, are both statistically 
significant. City location and gang set affiliation are statistically significant at the 95% 
confidence interval (p < 0.0375 and p < 0.0142). When observing the joint effects by state 
location and gang set, states are statistically significant at the 95% confidence interval (p < 
0.0103), while gang set affiliation is not statistically significant. State location and primary gang 
affiliation, on the other hand, show that states remain statistically significant at the 95% 
confidence interval (p < 0.0150) and primary gang affiliation is approaching statistical 
significance at the 90% confidence interval (p < 0.0661).  
The results of the joint effects model suggest that city location is not conditioned by gang 
set affiliation. When compared to the individual effects model that considers the same number of 
edges and vertices, the statistical significance of city location decreases while the statistical 
significance of gang set affiliation remains constant.  Conversely, comparing the joint effects of 
state location and gang set affiliation to the individual effects model suggests that belonging to 
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the same gang is not conditioned by location when observing gang member connections. This is, 
however, inconclusive because the number of observations for gang set affiliation is significantly 
less in the joint effects model (771 edges connecting 385 vertices) than the individual effects 
model (1,538 edges connecting 717 vertices). Future research could help clarify the relationship 
between the independent variables.  
 
Table 5.8 ERGM Results: Joint Effects Model of Nodal Attributes 
  
City & Primary 
Gang City & Gang Set 
State & Primary 
Gang State & Gang Set 
  City 
Primary 





Vertices 335 335 335 335 385 385 385 385 
Edges 634 634 634 634 771 771 771 771 
Estimate 0.3155 0.2261 0.2712 0.4105 0.2548 0.1571 0.2681 0.1339 
Std. Error 0.1517 0.0922 0.1525 0.1047 0.1048 0.0855 0.1045 0.1044 
p-Value 0.0375* 0.0142* 0.0753+ <1e-04*** 0.0150* 0.0661+ 0.0103* 0.1998 
Probability 0.5782 0.5563 0.5674 0.6012 0.5634 0.5392 0.5666 0.5334 
Signif. codes: 0 '***'  0.001 '**'  0.01 '*'  0.05 '+'  0.1 ' '  1 
 
 
Whereas Table 5.7 and 5.8 illustrate the interaction effects between network attributes 
and gang member connections, it is also important to consider the main effects. The main effects 
of nodal attributes show the subset of independent variables (i.e., each city, state, and gang 
affiliation) and their impact on the dependent variable (i.e., gang member connections). Here you 
can see the contribution of individual city, state, and gang affiliation attributes driving each 
model's results. For example, in the individual effects model, the results are determined by 
several cities, states, or gangs rather than being driven by a handful of locations or gangs in the 
sample population. There are twenty-two cities, twenty-one states, and nine gang sets that are 
statistically significant in each of the individual effects models, despite some locations (e.g., Los 
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Angeles, Compton, Chicago, California, Georgia, etc.) and gangs (e.g., Crips, Gangster 
Disciples, etc.) being disproportionately represented. When looking at the main effects of the 
joint effects model between location and gang affiliation, there are nine cities and three gang sets 
of statistical significance that are all positively correlated with observing shared connections 
between gang members. The number of statistically significant cities and gangs increase to fifty-
six and ten, respectively, when consolidating gang sets into their primary gang. Those cities that 
are statistically significant remain positively correlated with gang member connections while 
primary gangs are negatively correlated. The main effects of state variables and gang set 
affiliation shows that there are eighteen states and twenty gang sets that are statistically 
significant. States are positively correlated with gang member connections, while gang sets are 
negatively correlated. The main effects between states and primary gangs show that twenty states 
and ten primary gangs are statistically significant. States remain positively correlated with gang 
member connections, while the correlation of primary gangs and gang member connections are 
mixed. Some gangs such as the Bishop Bloods, Cambodia Crips, and Gangster Disciples are 
positively correlated, while others such as the Gotti Gang and Bounty Hunter Bloods are 
negatively correlated. The statistical significance of individual nodal attributes provides areas for 
future research in terms of location and gang affiliation. I discuss this point further in the next 
section. See the Appendix for a full review of the main effects of nodal attributes in the 
individual and joint effects homophily models. 
5.7 Discussion 
The results of this study demonstrate consistency with the proximity principle. That is, 
location homophily plays a role in the formation of gang member connections. It is reasonable to 
expect that people living close together are more likely to have interpersonal relationships. Social 
interaction at school, work, and worship, or in shared residential spaces increase the likelihood of 
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localized connections forming. Within these public spaces exist, gangs, making it unsurprising 
that city and state attributes help explain gang member connections to some extent. However, 
location homophily is not as strong a predictor of gang member interconnectivity as one would 
expect to observe given the location-based consensus in gang studies. Depending on the unit of 
analysis or how location is defined (e.g., public housing complex, street, city, county, state, etc.), 
this research shows that the wider the geographic space, the greater the likelihood of observing a 
shared connection between gang members. As a result, gang member connections appear to be 
less localized than gang research suggests. Definitions that describe gangs as loosely organized 
groups of juveniles seeking to protect territory discounts their national and transnational 
connections. Instead, advances in communication technology and social media platforms have 
enabled gang members to re-spatialize how they form and maintain friendships in unbounded 
geographic spaces.  
The findings of this study challenge the location-based perspective asserting gang 
localization in two important ways. First, the frequency distribution of the sample population 
suggests that gang affiliation is a strong indicator of gang member connectivity. Approximately 
sixty percent of gang members from the same set share a connection. These connections increase 
to eighty-two percent when gang members are consolidated into the primary gang with which 
that set is aligned. The increase of shared connections between gang members from 'gang set' to 
'primary gang' supports the value of understanding the macro-level relationships of gangs that I 
presented in the previous chapter. There is a high degree of homogenous ties between gang 
members of the same gang or the alliance with which their gang belongs. The ERGM results 
support gang homophily as a strong indicator of shared gang member connections. As a singular 
nodal attribute, the interaction effect of gang affiliation is highly statistically significant. 
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However, gang members both exist in a location (e.g., city or state) and belong to a gang 
simultaneously. Although the structure of future studies should better model the interaction 
between these nodal attributes, the interaction effect in this study suggests that the relationship 
between these two variables is not reciprocal. For example, city location as a singular attribute is 
statistically significant, but not when conditioned by gang set affiliation. This means that the 
impact of city location on gang member connections is not determined by gang affiliation.   
Second, the concentration of gang members in the sample population reveals that gang 
members are located primarily in mid- to small-density cities. If gang members were localized, 
we would expect to see more gang members concentrated in large-density cities since gang 
formation can be traced back to large urban centers such as Los Angeles, Chicago, and New 
York (Howell, 2015). There are nearly just as many gang members in large-density cities as 
there are in minuscule-density cities. Similarly, the locations represented in this study are 
geospatially diverse.  Gang member connections are domestically and internationally more 
diffuse than is currently represented in gang studies. By proxy, the interconnectedness of gangs 
at the macro-level is spread out over a larger geographic space than is assumed by the 
localization of gangs. The consequence of which transposes localized security threats to the 
national consciousness by facilitating recruitment opportunities, disseminating gang culture, and 
making possible the coordination of criminal gang activity across city, state, and national 
borders. 
In addition to challenging the location-based consensus on gangs, this study suggests 
further areas of research. For example, some gangs such as the Grape Street Crips appear to be 
more geographically concentrated than other gangs such as the Gangster Disciples and Five 
Percenters. Distinctions between gang typologies could help explain the geospatial distribution 
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of gang member connections. Whereas the Gangster Disciples and Five Percenters can be 
classified as ideologically-driven third-generation gangs, the Grape Street Crips are presumably a 
second-generation gang motivated by profits. Moreover, some gangs are easier to detect on 
social media than others, allowing for gang-specific studies that examine how micro-level 
behavioral processes influence macro-level outcomes within a specific subset of gangs. Finally, 
this study can be used to discover other potential research areas at the local level. The discovery 
of "new" gangs and their whereabouts provides an opportunity to analyze gang formation and 
behavior in a contemporary context. Similarly, the sample population includes several cities not 
typically associated with gang activity. The results of the data collection process in this study can 
expand on work that compares emerging gang cities to established gang cities (See Decker, 
Bynum, & Wiesel, 1998). Working with local law enforcement in these cities can help improve 
our understanding of gangs outside studies that privilege high-density cities such as Los Angeles, 

















There is little argument that criminal gang activity jeopardizes public safety in 
communities throughout the United States. Historically, gangs have existed in geographic spaces 
as localized groups. The introduction of "hard" drugs, however, was partially responsible for 
transforming gangs from a territorial- to a market-orientation (Coughlin & Venkatesh, 2003). 
While some remained ‘neighborhood gangs,' others emerged as ‘national gangs’ with local, 
national, and transnational connections. Network structures as a system of connections beyond 
the local setting have featured prominently in the gang transformation process. By studying gang 
networks, we can better understand the influence gangs have on the social, political, economic, 
and cultural determinants of national security. Through these network structures, gangs can 
challenge law and order, weaken institutions, and impact the structural integrity of the state.  
Social network analysis (SNA) provides an effective empirical-analytic method to 
examine the interconnectedness of gangs. At the macro-level, gangs are forming alliances that 
integrate street, prison, and outlaw motorcycle gangs (OMGs) in addition to other criminal 
groups like Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs). In some cases, these alliances 
transpose local gang activity onto the national security consciousness. At the micro-level, 
connections between individual gang members facilitate entry into “new” markets and facilitate 
the flow of information and resources throughout the country. Although the consensus in 
criminology indicates gangs are localized, the examination of micro-level network structures 
between gang members demonstrates the diverse geospatial distribution of gangs. Gang members 
are connected to other gang members in small-, medium-, and large-density cities. In some cases, 
these cities lack the resources and capabilities to address criminal gang activity.  
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The network structure of gangs also has ontological implications. There is a rigorous 
debate on the likelihood of a gang-terrorist nexus. Whereas the foundation of this debate 
considers the physical connections between gangs and terrorists, there exists a metaphysical 
integration of extremist ideologies into the gang construct. This "network of ideas" has 
reconfigured the identity of some gangs seeking to achieve political outcomes. As a result, the 
transformation of these gangs involves actively challenging the state. SNA can help assess the 
extent to which gangs resemble other criminal groups. Under what conditions should a gang be 
categorized as a terrorist organization? Answering this important question could potentially 
change the strategic and tactical responses of law enforcement as well as the agencies and 
resources available to address certain gangs. Further, gang members exist as social actors 
(Hagedorn, 2005). Despite their propensity for violence and criminal conduct, gang members 
often remain involved in their neighborhood or community. For this reason, gang networks are 
capable of influencing the social, political, economic, and cultural landscape through legitimate 
channels. SNA provides an analytic tool to examine the extent to which gangs undermine the 
efficacy of state institutions like the military and law enforcement agencies. 
6.1 The Transformation of Gangs 
There is a consensus that gangs in the United States are localized (Venkatesh, 2000). The 
underlying assertion of the location-based perspective relies on several factors that describe 
gangs as having young members with loose affiliations whose time in the gang is short and their 
mobility restricted to a narrowly defined geographic space. Early gang studies such as Frederic 
Thrasher (1927) established this archetypal view, which continues to be reproduced in 
contemporary assumptions about gangs. Local conditions undoubtedly play a role in gang 
formation and should not be discounted but explained as part of a larger historical context of the 
gang phenomenon.  
210 
 
James Howell (2015) points out that gangs in the northeastern region of the country 
emerged in 1783, while the southern region did not experience gangs until almost two centuries 
later in the 1970s. Between that time, the first documented gang activity in the midwestern and 
western regions occurred in the 1860s and 1890s, respectively. Although gang formation 
occurred disproportionately across regions of the United States, comparing each region reveals a 
pattern of similar conditions that led to gang formation. One important factor is the impact of 
international and intranational mass migration on regional populations. European migration to 
the East, the Great Migration of Southern Blacks to the West and Midwest, and migration at the 
southern border led to a population disequilibrium at various points in time. During the Great 
Migration, for example, the diffusion of Southern Blacks disproportionately impacted other parts 
of the country (Howell, 2015). The population in the South decreased while the West and 
Midwest experienced a rise in population density. Within those regions, a majority of people 
settled in urban areas creating city pockets of poor neighborhoods. Local politicians responded to 
the population increase by establishing affordable housing, which had the unintended 
consequence of creating concentrated disadvantage and gang consolidation. The conditions of 
mass migration and concentrated disadvantage contributed to social disorganization in city areas 
where gang norms replaced traditional forms of social control from institutions like family and 
school. Further, throughout U.S. history, racial tension produced frequent conflicts between 
white, Black, Hispanic, and Asian communities. This enmity has commonly led to gangs 
forming along racial lines and has been used to create gang cohesion in cases where 
ethnocentrism is part and parcel to the gang’s identity. For example, the Crips, one of the largest 
African American gangs, formed in response to the civil rights movement as an offshoot of the 
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Black Panther Party to protect Black communities. Similarly, the Latin Kings originally formed 
to advocate for the Hispanic community. 
Originally, gangs formed as conflict groups to protect their members and neighborhoods 
from predation. This included keeping drugs out of their community. After 1970, however, when 
large quantities of “hard” drugs such as cocaine and heroin began flooding the streets, gangs 
became more entrepreneurial as they saw economic opportunity in selling narcotics (Coughlin & 
Venkatesh, 2003). The group activity of controlling drugs as a business transformed gang 
motivation from territorial to market-oriented, or what John Sullivan (1997) describes as the 
second-generation (2-G) of gangs. As a result, gangs organized into network structures, a feature 
distinct to modern gangs compared to historic gangs. This is a good point to restate Phil 
Williams (2001) as he summarizes the benefits of a network orientation. “Criminal networks 
provide moving and elusive targets that operate across enemy lines, infiltrating law enforcement 
agencies and governments, avoiding confrontation in favor of cooption and corruption. They are 
resilient – although not impervious – to damage and have qualities that facilitate recuperation 
and regeneration” (p. 82). Network structures facilitate gang alliances, expansion, and access or 
control over information and resources. At the same time that gang networks function in 
unbounded spaces, law enforcement agencies face jurisdictional constraints. Their legal authority 
is often limited to a specific location. Additionally, they are restricted by bureaucratic processes 
that can differ between districts making the detection and apprehension of gang members more 
difficult. This includes the defined set of standard operating procedures that determine 
community engagement with gang members and how gang data is collected and shared, if at all. 
6.2 A Macro-Level Structural Analysis of Gang Networks 
My dissertation provides a formal analysis of the network structure of gangs. Despite the 
transformation of gangs since the 1970s, the interconnectedness of gangs is not well understood. 
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This understanding is further obscured by a lack of publicly available data and inconsistencies in 
data collection methods between law enforcement agencies throughout the country. Social 
network analysis provides an empirical-analytic tool to effectively study gang structures. At the 
macro-level, the establishment of national gang alliances suggests some gangs are forming 
criminal syndicates, exceeding the explanatory power of localized studies on the gang 
phenomenon. One result of my macro-level network analysis of gangs presented in Chapter 4 
illustrates gang clusters. There are several primary gangs with which other gangs orbit in the 
network. Some of the largest gangs in the United States, like the Crips and Bloods, for example, 
have several affiliated sets or smaller gangs that claim allegiance. Other gangs like the People 
and Folk have formed "nations," which is an alliance of independent gangs that have agreed to 
cooperate. Similarly, outlaw motorcycle gangs (OMGs) tend to orbit the "Big Five" motorcycle 
clubs (MCs) that include the Hells Angels, Mongols, Pagans, Bandidos, and Sons of Silence. 
Instead of gang sets, several of the large MCs maintain support clubs. Except for a few 
connections from the Big Five MCs, however, OMGs remain loosely connected to the gang 
network's overall structure. 
Another important finding of the macro-level analysis of gangs reveals that native gangs 
are more influential than immigrant gangs. That is to say, native gangs, in the context of the 
network structure, are better connected to other gangs (i.e., have a lot of allies), closely 
connected to other gangs (i.e., their alliances are cohesive), “bridge” gaps between gangs (i.e., 
connect other gangs), and remain connected to highly influential gangs. Network influence, or 
centrality, does not account for the magnitude of immigrant gangs in society (i.e., immigrant 
gangs are not less dangerous than native gangs) but demonstrates the relationships between 
gangs and shows which gangs best control the flow of information and resources in the network. 
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Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13), an immigrant gang, is one of the most violent in the United States. 
They are often politicized in public discourses that argue for stronger border security. However, 
their influence in the gang network is relatively low. Two of the most influential gangs, the Crips 
and Bloods, are native gangs. Both gangs rank among the highest across all five centrality 
measures (degree, closeness, betweenness, PageRank, and eigenvector) presented in this 
research. In some cases, politicizing immigrant gangs serves to achieve political objectives but 
does not address the primary source of gang formation or the outgroup pressures native gangs 
place on immigrant populations. Native gangs like the Crips and Bloods exploited Salvadoran 
migrants resettling in Los Angeles and bear some responsibility for the formation of MS-13 
(Wolf, 2012).  
Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs), or cartels, are also highly influential in 
the gang network. When removed, the structure of the network changes. For example, the 
Sinaloa Cartel contributes to the network influence of the Crips. By removing cartels from the 
network, ideologically motivated gangs and their allies, or what John Sullivan refers to as third-
generation (3-G) gangs, appear to be more influential than market-oriented, 2-G, gangs. Similar 
to the Crips, MS-13 relies on cartels for their network influence. The primary allies of MS-13 
include the Sinaloa, La Familia, Los Zetas, and Gulf Cartels, all of which are highly influential in 
the gang network. Unlike the Crips, however, MS-13 has an adversarial relationship with the 
Juarez, Sierra, and Tijuana Cartels, which is atypical for gangs. Additionally, as a member of La 
Eme, MS-13 falls under the Mexican Mafia umbrella but continues to rival gangs both within 
and outside this alliance. Their primary rival being Barrio 18, another Eme set.  
Two immigrant gangs that demonstrate greater influence in the gang network, and are 
less reliant on cartels, includes Zoe Pound and La Raza. Both gangs derive their influence from 
214 
 
bridging gaps between rival gangs and include connections to other highly influential gangs. For 
example, Zoe Pound has positive ties to the Crips and Bloods and various gang sets of the Folk 
and People Nations. Since gangs rarely challenge them, cartels serve a similar role in the 
network. Cartels maintain positive relationships with most gangs, regardless of gang rivalries. As 
one of the largest DTOs, the Sinaloa Cartel has alliances with street, prison, and outlaw 
motorcycle gangs. They, too, bridge gaps between several major rivals, including the Crips and 
Bloods, Sureños and Norteños, and various gangs in the People and Folk Nations.  
Overall, the network of native gangs tends to be more complex than immigrant gangs. 
The strong influence of native gangs in the network suggests that they are more likely to 
undermine the state's structural integrity than immigrant gangs. Immigrant gangs, on the other 
hand, primarily fill gaps in the network structure. These "bridges" facilitate the shortest path that 
brings rival gangs closer together. If removed from the network, rivals would be forced to travel 
longer distances or become altogether disconnected from the network. Mexican DTOs, however, 
serve a dual role in the gang network. Cartels are both highly influential and broker connections 
between gangs. This makes sense considering cartels are the primary source of narcotics entering 
the United States, and gangs tend to act as distributors in the criminal supply chain (Drug 
Enforcement Agency, 2018). Therefore, Mexican DTOs can cooperate with gangs whether or not 
a rivalry between them exists. 
6.3 A Micro-Level Structural Analysis of Gang Networks 
Although the macro-level network analysis provides valuable insight into the structural 
relationships between gangs, critics deride this approach in favor of localized studies arguing that 
gangs lack national cohesion. The second quantitative study in my dissertation, presented in 
Chapter 5, involves a micro-level network analysis that challenges the location-based gang 
consensus and reinforces the efficacy of using a macro-level methodology to improve our 
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understanding of gangs. The results suggest that gang affiliation is a strong indicator of 
connections between gang members. In other words, connections are likely to form among those 
that identify with the same gang. Additionally, gang member connections appear to be consistent 
with the proximity principle. That is, the smaller the geographic space, the higher the probability 
that individuals will interact. When people share public spaces, they are more likely to socialize 
with others in their immediate orbit. In contrast, the further individuals are from one another, the 
less likely they are to interact. Social media, however, has altered this calculus by re-spatializing 
how people form and maintain relationships. Using Twitter data, I examine location homophily 
by city and state. While statistically significant, location is not as strong a predictor of gang 
member connections as one would expect given the consensus that explains gangs as local 
actors. A general acceptance of fact based on an anachronistic premise limits our ability to 
understand gangs as they continue to evolve. Taken together, if gang members connect to other 
members of the same gang and many of those connections are geographically decentralized, then 
it can be inferred that some gangs possess a nationally connected network. 
Moreover, the population (determined by an exponential non-discriminative snowball 
sample where referrals were drawn at random) represented in the dataset for this study is 
primarily located in small- to mid-density cities with a small percentage residing in large- and 
minuscule-density cities. If gangs were localized, one would expect to observe more gang 
members from high-density cities since the genesis of gangs can be traced to metropolitan areas 
like Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York. However, the population sample indicates that gang 
members occupy “new” geographic spaces. Instead of large urban centers, it is reasonable to 
assume that gangs have spread by proxy of gang member migration to small and mid-sized cities, 
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a fact that Howell implicitly points out when discussing the regional history and transformation 
of gangs.  
Analyzing the structure of gang networks is one method to understanding the extent to 
which gangs challenge law and order, weaken institutions, and impact the structural integrity of 
the state, a point that Max Manwaring (2005) argues is demonstrative to measuring the threat of 
gangs. Network structures are the vehicle with which some gangs have transformed from 
localized conflict groups to criminal syndicates and, in the process, distributed local problems 
across a larger geographic space. In some cases, gang-related issues have been transposed 
nationally and internationally. In other cases, gang activity has been imported in areas where the 
problem exceeds the capabilities of local law enforcement. Gangs continue to exploit a criminal 
justice system that is, in large part, disconnected in terms of addressing gang activity. At the 
macro-level, gang alliances indicate structural changes that have allowed some gangs to emerge 
from localized control centers to resemble organized crime groups whose influence extends to 
state, national, and international levels. Julie Ayling (2011) concludes, “Many gangs dissolve 
after only short periods of time, but there are some variants that have survived over the longer 
term and have ultimately become more networked, technologically savvy, internationalized, less 
visible, more predatory and sometimes more violent. At least some of these gangs would 
undoubtedly fit the label ‘organized crime’… Understanding why this is happening is crucial to 
planning effective responses” (p. 20). The Crips, for example, formed by consolidating local 
gangs in the Los Angeles area. Their main rival, the Bloods, followed a similar pattern where 
gang consolidation was intended to counter the predatory behavior of the Crips. Both gangs have 
been reported in all fifty states and some countries worldwide.  
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Although it is often cited that gangs lack national cohesion and are united in namesake 
alone, some gangs maintain national and transnational connections. OMGs, for example, have 
regional leadership that meets on an annual, semi-annual, and monthly basis. They also have 
established international chapters with which they coordinate. Leadership from MS-13 has 
annual meetings, and prison gangs like the Mexican Mafia and Aryan Brotherhood maintain 
national charters and constitutions that outline rules and regulations with which members must 
follow. These dictums also describe the consequences of failed compliance. In fact, this is how 
prison gangs control street-level activity despite high-level leaders being incarcerated for lengthy 
sentences.  
The micro-level analysis of gangs demonstrates that gangs are geospatially distributed 
across a larger area of the country than is considered by localized gang studies. Gang members 
are maintaining connections with other gang members regardless of location. From a network 
perspective, this means that information and resources are flowing between a diverse range of 
populated cities. This creates challenges for law enforcement, where authorities remain localized, 
and gangs have become mobile. The implications of the micro-level interconnectedness of gangs 
can impede gang investigations or transfer gang activity to smaller cities that lack the resources 
to combat gangs, both of which present challenges to law and order. 
6.4 Other Applications of Structural Analysis on Gang Networks 
The fact remains that both local and national gangs exist simultaneously. This is 
represented in the distinction that government agencies make between neighborhood and 
national gangs. In addition to gangs permeating into “new” geographic spaces, network 
structures can reshape gang identity. There is a contentious debate on the likelihood of gang-
terrorist partnerships. With few empirical cases to study, Gary Wilson and John Sullivan (2007) 
have indicated the potential for gang-terrorist connections based on the changing conflict 
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environment. Using investigations conducted by the National Alliance of Gang Investigators 
Association [NAGIA] (2005), they conclude emergent conditions facilitate, if not incentivize, 
cooperation between these two seemingly divergent groups, especially when considering the 
global reach of 3-G gangs. In 1986, for instance, Jeff Fort, founder of El Rukn, conspired with 
Muammar Gaddafi and the Libyan government to carry out terrorist attacks in the United States. 
Cases such as this, however, have been dismissed as anecdotal (Wolf, 2012). 
On the whole, critics claim that cooperation between gangs and terrorists are based on 
conjecture. Contrary to Wilson and Sullivan, Scott Decker and David Pyrooz (2015) conclude 
that divergent interests, ideological differences, and a lack of organization (decentralized 
leadership and a lack of control over the actions of individual gang members) undermine the 
potential of a gang-terrorist nexus. Moreover, they continue by pointing out, any attempt at an 
alliance is further exacerbated by the fact that gang members are known to law enforcement 
officers. When avoiding detection is an operational objective, terrorists run a higher risk of being 
exposed by cooperating with gangs because gangs are identifiable by tattoos, "colors," and 
criminal databases. 
Despite the strong cases made on both sides of the debate, three oversights remain when 
concluding the potential for a gang-terrorist nexus. First, the term 'terrorist' is narrowly defined. 
After President George Bush declared the "war on terror" following the World Trade Center 
attack in 2001, terrorism has increasingly become synonymous with Islamic-inspired attacks. 
Although terrorism is politically motivated, there are a plethora of secular terrorist groups that 
ideologically range from left-wing to right-wing extremism. Second, the debate on a gang-
terrorist nexus operationalizes ‘connection’ through a physical interface that includes training, 
guidance, or some type of material support (Byman, 2005). However, assumptions based on 
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direct communique neglects the idea of homegrown terrorism where native-born citizens take up 
arms against their country of origin. This can take place absent the direction of a nationally 
recognized terrorist organization. On the topic of homegrown terrorism, former Department of 
Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson emphasizes, “By their nature, terrorist-inspired attacks 
are often difficult to detect by our intelligence and law enforcement communities, could occur 
with little or no notice, and in general, make for a more complex homeland security challenge” 
(U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2016). Self-radicalization often occurs through “soft 
power,” or the attractiveness of extremist ideologies, with which groups and individuals 
proselytize. In a sense, self-radicalized groups and individuals adopt a metaphysical attachment 
to an idea. Rather than a direct connection to terrorists, the crystallization of extremist norms has 
led to the hybridization of some gangs. “White supremacist prison gangs use race and white 
supremacist ideology as ways to bond members together. To this, such gangs will often add the 
notion of a racial “family” of sorts, with references to “our white family” or “our Aryan family,” 
and encouraging members to call each other brothers (and, where applicable, sisters)” (Anti-
Defamation League [ADL], 2016, p. 20). Another hybrid gang, the Five Percenters, takes a 
similar approach but incorporates the radical teachings espoused by the Nation of Islam as part 
and parcel to their identity. 
Third, the shrinking criminal landscape has caused gangs and terrorist groups to become 
functionally similar. Along the same strand of thought as the changing conflict environment 
posited by Wilson and Sullivan, opportunities exist for gangs and terrorists to create synergies 
through cooperation. Brandon Sullivan, Steven Chermak, Jeremy Wilson, and Joshua Freilich 
(2014) indicate that increased efforts to limit financing sources has caused terrorist groups to 
seek out alternative means of operational funding. Rather than relying on state sponsorship or 
220 
 
wealthy donors, terrorist groups have diversified their illicit activities to include credit card 
fraud, counterfeiting, and manufacturing narcotics. To that end, gangs provide know-how and an 
ally in distribution, a similar strategy utilized by cartels. Gangs, on the other hand, have 
increasingly become more ambitious. They can benefit from acquiring new suppliers of illicit 
goods and, in some cases, join forces with like-minded groups. Some gangs like MS-13, the 
Gangster Disciples, Black P. Stone Nation, and Black Guerilla Family, to name a few, aim to 
influence political outcomes, which is more consistent with the motivation of terrorist 
organizations than gangs. 
The U.S. prison system is often considered the embodiment of gang and terrorist 
connections. Radicalization in prisons has been the subject of several congressional inquiries, 
and prisons are considered fertile ground for the incubation and exchange of radical norms 
(Committee on Homeland Security, 2012). Jerome Bjelopera (2015) raises two critical points on 
the salience of prison radicalization. First, there is empirical evidence that shows the 
dissemination of extremist ideologies for other terrorist subgroups in the prison setting. Second, 
he highlights the importance of better understanding the phenomenon of prison radicalization to 
mitigate potential crises in the future. Two cases that exemplify prison radicalization involve the 
al-Haramain Islamic Foundation (AHF), a Saudi-based charitable organization that infiltrated 
U.S. prisons intending to recruit inmates, and the 2005 Los Angeles bomb plot planned by Kevin 
Lamar James, a 76th Street Crip. He controlled Jamiyyat Ul-Islam Is-Saheeh (JIS) in the 
California prison system and used his network of followers to disseminate the JIS Protocol and 
plan attacks on military recruitment centers and Jewish synagogues.  
Network structures have also facilitated gang connections to the state apparatus.   
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Will Reno (2009) refers to these structures as “fusion regimes” whereby criminal groups enrich 
themselves by integrating with state channels through legitimate means. At the political level, 
elected officials set agendas and make decisions to benefit their constituents' interests. The 
primary objective for law enforcement and the military is public safety and national security, 
respectively. These three critical institutions, however, have been exploited by gangs. From 
Tammany Hall in New York to Richard Daley in Chicago, gangs have historically been used to 
serve political agendas, influence political outcomes, and, by proxy, provide gang influence and 
legitimacy (Bernstein & Isackson, 2011). Gangs have also infiltrated law enforcement agencies. 
The Rampart scandal, for example, involved widespread corruption of the Los Angeles Police 
Department in the late 1990s. Investigations into this corruption revealed that several officers 
assigned to the anti-gang task force were gang members themselves (Berlin et al., 2007). More 
generally, gang members gain employment in correctional facilities to support their gang and 
assist members who are incarcerated. This includes gaining intelligence on correctional officers, 
supporting recruitment efforts, and controlling contraband entry into the prison. Gangs in the 
military are another example of the fusion regime discussed by Reno. According to the Federal 
Bureau of Investigations, 1-2% of the U.S. military is composed of gang members (National 
Gang Intelligence Center, 2011). Gustav Eyler (2009) explains that the presence of gangs in the 
military is disruptive and weakens the institution's efficacy. Upon returning home, it has been 
confirmed that military-connected gang members transfer training to their gang. In situations 
where this has occurred, gangs have overwhelmed law enforcement officials and jeopardized 
public safety.  
6.5 Conclusion 
In short, there is little argument that gangs in the United States are violent and dangerous. 
The extent to which this violence falls under the jurisdiction of local law enforcement is well-
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established. However, while some gang researchers choose to focus on a location-based 
approach to study gangs, they limit our understanding of gangs to a narrowly defined geographic 
space. Local conditions are important insofar as they provide context on the genesis of some 
gangs but fail to address the transformation of other gangs that expand beyond the 
'neighborhood.' One driver behind this transformation is the cultivation of network structures to 
facilitate criminal activity. John Hagedorn (2005) describes gangs as ‘social actors’ with which, 
“Many are deeply involved with politics, real estate, religion, and community organizations and 
cannot be easily destroyed by suppression or repression of the drug economy” (p. 163). At the 
macro-level, gang alliances provide better control over information and resource flows as some 
gangs have transformed into criminal enterprises. At the micro-level, gang members maintain 
geospatially diverse connections spreading gangs to non-traditional cities across the country. 
Overall, the complex web of gang interconnectedness in social and institutional spaces continues 
to challenge law and order, weaken institutions, and negatively impact the structural integrity of 
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Crips 1 73 4.58 Street US 
Bloods 2 71 4.43 Street US 
Sureños 3 45 2.41 Street US 
Aryan Brotherhood 4 37 1.78 Prison US 
Latin Kings 5 36 1.71 Street US 
Black P Stones 6 35 1.63 Street US 
Gangster Disciples 6 35 1.63 Street US 
Aryan Nation 7 34 1.55 Street US 
Norteños 7 34 1.55 Street US 
Black Disciples 8 33 1.47 Street US 
Black Guerrilla Family 8 33 1.47 Prison US 
MS-13 9 31 1.32 Street El Salvador 
Sinaloa Cartel 10 29 1.16 Cartel Mexico 
Zoe Pound 11 28 1.08 Street Haiti 
Folk Nation 12 26 0.93 Street US 
Peckerwood 12 26 0.93 Street US 
People Nation 12 26 0.93 Street US 
Mexican Mafia 13 25 0.85 Prison US 
Aryan Circle 14 24 0.77 Prison US 
La Raza 14 24 0.77 Street Mexico 
Traveling Vice Lords 14 24 0.77 Street US 
Nazi Low Riders 15 23 0.70 Prison US 
Vice Lords 15 23 0.70 Street US 
Conservative Vice Lords 16 22 0.62 Street US 
Neo Nazi 16 22 0.62 Street UK 
White Power 16 22 0.62 Street US 
White Supremacists 16 22 0.62 Street US 
Zetas Cartel 16 22 0.62 Cartel Mexico 
Gulf Cartel 17 21 0.54 Cartel Mexico 
Skinheads 17 21 0.54 Street UK 
White Aryan Resistance 17 21 0.54 Street US 
Black Panther 18 20 0.46 Street US 
Hammerskins 18 20 0.46 Street US 
Supreme White Power 18 20 0.46 Prison US 
Four Corner Hustlers 19 19 0.38 Street US 
Imperial Gangster Disciples 19 19 0.38 Street Puerto Rico 
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Insane Unknowns 19 19 0.38 Street Puerto Rico 
Latin Counts 19 19 0.38 Street Mexico 
Piru 19 19 0.38 Street US 
Tijuana Cartel 19 19 0.38 Cartel Mexico 
Insane Gangster Disciple 20 18 0.31 Street US 
Maniac Latin Disciples 20 18 0.31 Street US 
Mexikanemi 20 18 0.31 Prison US 
Nuestra Familia 20 18 0.31 Prison US 
Satans Disciples 20 18 0.31 Street US 
Hells Angels 21 17 0.23 OMG US 
Five Percenters 22 16 0.15 Street US 
La Familia Michoacana Cartel 22 16 0.15 Cartel Mexico 
Rollin 60s Crips 22 16 0.15 Street US 
Juarez Cartel 23 15 0.07 Cartel Mexico 
Vatos Locos 23 15 0.07 Street Mexico 
18th St  24 14 0.00 Street El Salvador 
Juggalos 24 14 0.00 Street US 
Outlaws MC 24 14 0.00 OMG US 
Florencia 13 25 13 -0.08 Street US 
Rollin 20s Crips 25 13 -0.08 Street US 
Border Brothers 26 12 -0.16 Prison Mexico 
Rollin 30s Crips 26 12 -0.16 Street Belize 
Rollin 40s Crips 26 12 -0.16 Street US 
Spanish Cobras 26 12 -0.16 Street Puerto Rico 
Mongols MC 27 11 -0.24 OMG US 
Texas Syndicate 27 11 -0.24 Prison Mexico 
Trinitarios 27 11 -0.24 Street 
Dominican 
Republic 
Bandidos MC 28 10 -0.31 OMG US 
Hoover Gangsters 28 10 -0.31 Street US 
Ñetas 28 10 -0.31 Prison Puerto Rico 
Pagans MC 28 10 -0.31 OMG US 
Sex Money Murder 28 10 -0.31 Street US 
Desperados MC 29 9 -0.39 OMG NA 
Red Devils MC 29 9 -0.39 OMG Canada 
Tiny Rascal Gang  29 9 -0.39 Street Cambodia 
Vagos MC 29 9 -0.39 OMG US 
BelLey Cartel 30 8 -0.47 Cartel Mexico 
Bounty Hunter Bloods 30 8 -0.47 Street US 
Dead Man Incorporated 30 8 -0.47 Prison US 
Grape Street Crips 30 8 -0.47 Street US 
JalNewGen Cartel 30 8 -0.47 Cartel Mexico 
Shotgun Crips 30 8 -0.47 Street US 
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Asian Boyz (Crips) 31 7 -0.55 Street Cambodia 
Black Angels 31 7 -0.55 Street US 
Black Pistons MC 31 7 -0.55 OMG Germany 
Dirty White Boys 31 7 -0.55 Prison US 
Sons of Samoa 31 7 -0.55 Street Samoa 
Sons of Silence MC 31 7 -0.55 OMG US 
Tree Top Piru 31 7 -0.55 Street US 
Athens Park Bloods 32 6 -0.63 Street US 
El Forastero MC 32 6 -0.63 OMG US 
Native Mob 33 5 -0.70 Street US 
Raza Unida 33 5 -0.70 Prison US 
Six Deuce Brim 34 4 -0.78 Street US 
Texas Chicano Brotherhood 34 4 -0.78 Prison US 
Renegades MC 35 3 -0.86 OMG US 
Tango Blast 35 3 -0.86 Prison US 
Warlocks MC 35 3 -0.86 OMG US 
Brown Pride 36 2 -0.94 Street NA 
Grupo 27 36 2 -0.94 Prison Puerto Rico 
Hilltop Crips 36 2 -0.94 Street US 
Money Over Bitches 36 2 -0.94 Street US 
Nine Trey Gangster Blood 36 2 -0.94 Street US 
Wheels of Soul MC 36 2 -0.94 OMG US 
Avengers MC 37 1 -1.01 OMG US 
Devils Disciples MC 37 1 -1.01 OMG US 
Diablos MC 37 1 -1.01 OMG US 
Grupo 25 37 1 -1.01 Prison Puerto Rico 
Iron Horsemen MC 37 1 -1.01 OMG US 
Outcast MC  37 1 -1.01 OMG US 
Prison Motorcycle 
Brotherhood 37 1 -1.01 Prison US 
Rebels 13 MC 37 1 -1.01 OMG Australia 
Rough Riders MC 37 1 -1.01 OMG US 
Tribe MC 37 1 -1.01 OMG NA 
Bandits 38 0 -1.09 Street NA 
Click Clack 38 0 -1.09 Street NA 
Code Red 38 0 -1.09 Street NA 
Hard Times  38 0 -1.09 Street NA 
Midnight Riders MC 38 0 -1.09 OMG NA 
Oriental Boy Soldiers 38 0 -1.09 Street NA 
Russian Gangs 38 0 -1.09 Street Russia 
Sin City Deciples MC 38 0 -1.09 OMG US 
Somali Gangs 38 0 -1.09 Street Somalia 
The Cool Kids 38 0 -1.09 Street NA 
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Bloods 1 0.000668 0.56 Street US 
Crips 1 0.000668 0.56 Street US 
Aryan Brotherhood 2 0.000658 0.50 Prison US 
Aryan Nation 3 0.000657 0.49 Street US 
Sureños 4 0.000656 0.49 Street US 
Black Guerrilla Family 5 0.000651 0.46 Prison US 
Mexican Mafia 5 0.000651 0.46 Prison US 
MS-13 5 0.000651 0.46 Street El Salvador 
Norteños 5 0.000651 0.46 Street US 
Sinaloa Cartel 5 0.000651 0.46 Cartel Mexico 
Black P Stones 6 0.000649 0.44 Street US 
Gulf Cartel 6 0.000649 0.44 Cartel Mexico 
Latin Kings 6 0.000649 0.44 Street US 
Nazi Low Riders 6 0.000649 0.44 Prison US 
Gangster Disciples 7 0.000647 0.43 Street US 
Peckerwood 8 0.000645 0.42 Street US 
Aryan Circle 9 0.000644 0.41 Prison US 
Juarez Cartel 9 0.000644 0.41 Cartel Mexico 
La Familia Michoacana Cartel 9 0.000644 0.41 Cartel Mexico 
Traveling Vice Lords 9 0.000644 0.41 Street US 
Neo Nazi 10 0.000643 0.41 Street UK 
Nuestra Familia 10 0.000643 0.41 Prison US 
White Power 10 0.000643 0.41 Street US 
Zetas Cartel 10 0.000643 0.41 Cartel Mexico 
Zoe Pound 10 0.000643 0.41 Street Haiti 
La Raza 11 0.000642 0.40 Street Mexico 
Skinheads 11 0.000642 0.40 Street UK 
Supreme White Power 11 0.000642 0.40 Prison US 
Tijuana Cartel 11 0.000642 0.40 Cartel Mexico 
White Aryan Resistance 11 0.000642 0.40 Street US 
White Supremacists 11 0.000642 0.40 Street US 
Black Panther 12 0.000641 0.39 Street US 
Black Disciples 13 0.000640 0.39 Street US 
Juggalos 13 0.000640 0.39 Street US 
18th St  14 0.000639 0.38 Street El Salvador 
Five Percenters 14 0.000639 0.38 Street US 
Conservative Vice Lords 15 0.000638 0.38 Street US 
Florencia 13 15 0.000638 0.38 Street US 
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Mexikanemi 15 0.000638 0.38 Prison US 
Rollin 60s Crips 15 0.000638 0.38 Street US 
Folk Nation 16 0.000637 0.37 Street US 
Hammerskins 16 0.000637 0.37 Street US 
People Nation 16 0.000637 0.37 Street US 
Border Brothers 17 0.000635 0.36 Prison Mexico 
JalNewGen Cartel 17 0.000635 0.36 Cartel Mexico 
Tiny Rascal Gang  17 0.000635 0.36 Street Cambodia 
Vice Lords 17 0.000635 0.36 Street US 
Black Angels 18 0.000634 0.35 Street US 
Hells Angels 18 0.000634 0.35 OMG US 
Piru 18 0.000634 0.35 Street US 
Four Corner Hustlers 19 0.000633 0.35 Street US 
Imperial Gangster Disciples 19 0.000633 0.35 Street Puerto Rico 
Insane Gangster Disciple 19 0.000633 0.35 Street US 
Insane Unknowns 19 0.000633 0.35 Street Puerto Rico 
Latin Counts 19 0.000633 0.35 Street Mexico 
Maniac Latin Disciples 19 0.000633 0.35 Street US 
Satans Disciples 19 0.000633 0.35 Street US 
Vatos Locos 19 0.000633 0.35 Street Mexico 
Trinitarios 20 0.000632 0.34 Street 
Dominican 
Republic 
Hoover Gangsters 21 0.000631 0.33 Street US 
Ñetas 21 0.000631 0.33 Prison Puerto Rico 
Sex Money Murder 22 0.000630 0.33 Street US 
Spanish Cobras 22 0.000630 0.33 Street Puerto Rico 
Asian Boyz (Crips) 23 0.000629 0.32 Street Cambodia 
Outlaws MC 23 0.000629 0.32 OMG US 
Rollin 20s Crips 23 0.000629 0.32 Street US 
Rollin 30s Crips 24 0.000628 0.31 Street Belize 
Rollin 40s Crips 24 0.000628 0.31 Street US 
Bounty Hunter Bloods 25 0.000627 0.31 Street US 
Grape Street Crips 25 0.000627 0.31 Street US 
Shotgun Crips 25 0.000627 0.31 Street US 
Texas Syndicate 25 0.000627 0.31 Prison Mexico 
Vagos MC 25 0.000627 0.31 OMG US 
Athens Park Bloods 26 0.000626 0.30 Street US 
Dead Man Incorporated 26 0.000626 0.30 Prison US 
Sons of Samoa 26 0.000626 0.30 Street Samoa 
Tree Top Piru 26 0.000626 0.30 Street US 
BelLey Cartel 27 0.000625 0.30 Cartel Mexico 
Native Mob 27 0.000625 0.30 Street US 
Six Deuce Brim 27 0.000625 0.30 Street US 
254 
 
Hilltop Crips 28 0.000624 0.29 Street US 
Money Over Bitches 28 0.000624 0.29 Street US 
Nine Trey Gangster Blood 28 0.000624 0.29 Street US 
Pagans MC 28 0.000624 0.29 OMG US 
Bandidos MC 29 0.000622 0.28 OMG US 
Dirty White Boys 29 0.000622 0.28 Prison US 
Raza Unida 29 0.000622 0.28 Prison US 
Sons of Silence MC 29 0.000622 0.28 OMG US 
Mongols MC 30 0.000616 0.24 OMG US 
Brown Pride 31 0.000614 0.23 Street NA 
Texas Chicano Brotherhood 32 0.000609 0.20 Prison US 
Desperados MC 33 0.000603 0.16 OMG NA 
Red Devils MC 33 0.000603 0.16 OMG Canada 
El Forastero MC 34 0.000601 0.15 OMG US 
Black Pistons MC 35 0.000599 0.14 OMG Germany 
Tango Blast 36 0.000598 0.13 Prison US 
Renegades MC 37 0.000597 0.12 OMG US 
Devils Disciples MC 38 0.000593 0.10 OMG US 
Grupo 27 39 0.000592 0.09 Prison Puerto Rico 
Warlocks MC 39 0.000592 0.09 OMG US 
Diablos MC 40 0.000589 0.07 OMG US 
Iron Horsemen MC 40 0.000589 0.07 OMG US 
Prison Motorcycle 
Brotherhood 40 0.000589 0.07 Prison US 
Avengers MC 41 0.000585 0.05 OMG US 
Rough Riders MC 41 0.000585 0.05 OMG US 
Tribe MC 41 0.000585 0.05 OMG NA 
Wheels of Soul MC 42 0.000583 0.04 OMG US 
Rebels 13 MC 43 0.000582 0.03 OMG Australia 
Grupo 25 44 0.000556 -0.13 Prison Puerto Rico 
Outcast MC  45 0.000549 -0.17 OMG US 
Bandits 46 0.000069 -3.14 Street NA 
Click Clack 46 0.000069 -3.14 Street NA 
Code Red 46 0.000069 -3.14 Street NA 
Hard Times  46 0.000069 -3.14 Street NA 
Midnight Riders MC 46 0.000069 -3.14 OMG NA 
Oriental Boy Soldiers 46 0.000069 -3.14 Street NA 
Russian Gangs 46 0.000069 -3.14 Street Russia 
Sin City Deciples MC 46 0.000069 -3.14 OMG US 
Somali Gangs 46 0.000069 -3.14 Street Somalia 
The Cool Kids 46 0.000069 -3.14 Street NA 










Crips 1 1107.86 6.10 Street US 
Bloods 2 984.21 5.37 Street US 
Aryan Brotherhood 3 628.69 3.28 Prison US 
Aryan Nation 4 572.02 2.95 Street US 
Outlaws MC 5 503.26 2.54 OMG US 
Pagans MC 6 379.49 1.82 OMG US 
Bandidos MC 7 371.62 1.77 OMG US 
Hells Angels 8 354.91 1.67 OMG US 
Sureños 9 256.70 1.10 Street US 
Sinaloa Cartel 10 243.29 1.02 Cartel Mexico 
Gulf Cartel 11 237.80 0.98 Cartel Mexico 
Mexican Mafia 12 224.05 0.90 Prison US 
Ñetas 13 214.79 0.85 Prison Puerto Rico 
Latin Kings 14 191.40 0.71 Street US 
Zetas Cartel 15 190.54 0.71 Cartel Mexico 
MS-13 16 188.37 0.69 Street El Salvador 
Black P Stones 17 136.35 0.39 Street US 
Tijuana Cartel 18 123.95 0.32 Cartel Mexico 
Mexikanemi 19 114.94 0.26 Prison US 
Grupo 27 20 108.00 0.22 Prison Puerto Rico 
Wheels of Soul MC 20 108.00 0.22 OMG US 
Black Guerrilla Family 21 91.77 0.13 Prison US 
Zoe Pound 22 91.22 0.12 Street Haiti 
Norteños 23 88.92 0.11 Street US 
Gangster Disciples 24 85.87 0.09 Street US 
Juarez Cartel 25 80.80 0.06 Cartel Mexico 
Nazi Low Riders 26 74.73 0.03 Prison US 
Vagos MC 27 58.49 -0.07 OMG US 
Traveling Vice Lords 28 57.24 -0.08 Street US 
Black Disciples 29 46.14 -0.14 Street US 
Texas Syndicate 30 44.07 -0.15 Prison Mexico 
Mongols MC 31 37.79 -0.19 OMG US 
Piru 32 33.01 -0.22 Street US 
La Raza 33 32.48 -0.22 Street Mexico 
Sons of Silence MC 34 31.71 -0.23 OMG US 
Rollin 60s Crips 35 30.89 -0.23 Street US 
Folk Nation 36 29.64 -0.24 Street US 
People Nation 36 29.64 -0.24 Street US 
Conservative Vice Lords 37 27.66 -0.25 Street US 
Aryan Circle 38 26.70 -0.26 Prison US 
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Peckerwood 39 24.40 -0.27 Street US 
Nuestra Familia 40 19.73 -0.30 Prison US 
Desperados MC 41 17.83 -0.31 OMG NA 
Red Devils MC 41 17.83 -0.31 OMG Canada 
Juggalos 42 17.23 -0.31 Street US 
Supreme White Power 43 12.74 -0.34 Prison US 
La Familia Michoacana Cartel 44 11.83 -0.34 Cartel Mexico 
Black Panther 45 11.50 -0.35 Street US 
Florencia 13 46 9.35 -0.36 Street US 
Vatos Locos 47 7.71 -0.37 Street Mexico 
Vice Lords 48 7.53 -0.37 Street US 
Tiny Rascal Gang  49 7.26 -0.37 Street Cambodia 
Border Brothers 50 7.20 -0.37 Prison Mexico 
18th St  51 6.61 -0.37 Street El Salvador 
El Forastero MC 52 6.55 -0.37 OMG US 
Rollin 20s Crips 53 6.30 -0.38 Street US 
Black Pistons MC 54 5.81 -0.38 OMG Germany 
Hoover Gangsters 55 5.04 -0.38 Street US 
Neo Nazi 56 4.95 -0.38 Street UK 
White Power 56 4.95 -0.38 Street US 
White Supremacists 56 4.95 -0.38 Street US 
Skinheads 57 4.46 -0.39 Street UK 
Rollin 40s Crips 58 4.35 -0.39 Street US 
Five Percenters 59 4.19 -0.39 Street US 
White Aryan Resistance 60 3.63 -0.39 Street US 
Rollin 30s Crips 61 3.28 -0.39 Street Belize 
Warlocks MC 62 3.09 -0.39 OMG US 
Trinitarios 63 2.82 -0.40 Street 
Dominican 
Republic 
Texas Chicano Brotherhood 64 2.47 -0.40 Prison US 
Hammerskins 65 2.38 -0.40 Street US 
BelLey Cartel 66 2.36 -0.40 Cartel Mexico 
Grape Street Crips 67 1.98 -0.40 Street US 
JalNewGen Cartel 68 1.86 -0.40 Cartel Mexico 
Imperial Gangster Disciples 69 1.51 -0.40 Street Puerto Rico 
Sex Money Murder 70 1.11 -0.41 Street US 
Shotgun Crips 71 1.03 -0.41 Street US 
Asian Boyz (Crips) 72 0.90 -0.41 Street Cambodia 
Athens Park Bloods 73 0.74 -0.41 Street US 
Bounty Hunter Bloods 74 0.70 -0.41 Street US 
Four Corner Hustlers 75 0.58 -0.41 Street US 
Insane Unknowns 75 0.58 -0.41 Street Puerto Rico 
Latin Counts 75 0.58 -0.41 Street Mexico 
257 
 
Sons of Samoa 76 0.51 -0.41 Street Samoa 
Raza Unida 77 0.32 -0.41 Prison US 
Dirty White Boys 78 0.18 -0.41 Prison US 
Black Angels 79 0.10 -0.41 Street US 
Avengers MC 80 0.00 -0.41 OMG US 
Bandits 80 0.00 -0.41 Street NA 
Brown Pride 80 0.00 -0.41 Street NA 
Click Clack 80 0.00 -0.41 Street NA 
Code Red 80 0.00 -0.41 Street NA 
Dead Man Incorporated 80 0.00 -0.41 Prison US 
Devils Disciples MC 80 0.00 -0.41 OMG US 
Diablos MC 80 0.00 -0.41 OMG US 
Grupo 25 80 0.00 -0.41 Prison Puerto Rico 
Hard Times  80 0.00 -0.41 Street NA 
Hilltop Crips 80 0.00 -0.41 Street US 
Insane Gangster Disciple 80 0.00 -0.41 Street US 
Iron Horsemen MC 80 0.00 -0.41 OMG US 
Maniac Latin Disciples 80 0.00 -0.41 Street US 
Midnight Riders MC 80 0.00 -0.41 OMG NA 
Money Over Bitches 80 0.00 -0.41 Street US 
Native Mob 80 0.00 -0.41 Street US 
Nine Trey Gangster Blood 80 0.00 -0.41 Street US 
Oriental Boy Soldiers 80 0.00 -0.41 Street NA 
Outcast MC  80 0.00 -0.41 OMG US 
Prison Motorcycle 
Brotherhood 80 0.00 -0.41 Prison US 
Rebels 13 MC 80 0.00 -0.41 OMG Australia 
Renegades MC 80 0.00 -0.41 OMG US 
Rough Riders MC 80 0.00 -0.41 OMG US 
Russian Gangs 80 0.00 -0.41 Street Russia 
Satans Disciples 80 0.00 -0.41 Street US 
Sin City Deciples MC 80 0.00 -0.41 OMG US 
Six Deuce Brim 80 0.00 -0.41 Street US 
Somali Gangs 80 0.00 -0.41 Street Somalia 
Spanish Cobras 80 0.00 -0.41 Street Puerto Rico 
Tango Blast 80 0.00 -0.41 Prison US 
The Cool Kids 80 0.00 -0.41 Street NA 
Tree Top Piru 80 0.00 -0.41 Street US 
Tribe MC 80 0.00 -0.41 OMG NA 










Crips 1 0.0365 4.79 Street US 
Bloods 2 0.0353 4.59 Street US 
Sureños 3 0.022 2.33 Street US 
Aryan Brotherhood 4 0.0198 1.96 Prison US 
Aryan Nation 5 0.0184 1.72 Street US 
Latin Kings 6 0.017 1.48 Street US 
Outlaws MC 7 0.0165 1.40 OMG US 
MS-13 8 0.0164 1.38 Street El Salvador 
Norteños 8 0.0164 1.38 Street US 
Black P Stones 9 0.0163 1.36 Street US 
Gangster Disciples 10 0.016 1.31 Street US 
Black Guerrilla Family 11 0.0158 1.28 Prison US 
Hells Angels 11 0.0158 1.28 OMG US 
Sinaloa Cartel 12 0.0155 1.23 Cartel Mexico 
Black Disciples 13 0.015 1.14 Street US 
Mexican Mafia 14 0.0136 0.91 Prison US 
Zoe Pound 15 0.0134 0.87 Street Haiti 
Pagans MC 16 0.0132 0.84 OMG US 
Folk Nation 17 0.0125 0.72 Street US 
People Nation 17 0.0125 0.72 Street US 
Peckerwood 18 0.0124 0.70 Street US 
Gulf Cartel 19 0.012 0.64 Cartel Mexico 
Zetas Cartel 19 0.012 0.64 Cartel Mexico 
Aryan Circle 20 0.0117 0.58 Prison US 
Nazi Low Riders 21 0.0116 0.57 Prison US 
Bandidos MC 22 0.0114 0.53 OMG US 
La Raza 23 0.0113 0.52 Street Mexico 
Traveling Vice Lords 23 0.0113 0.52 Street US 
Tijuana Cartel 24 0.0111 0.48 Cartel Mexico 
Piru 25 0.011 0.47 Street US 
Mongols MC 26 0.0109 0.45 OMG US 
Vice Lords 27 0.0108 0.43 Street US 
Conservative Vice Lords 28 0.0105 0.38 Street US 
Mexikanemi 28 0.0105 0.38 Prison US 
Neo Nazi 29 0.0104 0.36 Street UK 
White Power 29 0.0104 0.36 Street US 
White Supremacists 29 0.0104 0.36 Street US 
Skinheads 30 0.01 0.30 Street UK 
White Aryan Resistance 30 0.01 0.30 Street US 
Black Panther 31 0.0097 0.24 Street US 
Supreme White Power 31 0.0097 0.24 Prison US 
Desperados MC 32 0.0095 0.21 OMG NA 
Hammerskins 32 0.0095 0.21 Street US 
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Nuestra Familia 32 0.0095 0.21 Prison US 
Red Devils MC 32 0.0095 0.21 OMG Canada 
Rollin 60s Crips 33 0.0094 0.19 Street US 
Four Corner Hustlers 34 0.0091 0.14 Street US 
Insane Unknowns 34 0.0091 0.14 Street Puerto Rico 
Latin Counts 34 0.0091 0.14 Street Mexico 
Imperial Gangster Disciples 35 0.009 0.13 Street Puerto Rico 
Juarez Cartel 36 0.0088 0.09 Cartel Mexico 
Insane Gangster Disciple 37 0.0086 0.06 Street US 
La Familia Michoacana Cartel 37 0.0086 0.06 Cartel Mexico 
Maniac Latin Disciples 37 0.0086 0.06 Street US 
Satans Disciples 37 0.0086 0.06 Street US 
Black Pistons MC 38 0.0082 -0.01 OMG Germany 
Rollin 20s Crips 38 0.0082 -0.01 Street US 
Five Percenters 39 0.0081 -0.03 Street US 
Vatos Locos 40 0.0078 -0.08 Street Mexico 
18th St  41 0.0076 -0.11 Street El Salvador 
Rollin 40s Crips 41 0.0076 -0.11 Street US 
Vagos MC 41 0.0076 -0.11 OMG US 
Rollin 30s Crips 42 0.0075 -0.13 Street Belize 
Florencia 13 43 0.0074 -0.15 Street US 
Texas Syndicate 43 0.0074 -0.15 Prison Mexico 
Juggalos 44 0.0073 -0.16 Street US 
Ñetas 44 0.0073 -0.16 Prison Puerto Rico 
Border Brothers 45 0.0069 -0.23 Prison Mexico 
Sons of Silence MC 46 0.0066 -0.28 OMG US 
El Forastero MC 47 0.0065 -0.30 OMG US 
Hoover Gangsters 48 0.0063 -0.33 Street US 
Spanish Cobras 49 0.0062 -0.35 Street Puerto Rico 
Trinitarios 49 0.0062 -0.35 Street 
Dominican 
Republic 
Tiny Rascal Gang  50 0.0056 -0.45 Street Cambodia 
Bounty Hunter Bloods 51 0.0054 -0.48 Street US 
Sex Money Murder 51 0.0054 -0.48 Street US 
Shotgun Crips 51 0.0054 -0.48 Street US 
Wheels of Soul MC 51 0.0054 -0.48 OMG US 
Grape Street Crips 52 0.0052 -0.52 Street US 
BelLey Cartel 53 0.0051 -0.54 Cartel Mexico 
JalNewGen Cartel 53 0.0051 -0.54 Cartel Mexico 
Dead Man Incorporated 54 0.0049 -0.57 Prison US 
Grupo 27 54 0.0049 -0.57 Prison Puerto Rico 
Asian Boyz (Crips) 55 0.0048 -0.59 Street Cambodia 
Sons of Samoa 55 0.0048 -0.59 Street Samoa 
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Tree Top Piru 55 0.0048 -0.59 Street US 
Warlocks MC 56 0.0045 -0.64 OMG US 
Black Angels 57 0.0043 -0.67 Street US 
Dirty White Boys 57 0.0043 -0.67 Prison US 
Athens Park Bloods 58 0.0042 -0.69 Street US 
Renegades MC 59 0.0041 -0.71 OMG US 
Raza Unida 60 0.0038 -0.76 Prison US 
Texas Chicano Brotherhood 60 0.0038 -0.76 Prison US 
Outcast MC  61 0.0036 -0.79 OMG US 
Grupo 25 62 0.0034 -0.82 Prison Puerto Rico 
Native Mob 62 0.0034 -0.82 Street US 
Six Deuce Brim 63 0.0032 -0.86 Street US 
Tango Blast 63 0.0032 -0.86 Prison US 
Avengers MC 64 0.0025 -0.98 OMG US 
Rough Riders MC 64 0.0025 -0.98 OMG US 
Tribe MC 64 0.0025 -0.98 OMG NA 
Diablos MC 65 0.0023 -1.01 OMG US 
Iron Horsemen MC 65 0.0023 -1.01 OMG US 
Prison Motorcycle 
Brotherhood 65 0.0023 -1.01 Prison US 
Rebels 13 MC 65 0.0023 -1.01 OMG Australia 
Brown Pride 66 0.0022 -1.03 Street NA 
Hilltop Crips 66 0.0022 -1.03 Street US 
Money Over Bitches 66 0.0022 -1.03 Street US 
Nine Trey Gangster Blood 66 0.0022 -1.03 Street US 
Devils Disciples MC 67 0.0021 -1.04 OMG US 
Bandits 68 0.0013 -1.18 Street NA 
Click Clack 68 0.0013 -1.18 Street NA 
Code Red 68 0.0013 -1.18 Street NA 
Hard Times  68 0.0013 -1.18 Street NA 
Midnight Riders MC 68 0.0013 -1.18 OMG NA 
Oriental Boy Soldiers 68 0.0013 -1.18 Street NA 
Russian Gangs 68 0.0013 -1.18 Street Russia 
Sin City Deciples MC 68 0.0013 -1.18 OMG US 
Somali Gangs 68 0.0013 -1.18 Street Somalia 
The Cool Kids 68 0.0013 -1.18 Street NA 








Crips 1 1.0000 3.45 Street US 
Bloods 2 0.9931 3.41 Street US 
Sureños 3 0.6894 2.04 Street US 
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Gangster Disciples 4 0.6355 1.80 Street US 
Black P Stones 5 0.6254 1.76 Street US 
Latin Kings 6 0.6156 1.71 Street US 
Black Disciples 7 0.6128 1.70 Street US 
Black Guerrilla Family 8 0.5959 1.62 Prison US 
Norteños 9 0.5929 1.61 Street US 
Aryan Brotherhood 10 0.5851 1.57 Prison US 
Aryan Nation 11 0.5550 1.44 Street US 
Zoe Pound 12 0.5404 1.37 Street Haiti 
Peckerwood 13 0.5218 1.29 Street US 
Neo Nazi 14 0.4831 1.11 Street UK 
White Power 14 0.4831 1.11 Street US 
White Supremacists 14 0.4831 1.11 Street US 
Traveling Vice Lords 15 0.4788 1.09 Street US 
Sinaloa Cartel 16 0.4694 1.05 Cartel Mexico 
Skinheads 17 0.4660 1.04 Street UK 
La Raza 18 0.4627 1.02 Street Mexico 
White Aryan Resistance 19 0.4622 1.02 Street US 
Aryan Circle 20 0.4554 0.99 Prison US 
MS-13 21 0.4551 0.99 Street El Salvador 
Nazi Low Riders 22 0.4517 0.97 Prison US 
Folk Nation 23 0.4492 0.96 Street US 
People Nation 23 0.4492 0.96 Street US 
Hammerskins 24 0.4401 0.92 Street US 
Vice Lords 25 0.4316 0.88 Street US 
Supreme White Power 26 0.4293 0.87 Prison US 
Black Panther 27 0.4194 0.83 Street US 
Conservative Vice Lords 28 0.4093 0.78 Street US 
Mexican Mafia 29 0.3910 0.70 Prison US 
Imperial Gangster Disciples 30 0.3890 0.69 Street Puerto Rico 
Four Corner Hustlers 31 0.3784 0.64 Street US 
Insane Unknowns 31 0.3784 0.64 Street Puerto Rico 
Latin Counts 31 0.3784 0.64 Street Mexico 
Zetas Cartel 32 0.3723 0.61 Cartel Mexico 
Insane Gangster Disciple 33 0.3687 0.60 Street US 
Maniac Latin Disciples 33 0.3687 0.60 Street US 
Satans Disciples 33 0.3687 0.60 Street US 
Gulf Cartel 34 0.3525 0.52 Cartel Mexico 
Nuestra Familia 35 0.3385 0.46 Prison US 
Vatos Locos 36 0.3170 0.36 Street Mexico 
Juggalos 37 0.3163 0.36 Street US 
La Familia Michoacana Cartel 38 0.3118 0.34 Cartel Mexico 
Five Percenters 39 0.3112 0.34 Street US 
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18th St  40 0.2720 0.16 Street El Salvador 
Mexikanemi 41 0.2599 0.11 Prison US 
Spanish Cobras 42 0.2577 0.10 Street Puerto Rico 
Piru 43 0.2521 0.07 Street US 
Trinitarios 44 0.2465 0.05 Street 
Dominican 
Republic 
Tijuana Cartel 45 0.2451 0.04 Cartel Mexico 
Sex Money Murder 46 0.2414 0.02 Street US 
Juarez Cartel 47 0.2367 0.00 Cartel Mexico 
Florencia 13 48 0.2322 -0.02 Street US 
Border Brothers 49 0.2272 -0.04 Prison Mexico 
Rollin 60s Crips 50 0.2194 -0.08 Street US 
Ñetas 51 0.1985 -0.17 Prison Puerto Rico 
Black Angels 52 0.1845 -0.23 Street US 
Tiny Rascal Gang  53 0.1774 -0.27 Street Cambodia 
Hoover Gangsters 54 0.1587 -0.35 Street US 
Rollin 30s Crips 55 0.1575 -0.36 Street Belize 
Rollin 40s Crips 56 0.1562 -0.36 Street US 
Dead Man Incorporated 57 0.1529 -0.38 Prison US 
Rollin 20s Crips 58 0.1451 -0.41 Street US 
Texas Syndicate 59 0.1396 -0.44 Prison Mexico 
JalNewGen Cartel 60 0.1358 -0.45 Cartel Mexico 
Dirty White Boys 61 0.1325 -0.47 Prison US 
Asian Boyz (Crips) 62 0.1319 -0.47 Street Cambodia 
Grape Street Crips 63 0.1267 -0.49 Street US 
Native Mob 64 0.1231 -0.51 Street US 
Athens Park Bloods 65 0.1215 -0.52 Street US 
Bounty Hunter Bloods 66 0.1191 -0.53 Street US 
Shotgun Crips 67 0.1155 -0.55 Street US 
Tree Top Piru 68 0.1144 -0.55 Street US 
Sons of Samoa 69 0.1142 -0.55 Street Samoa 
BelLey Cartel 70 0.1116 -0.56 Cartel Mexico 
Hells Angels 71 0.1057 -0.59 OMG US 
Six Deuce Brim 72 0.0939 -0.64 Street US 
Vagos MC 73 0.0797 -0.71 OMG US 
Hilltop Crips 74 0.0780 -0.71 Street US 
Money Over Bitches 74 0.0780 -0.71 Street US 
Nine Trey Gangster Blood 74 0.0780 -0.71 Street US 
Raza Unida 75 0.0717 -0.74 Prison US 
Outlaws MC 76 0.0683 -0.76 OMG US 
Sons of Silence MC 77 0.0518 -0.83 OMG US 
Pagans MC 78 0.0517 -0.83 OMG US 
Bandidos MC 79 0.0449 -0.86 OMG US 
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Brown Pride 80 0.0362 -0.90 Street NA 
Texas Chicano Brotherhood 81 0.0301 -0.93 Prison US 
Mongols MC 82 0.0277 -0.94 OMG US 
Desperados MC 83 0.0179 -0.99 OMG NA 
Red Devils MC 83 0.0179 -0.99 OMG Canada 
Tango Blast 84 0.0168 -0.99 Prison US 
El Forastero MC 85 0.0148 -1.00 OMG US 
Black Pistons MC 86 0.0098 -1.02 OMG Germany 
Grupo 27 87 0.0078 -1.03 Prison Puerto Rico 
Renegades MC 88 0.0072 -1.03 OMG US 
Warlocks MC 89 0.0051 -1.04 OMG US 
Devils Disciples MC 90 0.0041 -1.05 OMG US 
Diablos MC 91 0.0027 -1.05 OMG US 
Iron Horsemen MC 91 0.0027 -1.05 OMG US 
Prison Motorcycle 
Brotherhood 91 0.0027 -1.05 Prison US 
Avengers MC 92 0.0020 -1.06 OMG US 
Rough Riders MC 92 0.0020 -1.06 OMG US 
Tribe MC 92 0.0020 -1.06 OMG NA 
Rebels 13 MC 93 0.0018 -1.06 OMG Australia 
Wheels of Soul MC 93 0.0018 -1.06 OMG US 
Grupo 25 94 0.0003 -1.07 Prison Puerto Rico 
Outcast MC  95 0.0001 -1.07 OMG US 
Bandits 96 0.0000 -1.07 Street NA 
Click Clack 96 0.0000 -1.07 Street NA 
Code Red 96 0.0000 -1.07 Street NA 
Hard Times  96 0.0000 -1.07 Street NA 
Midnight Riders MC 96 0.0000 -1.07 OMG NA 
Oriental Boy Soldiers 96 0.0000 -1.07 Street NA 
Russian Gangs 96 0.0000 -1.07 Street Russia 
Sin City Deciples MC 96 0.0000 -1.07 OMG US 
Somali Gangs 96 0.0000 -1.07 Street Somalia 
The Cool Kids 96 0.0000 -1.07 Street NA 
Zulus MC 96 0.0000 -1.07 OMG US 
 











Crips 1 30 3.75 Street US 
Bloods 2 28 3.43 Street US 
Sinaloa Cartel 3 24 2.80 Cartel Mexico 
Sureños 3 24 2.80 Street US 
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Latin Kings 4 20 2.17 Street US 
Aryan Brotherhood 5 17 1.70 Prison US 
Aryan Nation 5 17 1.70 Street US 
Mexican Mafia 5 17 1.70 Prison US 
Gulf Cartel 6 16 1.54 Cartel Mexico 
Zetas Cartel 6 16 1.54 Cartel Mexico 
Black P Stones 7 15 1.38 Street US 
Peckerwood 7 15 1.38 Street US 
Black Guerrilla Family 8 14 1.22 Prison US 
Gangster Disciples 8 14 1.22 Street US 
Tijuana Cartel 8 14 1.22 Cartel Mexico 
Zoe Pound 8 14 1.22 Street Haiti 
Nazi Low Riders 9 13 1.07 Prison US 
People Nation 9 13 1.07 Street US 
Vice Lords 9 13 1.07 Street US 
Conservative Vice Lords 10 12 0.91 Street US 
La Familia Michoacana Cartel 10 12 0.91 Cartel Mexico 
La Raza 10 12 0.91 Street Mexico 
Juggalos 11 11 0.75 Street US 
Norteños 11 11 0.75 Street US 
Traveling Vice Lords 11 11 0.75 Street US 
Black Disciples 12 10 0.59 Street US 
Folk Nation 12 10 0.59 Street US 
Hells Angels 12 10 0.59 OMG US 
Juarez Cartel 12 10 0.59 Cartel Mexico 
Neo Nazi 12 10 0.59 Street UK 
White Aryan Resistance 12 10 0.59 Street US 
White Power 12 10 0.59 Street US 
White Supremacists 12 10 0.59 Street US 
Aryan Circle 13 9 0.43 Prison US 
Four Corner Hustlers 13 9 0.43 Street US 
Hammerskins 13 9 0.43 Street US 
Insane Unknowns 13 9 0.43 Street Puerto Rico 
Mexikanemi 13 9 0.43 Prison US 
Supreme White Power 13 9 0.43 Prison US 
Imperial Gangster Disciples 14 8 0.28 Street Puerto Rico 
Latin Counts 14 8 0.28 Street Mexico 
Maniac Latin Disciples 14 8 0.28 Street US 
MS-13 14 8 0.28 Street El Salvador 
Skinheads 14 8 0.28 Street UK 
18th St  15 7 0.12 Street El Salvador 
Black Panther 15 7 0.12 Street US 
Insane Gangster Disciple 15 7 0.12 Street US 
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Mongols MC 15 7 0.12 OMG US 
Satans Disciples 15 7 0.12 Street US 
Vatos Locos 15 7 0.12 Street Mexico 
Border Brothers 16 6 -0.04 Prison Mexico 
Florencia 13 16 6 -0.04 Street US 
Piru 16 6 -0.04 Street US 
Rollin 60s Crips 16 6 -0.04 Street US 
Sex Money Murder 16 6 -0.04 Street US 
JalNewGen Cartel 17 5 -0.20 Cartel Mexico 
Nuestra Familia 17 5 -0.20 Prison US 
Outlaws MC 17 5 -0.20 OMG US 
Rollin 20s Crips 17 5 -0.20 Street US 
Rollin 30s Crips 17 5 -0.20 Street Belize 
Vagos MC 17 5 -0.20 OMG US 
Bandidos MC 18 4 -0.35 OMG US 
BelLey Cartel 18 4 -0.35 Cartel Mexico 
Ñetas 18 4 -0.35 Prison Puerto Rico 
Pagans MC 18 4 -0.35 OMG US 
Rollin 40s Crips 18 4 -0.35 Street US 
Asian Boyz (Crips) 19 3 -0.51 Street Cambodia 
Athens Park Bloods 19 3 -0.51 Street US 
Black Angels 19 3 -0.51 Street US 
Dead Man Incorporated 19 3 -0.51 Prison US 
Dirty White Boys 19 3 -0.51 Prison US 
Five Percenters 19 3 -0.51 Street US 
Sons of Silence MC 19 3 -0.51 OMG US 
Black Pistons MC 20 2 -0.67 OMG Germany 
Desperados MC 20 2 -0.67 OMG NA 
Grape Street Crips 20 2 -0.67 Street US 
Hoover Gangsters 20 2 -0.67 Street US 
Raza Unida 20 2 -0.67 Prison US 
Red Devils MC 20 2 -0.67 OMG Canada 
Shotgun Crips 20 2 -0.67 Street US 
Six Deuce Brim 20 2 -0.67 Street US 
Sons of Samoa 20 2 -0.67 Street Samoa 
Spanish Cobras 20 2 -0.67 Street Puerto Rico 
Texas Syndicate 20 2 -0.67 Prison Mexico 
Bounty Hunter Bloods 21 1 -0.83 Street US 
Brown Pride 21 1 -0.83 Street NA 
Devils Disciples MC 21 1 -0.83 OMG US 
El Forastero MC 21 1 -0.83 OMG US 
Grupo 25 21 1 -0.83 Prison Puerto Rico 
Grupo 27 21 1 -0.83 Prison Puerto Rico 
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Hilltop Crips 21 1 -0.83 Street US 
Money Over Bitches 21 1 -0.83 Street US 
Nine Trey Gangster Blood 21 1 -0.83 Street US 
Prison Motorcycle Brotherhood 21 1 -0.83 Prison US 
Renegades MC 21 1 -0.83 OMG US 
Rough Riders MC 21 1 -0.83 OMG US 
Texas Chicano Brotherhood 21 1 -0.83 Prison US 
Trinitarios 21 1 -0.83 Street 
Dominican 
Republic 
Avengers MC 22 0 -0.99 OMG US 
Bandits 22 0 -0.99 Street NA 
Click Clack 22 0 -0.99 Street NA 
Code Red 22 0 -0.99 Street NA 
Diablos MC 22 0 -0.99 OMG US 
Hard Times  22 0 -0.99 Street NA 
Iron Horsemen MC 22 0 -0.99 OMG US 
Midnight Riders MC 22 0 -0.99 OMG NA 
Native Mob 22 0 -0.99 Street US 
Oriental Boy Soldiers 22 0 -0.99 Street NA 
Outcast MC  22 0 -0.99 OMG US 
Rebels 13 MC 22 0 -0.99 OMG Australia 
Russian Gangs 22 0 -0.99 Street Russia 
Sin City Deciples MC 22 0 -0.99 OMG US 
Somali Gangs 22 0 -0.99 Street Somalia 
Tango Blast 22 0 -0.99 Prison US 
The Cool Kids 22 0 -0.99 Street NA 
Tiny Rascal Gang  22 0 -0.99 Street Cambodia 
Tree Top Piru 22 0 -0.99 Street US 
Tribe MC 22 0 -0.99 OMG NA 
Warlocks MC 22 0 -0.99 OMG US 
Wheels of Soul MC 22 0 -0.99 OMG US 












Sinaloa Cartel 1 0.000313 0.60 Cartel Mexico 
Crips 2 0.000311 0.58 Street US 
Gulf Cartel 2 0.000311 0.58 Cartel Mexico 
La Familia Michoacana Cartel 2 0.000311 0.58 Cartel Mexico 
Mexican Mafia 2 0.000311 0.58 Prison US 
Zetas Cartel 2 0.000311 0.58 Cartel Mexico 
Aryan Brotherhood 3 0.000310 0.57 Prison US 
Bloods 3 0.000310 0.57 Street US 
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Juggalos 3 0.000310 0.57 Street US 
Sureños 3 0.000310 0.57 Street US 
Zoe Pound 3 0.000310 0.57 Street Haiti 
Aryan Nation 4 0.000309 0.56 Street US 
Black Guerrilla Family 4 0.000309 0.56 Prison US 
Gangster Disciples 4 0.000309 0.56 Street US 
Juarez Cartel 4 0.000309 0.56 Cartel Mexico 
Latin Kings 4 0.000309 0.56 Street US 
Norteños 4 0.000309 0.56 Street US 
Tijuana Cartel 4 0.000309 0.56 Cartel Mexico 
Black P Stones 5 0.000308 0.55 Street US 
Conservative Vice Lords 5 0.000308 0.55 Street US 
La Raza 5 0.000308 0.55 Street Mexico 
Mexikanemi 5 0.000308 0.55 Prison US 
Nazi Low Riders 5 0.000308 0.55 Prison US 
18th St  6 0.000307 0.54 Street El Salvador 
Hells Angels 6 0.000307 0.54 OMG US 
JalNewGen Cartel 6 0.000307 0.54 Cartel Mexico 
MS-13 6 0.000307 0.54 Street El Salvador 
Nuestra Familia 6 0.000307 0.54 Prison US 
Peckerwood 6 0.000307 0.54 Street US 
Rollin 60s Crips 6 0.000307 0.54 Street US 
Vice Lords 6 0.000307 0.54 Street US 
Black Disciples 7 0.000306 0.53 Street US 
Black Panther 7 0.000306 0.53 Street US 
Border Brothers 7 0.000306 0.53 Prison Mexico 
Florencia 13 7 0.000306 0.53 Street US 
Folk Nation 7 0.000306 0.53 Street US 
People Nation 7 0.000306 0.53 Street US 
Vagos MC 7 0.000306 0.53 OMG US 
Vatos Locos 7 0.000306 0.53 Street Mexico 
BelLey Cartel 8 0.000305 0.52 Cartel Mexico 
Maniac Latin Disciples 8 0.000305 0.52 Street US 
Outlaws MC 8 0.000305 0.52 OMG US 
Piru 8 0.000305 0.52 Street US 
Traveling Vice Lords 8 0.000305 0.52 Street US 
Bandidos MC 9 0.000304 0.50 OMG US 
Black Angels 9 0.000304 0.50 Street US 
Brown Pride 9 0.000304 0.50 Street NA 
Five Percenters 9 0.000304 0.50 Street US 
Imperial Gangster Disciples 9 0.000304 0.50 Street Puerto Rico 
Insane Gangster Disciple 9 0.000304 0.50 Street US 
Raza Unida 9 0.000304 0.50 Prison US 
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Sex Money Murder 9 0.000304 0.50 Street US 
Aryan Circle 10 0.000303 0.49 Prison US 
Asian Boyz (Crips) 10 0.000303 0.49 Street Cambodia 
Four Corner Hustlers 10 0.000303 0.49 Street US 
Insane Unknowns 10 0.000303 0.49 Street Puerto Rico 
Latin Counts 10 0.000303 0.49 Street Mexico 
Ñetas 10 0.000303 0.49 Prison Puerto Rico 
Rollin 20s Crips 10 0.000303 0.49 Street US 
Rollin 30s Crips 10 0.000303 0.49 Street Belize 
Rollin 40s Crips 10 0.000303 0.49 Street US 
Satans Disciples 10 0.000303 0.49 Street US 
Shotgun Crips 10 0.000303 0.49 Street US 
Spanish Cobras 10 0.000303 0.49 Street Puerto Rico 
Texas Syndicate 10 0.000303 0.49 Prison Mexico 
White Aryan Resistance 10 0.000303 0.49 Street US 
White Power 10 0.000303 0.49 Street US 
White Supremacists 10 0.000303 0.49 Street US 
Athens Park Bloods 11 0.000302 0.48 Street US 
Dead Man Incorporated 11 0.000302 0.48 Prison US 
Dirty White Boys 11 0.000302 0.48 Prison US 
Hilltop Crips 11 0.000302 0.48 Street US 
Mongols MC 11 0.000302 0.48 OMG US 
Neo Nazi 11 0.000302 0.48 Street UK 
Pagans MC 11 0.000302 0.48 OMG US 
Six Deuce Brim 11 0.000302 0.48 Street US 
Sons of Samoa 11 0.000302 0.48 Street Samoa 
Supreme White Power 11 0.000302 0.48 Prison US 
Texas Chicano Brotherhood 11 0.000302 0.48 Prison US 
Bounty Hunter Bloods 12 0.000301 0.47 Street US 
Hammerskins 12 0.000301 0.47 Street US 
Money Over Bitches 12 0.000301 0.47 Street US 
Nine Trey Gangster Blood 12 0.000301 0.47 Street US 
Sons of Silence MC 12 0.000301 0.47 OMG US 
Trinitarios 12 0.000301 0.47 Street 
Dominican 
Republic 
Skinheads 13 0.000300 0.46 Street UK 
Desperados MC 14 0.000299 0.45 OMG NA 
Devils Disciples MC 14 0.000299 0.45 OMG US 
El Forastero MC 14 0.000299 0.45 OMG US 
Red Devils MC 14 0.000299 0.45 OMG Canada 
Renegades MC 14 0.000299 0.45 OMG US 
Black Pistons MC 15 0.000298 0.44 OMG Germany 
Prison Motorcycle Brotherhood 16 0.000296 0.42 Prison US 
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Grape Street Crips 17 0.000295 0.41 Street US 
Hoover Gangsters 17 0.000295 0.41 Street US 
Rough Riders MC 18 0.000293 0.39 OMG US 
Avengers MC 19 0.000069 -1.96 OMG US 
Bandits 19 0.000069 -1.96 Street NA 
Click Clack 19 0.000069 -1.96 Street NA 
Code Red 19 0.000069 -1.96 Street NA 
Diablos MC 19 0.000069 -1.96 OMG US 
Grupo 25 19 0.000069 -1.96 Prison Puerto Rico 
Grupo 27 19 0.000069 -1.96 Prison Puerto Rico 
Hard Times  19 0.000069 -1.96 Street NA 
Iron Horsemen MC 19 0.000069 -1.96 OMG US 
Midnight Riders MC 19 0.000069 -1.96 OMG NA 
Native Mob 19 0.000069 -1.96 Street US 
Oriental Boy Soldiers 19 0.000069 -1.96 Street NA 
Outcast MC  19 0.000069 -1.96 OMG US 
Rebels 13 MC 19 0.000069 -1.96 OMG Australia 
Russian Gangs 19 0.000069 -1.96 Street Russia 
Sin City Deciples MC 19 0.000069 -1.96 OMG US 
Somali Gangs 19 0.000069 -1.96 Street Somalia 
Tango Blast 19 0.000069 -1.96 Prison US 
The Cool Kids 19 0.000069 -1.96 Street NA 
Tiny Rascal Gang  19 0.000069 -1.96 Street Cambodia 
Tree Top Piru 19 0.000069 -1.96 Street US 
Tribe MC 19 0.000069 -1.96 OMG NA 
Warlocks MC 19 0.000069 -1.96 OMG US 
Wheels of Soul MC 19 0.000069 -1.96 OMG US 












Crips 1 1077.05 6.38 Street US 
Sinaloa Cartel 2 838.78 4.88 Cartel Mexico 
Bloods 3 707.55 4.05 Street US 
Hells Angels 4 460.53 2.49 OMG US 
Sureños 5 375.68 1.96 Street US 
Mexican Mafia 6 338.21 1.72 Prison US 
Aryan Nation 7 312.53 1.56 Street US 
Gulf Cartel 8 311.45 1.55 Cartel Mexico 
Aryan Brotherhood 9 287.30 1.40 Prison US 
Juggalos 10 276.86 1.33 Street US 
Zetas Cartel 11 226.78 1.02 Cartel Mexico 
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Zoe Pound 12 209.04 0.91 Street Haiti 
Tijuana Cartel 13 207.86 0.90 Cartel Mexico 
Peckerwood 14 191.26 0.79 Street US 
Latin Kings 15 184.25 0.75 Street US 
Outlaws MC 16 159.74 0.60 OMG US 
Black Guerrilla Family 17 140.62 0.48 Prison US 
Black P Stones 18 134.54 0.44 Street US 
Nazi Low Riders 19 117.34 0.33 Prison US 
La Familia Michoacana Cartel 20 112.67 0.30 Cartel Mexico 
Gangster Disciples 21 105.71 0.26 Street US 
Pagans MC 22 97.49 0.20 OMG US 
Rollin 30s Crips 23 93.50 0.18 Street Belize 
Norteños 24 92.67 0.17 Street US 
Shotgun Crips 25 90.50 0.16 Street US 
La Raza 26 87.93 0.14 Street Mexico 
Mongols MC 27 56.14 -0.06 OMG US 
Juarez Cartel 28 54.89 -0.07 Cartel Mexico 
Rollin 60s Crips 29 53.55 -0.07 Street US 
Conservative Vice Lords 30 46.63 -0.12 Street US 
Aryan Circle 31 35.07 -0.19 Prison US 
People Nation 32 32.59 -0.21 Street US 
Folk Nation 33 32.41 -0.21 Street US 
Black Panther 34 27.50 -0.24 Street US 
Vice Lords 35 26.26 -0.25 Street US 
Vatos Locos 36 25.38 -0.25 Street Mexico 
Nuestra Familia 37 20.51 -0.28 Prison US 
Bandidos MC 38 20.38 -0.28 OMG US 
JalNewGen Cartel 39 19.18 -0.29 Cartel Mexico 
Black Disciples 40 18.73 -0.29 Street US 
White Aryan Resistance 41 18.26 -0.30 Street US 
White Power 41 18.26 -0.30 Street US 
White Supremacists 41 18.26 -0.30 Street US 
Mexikanemi 42 15.65 -0.31 Prison US 
Piru 43 15.38 -0.31 Street US 
Maniac Latin Disciples 44 14.44 -0.32 Street US 
Vagos MC 45 14.12 -0.32 OMG US 
18th St  46 12.58 -0.33 Street El Salvador 
MS-13 47 11.46 -0.34 Street El Salvador 
Neo Nazi 48 9.96 -0.35 Street UK 
Supreme White Power 49 8.22 -0.36 Prison US 
Traveling Vice Lords 50 7.75 -0.36 Street US 
Sons of Silence MC 51 3.49 -0.39 OMG US 
BelLey Cartel 52 3.20 -0.39 Cartel Mexico 
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Florencia 13 53 2.67 -0.39 Street US 
Grape Street Crips 54 2.50 -0.40 Street US 
Rollin 20s Crips 55 2.00 -0.40 Street US 
Border Brothers 56 1.99 -0.40 Prison Mexico 
Hammerskins 57 1.74 -0.40 Street US 
Ñetas 58 1.19 -0.40 Prison Puerto Rico 
Sex Money Murder 59 1.12 -0.40 Street US 
Hoover Gangsters 60 1.00 -0.41 Street US 
Four Corner Hustlers 61 0.80 -0.41 Street US 
Insane Unknowns 61 0.80 -0.41 Street Puerto Rico 
Imperial Gangster Disciples 62 0.69 -0.41 Street Puerto Rico 
Athens Park Bloods 63 0.67 -0.41 Street US 
Insane Gangster Disciple 64 0.54 -0.41 Street US 
Asian Boyz (Crips) 65 0.50 -0.41 Street Cambodia 
Texas Syndicate 66 0.27 -0.41 Prison Mexico 
Satans Disciples 67 0.24 -0.41 Street US 
Dead Man Incorporated 68 0.20 -0.41 Prison US 
Avengers MC 69 0.00 -0.41 OMG US 
Bandits 69 0.00 -0.41 Street NA 
Black Angels 69 0.00 -0.41 Street US 
Black Pistons MC 69 0.00 -0.41 OMG Germany 
Bounty Hunter Bloods 69 0.00 -0.41 Street US 
Brown Pride 69 0.00 -0.41 Street NA 
Click Clack 69 0.00 -0.41 Street NA 
Code Red 69 0.00 -0.41 Street NA 
Desperados MC 69 0.00 -0.41 OMG NA 
Devils Disciples MC 69 0.00 -0.41 OMG US 
Diablos MC 69 0.00 -0.41 OMG US 
Dirty White Boys 69 0.00 -0.41 Prison US 
El Forastero MC 69 0.00 -0.41 OMG US 
Five Percenters 69 0.00 -0.41 Street US 
Grupo 25 69 0.00 -0.41 Prison Puerto Rico 
Grupo 27 69 0.00 -0.41 Prison Puerto Rico 
Hard Times  69 0.00 -0.41 Street NA 
Hilltop Crips 69 0.00 -0.41 Street US 
Iron Horsemen MC 69 0.00 -0.41 OMG US 
Latin Counts 69 0.00 -0.41 Street Mexico 
Midnight Riders MC 69 0.00 -0.41 OMG NA 
Money Over Bitches 69 0.00 -0.41 Street US 
Native Mob 69 0.00 -0.41 Street US 
Nine Trey Gangster Blood 69 0.00 -0.41 Street US 
Oriental Boy Soldiers 69 0.00 -0.41 Street NA 
Outcast MC  69 0.00 -0.41 OMG US 
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Prison Motorcycle Brotherhood 69 0.00 -0.41 Prison US 
Raza Unida 69 0.00 -0.41 Prison US 
Rebels 13 MC 69 0.00 -0.41 OMG Australia 
Red Devils MC 69 0.00 -0.41 OMG Canada 
Renegades MC 69 0.00 -0.41 OMG US 
Rollin 40s Crips 69 0.00 -0.41 Street US 
Rough Riders MC 69 0.00 -0.41 OMG US 
Russian Gangs 69 0.00 -0.41 Street Russia 
Sin City Deciples MC 69 0.00 -0.41 OMG US 
Six Deuce Brim 69 0.00 -0.41 Street US 
Skinheads 69 0.00 -0.41 Street UK 
Somali Gangs 69 0.00 -0.41 Street Somalia 
Sons of Samoa 69 0.00 -0.41 Street Samoa 
Spanish Cobras 69 0.00 -0.41 Street Puerto Rico 
Tango Blast 69 0.00 -0.41 Prison US 
Texas Chicano Brotherhood 69 0.00 -0.41 Prison US 
The Cool Kids 69 0.00 -0.41 Street NA 
Tiny Rascal Gang  69 0.00 -0.41 Street Cambodia 
Tree Top Piru 69 0.00 -0.41 Street US 
Tribe MC 69 0.00 -0.41 OMG NA 
Trinitarios 69 0.00 -0.41 Street 
Dominican 
Republic 
Warlocks MC 69 0.00 -0.41 OMG US 
Wheels of Soul MC 69 0.00 -0.41 OMG US 












Crips 1 0.0374 4.34 Street US 
Bloods 2 0.0335 3.76 Street US 
Sinaloa Cartel 3 0.0272 2.82 Cartel Mexico 
Sureños 4 0.0259 2.62 Street US 
Latin Kings 5 0.0209 1.88 Street US 
Aryan Brotherhood 6 0.0207 1.85 Prison US 
Aryan Nation 7 0.0199 1.73 Street US 
Gulf Cartel 8 0.0195 1.67 Cartel Mexico 
Mexican Mafia 9 0.0192 1.63 Prison US 
Hells Angels 10 0.0188 1.57 OMG US 
Zetas Cartel 11 0.0183 1.49 Cartel Mexico 
Tijuana Cartel 12 0.0168 1.27 Cartel Mexico 
Zoe Pound 13 0.0163 1.20 Street Haiti 
Black Guerrilla Family 14 0.0161 1.17 Prison US 
Black P Stones 14 0.0161 1.17 Street US 
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Peckerwood 15 0.0159 1.14 Street US 
Gangster Disciples 16 0.0155 1.08 Street US 
Nazi Low Riders 17 0.0144 0.91 Prison US 
People Nation 18 0.0141 0.87 Street US 
Vice Lords 19 0.0138 0.82 Street US 
La Familia Michoacana Cartel 20 0.0134 0.76 Cartel Mexico 
La Raza 20 0.0134 0.76 Street Mexico 
Conservative Vice Lords 21 0.0129 0.69 Street US 
Norteños 22 0.0128 0.67 Street US 
Juggalos 23 0.0122 0.58 Street US 
Folk Nation 24 0.0119 0.54 Street US 
Traveling Vice Lords 25 0.0118 0.53 Street US 
Black Disciples 26 0.0116 0.50 Street US 
Juarez Cartel 26 0.0116 0.50 Cartel Mexico 
Mongols MC 27 0.0114 0.47 OMG US 
Neo Nazi 28 0.0107 0.36 Street UK 
White Aryan Resistance 29 0.0106 0.35 Street US 
White Power 29 0.0106 0.35 Street US 
White Supremacists 29 0.0106 0.35 Street US 
Mexikanemi 30 0.0102 0.29 Prison US 
Grupo 25 31 0.0099 0.24 Prison Puerto Rico 
Grupo 27 31 0.0099 0.24 Prison Puerto Rico 
Four Corner Hustlers 31 0.0098 0.23 Street US 
Insane Unknowns 31 0.0098 0.23 Street Puerto Rico 
Supreme White Power 31 0.0098 0.23 Prison US 
Aryan Circle 32 0.0097 0.21 Prison US 
Hammerskins 32 0.0097 0.21 Street US 
Imperial Gangster Disciples 33 0.0095 0.18 Street Puerto Rico 
MS-13 33 0.0095 0.18 Street El Salvador 
Maniac Latin Disciples 34 0.0094 0.17 Street US 
Outlaws MC 34 0.0094 0.17 OMG US 
Rollin 30s Crips 35 0.009 0.11 Street Belize 
Latin Counts 36 0.0089 0.09 Street Mexico 
Rollin 60s Crips 36 0.0089 0.09 Street US 
Skinheads 37 0.0088 0.08 Street UK 
Black Panther 38 0.0087 0.06 Street US 
Insane Gangster Disciple 39 0.0085 0.03 Street US 
Satans Disciples 39 0.0085 0.03 Street US 
18th St  40 0.0084 0.02 Street El Salvador 
Rollin 20s Crips 40 0.0084 0.02 Street US 
Piru 41 0.0082 -0.01 Street US 
Vatos Locos 41 0.0082 -0.01 Street Mexico 
Border Brothers 42 0.0076 -0.10 Prison Mexico 
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Florencia 13 43 0.0075 -0.12 Street US 
Pagans MC 43 0.0075 -0.12 OMG US 
Sex Money Murder 44 0.0071 -0.17 Street US 
Vagos MC 45 0.0069 -0.20 OMG US 
Nuestra Familia 46 0.0068 -0.22 Prison US 
Rollin 40s Crips 46 0.0068 -0.22 Street US 
JalNewGen Cartel 47 0.0066 -0.25 Cartel Mexico 
Hoover Gangsters 48 0.006 -0.34 Street US 
Bandidos MC 49 0.0059 -0.35 OMG US 
Asian Boyz (Crips) 50 0.0057 -0.38 Street Cambodia 
Grape Street Crips 51 0.0056 -0.40 Street US 
BelLey Cartel 52 0.0054 -0.43 Cartel Mexico 
Desperados MC 52 0.0054 -0.43 OMG NA 
Red Devils MC 52 0.0054 -0.43 OMG Canada 
Ñetas 53 0.0053 -0.44 Prison Puerto Rico 
Shotgun Crips 54 0.0051 -0.47 Street US 
Sons of Silence MC 55 0.0049 -0.50 OMG US 
Athens Park Bloods 56 0.0046 -0.55 Street US 
Dead Man Incorporated 56 0.0046 -0.55 Prison US 
Five Percenters 57 0.0045 -0.56 Street US 
Black Angels 58 0.0044 -0.58 Street US 
Black Pistons MC 58 0.0044 -0.58 OMG Germany 
Dirty White Boys 58 0.0044 -0.58 Prison US 
Sons of Samoa 59 0.0042 -0.61 Street Samoa 
Six Deuce Brim 60 0.0037 -0.68 Street US 
Spanish Cobras 61 0.0035 -0.71 Street Puerto Rico 
Texas Syndicate 61 0.0035 -0.71 Prison Mexico 
Raza Unida 62 0.0034 -0.73 Prison US 
Devils Disciples MC 63 0.0031 -0.77 OMG US 
El Forastero MC 63 0.0031 -0.77 OMG US 
Prison Motorcycle Brotherhood 63 0.0031 -0.77 Prison US 
Renegades MC 63 0.0031 -0.77 OMG US 
Rough Riders MC 63 0.0031 -0.77 OMG US 
Bounty Hunter Bloods 64 0.0025 -0.86 Street US 
Hilltop Crips 64 0.0025 -0.86 Street US 
Money Over Bitches 64 0.0025 -0.86 Street US 
Nine Trey Gangster Blood 64 0.0025 -0.86 Street US 
Texas Chicano Brotherhood 64 0.0025 -0.86 Prison US 
Trinitarios 64 0.0025 -0.86 Street 
Dominican 
Republic 
Brown Pride 65 0.0024 -0.87 Street NA 
Avengers MC 66 0.0015 -1.01 OMG US 
Bandits 66 0.0015 -1.01 Street NA 
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Click Clack 66 0.0015 -1.01 Street NA 
Code Red 66 0.0015 -1.01 Street NA 
Diablos MC 66 0.0015 -1.01 OMG US 
Hard Times  66 0.0015 -1.01 Street NA 
Iron Horsemen MC 66 0.0015 -1.01 OMG US 
Midnight Riders MC 66 0.0015 -1.01 OMG NA 
Native Mob 66 0.0015 -1.01 Street US 
Oriental Boy Soldiers 66 0.0015 -1.01 Street NA 
Outcast MC  66 0.0015 -1.01 OMG US 
Rebels 13 MC 66 0.0015 -1.01 OMG Australia 
Russian Gangs 66 0.0015 -1.01 Street Russia 
Sin City Deciples MC 66 0.0015 -1.01 OMG US 
Somali Gangs 66 0.0015 -1.01 Street Somalia 
Tango Blast 66 0.0015 -1.01 Prison US 
The Cool Kids 66 0.0015 -1.01 Street NA 
Tiny Rascal Gang  66 0.0015 -1.01 Street Cambodia 
Tree Top Piru 66 0.0015 -1.01 Street US 
Tribe MC 66 0.0015 -1.01 OMG NA 
Warlocks MC 66 0.0015 -1.01 OMG US 
Wheels of Soul MC 66 0.0015 -1.01 OMG US 












18th St  30 0.3460 0.47 Street El Salvador 
Aryan Brotherhood 10 0.6266 1.64 Prison US 
Aryan Circle 50 0.2099 -0.09 Prison US 
Aryan Nation 11 0.6190 1.60 Street US 
Asian Boyz (Crips) 72 0.0815 -0.62 Street Cambodia 
Athens Park Bloods 58 0.1380 -0.39 Street US 
Avengers MC 87 0.0000 -0.96 OMG US 
Bandidos MC 56 0.1497 -0.34 OMG US 
Bandits 87 0.0000 -0.96 Street NA 
BelLey Cartel 54 0.1648 -0.28 Cartel Mexico 
Black Angels 55 0.1580 -0.30 Street US 
Black Disciples 32 0.3223 0.38 Street US 
Black Guerrilla Family 15 0.5384 1.27 Prison US 
Black P Stones 13 0.5992 1.52 Street US 
Black Panther 33 0.3111 0.33 Street US 
Black Pistons MC 82 0.0167 -0.89 OMG Germany 
Bloods 2 0.9263 2.88 Street US 
Border Brothers 42 0.2502 0.08 Prison Mexico 
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Bounty Hunter Bloods 75 0.0735 -0.65 Street US 
Brown Pride 73 0.0793 -0.63 Street NA 
Click Clack 87 0.0000 -0.96 Street NA 
Code Red 87 0.0000 -0.96 Street NA 
Conservative Vice Lords 18 0.5130 1.17 Street US 
Crips 4 0.8462 2.55 Street US 
Dead Man Incorporated 66 0.1047 -0.53 Prison US 
Desperados MC 80 0.0227 -0.86 OMG NA 
Devils Disciples MC 81 0.0209 -0.87 OMG US 
Diablos MC 87 0.0000 -0.96 OMG US 
Dirty White Boys 59 0.1360 -0.40 Prison US 
El Forastero MC 81 0.0209 -0.87 OMG US 
Five Percenters 57 0.1409 -0.38 Street US 
Florencia 13 37 0.2783 0.19 Street US 
Folk Nation 35 0.3062 0.31 Street US 
Four Corner Hustlers 29 0.4048 0.72 Street US 
Gangster Disciples 14 0.5480 1.31 Street US 
Grape Street Crips 84 0.0086 -0.92 Street US 
Grupo 25 87 0.0000 -0.96 Prison Puerto Rico 
Grupo 27 87 0.0000 -0.96 Prison Puerto Rico 
Gulf Cartel 7 0.6932 1.91 Cartel Mexico 
Hammerskins 51 0.2097 -0.09 Street US 
Hard Times  87 0.0000 -0.96 Street NA 
Hells Angels 39 0.2632 0.13 OMG US 
Hilltop Crips 77 0.0671 -0.68 Street US 
Hoover Gangsters 86 0.0060 -0.93 Street US 
Imperial Gangster Disciples 40 0.2554 0.10 Street Puerto Rico 
Insane Gangster Disciple 44 0.2347 0.01 Street US 
Insane Unknowns 29 0.4048 0.72 Street Puerto Rico 
Iron Horsemen MC 87 0.0000 -0.96 OMG US 
JalNewGen Cartel 49 0.2135 -0.07 Cartel Mexico 
Juarez Cartel 27 0.4508 0.91 Cartel Mexico 
Juggalos 19 0.5031 1.12 Street US 
La Familia Michoacana Cartel 9 0.6467 1.72 Cartel Mexico 
La Raza 26 0.4588 0.94 Street Mexico 
Latin Counts 31 0.3447 0.47 Street Mexico 
Latin Kings 5 0.8179 2.43 Street US 
Maniac Latin Disciples 36 0.2822 0.21 Street US 
Mexican Mafia 6 0.7277 2.05 Prison US 
Mexikanemi 22 0.4711 0.99 Prison US 
Midnight Riders MC 87 0.0000 -0.96 OMG NA 
Money Over Bitches 75 0.0735 -0.65 Street US 
Mongols MC 69 0.0938 -0.57 OMG US 
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MS-13 28 0.4115 0.75 Street El Salvador 
Native Mob 87 0.0000 -0.96 Street US 
Nazi Low Riders 20 0.5007 1.11 Prison US 
Neo Nazi 41 0.2552 0.10 Street UK 
Ñetas 52 0.1798 -0.21 Prison Puerto Rico 
Nine Trey Gangster Blood 75 0.0735 -0.65 Street US 
Norteños 16 0.5379 1.27 Street US 
Nuestra Familia 43 0.2429 0.05 Prison US 
Oriental Boy Soldiers 87 0.0000 -0.96 Street NA 
Outcast MC  87 0.0000 -0.96 OMG US 
Outlaws MC 61 0.1169 -0.47 OMG US 
Pagans MC 63 0.1069 -0.52 OMG US 
Peckerwood 23 0.4692 0.98 Street US 
People Nation 21 0.4960 1.10 Street US 
Piru 49 0.2135 -0.07 Street US 
Prison Motorcycle Brotherhood 83 0.0093 -0.92 Prison US 
Raza Unida 60 0.1227 -0.45 Prison US 
Rebels 13 MC 87 0.0000 -0.96 OMG Australia 
Red Devils MC 80 0.0227 -0.86 OMG Canada 
Renegades MC 81 0.0209 -0.87 OMG US 
Rollin 20s Crips 62 0.1074 -0.51 Street US 
Rollin 30s Crips 67 0.1020 -0.54 Street Belize 
Rollin 40s Crips 68 0.1014 -0.54 Street US 
Rollin 60s Crips 45 0.2227 -0.04 Street US 
Rough Riders MC 85 0.0085 -0.92 OMG US 
Russian Gangs 87 0.0000 -0.96 Street Russia 
Satans Disciples 47 0.2217 -0.04 Street US 
Sex Money Murder 34 0.3067 0.31 Street US 
Shotgun Crips 76 0.0676 -0.68 Street US 
Sin City Deciples MC 87 0.0000 -0.96 OMG US 
Sinaloa Cartel 1 1.0000 3.18 Cartel Mexico 
Six Deuce Brim 71 0.0904 -0.58 Street US 
Skinheads 53 0.1729 -0.24 Street UK 
Somali Gangs 87 0.0000 -0.96 Street Somalia 
Sons of Samoa 74 0.0736 -0.65 Street Samoa 
Sons of Silence MC 65 0.1063 -0.52 OMG US 
Spanish Cobras 70 0.0914 -0.58 Street Puerto Rico 
Supreme White Power 48 0.2184 -0.05 Prison US 
Sureños 3 0.8530 2.57 Street US 
Tango Blast 87 0.0000 -0.96 Prison US 
Texas Chicano Brotherhood 78 0.0550 -0.73 Prison US 
Texas Syndicate 64 0.1065 -0.52 Prison Mexico 
The Cool Kids 87 0.0000 -0.96 Street NA 
278 
 
Tijuana Cartel 25 0.4638 0.96 Cartel Mexico 
Tiny Rascal Gang  87 0.0000 -0.96 Street Cambodia 
Traveling Vice Lords 24 0.4669 0.97 Street US 
Tree Top Piru 87 0.0000 -0.96 Street US 
Tribe MC 87 0.0000 -0.96 OMG NA 
Trinitarios 79 0.0482 -0.76 Street 
Dominican 
Republic 
Vagos MC 46 0.2224 -0.04 OMG US 
Vatos Locos 31 0.3447 0.47 Street Mexico 
Vice Lords 17 0.5344 1.25 Street US 
Warlocks MC 87 0.0000 -0.96 OMG US 
Wheels of Soul MC 87 0.0000 -0.96 OMG US 
White Aryan Resistance 38 0.2724 0.17 Street US 
White Power 38 0.2724 0.17 Street US 
White Supremacists 38 0.2724 0.17 Street US 
Zetas Cartel 8 0.6498 1.73 Cartel Mexico 
Zoe Pound 12 0.6079 1.56 Street Haiti 
Zulus MC 87 0.0000 -0.96 OMG US 
 







Bloods 1 24 3.65 Street US 
Crips 1 24 3.65 Street US 
Sureños 2 17 2.30 Street US 
Aryan Nation 3 14 1.72 Street US 
Black P Stones 3 14 1.72 Street US 
Latin Kings 3 14 1.72 Street US 
Aryan Brotherhood 4 13 1.53 Prison US 
Mexican Mafia 4 13 1.53 Prison US 
Peckerwood 4 13 1.53 Street US 
People Nation 4 13 1.53 Street US 
Vice Lords 4 13 1.53 Street US 
Black Guerrilla Family 5 12 1.34 Prison US 
Nazi Low Riders 5 12 1.34 Prison US 
Zoe Pound 5 12 1.34 Street Haiti 
Gangster Disciples 6 11 1.14 Street US 
Juggalos 6 11 1.14 Street US 
La Raza 6 11 1.14 Street Mexico 
Traveling Vice Lords 6 11 1.14 Street US 
Black Disciples 7 10 0.95 Street US 
Conservative Vice Lords 7 10 0.95 Street US 
279 
 
Folk Nation 7 10 0.95 Street US 
Neo Nazi 7 10 0.95 Street UK 
White Aryan Resistance 7 10 0.95 Street US 
White Power 7 10 0.95 Street US 
White Supremacists 7 10 0.95 Street US 
Aryan Circle 8 9 0.76 Prison US 
Four Corner Hustlers 8 9 0.76 Street US 
Hammerskins 8 9 0.76 Street US 
Insane Unknowns 8 9 0.76 Street Puerto Rico 
Supreme White Power 8 9 0.76 Prison US 
Hells Angels 9 8 0.57 OMG US 
Imperial Gangster Disciples 9 8 0.57 Street Puerto Rico 
Latin Counts 9 8 0.57 Street Mexico 
Maniac Latin Disciples 9 8 0.57 Street US 
Skinheads 9 8 0.57 Street UK 
Black Panther 10 7 0.37 Street US 
Insane Gangster Disciple 10 7 0.37 Street US 
Norteños 10 7 0.37 Street US 
Satans Disciples 10 7 0.37 Street US 
Vatos Locos 10 7 0.37 Street Mexico 
Mexikanemi 11 6 0.18 Prison US 
Mongols MC 11 6 0.18 OMG US 
Piru 11 6 0.18 Street US 
Sex Money Murder 11 6 0.18 Street US 
18th St  12 5 -0.01 Street El Salvador 
Outlaws MC 12 5 -0.01 OMG US 
Rollin 20s Crips 12 5 -0.01 Street US 
Rollin 30s Crips 12 5 -0.01 Street Belize 
MS-13 13 4 -0.20 Street El Salvador 
Ñetas 13 4 -0.20 Prison Puerto Rico 
Nuestra Familia 13 4 -0.20 Prison US 
Pagans MC 13 4 -0.20 OMG US 
Rollin 40s Crips 13 4 -0.20 Street US 
Rollin 60s Crips 13 4 -0.20 Street US 
Asian Boyz (Crips) 14 3 -0.40 Street Cambodia 
Athens Park Bloods 14 3 -0.40 Street US 
Black Angels 14 3 -0.40 Street US 
Border Brothers 14 3 -0.40 Prison Mexico 
Dead Man Incorporated 14 3 -0.40 Prison US 
Dirty White Boys 14 3 -0.40 Prison US 
Five Percenters 14 3 -0.40 Street US 
Florencia 13 14 3 -0.40 Street US 
Sons of Silence MC 14 3 -0.40 OMG US 
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Vagos MC 14 3 -0.40 OMG US 
Black Pistons MC 15 2 -0.59 OMG Germany 
Desperados MC 15 2 -0.59 OMG NA 
Grape Street Crips 15 2 -0.59 Street US 
Hoover Gangsters 15 2 -0.59 Street US 
Red Devils MC 15 2 -0.59 OMG Canada 
Shotgun Crips 15 2 -0.59 Street US 
Six Deuce Brim 15 2 -0.59 Street US 
Sons of Samoa 15 2 -0.59 Street Samoa 
Spanish Cobras 15 2 -0.59 Street Puerto Rico 
Bandidos MC 16 1 -0.78 OMG US 
Bounty Hunter Bloods 16 1 -0.78 Street US 
Devils Disciples MC 16 1 -0.78 OMG US 
El Forastero MC 16 1 -0.78 OMG US 
Grupo 25 16 1 -0.78 Prison Puerto Rico 
Grupo 27 16 1 -0.78 Prison Puerto Rico 
Hilltop Crips 16 1 -0.78 Street US 
Money Over Bitches 16 1 -0.78 Street US 
Nine Trey Gangster Blood 16 1 -0.78 Street US 
Prison Motorcycle Brotherhood 16 1 -0.78 Prison US 
Raza Unida 16 1 -0.78 Prison US 
Renegades MC 16 1 -0.78 OMG US 
Rough Riders MC 16 1 -0.78 OMG US 
Trinitarios 16 1 -0.78 Street 
Dominican 
Republic 
Avengers MC 17 0 -0.98 OMG US 
Bandits 17 0 -0.98 Street NA 
Brown Pride 17 0 -0.98 Street NA 
Click Clack 17 0 -0.98 Street NA 
Code Red 17 0 -0.98 Street NA 
Diablos MC 17 0 -0.98 OMG US 
Hard Times  17 0 -0.98 Street NA 
Iron Horsemen MC 17 0 -0.98 OMG US 
Midnight Riders MC 17 0 -0.98 OMG NA 
Native Mob 17 0 -0.98 Street US 
Oriental Boy Soldiers 17 0 -0.98 Street NA 
Outcast MC  17 0 -0.98 OMG US 
Rebels 13 MC 17 0 -0.98 OMG Australia 
Russian Gangs 17 0 -0.98 Street Russia 
Sin City Deciples MC 17 0 -0.98 OMG US 
Somali Gangs 17 0 -0.98 Street Somalia 
Tango Blast 17 0 -0.98 Prison US 
Texas Chicano Brotherhood 17 0 -0.98 Prison US 
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Texas Syndicate 17 0 -0.98 Prison Mexico 
The Cool Kids 17 0 -0.98 Street NA 
Tiny Rascal Gang  17 0 -0.98 Street Cambodia 
Tree Top Piru 17 0 -0.98 Street US 
Tribe MC 17 0 -0.98 OMG NA 
Warlocks MC 17 0 -0.98 OMG US 
Wheels of Soul MC 17 0 -0.98 OMG US 








Juggalos 1 0.0003 0.66 Street US 
Mexican Mafia 1 0.0003 0.66 Prison US 
Crips 2 0.000299 0.65 Street US 
Bloods 3 0.000298 0.63 Street US 
Sureños 3 0.000298 0.63 Street US 
Aryan Brotherhood 4 0.000297 0.62 Prison US 
Aryan Nation 4 0.000297 0.62 Street US 
La Raza 4 0.000297 0.62 Street Mexico 
Mexikanemi 4 0.000297 0.62 Prison US 
Nazi Low Riders 4 0.000297 0.62 Prison US 
Gangster Disciples 5 0.000296 0.61 Street US 
Latin Kings 5 0.000296 0.61 Street US 
Peckerwood 5 0.000296 0.61 Street US 
People Nation 5 0.000296 0.61 Street US 
Vatos Locos 5 0.000296 0.61 Street Mexico 
Vice Lords 5 0.000296 0.61 Street US 
Zoe Pound 5 0.000296 0.61 Street Haiti 
18th St  6 0.000295 0.60 Street El Salvador 
Black Disciples 6 0.000295 0.60 Street US 
Black Guerrilla Family 6 0.000295 0.60 Prison US 
Black P Stones 6 0.000295 0.60 Street US 
Folk Nation 6 0.000295 0.60 Street US 
Norteños 6 0.000295 0.60 Street US 
Outlaws MC 6 0.000295 0.60 OMG US 
Piru 6 0.000295 0.60 Street US 
Aryan Circle 7 0.000294 0.59 Prison US 
Black Angels 7 0.000294 0.59 Street US 
Black Panther 7 0.000294 0.59 Street US 
Florencia 13 7 0.000294 0.59 Street US 
Maniac Latin Disciples 7 0.000294 0.59 Street US 
MS-13 7 0.000294 0.59 Street El Salvador 
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Nuestra Familia 7 0.000294 0.59 Prison US 
Traveling Vice Lords 7 0.000294 0.59 Street US 
Five Percenters 8 0.000293 0.58 Street US 
Imperial Gangster Disciples 8 0.000293 0.58 Street Puerto Rico 
Insane Gangster Disciple 8 0.000293 0.58 Street US 
Sex Money Murder 8 0.000293 0.58 Street US 
Asian Boyz (Crips) 9 0.000292 0.57 Street Cambodia 
Athens Park Bloods 9 0.000292 0.57 Street US 
Conservative Vice Lords 9 0.000292 0.57 Street US 
Four Corner Hustlers 9 0.000292 0.57 Street US 
Hells Angels 9 0.000292 0.57 OMG US 
Insane Unknowns 9 0.000292 0.57 Street Puerto Rico 
Latin Counts 9 0.000292 0.57 Street Mexico 
Ñetas 9 0.000292 0.57 Prison Puerto Rico 
Rollin 20s Crips 9 0.000292 0.57 Street US 
Rollin 30s Crips 9 0.000292 0.57 Street Belize 
Rollin 40s Crips 9 0.000292 0.57 Street US 
Rollin 60s Crips 9 0.000292 0.57 Street US 
Satans Disciples 9 0.000292 0.57 Street US 
Shotgun Crips 9 0.000292 0.57 Street US 
Sons of Samoa 9 0.000292 0.57 Street Samoa 
Spanish Cobras 9 0.000292 0.57 Street Puerto Rico 
White Aryan Resistance 9 0.000292 0.57 Street US 
White Power 9 0.000292 0.57 Street US 
White Supremacists 9 0.000292 0.57 Street US 
Border Brothers 10 0.000291 0.56 Prison Mexico 
Bounty Hunter Bloods 10 0.000291 0.56 Street US 
Dirty White Boys 10 0.000291 0.56 Prison US 
Hammerskins 10 0.000291 0.56 Street US 
Hilltop Crips 10 0.000291 0.56 Street US 
Money Over Bitches 10 0.000291 0.56 Street US 
Neo Nazi 10 0.000291 0.56 Street UK 
Nine Trey Gangster Blood 10 0.000291 0.56 Street US 
Pagans MC 10 0.000291 0.56 OMG US 
Raza Unida 10 0.000291 0.56 Prison US 
Six Deuce Brim 10 0.000291 0.56 Street US 
Sons of Silence MC 10 0.000291 0.56 OMG US 
Supreme White Power 10 0.000291 0.56 Prison US 
Vagos MC 10 0.000291 0.56 OMG US 
Skinheads 11 0.00029 0.55 Street UK 
Dead Man Incorporated 12 0.000289 0.54 Prison US 
Mongols MC 12 0.000289 0.54 OMG US 
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Trinitarios 12 0.000289 0.54 Street 
Dominican 
Republic 
Black Pistons MC 13 0.000288 0.53 OMG Germany 
Prison Motorcycle Brotherhood 13 0.000288 0.53 Prison US 
Desperados MC 14 0.000285 0.49 OMG NA 
Devils Disciples MC 14 0.000285 0.49 OMG US 
El Forastero MC 14 0.000285 0.49 OMG US 
Grape Street Crips 14 0.000285 0.49 Street US 
Hoover Gangsters 14 0.000285 0.49 Street US 
Red Devils MC 14 0.000285 0.49 OMG Canada 
Renegades MC 14 0.000285 0.49 OMG US 
Rough Riders MC 15 0.000284 0.48 OMG US 
Bandidos MC 16 0.000282 0.46 OMG US 
Grupo 25 17 0.00008 -1.73 Prison Puerto Rico 
Grupo 27 17 0.00008 -1.73 Prison Puerto Rico 
Avengers MC 18 0.000079 -1.74 OMG US 
Bandits 18 0.000079 -1.74 Street NA 
Brown Pride 18 0.000079 -1.74 Street NA 
Click Clack 18 0.000079 -1.74 Street NA 
Code Red 18 0.000079 -1.74 Street NA 
Diablos MC 18 0.000079 -1.74 OMG US 
Hard Times  18 0.000079 -1.74 Street NA 
Iron Horsemen MC 18 0.000079 -1.74 OMG US 
Midnight Riders MC 18 0.000079 -1.74 OMG NA 
Native Mob 18 0.000079 -1.74 Street US 
Oriental Boy Soldiers 18 0.000079 -1.74 Street NA 
Outcast MC  18 0.000079 -1.74 OMG US 
Rebels 13 MC 18 0.000079 -1.74 OMG Australia 
Russian Gangs 18 0.000079 -1.74 Street Russia 
Sin City Deciples MC 18 0.000079 -1.74 OMG US 
Somali Gangs 18 0.000079 -1.74 Street Somalia 
Tango Blast 18 0.000079 -1.74 Prison US 
Texas Chicano Brotherhood 18 0.000079 -1.74 Prison US 
Texas Syndicate 18 0.000079 -1.74 Prison Mexico 
The Cool Kids 18 0.000079 -1.74 Street NA 
Tiny Rascal Gang  18 0.000079 -1.74 Street Cambodia 
Tree Top Piru 18 0.000079 -1.74 Street US 
Tribe MC 18 0.000079 -1.74 OMG NA 
Warlocks MC 18 0.000079 -1.74 OMG US 
Wheels of Soul MC 18 0.000079 -1.74 OMG US 










Crips 1 1049.08 5.86 Street US 
Mexican Mafia 2 781.29 4.26 Prison US 
Bloods 3 716.03 3.87 Street US 
Juggalos 4 689.87 3.72 Street US 
Aryan Nation 5 419.54 2.11 Street US 
Sureños 6 418.20 2.10 Street US 
Hells Angels 7 404.00 2.02 OMG US 
Aryan Brotherhood 8 403.23 2.01 Prison US 
Outlaws MC 9 259.12 1.16 OMG US 
Zoe Pound 10 211.86 0.87 Street Haiti 
Nazi Low Riders 11 173.19 0.64 Prison US 
La Raza 12 157.12 0.55 Street Mexico 
Peckerwood 13 124.02 0.35 Street US 
Black Guerrilla Family 14 105.07 0.24 Prison US 
Black P Stones 15 101.27 0.22 Street US 
Pagans MC 16 100.29 0.21 OMG US 
Latin Kings 17 94.88 0.18 Street US 
Mongols MC 18 94.14 0.17 OMG US 
Rollin 30s Crips 19 82.50 0.10 Street Belize 
Shotgun Crips 20 79.50 0.09 Street US 
Norteños 21 77.16 0.07 Street US 
Aryan Circle 22 75.85 0.07 Prison US 
Mexikanemi 23 75.48 0.06 Prison US 
Vatos Locos 24 72.78 0.05 Street Mexico 
Gangster Disciples 25 70.10 0.03 Street US 
Vice Lords 26 65.22 0.00 Street US 
People Nation 27 64.71 0.00 Street US 
18th St  28 51.21 -0.08 Street El Salvador 
Folk Nation 29 40.61 -0.14 Street US 
Black Panther 30 36.85 -0.17 Street US 
Piru 31 31.53 -0.20 Street US 
Nuestra Familia 32 28.39 -0.22 Prison US 
Black Disciples 33 21.45 -0.26 Street US 
Maniac Latin Disciples 34 19.87 -0.27 Street US 
White Aryan Resistance 35 17.44 -0.28 Street US 
White Power 35 17.44 -0.28 Street US 
White Supremacists 35 17.44 -0.28 Street US 
Sons of Silence MC 36 17.29 -0.28 OMG US 
Vagos MC 37 17.29 -0.28 OMG US 
Neo Nazi 38 10.25 -0.33 Street UK 
Traveling Vice Lords 39 8.99 -0.33 Street US 
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Supreme White Power 40 8.36 -0.34 Prison US 
Florencia 13 41 4.66 -0.36 Street US 
Grape Street Crips 42 2.50 -0.37 Street US 
Sex Money Murder 43 2.30 -0.37 Street US 
Rollin 20s Crips 44 2.00 -0.37 Street US 
Conservative Vice Lords 45 1.91 -0.37 Street US 
Hammerskins 46 1.90 -0.37 Street US 
MS-13 47 1.78 -0.38 Street El Salvador 
Ñetas 48 1.27 -0.38 Prison Puerto Rico 
Imperial Gangster Disciples 49 1.09 -0.38 Street Puerto Rico 
Hoover Gangsters 50 1.00 -0.38 Street US 
Insane Gangster Disciple 51 0.95 -0.38 Street US 
Border Brothers 52 0.73 -0.38 Prison Mexico 
Four Corner Hustlers 53 0.67 -0.38 Street US 
Insane Unknowns 53 0.67 -0.38 Street Puerto Rico 
Athens Park Bloods 54 0.67 -0.38 Street US 
Asian Boyz (Crips) 55 0.50 -0.38 Street Cambodia 
Dead Man Incorporated 56 0.25 -0.38 Prison US 
Satans Disciples 57 0.24 -0.38 Street US 
Avengers MC 58 0.00 -0.39 OMG US 
Bandidos MC 58 0.00 -0.39 OMG US 
Bandits 58 0.00 -0.39 Street NA 
Black Angels 58 0.00 -0.39 Street US 
Black Pistons MC 58 0.00 -0.39 OMG Germany 
Bounty Hunter Bloods 58 0.00 -0.39 Street US 
Brown Pride 58 0.00 -0.39 Street NA 
Click Clack 58 0.00 -0.39 Street NA 
Code Red 58 0.00 -0.39 Street NA 
Desperados MC 58 0.00 -0.39 OMG NA 
Devils Disciples MC 58 0.00 -0.39 OMG US 
Diablos MC 58 0.00 -0.39 OMG US 
Dirty White Boys 58 0.00 -0.39 Prison US 
El Forastero MC 58 0.00 -0.39 OMG US 
Five Percenters 58 0.00 -0.39 Street US 
Grupo 25 58 0.00 -0.39 Prison Puerto Rico 
Grupo 27 58 0.00 -0.39 Prison Puerto Rico 
Hard Times  58 0.00 -0.39 Street NA 
Hilltop Crips 58 0.00 -0.39 Street US 
Iron Horsemen MC 58 0.00 -0.39 OMG US 
Latin Counts 58 0.00 -0.39 Street Mexico 
Midnight Riders MC 58 0.00 -0.39 OMG NA 
Money Over Bitches 58 0.00 -0.39 Street US 
Native Mob 58 0.00 -0.39 Street US 
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Nine Trey Gangster Blood 58 0.00 -0.39 Street US 
Oriental Boy Soldiers 58 0.00 -0.39 Street NA 
Outcast MC  58 0.00 -0.39 OMG US 
Prison Motorcycle Brotherhood 58 0.00 -0.39 Prison US 
Raza Unida 58 0.00 -0.39 Prison US 
Rebels 13 MC 58 0.00 -0.39 OMG Australia 
Red Devils MC 58 0.00 -0.39 OMG Canada 
Renegades MC 58 0.00 -0.39 OMG US 
Rollin 40s Crips 58 0.00 -0.39 Street US 
Rollin 60s Crips 58 0.00 -0.39 Street US 
Rough Riders MC 58 0.00 -0.39 OMG US 
Russian Gangs 58 0.00 -0.39 Street Russia 
Sin City Deciples MC 58 0.00 -0.39 OMG US 
Six Deuce Brim 58 0.00 -0.39 Street US 
Skinheads 58 0.00 -0.39 Street UK 
Somali Gangs 58 0.00 -0.39 Street Somalia 
Sons of Samoa 58 0.00 -0.39 Street Samoa 
Spanish Cobras 58 0.00 -0.39 Street Puerto Rico 
Tango Blast 58 0.00 -0.39 Prison US 
Texas Chicano Brotherhood 58 0.00 -0.39 Prison US 
Texas Syndicate 58 0.00 -0.39 Prison Mexico 
The Cool Kids 58 0.00 -0.39 Street NA 
Tiny Rascal Gang  58 0.00 -0.39 Street Cambodia 
Tree Top Piru 58 0.00 -0.39 Street US 
Tribe MC 58 0.00 -0.39 OMG NA 
Trinitarios 58 0.00 -0.39 Street 
Dominican 
Republic 
Warlocks MC 58 0.00 -0.39 OMG US 
Wheels of Soul MC 58 0.00 -0.39 OMG US 








Crips 1 0.0392 4.29 Street US 
Bloods 2 0.0361 3.85 Street US 
Sureños 3 0.0262 2.45 Street US 
Aryan Nation 4 0.0229 1.98 Street US 
Aryan Brotherhood 5 0.0226 1.94 Prison US 
Hells Angels 6 0.0217 1.81 OMG US 
Mexican Mafia 7 0.0208 1.69 Prison US 
Black P Stones 8 0.0185 1.36 Street US 
Latin Kings 8 0.0185 1.36 Street US 
Zoe Pound 9 0.0179 1.28 Street Haiti 
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Nazi Low Riders 10 0.0177 1.25 Prison US 
Peckerwood 10 0.0177 1.25 Street US 
Black Guerrilla Family 11 0.0176 1.23 Prison US 
People Nation 12 0.0171 1.16 Street US 
Vice Lords 13 0.0169 1.14 Street US 
La Raza 14 0.0161 1.02 Street Mexico 
Gangster Disciples 15 0.0156 0.95 Street US 
Juggalos 15 0.0156 0.95 Street US 
Mongols MC 16 0.0155 0.94 OMG US 
Folk Nation 17 0.0147 0.82 Street US 
Black Disciples 18 0.0144 0.78 Street US 
Traveling Vice Lords 18 0.0144 0.78 Street US 
Neo Nazi 19 0.0134 0.64 Street UK 
White Aryan Resistance 20 0.0133 0.63 Street US 
White Power 20 0.0133 0.63 Street US 
White Supremacists 20 0.0133 0.63 Street US 
Conservative Vice Lords 21 0.0131 0.60 Street US 
Outlaws MC 22 0.0124 0.50 OMG US 
Supreme White Power 23 0.0121 0.46 Prison US 
Aryan Circle 24 0.012 0.44 Prison US 
Hammerskins 24 0.012 0.44 Street US 
Four Corner Hustlers 25 0.0119 0.43 Street US 
Insane Unknowns 25 0.0119 0.43 Street Puerto Rico 
Imperial Gangster Disciples 26 0.0117 0.40 Street Puerto Rico 
Maniac Latin Disciples 27 0.0116 0.39 Street US 
Rollin 30s Crips 28 0.0113 0.34 Street Belize 
Grupo 25 29 0.011 0.30 Prison Puerto Rico 
Grupo 27 29 0.011 0.30 Prison Puerto Rico 
Norteños 29 0.011 0.30 Street US 
Skinheads 30 0.0108 0.27 Street UK 
Black Panther 31 0.0107 0.26 Street US 
Latin Counts 31 0.0107 0.26 Street Mexico 
Rollin 20s Crips 32 0.0106 0.25 Street US 
Insane Gangster Disciple 33 0.0105 0.23 Street US 
Satans Disciples 33 0.0105 0.23 Street US 
Vatos Locos 34 0.0103 0.20 Street Mexico 
Piru 35 0.01 0.16 Street US 
Pagans MC 36 0.0099 0.15 OMG US 
Mexikanemi 37 0.0096 0.10 Prison US 
18th St  38 0.0086 -0.04 Street El Salvador 
Rollin 40s Crips 38 0.0086 -0.04 Street US 
Rollin 60s Crips 38 0.0086 -0.04 Street US 
Sex Money Murder 38 0.0086 -0.04 Street US 
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MS-13 39 0.0072 -0.24 Street El Salvador 
Nuestra Familia 39 0.0072 -0.24 Prison US 
Asian Boyz (Crips) 40 0.007 -0.26 Street Cambodia 
Hoover Gangsters 40 0.007 -0.26 Street US 
Desperados MC 41 0.0069 -0.28 OMG NA 
Red Devils MC 41 0.0069 -0.28 OMG Canada 
Sons of Silence MC 42 0.0067 -0.31 OMG US 
Vagos MC 42 0.0067 -0.31 OMG US 
Grape Street Crips 43 0.0065 -0.33 Street US 
Ñetas 44 0.0064 -0.35 Prison Puerto Rico 
Border Brothers 45 0.0061 -0.39 Prison Mexico 
Florencia 13 45 0.0061 -0.39 Street US 
Shotgun Crips 46 0.006 -0.40 Street US 
Black Angels 47 0.0059 -0.42 Street US 
Black Pistons MC 47 0.0059 -0.42 OMG Germany 
Dead Man Incorporated 48 0.0058 -0.43 Prison US 
Dirty White Boys 49 0.0057 -0.45 Prison US 
Athens Park Bloods 50 0.0055 -0.48 Street US 
Five Percenters 50 0.0055 -0.48 Street US 
Sons of Samoa 51 0.005 -0.55 Street Samoa 
Six Deuce Brim 52 0.0043 -0.64 Street US 
Spanish Cobras 52 0.0043 -0.64 Street Puerto Rico 
Devils Disciples MC 53 0.004 -0.69 OMG US 
El Forastero MC 53 0.004 -0.69 OMG US 
Renegades MC 53 0.004 -0.69 OMG US 
Bandidos MC 54 0.0038 -0.72 OMG US 
Prison Motorcycle Brotherhood 54 0.0038 -0.72 Prison US 
Rough Riders MC 54 0.0038 -0.72 OMG US 
Hilltop Crips 55 0.003 -0.83 Street US 
Raza Unida 55 0.003 -0.83 Prison US 
Bounty Hunter Bloods 56 0.0029 -0.84 Street US 
Money Over Bitches 56 0.0029 -0.84 Street US 
Nine Trey Gangster Blood 56 0.0029 -0.84 Street US 
Trinitarios 56 0.0029 -0.84 Street 
Dominican 
Republic 
Avengers MC 57 0.0017 -1.01 OMG US 
Bandits 57 0.0017 -1.01 Street NA 
Brown Pride 57 0.0017 -1.01 Street NA 
Click Clack 57 0.0017 -1.01 Street NA 
Code Red 57 0.0017 -1.01 Street NA 
Diablos MC 57 0.0017 -1.01 OMG US 
Hard Times  57 0.0017 -1.01 Street NA 
Iron Horsemen MC 57 0.0017 -1.01 OMG US 
289 
 
Midnight Riders MC 57 0.0017 -1.01 OMG NA 
Native Mob 57 0.0017 -1.01 Street US 
Oriental Boy Soldiers 57 0.0017 -1.01 Street NA 
Outcast MC  57 0.0017 -1.01 OMG US 
Rebels 13 MC 57 0.0017 -1.01 OMG Australia 
Russian Gangs 57 0.0017 -1.01 Street Russia 
Sin City Deciples MC 57 0.0017 -1.01 OMG US 
Somali Gangs 57 0.0017 -1.01 Street Somalia 
Tango Blast 57 0.0017 -1.01 Prison US 
Texas Chicano Brotherhood 57 0.0017 -1.01 Prison US 
Texas Syndicate 57 0.0017 -1.01 Prison Mexico 
The Cool Kids 57 0.0017 -1.01 Street NA 
Tiny Rascal Gang  57 0.0017 -1.01 Street Cambodia 
Tree Top Piru 57 0.0017 -1.01 Street US 
Tribe MC 57 0.0017 -1.01 OMG NA 
Warlocks MC 57 0.0017 -1.01 OMG US 
Wheels of Soul MC 57 0.0017 -1.01 OMG US 








Bloods 1 1 3.57 Street US 
Vice Lords 2 0.8126 2.75 Street US 
Black P Stones 3 0.8033 2.70 Street US 
People Nation 4 0.7691 2.56 Street US 
Latin Kings 5 0.7485 2.47 Street US 
Traveling Vice Lords 6 0.7289 2.38 Street US 
Conservative Vice Lords 7 0.6822 2.17 Street US 
Four Corner Hustlers 8 0.6444 2.01 Street US 
Insane Unknowns 8 0.6444 2.01 Street Puerto Rico 
Zoe Pound 9 0.5866 1.76 Street Haiti 
Crips 10 0.5844 1.75 Street US 
Latin Counts 11 0.5793 1.72 Street Mexico 
Black Guerrilla Family 12 0.5377 1.54 Prison US 
Juggalos 13 0.5056 1.40 Street US 
Sex Money Murder 14 0.4341 1.09 Street US 
Gangster Disciples 15 0.4149 1.01 Street US 
Vatos Locos 16 0.4086 0.98 Street Mexico 
Sureños 17 0.3727 0.82 Street US 
Black Panther 18 0.3702 0.81 Street US 
Mexican Mafia 19 0.3673 0.80 Prison US 
Black Disciples 20 0.3668 0.79 Street US 
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Folk Nation 21 0.3505 0.72 Street US 
Norteños 22 0.3489 0.72 Street US 
La Raza 23 0.3399 0.68 Street Mexico 
Maniac Latin Disciples 24 0.3214 0.60 Street US 
Peckerwood 25 0.3009 0.51 Street US 
Aryan Nation 26 0.2931 0.47 Street US 
Nazi Low Riders 27 0.2888 0.45 Prison US 
Piru 28 0.2803 0.42 Street US 
Imperial Gangster Disciples 29 0.2729 0.38 Street Puerto Rico 
Aryan Brotherhood 30 0.2613 0.33 Prison US 
Insane Gangster Disciple 31 0.2449 0.26 Street US 
Satans Disciples 32 0.2433 0.25 Street US 
Ñetas 33 0.2392 0.24 Prison Puerto Rico 
White Aryan Resistance 34 0.2341 0.21 Street US 
White Power 34 0.2341 0.21 Street US 
White Supremacists 34 0.2341 0.21 Street US 
Neo Nazi 35 0.2272 0.18 Street UK 
Mexikanemi 36 0.222 0.16 Prison US 
Aryan Circle 37 0.2205 0.15 Prison US 
Nuestra Familia 38 0.212 0.12 Prison US 
Supreme White Power 39 0.2021 0.07 Prison US 
Hammerskins 40 0.2017 0.07 Street US 
Athens Park Bloods 41 0.1984 0.06 Street US 
Five Percenters 42 0.1817 -0.02 Street US 
Skinheads 43 0.1766 -0.04 Street UK 
18th St  44 0.1642 -0.09 Street El Salvador 
Six Deuce Brim 45 0.1219 -0.28 Street US 
MS-13 46 0.1105 -0.33 Street El Salvador 
Dead Man Incorporated 47 0.1046 -0.35 Prison US 
Bounty Hunter Bloods 48 0.0952 -0.39 Street US 
Money Over Bitches 48 0.0952 -0.39 Street US 
Nine Trey Gangster Blood 48 0.0952 -0.39 Street US 
Spanish Cobras 49 0.089 -0.42 Street Puerto Rico 
Rollin 20s Crips 50 0.0848 -0.44 Street US 
Hells Angels 51 0.0843 -0.44 OMG US 
Dirty White Boys 52 0.0814 -0.45 Prison US 
Black Angels 53 0.081 -0.46 Street US 
Rollin 30s Crips 54 0.0795 -0.46 Street Belize 
Rollin 40s Crips 55 0.0788 -0.47 Street US 
Rollin 60s Crips 55 0.0788 -0.47 Street US 
Florencia 13 56 0.076 -0.48 Street US 
Asian Boyz (Crips) 57 0.0696 -0.51 Street Cambodia 
Outlaws MC 58 0.0634 -0.53 OMG US 
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Sons of Samoa 59 0.0623 -0.54 Street Samoa 
Border Brothers 60 0.0584 -0.56 Prison Mexico 
Shotgun Crips 61 0.0562 -0.56 Street US 
Trinitarios 62 0.0559 -0.57 Street 
Dominican 
Republic 
Hilltop Crips 63 0.0556 -0.57 Street US 
Pagans MC 64 0.0555 -0.57 OMG US 
Sons of Silence MC 65 0.055 -0.57 OMG US 
Vagos MC 65 0.055 -0.57 OMG US 
Raza Unida 66 0.0355 -0.66 Prison US 
Mongols MC 67 0.0228 -0.71 OMG US 
Desperados MC 68 0.0089 -0.77 OMG NA 
Red Devils MC 68 0.0089 -0.77 OMG Canada 
Black Pistons MC 69 0.0082 -0.77 OMG Germany 
Grape Street Crips 69 0.0082 -0.77 Street US 
Devils Disciples MC 70 0.008 -0.78 OMG US 
El Forastero MC 70 0.008 -0.78 OMG US 
Renegades MC 70 0.008 -0.78 OMG US 
Hoover Gangsters 71 0.0061 -0.78 Street US 
Prison Motorcycle Brotherhood 72 0.006 -0.78 Prison US 
Rough Riders MC 73 0.0053 -0.79 OMG US 
Bandidos MC 74 0.0022 -0.80 OMG US 
Avengers MC 75 0 -0.81 OMG US 
Bandits 75 0 -0.81 Street NA 
Brown Pride 75 0 -0.81 Street NA 
Click Clack 75 0 -0.81 Street NA 
Code Red 75 0 -0.81 Street NA 
Diablos MC 75 0 -0.81 OMG US 
Grupo 25 75 0 -0.81 Prison Puerto Rico 
Grupo 27 75 0 -0.81 Prison Puerto Rico 
Hard Times  75 0 -0.81 Street NA 
Iron Horsemen MC 75 0 -0.81 OMG US 
Midnight Riders MC 75 0 -0.81 OMG NA 
Native Mob 75 0 -0.81 Street US 
Oriental Boy Soldiers 75 0 -0.81 Street NA 
Outcast MC  75 0 -0.81 OMG US 
Rebels 13 MC 75 0 -0.81 OMG Australia 
Russian Gangs 75 0 -0.81 Street Russia 
Sin City Deciples MC 75 0 -0.81 OMG US 
Somali Gangs 75 0 -0.81 Street Somalia 
Tango Blast 75 0 -0.81 Prison US 
Texas Chicano Brotherhood 75 0 -0.81 Prison US 
Texas Syndicate 75 0 -0.81 Prison Mexico 
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The Cool Kids 75 0 -0.81 Street NA 
Tiny Rascal Gang  75 0 -0.81 Street Cambodia 
Tree Top Piru 75 0 -0.81 Street US 
Tribe MC 75 0 -0.81 OMG NA 
Warlocks MC 75 0 -0.81 OMG US 
Wheels of Soul MC 75 0 -0.81 OMG US 
Zulus MC 75 0 -0.81 OMG US 
 









Crips 3.90 1 Street US 
Bloods 3.67 2 Street US 
Aryan Brotherhood 1.82 3 Prison US 
Sureños 1.67 4 Street US 
Aryan Nation 1.63 5 Street US 
Latin Kings 1.21 6 Street US 
Black P Stones 1.12 7 Street US 
Gangster Disciples 1.05 8 Street US 
Norteños 1.02 9 Street US 
Black Guerrilla Family 0.99 10 Prison US 
Sinaloa Cartel 0.98 11 Cartel Mexico 
MS-13 0.97 12 Street El Salvador 
Black Disciples 0.91 13 Street US 
Zoe Pound 0.77 14 Street Haiti 
Mexican Mafia 0.76 15 Prison US 
Outlaws MC 0.70 16 OMG US 
Gulf Cartel 0.63 17 Cartel Mexico 
Peckerwood 0.61 18 Street US 
Zetas Cartel 0.60 19 Cartel Mexico 
Hells Angels 0.59 20 OMG US 
Folk Nation 0.55 21 Street US 
People Nation 0.55 21 Street US 
Traveling Vice Lords 0.54 22 Street US 
Nazi Low Riders 0.54 22 Prison US 
Aryan Circle 0.50 23 Prison US 
La Raza 0.50 23 Street Mexico 
Neo Nazi 0.42 24 Street UK 
White Power 0.42 24 Street US 
White Supremacists 0.42 24 Street US 
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Vice Lords 0.40 25 Street US 
Conservative Vice Lords 0.38 26 Street US 
Skinheads 0.38 26 Street UK 
White Aryan Resistance 0.37 27 Street US 
Pagans MC 0.36 28 OMG US 
Supreme White Power 0.33 29 Prison US 
Tijuana Cartel 0.32 30 Cartel Mexico 
Black Panther 0.32 30 Street US 
Hammerskins 0.31 31 Street US 
Mexikanemi 0.29 32 Prison US 
Bandidos MC 0.28 33 OMG US 
Imperial Gangster Disciples 0.23 34 Street Puerto Rico 
Four Corner Hustlers 0.22 35 Street US 
Insane Unknowns 0.22 35 Street Puerto Rico 
Latin Counts 0.22 35 Street Mexico 
Nuestra Familia 0.22 35 Prison US 
Piru 0.21 36 Street US 
Insane Gangster Disciple 0.18 37 Street US 
Maniac Latin Disciples 0.18 37 Street US 
Satans Disciples 0.18 37 Street US 
Juarez Cartel 0.13 38 Cartel Mexico 
La Familia Michoacana Cartel 0.12 39 Cartel Mexico 
Ñetas 0.11 40 Prison Puerto Rico 
Five Percenters 0.09 41 Street US 
Rollin 60s Crips 0.08 42 Street US 
Vatos Locos 0.07 43 Street Mexico 
Juggalos 0.05 44 Street US 
18th St  0.01 45 Street El Salvador 
Florencia 13 -0.05 46 Street US 
Border Brothers -0.09 47 Prison Mexico 
Spanish Cobras -0.10 48 Street Puerto Rico 
Rollin 20s Crips -0.11 49 Street US 
Trinitarios -0.12 50 Street 
Dominican 
Republic 
Texas Syndicate -0.13 51 Prison Mexico 
Mongols MC -0.14 52 OMG US 
Rollin 40s Crips -0.14 52 Street US 
Rollin 30s Crips -0.14 52 Street Belize 
Sex Money Murder -0.17 53 Street US 
Vagos MC -0.19 54 OMG US 
Hoover Gangsters -0.21 55 Street US 
Tiny Rascal Gang  -0.22 56 Street Cambodia 
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Desperados MC -0.26 57 OMG NA 
Red Devils MC -0.26 57 OMG Canada 
JalNewGen Cartel -0.30 58 Cartel Mexico 
Black Angels -0.30 58 Street US 
Dead Man Incorporated -0.31 59 Prison US 
Grape Street Crips -0.32 60 Street US 
Bounty Hunter Bloods -0.32 60 Street US 
Shotgun Crips -0.32 60 Street US 
Sons of Silence MC -0.32 60 OMG US 
BelLey Cartel -0.33 61 Cartel Mexico 
Asian Boyz (Crips) -0.34 62 Street Cambodia 
Sons of Samoa -0.36 63 Street Samoa 
Tree Top Piru -0.36 63 Street US 
Dirty White Boys -0.36 63 Prison US 
Black Pistons MC -0.36 63 OMG Germany 
Athens Park Bloods -0.39 64 Street US 
El Forastero MC -0.43 65 OMG US 
Native Mob -0.43 65 Street US 
Wheels of Soul MC -0.44 66 OMG US 
Grupo 27 -0.44 66 Prison Puerto Rico 
Raza Unida -0.47 67 Prison US 
Six Deuce Brim -0.48 68 Street US 
Texas Chicano Brotherhood -0.53 69 Prison US 
Hilltop Crips -0.56 70 Street US 
Money Over Bitches -0.56 70 Street US 
Nine Trey Gangster Blood -0.56 70 Street US 
Warlocks MC -0.57 71 OMG US 
Renegades MC -0.58 72 OMG US 
Tango Blast -0.60 73 Prison US 
Brown Pride -0.61 74 Street NA 
Avengers MC -0.68 75 OMG US 
Rough Riders MC -0.68 75 OMG US 
Tribe MC -0.68 75 OMG NA 
Diablos MC -0.68 75 OMG US 
Iron Horsemen MC -0.68 75 OMG US 
Prison Motorcycle 
Brotherhood -0.68 75 Prison US 
Devils Disciples MC -0.68 75 OMG US 
Grupo 25 -0.69 76 Prison Puerto Rico 
Outcast MC  -0.69 76 OMG US 
Rebels 13 MC -0.69 76 OMG Australia 
Bandits -1.38 77 Street NA 
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Click Clack -1.38 77 Street NA 
Code Red -1.38 77 Street NA 
Hard Times  -1.38 77 Street NA 
Midnight Riders MC -1.38 77 OMG NA 
Oriental Boy Soldiers -1.38 77 Street NA 
Russian Gangs -1.38 77 Street Russia 
Sin City Deciples MC -1.38 77 OMG US 
Somali Gangs -1.38 77 Street Somalia 
The Cool Kids -1.38 77 Street NA 
Zulus MC -1.38 77 OMG US 
  








Crips 3.52 1 Street US 
Bloods 2.94 2 Street US 
Sinaloa Cartel 2.86 3 Cartel Mexico 
Sureños 2.10 4 Street US 
Latin Kings 1.56 5 Street US 
Mexican Mafia 1.54 6 Prison US 
Gulf Cartel 1.45 7 Cartel Mexico 
Aryan Brotherhood 1.43 8 Prison US 
Aryan Nation 1.43 8 Street US 
Zetas Cartel 1.27 9 Cartel Mexico 
Zoe Pound 1.09 10 Street Haiti 
Hells Angels 1.06 11 OMG US 
Black P Stones 1.01 12 Street US 
Tijuana Cartel 0.98 13 Cartel Mexico 
Peckerwood 0.97 14 Street US 
Black Guerrilla Family 0.94 15 Prison US 
Gangster Disciples 0.88 16 Street US 
Juggalos 0.87 17 Street US 
La Familia Michoacana Cartel 0.85 18 Cartel Mexico 
Nazi Low Riders 0.79 19 Prison US 
Vice Lords 0.69 20 Street US 
Norteños 0.68 21 Street US 
People Nation 0.67 22 Street US 
La Raza 0.66 23 Street Mexico 
Conservative Vice Lords 0.64 24 Street US 
Juarez Cartel 0.50 25 Cartel Mexico 
Traveling Vice Lords 0.48 26 Street US 
Mexikanemi 0.39 27 Prison US 
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Folk Nation 0.35 28 Street US 
Black Disciples 0.34 29 Street US 
Four Corner Hustlers 0.29 30 Street US 
Insane Unknowns 0.29 30 Street Puerto Rico 
MS-13 0.28 31 Street El Salvador 
White Aryan Resistance 0.26 32 Street US 
White Power 0.26 32 Street US 
White Supremacists 0.26 32 Street US 
Neo Nazi 0.24 33 Street UK 
Latin Counts 0.18 34 Street Mexico 
Aryan Circle 0.17 35 Prison US 
Vatos Locos 0.17 35 Street Mexico 
Maniac Latin Disciples 0.17 35 Street US 
18th St  0.16 36 Street El Salvador 
Black Panther 0.16 36 Street US 
Supreme White Power 0.15 37 Prison US 
Imperial Gangster Disciples 0.13 38 Street Puerto Rico 
Hammerskins 0.13 38 Street US 
Outlaws MC 0.12 39 OMG US 
Rollin 60s Crips 0.10 40 Street US 
Mongols MC 0.09 41 OMG US 
Insane Gangster Disciple 0.05 42 Street US 
Sex Money Murder 0.04 43 Street US 
Satans Disciples 0.04 43 Street US 
Florencia 13 0.03 44 Street US 
Skinheads 0.03 44 Street UK 
Piru 0.02 45 Street US 
Border Brothers 0.01 46 Prison Mexico 
Rollin 30s Crips 0.01 46 Street Belize 
Nuestra Familia -0.02 47 Prison US 
Vagos MC -0.05 48 OMG US 
JalNewGen Cartel -0.06 49 Cartel Mexico 
Pagans MC -0.06 49 OMG US 
Rollin 20s Crips -0.12 50 Street US 
Bandidos MC -0.17 51 OMG US 
Ñetas -0.18 52 Prison Puerto Rico 
BelLey Cartel -0.19 53 Cartel Mexico 
Rollin 40s Crips -0.21 54 Street US 
Shotgun Crips -0.23 55 Street US 
Black Angels -0.26 56 Street US 
Five Percenters -0.27 57 Street US 
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Athens Park Bloods -0.27 57 Street US 
Dirty White Boys -0.28 58 Prison US 
Asian Boyz (Crips) -0.29 59 Street Cambodia 
Sons of Silence MC -0.29 59 OMG US 
Dead Man Incorporated -0.30 60 Prison US 
Raza Unida -0.35 61 Prison US 
Texas Syndicate -0.36 62 Prison Mexico 
Sons of Samoa -0.37 63 Street Samoa 
Six Deuce Brim -0.37 63 Street US 
Spanish Cobras -0.38 64 Street Puerto Rico 
Desperados MC -0.38 64 OMG NA 
Red Devils MC -0.38 64 OMG Canada 
Hoover Gangsters -0.39 65 Street US 
Grape Street Crips -0.40 66 Street US 
Black Pistons MC -0.42 67 OMG Germany 
Brown Pride -0.45 68 Street NA 
Bounty Hunter Bloods -0.46 69 Street US 
Money Over Bitches -0.46 69 Street US 
Nine Trey Gangster Blood -0.46 69 Street US 
Hilltop Crips -0.46 69 Street US 
Texas Chicano Brotherhood -0.47 70 Prison US 
Trinitarios -0.48 71 Street 
Dominican 
Republic 
Devils Disciples MC -0.49 72 OMG US 
El Forastero MC -0.49 72 OMG US 
Renegades MC -0.49 72 OMG US 
Prison Motorcycle 
Brotherhood -0.50 73 Prison US 
Rough Riders MC -0.51 74 OMG US 
Grupo 25 -0.78 75 Prison Puerto Rico 
Grupo 27 -0.78 75 Prison Puerto Rico 
Avengers MC -1.06 76 OMG US 
Bandits -1.06 76 Street NA 
Click Clack -1.06 76 Street NA 
Code Red -1.06 76 Street NA 
Diablos MC -1.06 76 OMG US 
Hard Times  -1.06 76 Street NA 
Iron Horsemen MC -1.06 76 OMG US 
Midnight Riders MC -1.06 76 OMG NA 
Native Mob -1.06 76 Street US 
Oriental Boy Soldiers -1.06 76 Street NA 
Outcast MC  -1.06 76 OMG US 
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Rebels 13 MC -1.06 76 OMG Australia 
Russian Gangs -1.06 76 Street Russia 
Sin City Deciples MC -1.06 76 OMG US 
Somali Gangs -1.06 76 Street Somalia 
Tango Blast -1.06 76 Prison US 
The Cool Kids -1.06 76 Street NA 
Tiny Rascal Gang  -1.06 76 Street Cambodia 
Tree Top Piru -1.06 76 Street US 
Tribe MC -1.06 76 OMG NA 
Warlocks MC -1.06 76 OMG US 
Wheels of Soul MC -1.06 76 OMG US 
Zulus MC -1.06 76 OMG US 
  








Crips 3.24 1 Street US 
Bloods 3.11 2 Street US 
Mexican Mafia 1.79 3 Prison US 
Sureños 1.66 4 Street US 
Juggalos 1.57 5 Street US 
Aryan Nation 1.38 6 Street US 
Black P Stones 1.32 7 Street US 
Aryan Brotherhood 1.29 8 Prison US 
Latin Kings 1.27 9 Street US 
Vice Lords 1.20 10 Street US 
People Nation 1.17 11 Street US 
Zoe Pound 1.17 11 Street Haiti 
Black Guerrilla Family 0.99 12 Prison US 
Traveling Vice Lords 0.91 13 Street US 
Hells Angels 0.90 14 OMG US 
Nazi Low Riders 0.86 15 Prison US 
Peckerwood 0.85 16 Street US 
La Raza 0.80 17 Street Mexico 
Conservative Vice Lords 0.78 18 Street US 
Gangster Disciples 0.75 19 Street US 
Four Corner Hustlers 0.68 20 Street US 
Insane Unknowns 0.68 20 Street Puerto Rico 
Folk Nation 0.59 21 Street US 
Black Disciples 0.57 22 Street US 
Latin Counts 0.55 23 Street Mexico 
Vatos Locos 0.44 24 Street Mexico 
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White Aryan Resistance 0.42 25 Street US 
White Power 0.42 25 Street US 
White Supremacists 0.42 25 Street US 
Norteños 0.41 26 Street US 
Aryan Circle 0.40 27 Prison US 
Neo Nazi 0.40 27 Street UK 
Maniac Latin Disciples 0.37 28 Street US 
Black Panther 0.37 28 Street US 
Outlaws MC 0.34 29 OMG US 
Imperial Gangster Disciples 0.31 30 Street Puerto Rico 
Supreme White Power 0.30 31 Prison US 
Hammerskins 0.29 32 Street US 
Sex Money Murder 0.29 32 Street US 
Piru 0.23 33 Street US 
Mexikanemi 0.23 33 Prison US 
Mongols MC 0.22 34 OMG US 
Insane Gangster Disciple 0.21 35 Street US 
Satans Disciples 0.21 35 Street US 
Skinheads 0.19 36 Street UK 
Rollin 30s Crips 0.11 37 Street Belize 
18th St  0.08 38 Street El Salvador 
Pagans MC 0.03 39 OMG US 
Nuestra Familia 0.01 40 Prison US 
Rollin 20s Crips 0.00 41 Street US 
Ñetas -0.03 42 Prison Puerto Rico 
Rollin 40s Crips -0.10 43 Street US 
Rollin 60s Crips -0.10 43 Street US 
MS-13 -0.11 44 Street El Salvador 
Athens Park Bloods -0.13 45 Street US 
Five Percenters -0.14 46 Street US 
Shotgun Crips -0.18 47 Street US 
Asian Boyz (Crips) -0.20 48 Street Cambodia 
Sons of Silence MC -0.20 48 OMG US 
Vagos MC -0.20 48 OMG US 
Dead Man Incorporated -0.21 49 Prison US 
Florencia 13 -0.21 49 Street US 
Black Angels -0.21 49 Street US 
Dirty White Boys -0.23 50 Prison US 
Border Brothers -0.23 50 Prison Mexico 
Six Deuce Brim -0.27 51 Street US 
Spanish Cobras -0.29 52 Street Puerto Rico 
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Sons of Samoa -0.30 53 Street Samoa 
Hoover Gangsters -0.30 53 Street US 
Desperados MC -0.31 54 OMG NA 
Red Devils MC -0.31 54 OMG Canada 
Grape Street Crips -0.32 55 Street US 
Black Pistons MC -0.33 56 OMG Germany 
Bounty Hunter Bloods -0.37 57 Street US 
Money Over Bitches -0.37 57 Street US 
Nine Trey Gangster Blood -0.37 57 Street US 
Hilltop Crips -0.40 58 Street US 
Trinitarios -0.41 59 Street 
Dominican 
Republic 
Raza Unida -0.42 60 Prison US 
Devils Disciples MC -0.43 61 OMG US 
El Forastero MC -0.43 61 OMG US 
Renegades MC -0.43 61 OMG US 
Prison Motorcycle 
Brotherhood -0.43 61 Prison US 
Rough Riders MC -0.44 62 OMG US 
Bandidos MC -0.44 62 OMG US 
Grupo 25 -0.68 63 Prison Puerto Rico 
Grupo 27 -0.68 63 Prison Puerto Rico 
Avengers MC -0.99 64 OMG US 
Bandits -0.99 64 Street NA 
Brown Pride -0.99 64 Street NA 
Click Clack -0.99 64 Street NA 
Code Red -0.99 64 Street NA 
Diablos MC -0.99 64 OMG US 
Hard Times  -0.99 64 Street NA 
Iron Horsemen MC -0.99 64 OMG US 
Midnight Riders MC -0.99 64 OMG NA 
Native Mob -0.99 64 Street US 
Oriental Boy Soldiers -0.99 64 Street NA 
Outcast MC  -0.99 64 OMG US 
Rebels 13 MC -0.99 64 OMG Australia 
Russian Gangs -0.99 64 Street Russia 
Sin City Deciples MC -0.99 64 OMG US 
Somali Gangs -0.99 64 Street Somalia 
Tango Blast -0.99 64 Prison US 
Texas Chicano Brotherhood -0.99 64 Prison US 
Texas Syndicate -0.99 64 Prison Mexico 
The Cool Kids -0.99 64 Street NA 
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Tiny Rascal Gang  -0.99 64 Street Cambodia 
Tree Top Piru -0.99 64 Street US 
Tribe MC -0.99 64 OMG NA 
Warlocks MC -0.99 64 OMG US 
Wheels of Soul MC -0.99 64 OMG US 
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WORDS AND PHRASES TO DETECT GANG MEMBERS ON TWITTER 
 
 
Term/Phrase Meaning Gang 
000 Blood Bloods 
001 Blood Love Bloods 
013 Assault Bloods 
023 Watch Your Back Bloods 
025 What rank are you Bloods 
031 I'm a Blood Bloods 
041 Kill a Crip Bloods 
212 Blood Love Bloods 
311 CK (Crip Killer) Bloods 
730 Crazies (NY law for mental health) Bloods 
Answer Up Respect the orders of your superiors Bloods 
BFL Blood for Life Bloods 
CK Crip Killer Bloods 
CKA Crip Killer Always Bloods 
CKAD Crip Killing All Day Bloods 
Crab Disrespectful name for Crip Bloods 
Damu Swahili for Blood Bloods 
Dizzy State LA County Jail Bloods 
Ericket/Erick Insult to Crips Bloods 
Flue Blood for Blue Bloods 
GKB Gangster Killer Bloods Bloods 
Krab Insult to Crips Bloods 
PYT Money Bloods 
Piru Original name of Bloods Bloods 
Rawville San Quentin Bloods 
Red Nation All Blood gangs taken as a whole Bloods 
Scar Face, Scarface NY Bloods Bloods 
Smurfs Derogatory term for white people Bloods 
Snoovers Insult to Hoover Street Crips Bloods 
UBL United Blood Line Bloods 
UBN United Blood Nation Bloods 
UGS Bloods Bloods 
Voltron Hit Bloods 
What it B Like Blood greeting Bloods 
BALLY Bloods Always Live Longer Years Bloods 
CCN Crazy Crip Nation Crips 
312 CL (Crip Love) Crips 
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AC Fisk University Crips 
Adidas All Day I Destroy a Slob (Blood) Crips 
B/K Blood Killer Crips 
BKA Blood Killer Always Crips 
BKAD Blood Killing All Day Crips 
Blob Disrespectful name for Blood Crips 
BNCO Blue Note Crip Organization Crips 
CFL Crips for Life Crips 
CL Crip Love Crips 
 Crips Rule Crips 
 Crips Rule All Bloods Crips 
Cuz, Cuzz Friendly term between members Crips 
Dead Rag Insult to Bloods Crips 
FUCC Fuck in slang Crips 
ICM International Crip Mafia Crips 
KC King Crips Crips 
KSWISS Kill Slobs When I See Slobs Crips 
KSWYSS Kill Slobs When You See Slobs Crips 
No Mex Rebels Crips 
Ooh Lah Insult to Bloods Crips 
PK Piru Killer Crips 
Red Rags Insult to Bloods Crips 
Sissies Derogatory for Sixties Gangsters Crips 
SK Slob Killer (Insult to Bloods) Crips 
Slob, Sloob Disrespect Bloods Crips 
So Mex Fender bender Crips 
UCG United Crips Gang Crips 
What it C Like Crip greeting Crips 
Zipgun Payday Crips 
Ace Duce 12th Street Hoover Crips, Close friend Crips 
006 Silence Folk 
1/1/15 All As One Folk 
1/14/18 All Due Respect Folk 
1/15 As One Folk 
2/4/14 Black Disciple Nation Folk 
2/7/414 Black Gangster Disciple Nation Folk 
410 Wisdom Folk 
412 Understanding Folk 
420 Disciple in trouble Folk 
430 Do what you're told Folk 
6006 Fully silent Folk 
74 GD (Gangster Disciples) Folk 
All Is One We're all together and OK Folk 
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AR804 Chicago rules & regulations Folk 
 Brother of Struggle Folk 
FMLDN Latin Disciple Nation Folk 
GD Gangster Disciples Folk 
LLLWUK 
Love, Life, Loyalty, Wisdom, Understanding, 
Knowledge Folk 
LC Latin Cowards Folk 
Vicky Lous Insult to Vice Lords/People Nation Folk 
Silver Devils Law enforcement Folk  
16/11 Pure Knowledge Folk/People 
16/16 People Power Folk/People 
360 Knowledge Folk/People 
4-2-4 Death Before Dishonor Folk/People 
55 Drinks Folk/People 
720 Pure black and blue hearts Folk/People 
78 
Part of Code of Arms (year of new teachings of King 
Hoover & King Shorty) Folk/People 
8-20 Hoover Thang Folk/People 
9-1 Kill Folk/People 
9-12-25-23-21 I leave you with understanding Folk/People 
C 15 Money Folk/People 
Chi Town Chicago Folk/People 
CIT Check in time, Time to meet Folk/People 
E5 Special Force's Unit Folk/People 
E7 Meeting Folk/People 
GW Gangster Warrior Folk/People 
March On Go into enemy territory Folk/People 
Nap Town Indianapolis Folk/People 
PLO Present Location Folk/People 
Put Down Your Flag Disrespect rival gang Folk/People 
Ready Rock Rock cocaine Folk/People 
Riding High Gang is well organized & in good spirits Folk/People 
Riding Low Gang is disorganized, infighting Folk/People 
Stole On Sucker punched Folk/People 
Zig, Zag, Zig Understanding Folk/People 
88 Girl/Cocaine Folk/People 
5 in the sky, 6 must die Revenge People 
ADR Amor De Rey People 
ALKN Almighty Latin King's Nation People 
DK Disciple Killer People 
Eleven Pointed Pancake Vice Lord who became a Disciple People 
LK, L/K Latin Kings People 
 Latin Counts People 
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LHOSR Love, Honor, Obedience, Sacrifice, Righteousness People 
LK Latin Kings People 
LKK Latin King Killer People 
 All People gangs taken as a whole People 
Vice Lords Gangs that make up the People Nation People 
WKU Wisdom, Knowledge, Understanding People 
Al Rato (alrato) In a while, Later Hispanic 
Awetado Mad Hispanic 
Aztlan Occupied Mexico Hispanic 
Baboso Slob, Idiot, Dummy Hispanic 
CS Con Safos Hispanic 
Chota Police, Jail Hispanic 
CR Criminal Raza Hispanic 
CWA Chicanos With Attitudes Hispanic 
Dedos Snitches Hispanic 
ENE ERE NR (Norte Rules) Hispanic 
Gara gang colors Hispanic 
La Chinga References work Hispanic 
La Raza The Race Hispanic 
La Vida Loca The Crazy Life Hispanic 
Llanta Insult to black people Hispanic 
Llesca Marijuana Hispanic 
Mara Short for Mara Villa Hispanic 
Maya, Mayate Insult to black people Hispanic 
Mexican Power Hispanic gang acitivty considered political action Hispanic 
Mi Vida Loca My Crazy Life Hispanic 
Mica Immigration Card Hispanic 
Migra U.S. Immigration Hispanic 
MM Mexican Mafia Hispanic 
Mota Marijuana Hispanic 
N/S North Side Hispanic 
Nester Norteno Hispanic 
NF Nuestra Familia Hispanic 
NR North Rules Hispanic 
Nuestra Raza New Race Hispanic 
Onta Ontario Barrio Hispanic 
Por Vida, PV For Life Hispanic 
Pcho Mexican born in America Hispanic 
Puto Snizzle Snitch Hispanic 
SS, S/S Soughside Hispanic 
Scrape, Scrapa Derogatory for Surenos Hispanic 
Smile Now, Cry Later Do what you want now and cry when you pay for it later Hispanic 
Stoflon Snitch Hispanic 
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Tahas Texas Hispanic 
Toches Whites Hispanic 
Trece, Trese 13 (Spanish) Hispanic 
Vida Loca Crazy life Hispanic 
Viva la Raza Long live the race Hispanic 
VL Vato Loco Hispanic 
X3 13 Hispanic 
X4 14 Hispanic 
XIII 13 Hispanic 
XIV 14 Hispanic 
XV3 18 Hispanic 
XVIII 18 Hispanic 
Yerba, Yerva Marijuana Hispanic 
EME M (Spanish) 
Mexican 
Mafia 
DR Daily Report 
Nuestra 
Familia 
EFE, ENE EFE F (Spanish) 
Nuestra 
Familia 


















TT Tier Tender 
Nuestra 
Familia 






Approved for the Hood Membership in Aryan Brotherhood approved 
Aryan 
Brotherhood 
Bees & Honey Money 
Aryan 
Brotherhood 
Emely, Emily Insult to Mexican Mafia 
Aryan 
Brotherhood 
Marty Draper Newspaper 
Aryan 
Brotherhood 





Sackett Member of Aryan Brotherhood 
Aryan 
Brotherhood 
Slay and Slew Jews 
Aryan 
Brotherhood 
EPT El Paso Tip 
Texas 
Syndicate 
88 HH (Heil Hitler) 
White 
Supremacist 
Act Your Color Act like a white person 
White 
Supremacist 
Agro Getting into fights 
White 
Supremacist 
AKIA A Klansman I Am 
White 
Supremacist 
AKIGY A Klansman Is Greeting You 
White 
Supremacist 
ANP American Nazi Party 
White 
Supremacist 
AYM Aryan Youth Movement 
White 
Supremacist 
BBKS Black Boy Killers 
White 
Supremacist 
Brillo Head Derogatory remark on black person's hair 
White 
Supremacist 
Delenda Est Judaica Destroy All Jews 
White 
Supremacist 
HH Heil Hitler 
White 
Supremacist 
Hymie Insult to Jews 
White 
Supremacist 
Jig, Jigaboo Insult to black people 
White 
Supremacist 
Kike Insult to Jews 
White 
Supremacist 
KKK Ku Klux Klan 
White 
Supremacist 
KZ Nazi Concentration Camps 
White 
Supremacist 
Mein Kampf Book by Adolf Hitler 
White 
Supremacist 
Mud People Insult to minorities 
White 
Supremacist 
Murky White person who likes minorities 
White 
Supremacist 
Neck Tie Party Hang someone 
White 
Supremacist 
Negro, Nigger, Negroid, 
Nig, Nigga Derogatory towards blacks 
White 
Supremacist 





 Nigger Replacement 
White 
Supremacist 
NSWP Neo Supreme White Power 
White 
Supremacist 
Oxbloods Brand of shoe 
White 
Supremacist 
Race Traitor Anyone who supports non-whites 
White 
Supremacist 
Rag Head Insult to anyone from Middle East 
White 
Supremacist 
RAHOWA, RaHoWa Racial Holy War 
White 
Supremacist 
Red Laces White Power 
White 
Supremacist 
 Die Jews & Niggers 
White 
Supremacist 
 Hatred of Blacks 
White 
Supremacist 
Sambo Derogatory term for Blacks 
White 
Supremacist 
SH Skin Heads 
White 
Supremacist 
Slags An insult 
White 
Supremacist 
Slant Eyes, Sloop Eyes, 
Sloops Derogatory term for Asiana 
White 
Supremacist 
Spic, Spick Derogatory term for Hispanics 
White 
Supremacist 
SRIW Super Race Is White 
White 
Supremacist 
SS Shutz Staple 
White 
Supremacist 
SWP Supreme White Power 
White 
Supremacist 
Tar Boon Derogatory term for Blacks 
White 
Supremacist 
(10%) Ten Percent And Out 
Some WS groups request 10% of country be reserved 
only for whites 
White 
Supremacist 
White Laces White power, White pride, Hatred of Jews 
White 
Supremacist 
WKKK Women of the KKK 
White 
Supremacist 
WP White Power 
White 
Supremacist 
Zipper Head Derogatory term for Aisana 
White 
Supremacist 
Hudas Devil Asian 
Huynh Friends Asian 
My Lai Insult 1/2 American 1/2 Vietnamese Asian 
Sai Lows Young gang members Asian 
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Shaby, Shabu, Shab Crystal Meth Asian 
Yim Jai Snitch Asian 












Medina Brooklyn, NY 
Five 
Percenters 
New Jerusalem New Jersey 
Five 
Percenters 
Binghl Brother, Homie Jamaican 
Dunzl Money Jamaican 
I & I, I n I I, we, you, and me Jamaican 
ILY Marijuana Jamaican 
Likk To shoot Jamaican 
PNP 
People National Party, Neighborhood where members 
recruited Jamaican 
Steep Hot, Wanted by police Jamaican 
1% One Percenters OMG 
81 HA (Hells Angels) OMG 
926-590 US patent held by Hells Angels OMG 
AFFA, AFFL Angels Forever, Forever Angels OMG 
 Angels Forever, Forever Loaded OMG 
 Acid Forever, Forever Loaded OMG 
 Alcohol Forever, Forever Loaded OMG 
Alice Baker Aryan Brotherhood OMG 
BFFB Bandidos Forever, Forever Brothers OMG 
BFFP Brothers Forever, Forever Pagans OMG 
BTBF Bikers Together, Bikers Forever OMG 
DFFL Dope Forever, Forever Loaded OMG 
ITCOB I Took Care of Business OMG 
OFFO Outlaws Forever, Forever Outlaws OMG 
PPDSPEMFOBBT 
Pill popping, dope smoking, pussy eating, mother fuckin 
outlaw brothers biken together OMG 
23/24 Inmates locked up 23 out of 24 hours a day Prison 
AB, ABT Aryan Brotherhood, of Texas Prison 
Asked for Nancy's Hand Put up for membership in Nuestra Familia Prison 
BGF Black Guerilla Family Prison 
C/ Nuestra Familia Prison 
DC Blacks Black inmates from DC area Prison 
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F&Bs Format & Bonds Prison 
Gorras Negras Black Berets Prison 
LNF La Nuestra Familia Prison 
Magic Mountain Vacaville state prison Prison 
Mary's Club Nuestra Familia at California Men's Colony prison Prison 
Nancy Flores Nuestra Familia Prison 
Nancy is going with Emily 
Someone changed from Nuestra Familia to Mexican 
Mafia Prison 
Nancy's X San Quentin Prison Prison 
 Member of Nuestra Familia Prison 
Rain and Thunder Trouble with the Mexican Mafia Prison 
Sister Alice Baker Aryan Brotherhood Prison 
Sitting Bull Ambush Prison 
Square John Person with no prior prison experience Prison 
Tamal San Quentin state prison Prison 
TDC Texas Department of Corrections Prison 
Terror Dome Attica State Prison Prison 
Track 13 Life Sentence Prison 
TS Texas Syndicate Prison 
Wanted for Xmas Investigate Prison 
Source: Russell D. Flores 
(2004) Gang Slanging 


























FACTOR ATTRIBUTE EFFECT OF NODAL ATTRIBUTES 
 
City Nodal Attribute Model 
Nodal Attribute Estimate Std. Error p-Value 
edges -7.15E+00 2.00E+00 0.000362 *** 
nodefactor.city.Alton -1.35E-08 1.42E+00 1 
nodefactor.city.Ambato 2.12E+00 1.07E+00 0.046991 * 
nodefactor.city.Antwerp 6.63E-13 1.42E+00 1 
nodefactor.city.Asbury Park -6.04E-08 1.42E+00 1 
nodefactor.city.Atlanta 1.42E+00 1.01E+00 0.157774 
nodefactor.city.Augusta 2.24E+00 1.06E+00 0.034449 * 
nodefactor.city.Badiraguato 1.22E+00 1.05E+00 0.247534 
nodefactor.city.Baltimore 6.98E-01 1.23E+00 0.569756 
nodefactor.city.Bay Shore -6.04E-08 1.42E+00 1 
nodefactor.city.Belle Meade 9.24E-01 1.10E+00 0.400249 
nodefactor.city.Birmingham 4.73E-01 1.06E+00 0.656302 
nodefactor.city.Blacksville 6.98E-01 1.23E+00 0.569756 
nodefactor.city.Bloemfontein 1.52E+00 1.06E+00 0.149953 
nodefactor.city.Bloit 1.40E+00 1.12E+00 0.211607 
nodefactor.city.Boston -1.00E-08 1.42E+00 1 
nodefactor.city.Bridgeport -9.16E-09 1.42E+00 1 
nodefactor.city.Calabassas 1.63E+00 1.10E+00 0.138251 
nodefactor.city.Caracas -6.04E-08 1.42E+00 1 
nodefactor.city.Charleston 1.11E+00 1.16E+00 0.338547 
nodefactor.city.Charlotte 1.11E+00 1.08E+00 0.305959 
nodefactor.city.Chattanooga 6.98E-01 1.12E+00 0.533339 
nodefactor.city.Chester 1.40E+00 1.12E+00 0.211607 
nodefactor.city.Chicago 1.15E+00 1.01E+00 0.254682 
nodefactor.city.Cincinnati 1.90E+00 1.04E+00 0.067942 . 
nodefactor.city.Cleveland 6.98E-01 1.23E+00 0.569756 
nodefactor.city.College Station 3.04E+00 1.03E+00 0.003221 ** 
nodefactor.city.Columbia -9.16E-09 1.42E+00 1 
nodefactor.city.Columbus -6.04E-08 1.42E+00 1 
nodefactor.city.Compton 1.46E+00 1.01E+00 0.146495 
nodefactor.city.Covington 2.35E+00 1.05E+00 0.025732 * 
nodefactor.city.Culiacan 1.98E+00 1.02E+00 0.052693 . 
nodefactor.city.Dallas 8.54E-01 1.07E+00 0.425465 
nodefactor.city.Denver 1.40E+00 1.12E+00 0.211607 
nodefactor.city.Detroit 9.89E-01 1.06E+00 0.352148 
nodefactor.city.Duluth 2.35E+00 1.05E+00 0.025732 * 
nodefactor.city.Duval 1.82E+00 1.08E+00 0.093722 . 
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nodefactor.city.East Point 2.92E+00 1.03E+00 0.004799 ** 
nodefactor.city.El Paso -2.50E-08 1.42E+00 1 
nodefactor.city.Fresno 6.70E-13 1.42E+00 1 
nodefactor.city.Gadsden 2.63E+00 1.04E+00 0.011731 * 
nodefactor.city.Galveston 1.82E+00 1.08E+00 0.093722 . 
nodefactor.city.Georgetown 6.98E-01 1.12E+00 0.533339 
nodefactor.city.Greensboro 6.98E-01 1.23E+00 0.569756 
nodefactor.city.Greenville 1.00E+00 1.02E+00 0.32621 
nodefactor.city.Haiti 1.11E+00 1.16E+00 0.338547 
nodefactor.city.Hartford -6.04E-08 1.42E+00 1 
nodefactor.city.Highland Beach 2.12E+00 1.07E+00 0.046991 * 
nodefactor.city.Houma -6.04E-08 1.42E+00 1 
nodefactor.city.Houston 6.98E-01 1.12E+00 0.533339 
nodefactor.city.Inglewood 6.98E-01 1.08E+00 0.518995 
nodefactor.city.Jackson -2.76E-08 1.42E+00 1 
nodefactor.city.Jacksonville 2.30E+00 1.03E+00 0.025756 * 
nodefactor.city.Jersey City 1.11E+00 1.08E+00 0.305959 
nodefactor.city.Kansas City 1.98E+00 1.07E+00 0.065515 . 
nodefactor.city.Knoxville -5.55E-07 1.23E+00 1 
nodefactor.city.Kokomo 6.98E-01 1.23E+00 0.569756 
nodefactor.city.LA 1.39E+00 1.00E+00 0.165044 
nodefactor.city.Las Vegas 1.63E+00 1.05E+00 0.121259 
nodefactor.city.Lauderhill 6.98E-01 1.23E+00 0.569756 
nodefactor.city.Laurens 1.63E+00 1.10E+00 0.138251 
nodefactor.city.Lithia Springs -9.16E-09 1.42E+00 1 
nodefactor.city.Long Beach 1.40E+00 1.02E+00 0.167722 
nodefactor.city.Los Olivos 6.71E-13 1.42E+00 1 
nodefactor.city.Macon 2.05E+00 1.04E+00 0.048021 * 
nodefactor.city.Mafikeng -6.04E-08 1.42E+00 1 
nodefactor.city.Mandeville 4.08E-01 1.16E+00 0.724468 
nodefactor.city.Marion 1.40E+00 1.12E+00 0.211607 
nodefactor.city.Mazatlan 1.11E+00 1.08E+00 0.305959 
nodefactor.city.Memphis 1.45E+00 1.01E+00 0.153151 
nodefactor.city.Miami 1.82E+00 1.04E+00 0.081704 . 
nodefactor.city.Milford 1.40E+00 1.12E+00 0.211607 
nodefactor.city.Milwaukee 1.98E+00 1.07E+00 0.065515 . 
nodefactor.city.Mobile 1.11E+00 1.16E+00 0.338547 
nodefactor.city.Monterrey 1.63E+00 1.10E+00 0.138251 
nodefactor.city.Murfreesboro -6.04E-08 1.42E+00 1 
nodefactor.city.Myrtle Beach 4.08E-01 1.16E+00 0.724468 
nodefactor.city.Nashville 1.45E+00 1.03E+00 0.157141 
nodefactor.city.New Orleans -1.35E-08 1.42E+00 1 
nodefactor.city.New York 1.63E+00 1.05E+00 0.121259 
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nodefactor.city.Nova Iguacu -1.35E-08 1.42E+00 1 
nodefactor.city.Nuevo Laredo -5.55E-07 1.23E+00 1 
nodefactor.city.NY 1.14E+00 1.02E+00 0.263042 
nodefactor.city.Orlando 1.11E+00 1.08E+00 0.305959 
nodefactor.city.Pemberton -5.65E-07 1.16E+00 1 
nodefactor.city.Phenix City -3.71E-08 1.42E+00 1 
nodefactor.city.Philadelphia -6.04E-08 1.42E+00 1 
nodefactor.city.Phoenix 3.20E+00 1.03E+00 0.001855 ** 
nodefactor.city.Pittsburgh 6.98E-01 1.23E+00 0.569756 
nodefactor.city.Quitman 2.12E+00 1.07E+00 0.046991 * 
nodefactor.city.Quito -1.00E-08 1.42E+00 1 
nodefactor.city.Raleigh -5.64E-07 1.16E+00 1 
nodefactor.city.Reno 1.11E+00 1.16E+00 0.338547 
nodefactor.city.Richmond 1.11E+00 1.16E+00 0.338547 
nodefactor.city.Ridgeway -1.26E-08 1.42E+00 1 
nodefactor.city.Rio -4.86E-09 1.42E+00 1 
nodefactor.city.San Antonio 1.63E+00 1.10E+00 0.138251 
nodefactor.city.Sao Paulo 1.40E+00 1.12E+00 0.211607 
nodefactor.city.Simpsonville 2.54E+00 1.05E+00 0.015043 * 
nodefactor.city.Six Forks -1.35E-08 1.42E+00 1 
nodefactor.city.Spartanburg -6.04E-08 1.42E+00 1 
nodefactor.city.Springdale 6.98E-01 1.23E+00 0.569756 
nodefactor.city.St. Louis 6.98E-01 1.23E+00 0.569756 
nodefactor.city.Stone Mt 6.98E-01 1.23E+00 0.569756 
nodefactor.city.Sylvester -6.53E-09 1.42E+00 1 
nodefactor.city.Tallahasee 2.71E+00 1.04E+00 0.009250 ** 
nodefactor.city.Thomaston 6.98E-01 1.23E+00 0.569756 
nodefactor.city.Torrance 1.98E+00 1.02E+00 0.052693 . 
nodefactor.city.Tuscaloosa 1.11E+00 1.16E+00 0.338547 
nodefactor.city.Uniondale 1.63E+00 1.10E+00 0.138251 
nodefactor.city.Wake Forest -3.81E-08 1.42E+00 1 
nodefactor.city.Warm Springs 6.98E-01 1.23E+00 0.569756 
nodefactor.city.Washington 1.40E+00 1.12E+00 0.211607 
nodefactor.city.West Palm Beach 1.40E+00 1.12E+00 0.211607 
nodefactor.city.Westmont 8.83E-01 1.04E+00 0.397522 
nodefactor.city.Wichita -6.04E-08 1.42E+00 1 
nodefactor.city.Wilson 1.11E+00 1.16E+00 0.338547 
nodefactor.city.Wonosobo -9.16E-09 1.42E+00 1 
---    
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
    
City Nodal Attribute Gang Set Interaction 
Nodal Attribute Estimate Std. Error p-Value 
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edges -7.15E+00 2.01E+00 0.000363 *** 
nodefactor.city.Alton -1.73E-13 1.42E+00 1 
nodefactor.city.Ambato 2.22E+00 1.26E+00 0.078293 . 
nodefactor.city.Antwerp 1.07E-01 1.57E+00 0.94576 
nodefactor.city.Asbury Park -1.63E+00 1.52E+00 0.281295 
nodefactor.city.Atlanta 1.01E+00 1.11E+00 0.366657 
nodefactor.city.Augusta 6.07E-01 1.19E+00 0.609024 
nodefactor.city.Badiraguato 2.31E+00 1.53E+00 0.131052 
nodefactor.city.Baltimore 2.34E-01 1.33E+00 0.859976 
nodefactor.city.Bay Shore -1.91E-01 1.50E+00 0.898299 
nodefactor.city.Belle Meade 4.60E-01 1.21E+00 0.703489 
nodefactor.city.Birmingham -1.73E-01 1.17E+00 0.882404 
nodefactor.city.Blacksville 1.63E-02 1.32E+00 0.990155 
nodefactor.city.Bloemfontein 1.33E+00 1.16E+00 0.250363 
nodefactor.city.Bloit 7.01E-01 1.24E+00 0.570935 
nodefactor.city.Boston -1.91E-01 1.50E+00 0.898299 
nodefactor.city.Bridgeport -6.82E-01 1.50E+00 0.649188 
nodefactor.city.Calabassas 1.30E+00 1.20E+00 0.278606 
nodefactor.city.Caracas -3.27E-01 1.50E+00 0.827393 
nodefactor.city.Charleston 4.27E-01 1.26E+00 0.734176 
nodefactor.city.Charlotte 4.18E-01 1.19E+00 0.725895 
nodefactor.city.Chattanooga 1.63E-02 1.22E+00 0.989356 
nodefactor.city.Chester 7.01E-01 1.24E+00 0.570935 
nodefactor.city.Chicago 6.33E-01 1.12E+00 0.571251 
nodefactor.city.Cincinnati 1.44E+00 1.15E+00 0.209709 
nodefactor.city.Cleveland 8.06E-01 1.40E+00 0.566131 
nodefactor.city.College Station 2.36E+00 1.14E+00 0.038767 * 
nodefactor.city.Columbia -1.91E-01 1.50E+00 0.898299 
nodefactor.city.Columbus -6.82E-01 1.50E+00 0.649188 
nodefactor.city.Compton 1.25E+00 1.11E+00 0.260265 
nodefactor.city.Covington 1.67E+00 1.16E+00 0.150762 
nodefactor.city.Culiacan 3.07E+00 1.51E+00 0.041629 * 
nodefactor.city.Dallas 2.26E-01 1.19E+00 0.848662 
nodefactor.city.Denver 7.20E-01 1.22E+00 0.55636 
nodefactor.city.Detroit 4.13E-01 1.17E+00 0.72372 
nodefactor.city.Duluth 1.67E+00 1.16E+00 0.150762 
nodefactor.city.Duval 1.36E+00 1.20E+00 0.257492 
nodefactor.city.East Point 2.22E+00 1.16E+00 0.055331 . 
nodefactor.city.El Paso -7.92E-13 1.42E+00 1 
nodefactor.city.Fresno -1.91E-01 1.50E+00 0.898299 
nodefactor.city.Gadsden 1.95E+00 1.15E+00 0.090834 . 
nodefactor.city.Galveston 1.27E+00 1.20E+00 0.290996 
nodefactor.city.Georgetown 6.99E-01 1.12E+00 0.533423 
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nodefactor.city.Greensboro 2.34E-01 1.33E+00 0.859976 
nodefactor.city.Greenville 3.60E-01 1.13E+00 0.750131 
nodefactor.city.Haiti 4.27E-01 1.26E+00 0.734176 
nodefactor.city.Hartford -7.02E-01 1.51E+00 0.642184 
nodefactor.city.Highland Beach 2.22E+00 1.26E+00 0.078293 . 
nodefactor.city.Houma -3.27E-01 1.50E+00 0.827393 
nodefactor.city.Houston 1.63E-02 1.22E+00 0.989356 
nodefactor.city.Inglewood 2.54E-01 1.19E+00 0.831161 
nodefactor.city.Jackson -6.82E-01 1.50E+00 0.649188 
nodefactor.city.Jacksonville 1.75E+00 1.15E+00 0.129214 
nodefactor.city.Jersey City 5.58E-01 1.20E+00 0.641605 
nodefactor.city.Kansas City 1.98E+00 1.07E+00 0.065488 . 
nodefactor.city.Knoxville -1.91E-01 1.32E+00 0.884568 
nodefactor.city.Kokomo 2.34E-01 1.33E+00 0.859976 
nodefactor.city.LA 1.09E+00 1.11E+00 0.324983 
nodefactor.city.Las Vegas 1.17E+00 1.16E+00 0.312955 
nodefactor.city.Lauderhill 5.08E-01 1.32E+00 0.699967 
nodefactor.city.Laurens 9.49E-01 1.20E+00 0.430594 
nodefactor.city.Lithia Springs -2.14E-13 1.42E+00 1 
nodefactor.city.Long Beach 1.06E+00 1.13E+00 0.346151 
nodefactor.city.Los Olivos -1.91E-01 1.50E+00 0.898299 
nodefactor.city.Macon 1.86E+00 1.14E+00 0.102776 
nodefactor.city.Mafikeng -7.02E-01 1.51E+00 0.642184 
nodefactor.city.Mandeville -5.61E-02 1.26E+00 0.964594 
nodefactor.city.Marion 9.38E-01 1.23E+00 0.445787 
nodefactor.city.Mazatlan 2.20E+00 1.55E+00 0.155785 
nodefactor.city.Memphis 9.50E-01 1.12E+00 0.397133 
nodefactor.city.Miami 1.46E+00 1.16E+00 0.209362 
nodefactor.city.Milford 1.40E+00 1.12E+00 0.211641 
nodefactor.city.Milwaukee 1.51E+00 1.19E+00 0.20182 
nodefactor.city.Mobile 4.27E-01 1.26E+00 0.734176 
nodefactor.city.Monterrey 1.63E+00 1.10E+00 0.138259 
nodefactor.city.Murfreesboro -1.91E-01 1.50E+00 0.898299 
nodefactor.city.Myrtle Beach -1.71E-01 1.26E+00 0.891827 
nodefactor.city.Nashville 8.98E-01 1.14E+00 0.430993 
nodefactor.city.New Orleans -1.86E-13 1.42E+00 1 
nodefactor.city.New York 4.60E-01 1.17E+00 0.694465 
nodefactor.city.Nova Iguacu -1.29E-12 1.42E+00 1 
nodefactor.city.Nuevo Laredo -1.93E-11 1.23E+00 1 
nodefactor.city.NY 4.64E-01 1.14E+00 0.683171 
nodefactor.city.Orlando 7.73E-01 1.19E+00 0.514578 
nodefactor.city.Pemberton -1.93E-11 1.16E+00 1 
nodefactor.city.Phenix City -6.82E-01 1.50E+00 0.649188 
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nodefactor.city.Philadelphia -7.02E-01 1.51E+00 0.642184 
nodefactor.city.Phoenix 3.01E+00 1.13E+00 0.007780 ** 
nodefactor.city.Pittsburgh 5.08E-01 1.32E+00 0.699967 
nodefactor.city.Quitman 1.44E+00 1.17E+00 0.220886 
nodefactor.city.Quito 1.07E-01 1.57E+00 0.94576 
nodefactor.city.Raleigh -5.23E-01 1.26E+00 0.67798 
nodefactor.city.Reno 6.45E-01 1.26E+00 0.60975 
nodefactor.city.Richmond 5.58E-01 1.27E+00 0.65975 
nodefactor.city.Ridgeway -4.64E-01 1.51E+00 0.757704 
nodefactor.city.Rio -3.09E-13 1.42E+00 1 
nodefactor.city.San Antonio 9.30E-01 1.22E+00 0.444838 
nodefactor.city.Sao Paulo 1.40E+00 1.12E+00 0.211641 
nodefactor.city.Simpsonville 1.86E+00 1.15E+00 0.106743 
nodefactor.city.Six Forks -1.29E-12 1.42E+00 1 
nodefactor.city.Spartanburg -6.82E-01 1.50E+00 0.649188 
nodefactor.city.Springdale 6.99E-01 1.23E+00 0.569816 
nodefactor.city.St. Louis 1.63E-02 1.32E+00 0.990155 
nodefactor.city.Stone Mt 5.08E-01 1.32E+00 0.699967 
nodefactor.city.Sylvester -6.82E-01 1.50E+00 0.649188 
nodefactor.city.Tallahasee 2.52E+00 1.14E+00 0.027561 * 
nodefactor.city.Thomaston 2.34E-01 1.33E+00 0.859976 
nodefactor.city.Torrance 1.79E+00 1.13E+00 0.112172 
nodefactor.city.Tuscaloosa 4.27E-01 1.26E+00 0.734176 
nodefactor.city.Uniondale 9.49E-01 1.20E+00 0.430594 
nodefactor.city.Wake Forest -7.02E-01 1.51E+00 0.642184 
nodefactor.city.Warm Springs 1.63E-02 1.32E+00 0.990155 
nodefactor.city.Washington 7.20E-01 1.22E+00 0.55636 
nodefactor.city.West Palm Beach 1.21E+00 1.22E+00 0.320043 
nodefactor.city.Westmont 7.28E-01 1.12E+00 0.51411 
nodefactor.city.Wichita -1.91E-01 1.50E+00 0.898299 
nodefactor.city.Wilson 1.11E+00 1.16E+00 0.338607 
nodefactor.city.Wonosobo -1.91E-01 1.50E+00 0.898299 
nodefactor.gang.set.52 hoover 1.63E+00 5.36E-01 0.002317 ** 
nodefactor.gang.set.60s 3.27E-01 4.88E-01 0.502695 
nodefactor.gang.set.80s NA 0.00E+00 NA 
nodefactor.gang.set.90s NA 0.00E+00 NA 
nodefactor.gang.set.antrax NA 0.00E+00 NA 
nodefactor.gang.set.black disciple -6.33E-01 1.12E+00 0.571251 
nodefactor.gang.set.blood 5.51E-01 5.14E-01 0.283191 
nodefactor.gang.set.bounty hunter 1.69E+00 5.41E-01 0.001727 ** 
nodefactor.gang.set.cambodia crip 1.06E+00 6.30E-01 0.093705 . 
nodefactor.gang.set.crip 1.91E-01 4.73E-01 0.686164 
nodefactor.gang.set.cutthroat 2.42E-01 5.75E-01 0.673546 
323 
 
nodefactor.gang.set.Five Percenter 7.02E-01 5.19E-01 0.176292 
nodefactor.gang.set.Florencia 13 -1.09E+00 1.11E+00 0.324983 
nodefactor.gang.set.Folk 4.64E-01 5.04E-01 0.356657 
nodefactor.gang.set.GD 6.82E-01 4.88E-01 0.162441 
nodefactor.gang.set.global avenue boys NA 0.00E+00 NA 
nodefactor.gang.set.gotti gang NA 0.00E+00 NA 
nodefactor.gang.set.grape street 2.27E-01 4.77E-01 0.634592 
nodefactor.gang.set.latin king -1.07E-01 6.78E-01 0.874725 
nodefactor.gang.set.maniac latin disciple 8.95E-01 5.81E-01 0.123736 
nodefactor.gang.set.mexican mafia NA 0.00E+00 NA 
nodefactor.gang.set.neighborhood crip 1.48E-01 7.01E-01 0.832484 
nodefactor.gang.set.pj watts -3.91E-01 8.52E-01 0.646161 
nodefactor.gang.set.red command NA 0.00E+00 NA 
nodefactor.gang.set.satan disciples NA 0.00E+00 NA 
nodefactor.gang.set.sinaloa -1.09E+00 1.11E+00 0.324983 
nodefactor.gang.set.spanish gangster disciple          NA 0.00E+00 NA 
nodefactor.gang.set.zetas NA 0.00E+00 NA 
nodefactor.gang.set.zoe pound NA 0.00E+00 NA 
---    
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
    
City Nodal Attribute Primary Gang Interaction 
Nodal Attribute Estimate Std. Error p-Value 
edges -7.15E+00 2.01E+00 0.000364*** 
nodefactor.city.Alton 9.53E-13 1.42E+00 1 
nodefactor.city.Ambato 3.86E+00 1.20E+00 0.001303** 
nodefactor.city.Antwerp 1.75E+00 1.52E+00 0.251508 
nodefactor.city.Asbury Park 1.59E-13 1.42E+00 1 
nodefactor.city.Atlanta 2.54E+00 1.05E+00 0.015016* 
nodefactor.city.Augusta 2.24E+00 1.06E+00 0.03445* 
nodefactor.city.Badiraguato 3.93E+00 1.48E+00 0.007751** 
nodefactor.city.Baltimore 1.63E+00 1.26E+00 0.197946 
nodefactor.city.Bay Shore 1.36E+00 1.44E+00 0.347557 
nodefactor.city.Belle Meade 1.85E+00 1.14E+00 0.103452 
nodefactor.city.Birmingham 1.39E+00 1.10E+00 0.207936 
nodefactor.city.Blacksville 1.63E+00 1.26E+00 0.197946 
nodefactor.city.Bloemfontein 2.88E+00 1.09E+00 0.008406** 
nodefactor.city.Bloit 2.27E+00 1.18E+00 0.053008. 
nodefactor.city.Boston 1.36E+00 1.44E+00 0.347557 
nodefactor.city.Bridgeport 9.29E-01 1.45E+00 0.521284 
nodefactor.city.Calabassas 2.99E+00 1.13E+00 0.008414** 
nodefactor.city.Caracas 1.36E+00 1.44E+00 0.347557 
nodefactor.city.Charleston 2.04E+00 1.20E+00 0.088443. 
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nodefactor.city.Charlotte 2.01E+00 1.13E+00 0.074517. 
nodefactor.city.Chattanooga 1.63E+00 1.16E+00 0.16058 
nodefactor.city.Chester 2.27E+00 1.18E+00 0.053008. 
nodefactor.city.Chicago 2.17E+00 1.05E+00 0.038275* 
nodefactor.city.Cincinnati 3.02E+00 1.08E+00 0.005069** 
nodefactor.city.Cleveland 2.44E+00 1.35E+00 0.069858. 
nodefactor.city.College Station 3.97E+00 1.07E+00 0.000217*** 
nodefactor.city.Columbia 1.36E+00 1.44E+00 0.347557 
nodefactor.city.Columbus 9.29E-01 1.45E+00 0.521284 
nodefactor.city.Compton 2.78E+00 1.05E+00 0.007844** 
nodefactor.city.Covington 3.28E+00 1.10E+00 0.002735** 
nodefactor.city.Culiacan 4.69E+00 1.46E+00 0.001253** 
nodefactor.city.Dallas 1.74E+00 1.12E+00 0.118817 
nodefactor.city.Denver 2.33E+00 1.16E+00 0.044655* 
nodefactor.city.Detroit 2.04E+00 1.10E+00 0.063689. 
nodefactor.city.Duluth 3.28E+00 1.10E+00 0.002735** 
nodefactor.city.Duval 2.75E+00 1.13E+00 0.014567* 
nodefactor.city.East Point 3.79E+00 1.09E+00 0.000513*** 
nodefactor.city.El Paso 2.72E+00 1.76E+00 0.122024 
nodefactor.city.Fresno 1.36E+00 1.44E+00 0.347557 
nodefactor.city.Gadsden 3.56E+00 1.08E+00 0.001032** 
nodefactor.city.Galveston 2.54E+00 1.13E+00 0.024734* 
nodefactor.city.Georgetown 6.99E-01 1.12E+00 0.533453 
nodefactor.city.Greensboro 1.63E+00 1.26E+00 0.197946 
nodefactor.city.Greenville 1.93E+00 1.06E+00 0.069276. 
nodefactor.city.Haiti 2.04E+00 1.20E+00 0.088443. 
nodefactor.city.Hartford 8.71E-01 1.46E+00 0.550798 
nodefactor.city.Highland Beach 3.86E+00 1.20E+00 0.001303** 
nodefactor.city.Houma 1.36E+00 1.44E+00 0.347557 
nodefactor.city.Houston 1.63E+00 1.16E+00 0.16058 
nodefactor.city.Inglewood 1.59E+00 1.12E+00 0.157467 
nodefactor.city.Jackson 9.29E-01 1.45E+00 0.521284 
nodefactor.city.Jacksonville 3.01E+00 1.08E+00 0.00511** 
nodefactor.city.Jersey City 1.83E+00 1.13E+00 0.105377 
nodefactor.city.Kansas City 2.91E+00 1.11E+00 0.009069** 
nodefactor.city.Knoxville 1.36E+00 1.26E+00 0.280916 
nodefactor.city.Kokomo 1.63E+00 1.26E+00 0.197946 
nodefactor.city.LA 2.72E+00 1.04E+00 0.008764** 
nodefactor.city.Las Vegas 2.75E+00 1.09E+00 0.011514* 
nodefactor.city.Lauderhill 2.06E+00 1.26E+00 0.102651 
nodefactor.city.Laurens 2.56E+00 1.14E+00 0.024658* 
nodefactor.city.Lithia Springs 1.36E+00 1.44E+00 0.347557 
nodefactor.city.Long Beach 2.78E+00 1.05E+00 0.008434** 
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nodefactor.city.Los Olivos 1.36E+00 1.44E+00 0.347557 
nodefactor.city.Macon 3.41E+00 1.07E+00 0.001488** 
nodefactor.city.Mafikeng 8.71E-01 1.46E+00 0.550798 
nodefactor.city.Mandeville 1.34E+00 1.20E+00 0.263278 
nodefactor.city.Marion 2.33E+00 1.16E+00 0.044655* 
nodefactor.city.Mazatlan 3.83E+00 1.50E+00 0.010742* 
nodefactor.city.Memphis 2.52E+00 1.05E+00 0.016622* 
nodefactor.city.Miami 3.08E+00 1.10E+00 0.004949** 
nodefactor.city.Milford 1.40E+00 1.12E+00 0.211694 
nodefactor.city.Milwaukee 2.91E+00 1.11E+00 0.009069** 
nodefactor.city.Mobile 2.04E+00 1.20E+00 0.088443. 
nodefactor.city.Monterrey 1.63E+00 1.10E+00 0.138314 
nodefactor.city.Murfreesboro 1.36E+00 1.44E+00 0.347557 
nodefactor.city.Myrtle Beach 1.34E+00 1.20E+00 0.263278 
nodefactor.city.Nashville 2.57E+00 1.07E+00 0.016186* 
nodefactor.city.New Orleans 9.43E-13 1.42E+00 1 
nodefactor.city.New York 2.10E+00 1.06E+00 0.046078* 
nodefactor.city.Nova Iguacu 5.73E-13 1.42E+00 1 
nodefactor.city.Nuevo Laredo -4.39E-12 1.23E+00 1 
nodefactor.city.NY 2.05E+00 1.07E+00 0.055609. 
nodefactor.city.Orlando 2.23E+00 1.12E+00 0.046341* 
nodefactor.city.Pemberton -4.40E-12 1.16E+00 1 
nodefactor.city.Phenix City 9.29E-01 1.45E+00 0.521284 
nodefactor.city.Philadelphia 8.71E-01 1.46E+00 0.550798 
nodefactor.city.Phoenix 4.56E+00 1.06E+00 < 1e-04*** 
nodefactor.city.Pittsburgh 2.06E+00 1.26E+00 0.102651 
nodefactor.city.Quitman 3.05E+00 1.11E+00 0.005888** 
nodefactor.city.Quito 1.75E+00 1.52E+00 0.251508 
nodefactor.city.Raleigh 7.83E-01 1.20E+00 0.512156 
nodefactor.city.Reno 2.04E+00 1.20E+00 0.088443. 
nodefactor.city.Richmond 1.83E+00 1.20E+00 0.12819 
nodefactor.city.Ridgeway 9.29E-01 1.45E+00 0.521284 
nodefactor.city.Rio 9.07E-13 1.42E+00 1 
nodefactor.city.San Antonio 2.50E+00 1.15E+00 0.030084* 
nodefactor.city.Sao Paulo 1.40E+00 1.12E+00 0.211694 
nodefactor.city.Simpsonville 3.47E+00 1.09E+00 0.001401** 
nodefactor.city.Six Forks 9.29E-01 1.45E+00 0.521284 
nodefactor.city.Spartanburg 9.29E-01 1.45E+00 0.521284 
nodefactor.city.Springdale 2.06E+00 1.26E+00 0.102651 
nodefactor.city.St. Louis 1.63E+00 1.26E+00 0.197946 
nodefactor.city.Stone Mt 2.06E+00 1.26E+00 0.102651 
nodefactor.city.Sylvester 9.29E-01 1.45E+00 0.521284 
nodefactor.city.Tallahasee 4.06E+00 1.08E+00 0.000158*** 
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nodefactor.city.Thomaston 1.63E+00 1.26E+00 0.197946 
nodefactor.city.Torrance 3.33E+00 1.06E+00 0.001605** 
nodefactor.city.Tuscaloosa 2.04E+00 1.20E+00 0.088443. 
nodefactor.city.Uniondale 2.56E+00 1.14E+00 0.024658* 
nodefactor.city.Wake Forest 8.71E-01 1.46E+00 0.550798 
nodefactor.city.Warm Springs 1.63E+00 1.26E+00 0.197946 
nodefactor.city.Washington 2.33E+00 1.16E+00 0.044655* 
nodefactor.city.West Palm Beach 2.76E+00 1.16E+00 0.016965* 
nodefactor.city.Westmont 2.24E+00 1.08E+00 0.037946* 
nodefactor.city.Wichita 1.36E+00 1.44E+00 0.347557 
nodefactor.city.Wilson 1.11E+00 1.16E+00 0.338651 
nodefactor.city.Wonosobo 1.36E+00 1.44E+00 0.347557 
nodefactor.gang.primary.Antrax NA 0.00E+00 NA 
nodefactor.gang.primary.Black Disciple -2.17E+00 1.05E+00 0.038275* 
nodefactor.gang.primary.Blood -7.18E-01 3.13E-01 0.021842* 
nodefactor.gang.primary.Crip -1.36E+00 2.73E-01 < 1e-04*** 
nodefactor.gang.primary.Cutthroat -1.44E+00 4.22E-01 0.000622*** 
nodefactor.gang.primary.Five Percenter -8.71E-01 3.45E-01 0.011687* 
nodefactor.gang.primary.Folk -9.29E-01 2.95E-01 0.001664** 
nodefactor.gang.primary.Global Avenue Boys NA 0.00E+00 NA 
nodefactor.gang.primary.Gotti Gang NA 0.00E+00 NA 
nodefactor.gang.primary.Grape Street -1.39E+00 2.75E-01 < 1e-04*** 
nodefactor.gang.primary.Latin King -1.75E+00 5.54E-01 0.001636** 
nodefactor.gang.primary.Red Command NA 0.00E+00 NA 
nodefactor.gang.primary.Sinaloa -2.72E+00 1.04E+00 0.008764** 
nodefactor.gang.primary.Sureno -2.72E+00 1.04E+00 0.008764** 
nodefactor.gang.primary.Zetas NA 0.00E+00 NA 
nodefactor.gang.primary.Zoe Pound NA 0.00E+00 NA 
---    
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 
    
State Nodal Attribute Model 
Nodal Attribute Estimate Std. Error p-Value 
edges -6.11038 0.42627 < 1e-04 *** 
nodefactor.state.Aleppo 1.3586 0.43851 0.001947 ** 
nodefactor.state.Antwerp -0.60915 1.02426 0.552032 
nodefactor.state.AR -0.04682 0.43534 0.914351 
nodefactor.state.AZ 1.49578 0.41767 0.000342 *** 
nodefactor.state.CA 0.89546 0.21864 < 1e-04 *** 
nodefactor.state.Caracas 0.08761 0.7412 0.905904 
nodefactor.state.CO 0.78803 0.54718 0.149819 
nodefactor.state.CT -0.60915 0.73997 0.410389 
nodefactor.state.DC 0.78803 0.54718 0.149819 
327 
 
nodefactor.state.DE 0.08761 0.7412 0.905904 
nodefactor.state.FL 0.86326 0.25278 0.000638 *** 
nodefactor.state.Free State 0.78803 0.41543 0.057841 . 
nodefactor.state.GA 0.93798 0.22527 < 1e-04 *** 
nodefactor.state.Haiti -0.60915 1.02427 0.552035 
nodefactor.state.IL 0.61135 0.24043 0.011001 * 
nodefactor.state.IN 0.49671 0.46286 0.283215 
nodefactor.state.Jawa Tengah 0.08761 0.7412 0.905904 
nodefactor.state.KS 0.08761 0.5455 0.872397 
nodefactor.state.KY 1.61722 0.4007 < 1e-04 *** 
nodefactor.state.LA -0.60915 0.73997 0.410389 
nodefactor.state.Lima -0.60915 1.02427 0.552035 
nodefactor.state.MA 1.95845 0.29609 < 1e-04 *** 
nodefactor.state.MD 0.08761 0.7412 0.905904 
nodefactor.state.MI -0.32026 0.54494 0.556734 
nodefactor.state.MN 0.08761 0.5455 0.872397 
nodefactor.state.MO 0.65268 0.43639 0.13475 
nodefactor.state.MS 0.92998 0.29995 0.001932 ** 
nodefactor.state.NC 0.78803 0.25274 0.001821 ** 
nodefactor.state.NJ 0.27139 0.29629 0.359689 
nodefactor.state.North-West 2.14977 0.34082 < 1e-04 *** 
nodefactor.state.Nuevo Leon -0.60915 1.02427 0.552035 
nodefactor.state.NV 1.01482 0.33712 0.002610 ** 
nodefactor.state.NY 0.47972 0.25077 0.055755 . 
nodefactor.state.OH 0.58872 0.29959 0.049407 * 
nodefactor.state.PA 0.78803 0.41543 0.057841 . 
nodefactor.state.Pichincha -0.60915 1.02426 0.552033 
nodefactor.state.Rio 0.49671 0.46286 0.283215 
nodefactor.state.Sao Paulo 0.78803 0.54718 0.149819 
nodefactor.state.SC 0.94461 0.23694 < 1e-04 *** 
nodefactor.state.Sinaloa 0.76235 0.26789 0.004431 ** 
nodefactor.state.Tamaulipas -0.20188 0.61717 0.743591 
nodefactor.state.TN 0.5646 0.24269 0.019993 * 
nodefactor.state.Tungurahua 0.08761 0.7412 0.905904 
nodefactor.state.TX 0.78803 0.25274 0.001821 ** 
nodefactor.state.VA 0.08761 0.4622 0.849654 
nodefactor.state.WI 1.61722 0.32122 < 1e-04 *** 
---    
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
    
State Nodal Attribute Gang Set Interaction 
Nodal Attribute Estimate Std. Error p-Value 
edges -4.556754 0.611413 < 1e-04 *** 
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nodefactor.state.Aleppo 0.582058 0.490346 0.235213 
nodefactor.state.Antwerp -0.738621 1.059727 0.485808 
nodefactor.state.AR -0.076547 0.439837 0.861837 
nodefactor.state.AZ 1.295661 0.427351 0.002431 ** 
nodefactor.state.CA 0.838465 0.234537 0.000350 *** 
nodefactor.state.Caracas 0.468767 0.754458 0.534383 
nodefactor.state.CO 0.871443 0.548624 0.112192 
nodefactor.state.CT -0.692174 0.740737 0.350077 
nodefactor.state.DC 0.871443 0.548624 0.112192 
nodefactor.state.DE -0.689597 0.773004 0.372339 
nodefactor.state.FL 0.778769 0.263172 0.003085 ** 
nodefactor.state.Free State 0.587365 0.425092 0.167053 
nodefactor.state.GA 0.919842 0.229736 < 1e-04 *** 
nodefactor.state.Haiti -0.52613 1.024089 0.607424 
nodefactor.state.IL 0.58838 0.244212 0.015983 * 
nodefactor.state.IN 0.420341 0.470842 0.371995 
nodefactor.state.Jawa Tengah -0.113316 0.746686 0.879377 
nodefactor.state.KS -0.047473 0.549464 0.93115 
nodefactor.state.KY 1.701311 0.402688 < 1e-04 *** 
nodefactor.state.LA -0.273605 0.776481 0.724564 
nodefactor.state.Lima -0.810209 1.027309 0.430305 
nodefactor.state.MA 1.746636 0.304088 < 1e-04 *** 
nodefactor.state.MD 0.02294 0.746193 0.975475 
nodefactor.state.MI -0.147299 0.54681 0.787639 
nodefactor.state.MN 0.004805 0.547417 0.992996 
nodefactor.state.MO 1.098368 0.501001 0.028355 * 
nodefactor.state.MS 0.95179 0.301709 0.001607 ** 
nodefactor.state.NC 0.894352 0.262549 0.000658 *** 
nodefactor.state.NJ 0.446317 0.41236 0.279098 
nodefactor.state.North-West 1.926131 0.35447 < 1e-04 *** 
nodefactor.state.Nuevo Leon -1.386489 1.046591 0.185249 
nodefactor.state.NV 0.947942 0.339962 0.005297 ** 
nodefactor.state.NY 0.342316 0.261898 0.191193 
nodefactor.state.OH 0.553266 0.304436 0.069165 . 
nodefactor.state.PA 0.575054 0.421181 0.172147 
nodefactor.state.Pichincha -0.738622 1.059739 0.485812 
nodefactor.state.Rio -0.28037 0.512202 0.584116 
nodefactor.state.Sao Paulo 0.011084 0.589551 0.985 
nodefactor.state.SC 0.995146 0.238174 < 1e-04 *** 
nodefactor.state.Sinaloa 1.12992 0.648308 0.081355 . 
nodefactor.state.Tamaulipas -0.979154 0.654988 0.134935 
nodefactor.state.TN 0.492531 0.250428 0.049211 * 
nodefactor.state.Tungurahua -0.041729 0.790704 0.957911 
329 
 
nodefactor.state.TX 0.746645 0.260998 0.004227 ** 
nodefactor.state.VA 0.010815 0.463412 0.981381 
nodefactor.state.WI 1.470104 0.326973 < 1e-04 *** 
nodefactor.gang.set.52 hoover -0.790436 0.348729 0.023414 * 
nodefactor.gang.set.60s -1.158364 0.239704 < 1e-04 *** 
nodefactor.gang.set.8 tray gangster crip -0.656344 0.521341 0.208048 
nodefactor.gang.set.80s -0.600456 0.496558 0.226572 
nodefactor.gang.set.90s -2.306331 1.025163 0.024467 * 
nodefactor.gang.set.antrax -1.027016 0.634879 0.105737 
nodefactor.gang.set.black disciple -1.033136 0.470134 0.027982 * 
nodefactor.gang.set.blood -0.689021 0.244805 0.004884 ** 
nodefactor.gang.set.bounty hunter -0.414348 0.461775 0.369562 
nodefactor.gang.set.cambodia crip 0.111631 0.382827 0.770596 
nodefactor.gang.set.crip -0.57628 0.212281 0.006634 ** 
nodefactor.gang.set.cutthroat -0.827381 0.356915 0.020441 * 
nodefactor.gang.set.five percenter -0.551804 0.235563 0.019156 * 
nodefactor.gang.set.Florencia 13 -0.827381 0.544582 0.128688 
nodefactor.gang.set.folk -0.712536 0.231088 0.002046 ** 
nodefactor.gang.set.GD -0.860359 0.225144 0.000133 *** 
nodefactor.gang.set.global avenue boys -2.280841 1.034219 0.027428 * 
nodefactor.gang.set.gotti gang -1.069366 0.470795 0.023122 * 
nodefactor.gang.set.grape street -0.938584 0.223946 < 1e-04 *** 
nodefactor.gang.set.gulf cartel -1.41029 0.863251 0.102323 
nodefactor.gang.set.latin king -0.647867 0.343931 0.059604 . 
nodefactor.gang.set.maniac latin disciple -0.254522 0.402505 0.527161 
nodefactor.gang.set.mexican mafia -1.436242 0.754793 0.057063 . 
nodefactor.gang.set.neighborhood crip -0.827381 0.544582 0.128688 
nodefactor.gang.set.pj watts -1.528062 0.739287 0.038740 * 
nodefactor.gang.set.red command NA 0 NA 
nodefactor.gang.set.Satan Disciples -1.787965 0.870764 0.040041 * 
nodefactor.gang.set.sinaloa -1.118836 0.616361 0.069489 . 
nodefactor.gang.set.spanish gangster disciple -2.280841 1.034211 0.027427 * 
nodefactor.gang.set.zetas NA 0 NA 
nodefactor.gang.set.zoe pound NA 0 NA 
---    
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
    
State Nodal Attribute Primary Gang Interaction 
Nodal Attribute Estimate Std. Error p-Value 
edges -6.251 0.712315 < 1e-04*** 
nodefactor.state.Aleppo 1.429008 0.523222 0.006311** 
nodefactor.state.Antwerp -0.638507 1.059763 0.546841 
nodefactor.state.AR 0.020893 0.436119 0.96179 
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nodefactor.state.AZ 1.501796 0.425858 0.000421*** 
nodefactor.state.CA 0.984309 0.23291 < 1e-04*** 
nodefactor.state.Caracas 0.093344 0.745841 0.900403 
nodefactor.state.CO 0.855849 0.547833 0.118231 
nodefactor.state.CT -0.732516 0.740965 0.32286 
nodefactor.state.DC 0.855849 0.547833 0.118231 
nodefactor.state.DE 0.157789 0.794251 0.842525 
nodefactor.state.FL 0.874714 0.261462 0.000821*** 
nodefactor.state.Free State 0.793851 0.423636 0.060944. 
nodefactor.state.GA 0.971628 0.229051 < 1e-04*** 
nodefactor.state.Haiti -0.541467 1.024248 0.597049 
nodefactor.state.IL 0.585434 0.242298 0.015685* 
nodefactor.state.IN 0.508434 0.468401 0.277715 
nodefactor.state.Jawa Tengah 0.093344 0.74584 0.900403 
nodefactor.state.KS 0.123869 0.547256 0.820933 
nodefactor.state.KY 1.685276 0.401605 < 1e-04*** 
nodefactor.state.LA -0.463969 0.764531 0.543939 
nodefactor.state.Lima -0.603464 1.027266 0.556904 
nodefactor.state.MA 1.810308 0.303234 < 1e-04*** 
nodefactor.state.MD 0.155341 0.741678 0.8341 
nodefactor.state.MI -0.273658 0.545902 0.616164 
nodefactor.state.MN -0.035598 0.547236 0.948134 
nodefactor.state.MO 0.720473 0.437184 0.099355. 
nodefactor.state.MS 0.997826 0.301086 0.000919*** 
nodefactor.state.NC 0.834787 0.256718 0.001147** 
nodefactor.state.NJ 0.474288 0.414041 0.251998 
nodefactor.state.North-West 1.866537 0.352777 < 1e-04*** 
nodefactor.state.Nuevo Leon -0.539019 1.062932 0.612081 
nodefactor.state.NV 1.061606 0.338684 0.001721** 
nodefactor.state.NY 0.281961 0.260526 0.27913 
nodefactor.state.OH 0.633103 0.30356 0.037015* 
nodefactor.state.PA 0.638916 0.420584 0.128733 
nodefactor.state.Pichincha -0.638507 1.059771 0.546844 
nodefactor.state.Rio 0.566929 0.543768 0.297136 
nodefactor.state.Sao Paulo 0.858297 0.617146 0.164301 
nodefactor.state.SC 1.006394 0.238179 < 1e-04*** 
nodefactor.state.Sinaloa 1.275677 0.647652 0.048873* 
nodefactor.state.Tamaulipas -0.131725 0.679953 0.846389 
nodefactor.state.TN 0.623239 0.244807 0.010902* 
nodefactor.state.Tungurahua 0.058301 0.79001 0.941172 
nodefactor.state.TX 0.768798 0.259762 0.00308** 
nodefactor.state.VA 0.024152 0.462819 0.958382 
nodefactor.state.WI 1.495071 0.324093 < 1e-04*** 
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nodefactor.gang.primary.Antrax -0.201869 0.659933 0.759686 
nodefactor.gang.primary.Black Disciple -0.150766 0.506166 0.765811 
nodefactor.gang.primary.Blood 0.111628 0.298514 0.708446 
nodefactor.gang.primary.Crip 0.064445 0.282947 0.819829 
nodefactor.gang.primary.Cutthroat -0.126013 0.405672 0.756084 
nodefactor.gang.primary.Five Percenter 0.354024 0.294916 0.229975 
nodefactor.gang.primary.Folk 0.002448 0.28781 0.993213 
nodefactor.gang.primary.Global Avenue Boys -1.373806 1.049226 0.190415 
nodefactor.gang.primary.Gotti Gang -0.237015 0.458606 0.605285 
nodefactor.gang.primary.Grape Street -0.228473 0.294535 0.437921 
nodefactor.gang.primary.Gulf Cartel -0.708748 0.884434 0.422925 
nodefactor.gang.primary.Latin King 0.099489 0.390257 0.798777 
nodefactor.gang.primary.Red Command NA 0 NA 
nodefactor.gang.primary.Sinaloa -0.41738 0.645771 0.518067 
nodefactor.gang.primary.Sureno -0.315293 0.500559 0.528771 
nodefactor.gang.primary.Zetas NA 0 NA 
nodefactor.gang.primary.Zoe Pound NA 0 NA 
---    
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
    
Gang Nodal Attribute Model 
Nodal Attribute Estimate Std. Error p-Value 
edges -5.39939 0.60457 < 1e-04 *** 
nodefactor.gang.20s -1.30437 1.04532 0.212097 
nodefactor.gang.30s -0.60932 0.77035 0.428969 
nodefactor.gang.40s 0.49694 0.51003 0.329887 
nodefactor.gang.40s Gangster Crip 0.08765 0.58605 0.881114 
nodefactor.gang.50s 1.01542 0.37751 0.007149 ** 
nodefactor.gang.52 hoover 0.3327 0.33368 0.318742 
nodefactor.gang.60s 0.01651 0.31058 0.957606 
nodefactor.gang.8 Tray Gangster Crip -1.30437 1.04526 0.212071 
nodefactor.gang.80s 0.31271 0.54172 0.563773 
nodefactor.gang.90s 0.08765 0.58605 0.881114 
nodefactor.gang.Antrax -0.79227 0.54054 0.142726 
nodefactor.gang.BD -0.06759 0.36536 0.853222 
nodefactor.gang.bishop Blood 1.49684 0.35182 < 1e-04 *** 
nodefactor.gang.Blood 0.43025 0.30883 0.16357 
nodefactor.gang.Blood hound brim 1.43041 0.40017 0.000351 *** 
nodefactor.gang.bounty hunter -1.30437 0.76969 0.090138 . 
nodefactor.gang.brim -1.30437 1.04529 0.212082 
nodefactor.gang.BWA Gang -1.30437 1.04527 0.212075 
nodefactor.gang.Cambodia Crip 1.01542 0.37751 0.007149 ** 
nodefactor.gang.Crip 0.17715 0.30474 0.561013 
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nodefactor.gang.Cutthroat 0.22227 0.35081 0.526345 
nodefactor.gang.Five Percenter 0.22729 0.30778 0.460229 
nodefactor.gang.Florencia 13 -0.60932 0.77035 0.428969 
nodefactor.gang.Folk -0.18121 0.31093 0.560038 
nodefactor.gang.GD 0.06825 0.30614 0.823582 
nodefactor.gang.global avenue boys -1.30437 1.04529 0.212085 
nodefactor.gang.Gotti Gang -0.60932 0.3652 0.095228 . 
nodefactor.gang.Grape Street 0.10801 0.31078 0.728189 
nodefactor.gang.gulf cartel -1.30437 1.04527 0.212075 
nodefactor.gang.Insane Gangster Disciple -0.20194 0.50908 0.691602 
nodefactor.gang.La Gente -1.30437 1.04529 0.212082 
nodefactor.gang.Latin Kings 0.0743 0.32401 0.818616 
nodefactor.gang.Maniac Latin Disciple 0.31271 0.43875 0.476022 
nodefactor.gang.Mexican Mafia -0.60932 0.77035 0.428969 
nodefactor.gang.Neighborhood Crip 0.08765 0.58605 0.881114 
nodefactor.gang.Nine Trey Gangster 0.31271 0.43875 0.476022 
nodefactor.gang.OMB -1.30437 1.04529 0.212082 
nodefactor.gang.Piru -0.30257 0.38007 0.42597 
nodefactor.gang.PJ Watts -1.30437 1.04527 0.212076 
nodefactor.gang.Red Command 0.49694 0.31767 0.117737 
nodefactor.gang.Satan Disciples -0.60932 0.77035 0.428969 
nodefactor.gang.Sex Money Murder 1.20157 0.42048 0.004268 ** 
nodefactor.gang.Sinaloa -0.25488 0.34456 0.45946 
nodefactor.gang.Spanish Gangster Disciple 1.77815 0.37562 < 1e-04 *** 
nodefactor.gang.Varrio Longos 13 -1.30437 1.04526 0.212071 
nodefactor.gang.Zetas -1.30437 0.58483 0.025724 * 
nodefactor.gang.Zoe Pound -1.30437 1.04529 0.212082 
---    
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